October 22, 1997   
This Date's Issues: 1302 • 1303 • 1304 1305 1306 1307

Johnson's Russia List [list two]
#1305
22 October 1997
davidjohnson@erols.com

******* 

From: "Dev Murarka" <devmur@centro.ru>
Date: Wed, 22 Oct 1997 16:18:25 MSK
Subject: Yavlinsky-Part One

--------

The piece below is copyright of Economic and Political Weekly, Mumbai
and meant for personal use only

----------------- 

Grigory Yavlinsky: A Profile [Part One]
By Dev Murarka
The author would be much obliged if JRL Readers will point out any
shortcomings in this profile or if they have any criticism to make. 


It is not enough to possess a talent: one must also have your
permission to possess it - eh, my friends?
Friedrich Nietzsche

Yavlinsky still remembers the precise moment he became an economist.
Ten years old, one day he went to buy a football clutching five rubles
in hand. But the football cost 6.50. Unlike most children he did not go
back home to ask for more money. Instead, he asked himself why it cost
6.50? But why? What was the reason for it? Who determined the price? He
forgot about the football. He walked through the streets. Why did a
lamp cost eleven rubles? Why did a loaf of bread cost 18 kopeks? Thus
he came upon one of the most fundamental problem of all times in
economics, cost. The problem continues to possess him. 
Yavlinsky, born on 10 April 1952 in Lvov, Ukraine, has come
through a hard but unusually interesting school of life. In childhood
his ideal was his own father, a man of remarkable integrity and
character, who worked as the city Director of orphanages for decades
and died of a heart attack in 1980, following an argument with the
Ukrainian Minister, when orphanages were transferred under the control
of the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs). His mother, still in Lvov,
was a chemistry teacher until her retirement. Not exactly poor, they
were not well off. A ride in a taxi was a luxury. In any provincial
town, in 1962, orange, pineapple, banana and mandarin were only names,
fruits he had never seen. 
He left school when in the 9th class and went out to work. One
reason was he wanted to read books on economics on his own. He had
trouble getting a job but eventually managed to find work as a postman.
Then, with great difficulty, he became assistant to a plumber in a
glass factory, later a plumber-mechanic there, and attended evening
school which he managed to finish.
His pugnaciousness enough to become a proficient boxer. He also
liked going dancing every Friday at the local dance club. Another of
his great love was the music of the Beatles. He is eloquent on them.
"The Beatles - it is a whole philosophy of life and love, philosophy of
relationship with everything in this world: war, narcotics,
bourgeoisie, friendship, the USSR, - there was everything in it...I do
not simply love the Beatles. It was a discovery, it was freedom!" He
kept long hair for many years, even when he started working in the
ranks of the administration. The more so because in Lvov he had been
grabbed by the volunteer police and his hair shaved off for such
unsocialist demeanor, a moment of unwarranted humiliation, resented for
long. 
This is excellent and valuable testimony showing how in the wake
of the de-Stalinization initiated by Nikita Khrushchev in 1956, even
though brakes had been put on ideological liberalisation almost
immediately, the subconscious of the very young was taking a flight
away from the stifling constraints which surrounded them. It was to lay
the foundation for the big changes which were to follow decades later.
This was the profound duality underneath the 18 years of the stagnation
period of Leonid Brezhnev with all its repression of the dissidents.
Behind the facades of conformity, minds were soaring, and not only of
dissidents. They began to flourish when given a chance by the Mikhail
Gorbachov led perestroika. Yavlinsky has also recalled that after
reading "One Day In The Life of Ivan Denisovich", the masterpiece by
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, he went to his father whom he adored and asked
if it was true, who said, yes. And this defined his attitude to the
writer and much else forever afterwards. 
His childhood was a happy one and he has very positive memories of
his parents, of his young days, of his enjoyment and work. What emerged
from this childhood was a youth of some determination, a great degree
of intelligence, self-confidence and ambition, and a capacity, rare in
most people, to ask questions to himself. 
His subsequent study of economics was preordained. He graduated
from the prestigious Plekhanov Institute in Moscow in 1973, became a
student of the well known economist, Leonid Abalkin, and defended his
thesis in 1978. After this he joined the All Union Coal Research
Institute, and while working there spent three years observing and
studying miners and their lives. Later, he went to the Labour Research
Institute where he became a departmental head. Though his ability and
capability as an economist were not in question, it was during this
