October 22, 1997   
This Date's Issues: 1302 • 1303 • 1304 1305 1306 1307

Johnson's Russia List [list two]
#1306
22 October 1997
davidjohnson@erols.com

******* 

From: "Dev Murarka" <devmur@centro.ru>
Date: Wed, 22 Oct 1997 16:18:27 MSK
Subject: Yavlinsky-Part Two

--------

The piece below is copyright of Economic and Political Weekly, Mumbai
and meant for personal use only

----------------- 

Grigory Yavlinsky: A Profile [Part Two]
By Dev Murarka
The author would be much obliged if JRL Readers will point out any
shortcomings in this profile or if they have any criticism to make. 

....this transformation, or you should go and do something else. I
want to advise to all those advisers, who care so little about the
countries they purport to help that they cannot even theorise
properly, to stay at home." 
However, communists-nationalists ignore this and insist on
bracketing him with the West. Perhaps their attitude is not so
shocking because somehow it is to be expected from them.
Nevertheless, Yavlinsky will do well not to appear to be in the
embrace of the western establishment or such guileful western
publicists, who abused him when he appeared to be sliding down
during the presidential elections, and are now rushing round to
paint an over bright future for him.
The antagonism displayed by the ruling establishment,
particularly by the Gaidar group, is another matter. In reality
they have treated and continue to treat Yavlinsky and his group as
their main political enemy. The reasons are psychological more
than anything else. In terms of adherence to the philosophy of
economic reform Yavlinsky is in many ways nearer to them than to
their opponents, though he is not a totally laissez faire liberal
like them. This very nearness of his outlook provokes them to
stronger criticism and detestation of Yabloko's position. 
Dissidence always arouses stronger emotions than opposition
because it is perceived as a kind of betrayal. Yavlinsky's firm
refusal to be part of the establishment except on his own terms is
seen as potentially more damaging and threatening to their
position than the communist-nationalist opposition which could be
more or less safely disregarded, having been placed beyond the
pale. 
On the one hand continuous efforts are made to entice
Yavlinsky into the government. On the other, he is always accused
of collaborating with the communists, projected virtually as a
crypto-communist. It often happens, of course, that communist and
Yabloko votes on some given issues coincide, both being in
opposition. The difference ignored by official detractors is that
Yabloko opposition is invariably more consistent, thoughtful and
principled, not demagogic, nationalistic and opportunistic. The
thankless loneliness of Yabloko's opposition stance does much
credit to it on the moral plane of principles. The sad reality for
Yabloko, however, is that this has failed to widen its public
support to any great extent even when it has espoused causes which
have wide appeal.
For instance, the Chechnya issue. When Yeltsin launched the
war there in December 1994, a wide spectrum of liberal centrist
public was outraged. There was a protest meeting in Pushkin Square
in the centre of the city where such diverse persons as Gorbachov,
Valeria Novodvorskaya, Gaidar, Yavlinsky, Elena Bonner and others
spoke out against it. But by and large the opposition petered out
and the war continued unabated. Of all the Duma factions, it was
Yabloko which opposed it consistently throughout the war and
Yavlinsky spoke up against it on every occasion. The Gaidarite
attitude to the war gradually became more equivocal because of
their ties with Yeltsin.
The Communists have been just plain hypocritical, criticising
the war because it was being pursued by Yeltsin, while loudly
beating the same nationalist-chauvinist drum of territorial
integrity which Yeltsin was thumping. It was a measure of the
political and moral failure of the whole opposition that the
shameless war with huge loss in lives continued till Yeltsin
himself did not change his course and let the retired General
Lebed negotiate a cease fire - in 1996!
Under the constitution, the first Duma had only two years of
life and throughout its existence an air of electioneering
pervaded its functioning. All groups and parties were openly
preparing for it, including the two new parties formed on orders
from Yeltsin and scores of others, most of which centered around
one or two well known names.
The December 1995 Duma election was complicated by another
important factor - the shadow of Yeltsin's persistent ill-health.
Since 1994 Yeltsin had been out of public view with ever
increasing frequency and duration. The question of his re-election
was very much in the air and seriously affected the attitudes and
postures of all groups and parties because their performance was
directly linked to the ambitions of their future presidential
candidates. Yavlinsky was one of them and his chances were rated
rather high by some.
Yabloko was beset with three serious problems from the
outset. Lack of access to television and opportunities for media
exposure, inadequate financial resources and a weak organisational
structure. 
In the event, Yabloko received only 4.7 million or 6.9 per
cent of votes. It won altogether 45 places in the Duma, 31 on
group tickets and 14 from single mandate constituencies. A
disappointing result in so far that despite all its efforts and
hard work in the intervening two years, despite its consistent and
sustained opposition to the government, it had made little headway
in widening its electoral base, that its appeal had remained
confined to a small sector of the student and professional class. 
It was even more disheartening considering that Gaidar's
group had failed to gain even 5 per cent of the votes necessary to
enter the Duma. In theory these lost votes should have been cast
for Yabloko as a democratic alternative. Another negative factor
for it was that votes were split among so many democratic
candidates from smaller groups that they failed to coalesce around
bigger groups. A far more significant reason was that overall, the
democrats' share of votes went down from 18.4 million (34 per
cent) in 1993 to 17.9 million (25.7 per cent) in 1995.
At the very beginning of the new Duma session, Yabloko was
placed in an awkward dilemma. There was a contest for the
Chairmanship. The establishment wanted Ivan Ribkin, the chairman
of the first Duma, to be reelected. The communists put up their
own candidate Gennady Seleznev. Yabloko supported one of its own
leaders, Vladimir Lukin. Seleznev carried the day. Yabloko is
blamed for facilitating his win although it is by no means sure
that in a straight contest Ribkin would have won. 
Yabloko's objections to Ribkin were really somewhat flimsy,
charging him with being responsible for the Chechnya war. But the
communists and the establishment were alike in their attitude.
Neither of them wanted to give up an iota of their leverage. In a
civilized democracy it would have been graceful to let a minority
third party have the chair.
The Duma elections and goings-on there, however, were quickly
forgotten because the fever of the presidential election ahead
gripped everybody. Attention of politicians and public alike was
focussed on it amidst intense speculation about the ability,
health and intentions of Yeltsin. The tension was even higher than
usual because his ratings in opinion polls at the time, the winter
of 1995-1996, were very low. Intense political maneouvres began.
On 14 May 1995 Yavlinksy had a face to face encounter with
Gaidar in the Sunday evening analytical-political television
programme "Itogi" during which he indicated that he was prepared
to enter into discussions for co-operation with Gaidar's DVR. But
next day he declared that it was not possible because of
differences between them on principles. The episode did some
damage to Yavlinsky. 
At the start of 1996 it looked plausible that Zyuganov might
win because public support for Yeltsin was extremely weak and none
of the other candidates appeared to have wide enough support.
There also existed an influential sector of political opinion
which saw salvation in consolidation of an alliance of those
equally opposed to Zyuganov and Yeltsin, a third force. The crux
of the democratic problem was to agree on a single candidate. All
the more so because Yeltsin's rating began to climb up steadily.
Some time in March 1996, Oleg Rumyantsev, belonging to the
small Democratic Party of Russia, took the initiative to bring
together three candidates for the post, the celebrated eye surgeon
Svyatoslav Fedorov, General Aleksandr Lebed and Yavlinsky, to
achieve this. The enterprise was doomed from the start. While it
might have been possible to persuade Fedorov to give up, it was
most unlikely that Lebed or Yavlinsky will yield to each other and
so it proved. By the end of May, shortly before the first round of
presidential election on June 16, these futile negotiations just
ceased.
There was yet another initiative, by Gorbachov, also
similarly seeking a single democratic candidate. This also came to
nothing because Yavlinsky felt that public association with
unpopular Gorbachov would have negative consequences for him. Some
analysts, however, remain of the opinion that had Yavlinsky agreed
on a common platform with Gorbachov and Fedorov, he might have
beaten Lebed to the fourth place.