period (1982-1984) that his troubles with the authorities began.
It all started with a book young Yavlinsky published in 1982 on
"The problem of improving the economic mechanism of the USSR". His
conclusion was that it could not be improved. All hell broke lose. The
book was immediately dubbed anti-Soviet and anti-state. The whole
edition was seized from the printing press and destroyed. The
preparatory rough notes and the manuscript were also taken away. 
This was far from the end of the story. For a long period
Yavlinsky was ordered to report to a special department. In every
organisation such a department existed and was controlled by the KGB.
Every time the same question was repeated: "Who taught you all this?"
His invariable answer: no one taught me, I am an economist with six
years training and have tried to sort out some problems. Moreover, I
have travelled all over the country and observed miners for three
years. My thesis grew out of it. The interrogation continued for six
long months and ceased only after the death of Brezhnev on 10 November
1982.
The nightmare, however, returned in an even more frightening form
when Konstantin Chernenko came to power on 13 February 1984. Now, he
was compelled to report to a clinic for medical examination. Prognosis:
the last stages of tuberculosis! He was only 34, father of two sons,
one very recently born. The fear and turbulence of his mind can be
barely comprehended.
It was drilled into him that he could infect his family and
friends.
He was compulsorily hospitalised, drugged for six months and then told
that the only cure was the removal of a lung. Isolated from family and
everybody else, with no hope of support or rescue, he had no choice but
to agree.
When he was being prepared for the operation, an old professor who
was to carry it out, whispered in his ear that he was perfectly healthy
and must save himself. But added that he will never say so openly and
it was upto his patient to find a way out. 
Yavlinsky escaped during the night but even his acquaintances were
scared to receive him for fear of infection. But he went to every
polyclinic in his area, bribed them with chocolates, persuading them to
carry out flurographic tests. Two days later he received 10
certificates attesting to his health.
But the nightmare continued. Armed with the certificates he went
to the chief doctor of the hospital where he had been detained. The
doctor closed the door of his office and remarked, "You are an
unfortunate person". He warned, "If you continue to insist that you are
healthy, you will not only remain in the tuberculosis hospital, but
placed in a psychiatric clinic. You have been given so many doses of
medicine that you are a ready case for such a clinic and at this moment
you are over agitated..."
Yavlinsky : "After this, for three months I struggled for freedom.
They transferred me to a cancer ward and tried to convince me that I
had cancer, not tuberculosis, and that earlier they had kept it from
me. Patients, who did not know they had cancer, were brought to this
ward to die. My friends helped a great deal in securing release,
specially the teachers from my beloved institute. Heaven knows what
would have happened without them. But it was a curious coincidence that
I was let out the day after Gorbachov was appointed the General
Secretary." That is, following the death of Chernenko. His release from
hospital on the first occasion had also come about after the death of
Brezhnev.
Yavlinsky was called in by the doctor and told that the treatment
was over and he need not come any more. No other explanation. Thus,
after 9 months he was free, a changed man, deeply scarred by the awful
experience. A pleasant denouement came seven years later when Yavlinsky
visited Japan. There, the well disposed Japanese persuaded him to
undergo a total clinical check up which confirmed that there was no
trace of any tuberculosis or of cancer, which never were.
Yavlinsky was in trouble with the authorities once again in 1987,
though not on a similar scale. He had been asked to prepare a law for
state enterprises. His submission was rejected by a commission headed
by Gaidar Aliev (then a Politburo member, now President of Azerbaizan)
and a departmental investigation launched against him. It came to
nothing.
The country was in the throes of perestroika by then and search
for economic reforms was beginning. In June 1989 Abalkin was appointed
Deputy Prime Minister of the Soviet Union. He made Yavlinsky Deputy
Chairman of the commission on economic reforms, who participated in the
preparation of the proposals. But his contribution was not included in
the final version.
Nevertheless, Yavlinsky and his friends prepared a programme for
radical reform and stabilisation on their own. The subsequent episodes
surrounding this programme are somewhat surrealistic. As one of his
colleagues and co-authors of the programme has told the story, they had
called it "400 days". A deputy of the Supreme Soviet, who had high
expectations of being appointed Prime Minister of the Russian