The Yeltsin camp, too, had no interest in the emergence of an
alternative, non-communist, third force which would endanger its
chances. To prevent such a development, it pursued a two pronged
policy. On the one side it helped and encouraged Lebed to remain
in the contest in the belief, not without foundation, that he will
draw away part of the communist vote with his strongman and
nationalist rhetoric. On the other, it tried to entice Yavlinsky
into its camp by offering to accept his economic programme in some
way and offering him the senior post of a Deputy Prime Minister in
the government.
Actually Yavlinsky, knowing perfectly well, that the Yeltsin
camp will approach him, took the initiative himself. In May, on
the eve of the first round, he wrote to Yeltsin, offering his
support, which implied his withdrawal from the contest, provided
Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin was sacked and he was given
complete authority over economic matters. In other words, the post
of the Prime Minister. It was a very aggressive move. The letter
resulted in a four hour meeting with the President before the
first round of elections during which Yeltsin tried to persuade
him to join the government. Of course, his demands were not
accepted so the talks led nowhere. But the conversation between
the two ended on a remarkable note.
" 'So what now? You will not withdraw your candidacy?', Yeltsin
asked. I said, 'No, I will not'. He bent down to my ear: 'I would
not withdraw also if I were you'." 
The results of the first round made it clear that to be
absolutely sure of victory in the final round, Yeltsin needed the
support of at least one of the unsuccessful candidates. Once
again, efforts were made to win over Yavlinsky but these failed on
the bedrock of his demands. In any case, the choice had already
been made in favour of Lebed, who had come third in the contest
with twice the number of votes than gained by Yavlinsky. 
Even after this some people were left with the impression
that Yeltsin will try again to come to terms with Yavlinsky. This
was a mistaken view. Anatoly Chubais, then running the campaign
for Yeltsin, had bluntly told Yavlinsky that after the second
round he will not be needed. The cat and mouse game of the pre-
election days was over.
The presidential election was a remarkable event for several
reasons. First of all, for the tremendous turn about in the rating
of Yeltsin between January 1995 and his eventual victory in July.
Secondly, it demonstrated the awesome power of the visual media
when ruthlessly controlled and used by a power group. The total
control over the electronic media, and only a little less over the
printed, exercised by the Yeltsin side virtually deprived all
other candidates of any meaningful publicity. Thirdly, for the
exceptionally high level of support which Lebed received from the
electors. Though not unexpected, it was a real surprise in the
light of poor performance of his group in the preceding Duma
elections.
In the first round Yavlinsky came fourth. For a while Yeltsin
dallied with him, soliciting his public declaration of support in
return for being inducted in the government. This was mostly a
trick. Yavlinsky, however, stood his ground in demanding control
over economic policy. Long before, Yeltsin had already decided to
make a deal with Lebed, who had come third, appointing him
Secretary of the Security Council. Had Yavlinsky come third,
political developments after the election would have taken an
entirely different shape. 
But ever since he has been bitterly denounced for asking his
supporters to vote against both the candidates, Yeltsin and
Zyuganov. He refused to accept the doctrine of the "lesser evil"
promoted from Yeltsin's side according to which since Zyuganov was
a communist, Yeltsin was the lesser evil of the two. Considering
that Yavlinsky has been a persistent critic of the president and
his policies, it would have been surely unprincipled and immoral
on his part to behave otherwise, particularly when it was clear
enough that there was no risk of Zyuganov winning. Moreover, a
large number of Yavlinsky supporters voted for Yeltsin anyway.
But some of the heat generated by the election lingered for a
long time. One of the charges made against Yavlinsky is that he
has never shown loyalty to Yeltsin. But it is not clear loyalty
for what? In what way Yavlinsky is obliged to Yeltsin, what favour
has been done to him by the Yeltsin camp which calls for a feudal
type of loyalty?
Ever since Yavlinsky has also been criticised and ridiculed
for his impertinent letter to the President. There is the routine
charge of being ambitious. Who is not in politics? He has been
called foolish for making unrealistic demands. Superficially, such
judgments appear to be fair. After the elections were over,
Chernomyrdin was asked about participation of the young economist
in the government. He retorted sarcastically, "Who is Yavlinsky?".
However, the critics miss the essence of the situation.
Yavlinsky has been a consistent opponent of Yeltsin's policies.
More than that, for all practical purposes he and his group
constitute virtually the only genuine democratic opposition to the
regime. The DVR of Gaidar cannot be considered an opposition
party, though it pretends to, because it is thoroughly enmeshed
with administration. Its leading members like Chubais, have places
in the administration and decide policies. The major part of the
rest of the opposition is communist and nationalist with an
authoritarian agenda.
In such circumstances it is incumbent upon Yavlinsky, if his
democratic affirmations are sincere, to maintain a distance from
the establishment, above all not to allow himself and his party to
be co-opted, and thereby swallowed, by it. Therefore, adherence to
his principles at all costs, is the only ethical and principled
course for him. There is the risk of course that it may also prove
to be highly self-sacrificial.
Simultaneously, in view of the establishment accusations,
Yavlinsky has to be constantly on guard to avoid being bracketed
with the communists. A typical situation arose when on 15 October
1997 when the communists and Yabloko tabled their no-confidence
motionsagainst the government in the Duma.
Yabloko, though in favour of voting no-confidence, could not
accept the ideological formulations in the preamble to the text of
the resolution proposed by the communists. It suggested its own
draft, with insistent on the withdrwal by the government of the
proposed tax code, and devoid of such bias. "The Communists oppose
the government for carrying out reforms," Yavlinsky declared
during the debate. "We oppose the government for being slow and
incompetent in carrying out reforms." Of course, the communists
were in a state of panic because they did not want such a
resolution to go through in the first place, for fear that the
Duma might be dissolved, and agreed to a postponement of the
debate on the 15th. The horse trading between the communists and
the establishment began.
Interestingly enough, President Yeltsin came to their rescue
by offering talks, and then more or less conceding their demands.
In response the communists withdrew their motion on the morning of
22 October and the no-confidence motions were taken off the
agenda. Yabloko was left isolated and did not have the necessary
95 number of votes - one fifth of the Duma membership - to put its
own motion on the agenda.
However, thee same morning, a relieved Chernomyrdin, to the
cheers of a large section of the Duma, was insultingly derisive
about Yavlinsky personally for his opposition to the government.
It confirmed once again that for the establishment he remains the
primary enemy to be crushed. Only two days earlier, on 20 October,
the weekly Novaya Gazeta had put it concisely : "They have already
started destroying Yavlinsky. To find any excuse to attack him."
The simple reality is that the honesty and integrity of Yavlinsky
is a standing rebuke to all of them which their conscience cannot
tolerate. 
Yavlinsky, has travelled a thorny path to force a place for
himself in Russian politics. His aspirations are compounded by his
intellect, intensive and singular. Not that there are no other
intellects in the field. However, he is one of the few for whom
politics is but a means to economic development.
It is unlikely that Gaidar's group will provide a democratic
alternative in the future. It is too wedded to the governing
establishment. But it has great leverage on a section of the
media. The establishment goes on promoting Gaidar as the voice of
liberal, reformist wisdom, in order to keep Yavlinsky down.
However, no matter how often he appears on television, Gaidar does
not go down well with the people and the effect is counter
productive.
Not all surmises of Yavlinsky are based on sound judgement.
One of the bigger illusions of Yavlinsky in the early years of his
independent political career was that the intelligentsia will
rally round him and carry his message because of its own reformist
sentiment. This becomes abundantly clear from his dialogue with
Lyudmila Saraskina in early 1993. He had specially in mind the
generation which grew up to maturity, in some cases to
extraordinary public accolade and fame, in the aftermath of the
Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party in 1956.
What he failed to realise was that the intelligentsia had
changed in character soon after perestroika began, and for the
worse. The greater part of it had long ceased to have any morals,
any concern for the welfare, either spiritual or material, of the
society and had turned into vultures scavenging the discarded
rubbish bins of those in power. 