Federation, heard about it and borrowed it for study. But he did not
keep his word, copied it and passed it on to Yeltsin and others. The
text began to do the rounds.
It fell into the hands of yet another person, who also thought of
himself as fit for the post, renamed it "500 Days" and circulated as
his election programme!
By now Yeltsin had become the Russian Federation President and
Ivan Silaev the Prime Minister. They were in search of an economic
programme to project before the public and in July 1990 appointed
Yavlinsky Deputy Prime Minister of the Federation to continue working
on it. The same month an agreement was reached between Yeltsin and
Gorbachov to work out a joint economic programme (between Russia and
the centre). Yavlinsky and Academician Stanislav Shatalin were asked to
prepare it. 
August 1990 saw the publication of their proposals with the title
of "500 Days". Yeltsin insisted that Yavlinsky be identified as the
co-author. In the public mind, however, it is mainly associated with
the name of Yavlinsky alone. This made him a national celebrity
overnight. No doubt the public imagination was caught by the promise of
achievement within a concrete and short period indicated by its title.
It was also presented by Gorbachov to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
Thus Yavlinsky, like most of the other political stars in the present
Russian firmament, owes his prominence to the perestroika period.
Controversy has raged about the merits of "500 Days". It was
perhaps unrealistic, particularly in its optimistic timetable.
Opposition to it apart, political conditions simply did not exist for
its implementation. However, conceptually it was based on Yavlinsky's
deliberations on reform over a long period of time. It was not designed
to save socialism as its liberal opponents later charged but to
demolish state monopoly, above all. 
It was strongly resisted by the then Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai
Ryzhkov, who regarded it as utter nonsense, and prepared his own
programme. He threatened to resign if it was not accepted. Gorbachov
tried to save a tense political situation thus created and presented
his own compromise programme. It did not succeed. Ever since, Yavlinsky
has held a grudge against him, not fully taking into account the
immensely conflicting political pressures bearing upon him. Gorbachov
also feels some guilt on this account. However, they do maintain good
personal relations and continue to meet.
Meanwhile, the proposal was accepted by the Russian Federation
Supreme Soviet in September 1990. But nothing was done to implement it.
An unhappy and dissatisfied Yavlinsky resigned from his post on 17
October 1990. It was unprecedented and extremely courageous at time
because senior officials never resigned on any issue, least of on a
matter of principle. A precedent, it might be noted, which has not been
followed since by any one else. But he does credit Yeltsin for making
his path into politics. He also turned down Gorbachov's plea to
continue working on the reform plan. 
Thus began the transformation of Yavlinsky from a brilliant,
unorthodox economist to a politician. He needed to create a base, a
platform for his activities. In January 1991, with like minded
colleagues, he established EPIcentre (Economic and Political Research
Centre). It remains his brains trust to this day.
Though disillusioned with political leaders, Yavlinsky did not
give up on them entirely because the carrying out of any reform
depended on their will. But his quest for seeking support for reform
took interesting twists and turns. The country was in a state of
political upheaval. The centre and its power was disintegrating, with
Gorbachov desperately trying to hold it together and Yeltsin bent upon
destroying it.
In April 1991 the United States State Department officially
invited Yavlinsky to participate in a meeting of the Council of the
Seven (world economic powers). His speech aroused a great deal of
interest. Based on it, and with the participation of Yavlinsky and
other Soviet and Western economists, a joint programme "Assent to
Opportunity", was prepared in May at Harvard University which aimed at
shifting the Soviet Union to market economy. It was meant for
discussion at the summit of the Seven in July in which Gorbachov and
Yavlinsky were to participate. 
The programme was devised within the framework of the set economic
goal of conversion to market economy, already accepted by the Soviet
leaders, with a view to the stabilisation and liberalisation, the
privatisation of property and integration into world economy. It was
considered implementable in the USSR and simultaneously supportable by
the West. One of its key features was stress on gradualism in
implementation while ensuring mutual advantage and trust between all
partners. The whole exercise was to be carried out over a period of six
years and completed by 1997.
However, Gorbachov's expectations of greater financial help from
the summit did not materialize because his position had become weak and