Yavlinsky alone is not to be blamed for it. The
intelligentsia, even at this point had continued to occupy a
hallowed place in many memories. Now, there are fewer illusions
left about its role or potency while it continues to be bedecked
by awards and medals tossed at it by those in power. In any case,
Russian intelligentsia as a distinct, coherent group has lost
prestige. It lost its conscience and shame long ago. All those who
claim to be the intelligentsia nowadays are virtually show
business people, prepared to sing and dance for any one who pays,
preferably those in authority.
He was right about his appeal to the intelligentsia but of a
different kind than the one he had so passionately in mind. He
was, and remains, attractive to a sizeable sector of the urban
educated people, specially the young. He is of their age, talks
their language, shares their outlook and aspirations and like them
has no ideological devotions. Though volatile, it is a modestly
expanding constituency.
Yavlinsky's differences with Gaidar do hurt him in the
esteem. Sometimes even his own supporters do not quite appreciate
why there is no greater co-operation with Gaidar. Personal
incompatibility between them apart, such a simplified view of the
matter is a profound misunderstanding of the Yavlinsky position
and fails to take into account the real obstacles to such a coming
together. 
A very basic difference is involved. Simply put, the Gaidar
group has a dual policy. While their posture is that of a liberal
opposition to the government, in reality no other group co-
operates or is as much part of the government as they are.
Gaidar's loyalty and devotion to the person of Yeltsin, has
undermined his role as a convincing opposition leader. 
For Yavlinsky such duality would be not only morally
dishonest but tantamount to political suicide. The issue is a
fundamental one. Artificial unity between Yavlinsky and other
democrats will not resolve their contradictions. His logical
argument is that if his party stands for a principle or a
programme, it has no place in the government unless its programme
is accepted and it has the authority to carry it out. Time and
again his negotiations with Chubais, Gaidar and Yeltsin have
broken down due to this. To him the danger of working with
Yeltsin, without some kind of cast iron guarantees about control
over policies, is self evident. When it was suggested to him that
had he come to terms with the president between the two election
tours last year he would have been in an influential position like
Nemtsov, his retort was self evident: No, I would have been like
Lebed.
It is not a small plus under Russian conditions that he
remains unsullied with the failures and corruption of the ruling
elite. In the long run such a consistent and principled position
might serve to enhance the position and prestige of Yabloko. This
is what riles his opponents. 
However, if despite the widespread reputation for being
principled and concerned for welfare of the people, the supportive
base for Yavlinsky has remained rather small, there are four main
reasons for it.
One, the personality of Yavlinsky himself. It is by no means
charismatic, an essential quality in this television and sound
bytes age. In his public appearances he manages to give the
impression of being rather professorial. This professorial quality
also creates the impression of arrogance though it is really crisp
and plain speaking on his part. He is happiest, and at his most
effective, when speaking to a young audience of students and like.
Two, and this is perhaps the most important reason for lack
of wider appeal, from early on Yavlinsky has got into the habit of
making and projecting huge plans for economic recovery, with
concrete figures and precise time tables. This is all right for
academics and specialists. But most people not only do not read
and understand all this, it makes them suspicious that once again
unfulfillable plans are being thrust upon them. 
Discussing and arguing about micro or macro economics is all very
well but the masses need a vision which they can understand in
concrete, recognisable form. With all his intelligence, Yavlinsky
has failed to do so and it is
essential for Yavlinsky to do so. A question mark remains on
whether he can do so.
Three, organisation. Yabloko appears to be lacking in
systematic organizational work. Though apart from the communists
and the LPDR of Zhirinovsky it is really the biggest group, there
seems to be no proper structure to help its further development.
Partly, of course, it is a legacy of the past because for decades
no such formation outside of the ruling party had been allowed or
attempted. But this is a problem which must be attended to if
Yabloko is to expand its mass base.
Four. Lack of resources. The Russian election process at all
levels is notoriously expensive due to lax controls. For instance,
there is no proper estimate of how much money, and from where, was
spent on the election of Yeltsin in 1996. Or what Zhirinovsky
spent. Similarly, organisation and nurturing of a party also
requires funds. And funds, as a rule, go to those who are in a
position to make a return on them. The bankers backed Yeltsin to
the hilt because they stood to gain from it. They did, and how!
Because the prospect of Yabloko or Yavlinsky becoming really
powerful appeared to be small, fewer resources were available for
them. Whether this situation will substantially change it is
difficult to predict.
On 20 September 1997, speaking to the Central Council of
Yabloko, he denounced the present system in Russia as the
"plundering form of capitalist system". He expressed the
apprehension that while the reintroduction of communist type
totalitarianism was obviated in 1996 with the vote against
Zyuganov, chances still existed of one of the three other types of
authoritarian regimes being established. These were:
a) A nationalist autocratic type similar to the Peron regime
in Argentina, which may be headed by one person or a group of
persons. He saw "concrete political leaders, well known to you,
who could be the builders of such an autocracy." He appeared to
have in mind Chubais and his group.
b) A "criminal dictatorship" of the Marcos type regime in the
Philippines or even a Mobutu kind regime in Zaire. It can grow
from the criminal-political groups which have already become
embedded in power in Russia. It is not just a theoretical
possibility.
c) A Pinochet model Chilean regime of "extreme radical
capitalists in order to establish an enlightened dictatorship for
continuing reforms". 
Yavlinsky argued that none of these three types of
authoritarian regimes would threaten the already established
system of corporate capitalism in Russia. According to him the
only system which can be effectively counterposed against such
regimes is that of a free democratic society and socially oriented
market economy. While Russia has every possibility of evolving
into the kind of civilised state like Germany or France, instead
it is being brought down to the level of "Asian tigers" like South
Korea or Singapore. Yavlinsky is no exception to the general
habit among the post-communist Russians to use Africa, Asia or
Latin America as a comparative term of abuse in relation to the
great Russia. If only Russia will achieve the Singapore standard
of living to begin with!
He asserted that this is his main difference with the Gaidar
group, or now perhaps more accurately the party of Chubais.
According to Yavlinsky, though the South-East Asian countries have
achieved great economic success based on the corporative
capitalist model, they are corrupt, have cheap labour, have
frequent coups and a low standard of living for the majority of
the people. Yabloko protests against such a perspective "with all
the fabric of its soul", Yavlinsky went on to add. Moreover, he
viewed with alarm the process of destabilisation of all political
systems of the Russian Federation and declared that his party will
support only those reformers who will not "break across the knee
those in disagreement" with them.
Yavlinsky's judgement on the present set up remains
uncompromising: "our government can never solve any social
problem. It is not communist, not liberal, not democratic, not
republican, and not conservative. Not red, not white, not green.
It is self serving. It is a selfish group", he has said.
When at the same meeting Yavlinsky announced his candidacy
for presidency, it appeared to be too soon since the elections are
not due till June 2000. However, he was making an important moral,
political point. It is no secret that a number of other potential
candidates - Chernomyrdin, Luzhkov and Nemtsov - are playing coy
about their intentions. They are uncertain about Yeltsin's real
intentions and afraid of his reaction. Perhaps they are also
mindful of the possibility that if they behave he may declare one
of them as his preferred candidate, which is more likely.
In Yavlinsky's view it is demeaning for Russia, if it is to
build the foundations of a democratic state, to have a tsarist
like succession handed down to the people. It is also uncertain
whether a recommendation from Yeltsin, himself hardly at the
pinnacle of his popularity, will be such an overwhelming or
decisive factor in the final outcome. Yavlinsky refuses to be
intimidated this way and the early declaration of candidacy
advertises as an available democratic alternative for all those
who are not in favour of communists or radical nationalists but
are opposed to Yeltsin. 
Whether he would benefit from such a calculatedly risky
course, remains uncertain. He might have handed a weapon too soon
to his adversaries. Even before his announcement of candidacy,
attacks on him were being prepared. The first out on the scene
was the September issue of Gaidar's monthly, Otkritaya Politika,
with three articles directed against him, two by Gaidar himself.
Another, also in September, was the weekly Profil, which also went
hell bent after his character. Significantly, the harshest
criticism came from three sources, the Gaidarite democrats, the
communists, and some anonymous spokesmen from the organs of
repression. 
Yeltsin and his ever changing entourage have one very curious
character. Its unending boast and bombast about power hides a deep
fear of the communists and of individuals. In its early phase, for
no reason whatsoever, they were afraid of Gorbachov. Later of
communists, then of General Lebed and Yavlinsky. In the case of
the last two, it is not only the fear that they might come to
power, which is secondary, but jealousy of their relatively
positive image and clean reputation.
Four factors will play a significant role in determining the
outcome of presidential elections.
The first factor of utmost importance will be the
participation or non-participation of Yeltsin in the contest.
Uncertainty will prevail on this score to the end. 
The second factor will be the Duma election results in
December 1999. How Yabloko performs in these elections will affect
his candidacy and prestige. If it performs well and is able to
attract, in addition to its own, a substantial number of centrist
and liberal voters who have become homeless because of the
collapsing NDR and DVR, it will greatly improve the chances of
Yavlinsky making it to the second round and in that case perhaps
even of winning.
The third uncertain factor is Nemtsov. They have known each
other since 1990 and Nemtsov considers Yavlinsky "very honest and
intelligent." For the time being, Nemtsov denies any intention to
run for the presidency. But this denial must be taken with a pinch
of salt. It may prove to be true only if Yeltsin runs. But if
Yeltsin bows out, Nemtsov will definitely run. This will split
Yavlinsky's votes in no uncertain manner because the chances that
these two young reformers will come to an agreement on
presidential candidacy by making place for one of the two are not
very bright.
Yavlinsky and his associates have not been wildly
enthusiastic about Nemtsov's participation in the government. They
fear that his policies will further damage all reformers in the
public eye because he is now associated with Chubais and Yeltsin.
Alexei Mikhailov, a close friend of Yavlinsky has said: "Nemtsov
is now doing what we warned him against. He is losing his
electorate and popularity. He joined the government without
consulting us. After he joined it, we met him at the EPIcentre -
he came there. We told him frankly what we thought about it.
Nemtsov answered that he could not refuse (joining the
administration)."
But there are two sides to the Nemtsov factor. While it may
not carry him to the top, the growth in the sentiment for more
drastic reforms might increase the level of support for Yabloko by
extension, which has a similar outlook. It is not without reason
that Yavlinsky has publicly stated that his party will do all it
can to help Nemtsov but from outside. Nemtsov, for his part, has
lamented Yabloko not joining with him in the government. 
There is, however, also the chance that if Nemtsov is
successful as a reformer, achieves something which appeals to the
public sentiment, he may win over to his side supporters of
Yavlinsky, to his disadvantage.
The fourth factor will be the personality and organising
capacity of Yavlinsky himself. Despite all his political
activities, much of it in the glare of publicity, to an average
person he does give the impression of being an intellectual
dilettante, and paradoxically of being irresolute despite his very
resolute, even inflexible policy stands. He has to find ways to
overcome this damaging impression.
As for organising capacity, Yavlinsky supporters still recall
with a shudder when, during the last presidential election, the
Central Election Commission refused to accept his candidacy
because not everything was in order with the necessary
documentation. Yavlinsky had to go to the court to win his case.
While the partisanship of the election commission was in little
doubt, the episode also underlined organisational inefficiency. 
Surprisingly, it is Sergei Yushenkov, one of his dedicated
opponents and a Duma member belonging to the DVR, who has paid a
true, if unintended, compliment to him while trying to prove his
disqualification for the job: "He is too refined and easily hurt a
person. However, in the present day Russia only his antipode - a
coarse and thick skinned man - can become President." However,
what Yushenkov's words attest to are his all too human qualities.
His distinction is that he has formed a style, posted an outlook,
which is recognisable as his and his alone.
Nice guys do not always come first in politics. But they are
oxygen, absolutely necessary for the health of a society, like
fresh air and water. Their contribution, even when unappreciated,
unrewarded by the masses and derided by the elite, is never in
vain.
But who can foretell. If the Russian society ever gets over
its hang-ups and evolves into a proper civil society, Yavlinsky
may still get a chance to prove himself fully. He is young still.

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