survival uncertain. The Western leaders were no longer interested in
supporting him. Yavlinsky has revealed that Yeltsin had plainly told
him that he did not want Gorbachov to succeed so as to strengthen his
own political clout. In any case, the document remained a paper project
because on 19 August 1991 the putsch against Gorbachov took place.
Yavlinsky opposed the putsch with Yeltsin and others remained in
the RSFSR government building during its duration. But in its wake he
took a bold and principled decision, which puzzled many. He accepted
Gorbachov's invitation to become Deputy Minister of Economics and
prepared a draft Treaty for Economic Union, as part of the move to
transform the structure of the existing Soviet Union. However, with the
disintegration of the USSR in December 1991 the draft became redundant.
The position adopted by Yavlinsky during these critical and
fateful months is of exceptional significance in understanding his
broad outlook. He is not among those who have waxed eloquent on the
demise of the Soviet Union either at the time or since. He has
unswervingly held to the opinion that there was no rational reason to
fragment and destroy its economic unity and the size of the Soviet
Union was an extremely valuable economic space which could be
reorganised and used for promoting prosperity for all. No one is better
off because of its disintegration, least of all Russia, because the
distribution and production system has been damaged, in many cases
irreparably destroyed. Characteristically, in formulating his position
he was more concerned about economic than purely political
considerations. It was a highly responsible, thoughtful position which
did not conform to the emotional state of the country. 
Not that he has any desire or illusions about the recreation of
the Soviet Union as the communists propagate. His point is that while
the old structure cannot be revived, and it is neither desirable nor
necessary to do so, the economic space can still be recreated by mutual
agreement and cooperation to everyone's benefit. To his disappointment,
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) formed in the wake of
dissolution of the Soviet Union exists more on paper and in rhetoric
than in real life.
The events of 1991 left Yavlinsky in a sort of political vacuum
and at a loss as to the direction of his future activity. In this
situation he came very close to Mikhail Gefter, a dissident historian-
philosopher, for whom he had great respect and who gave him moral,
psychological support and encouragement, sustained him spiritually. The
late Gefter was a highly influential figure among the intelligentsia
and Yavlinsky owes a lot to him for his intellectual development.
About this time the newly appointed young Governor of Nizhni
Novgorod (Gorky during part of the Soviet period) approached him to
help in planning and promoting new style economic reforms. Conditions
there were rather desperate and it provided a good opportunity for
Yavlinsky to test his ideas. Towards the end of the year he concluded
an agreement with Nemtsov and from January 1992 consultations began.
The reforms evolved by his team, and Nemtsov and his advisors, differed
in character from those promoted in other parts of Russia. In
contradistinction to Gaidar's total removal of price control, which
were state controlled till then, they stipulated a smoother transition
to freeing of prices, greater guarantees of social security for the
population, quick rational adjustment of the cost of energy for the
consumers, and faster privatisation of small businesses with the help
of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. A branch
of EPIcentre was established in there in June 1992 and continues to
exist there. 
While the ultimate results of Nizhni Novgorod reforms have been
questioned by some critics, mainly due to political hostility towards
Nemtsov or Yavlinsky or both. While no spectacular success can be
claimed for them due to difficult circumstances, they did have some
positive effect. In any case the effort enhanced the reputation of both
of them because something concrete was done in a liberal direction with
adequate care taken to avoid undue or greater hardship for the people.
In some ways even now Nizhni Novgorod remains rather ahead of many
other regions in economic management.
The vexed and painful question of price liberalisation is a highly
important political issue in Russia. Even in communist times, when
prices were fixed by the state, it was a thorny problem. Granted that
in principle price in a free market has to be regulated by its own
mechanism, the mindless, instant freeing of prices decreed by Yegor
Gaidar in January 1992 caused tremendous hardship to people because
their economic condition was not ripe for the increases that followed,
and its negative effects continue to be felt even now.
There was some justification for his policy. The economy was in a
sort of scissor's crisis, not of accumulation but of revenue receipts.
Production costs had grown and factory prices had ceased to be
controllable by the state. But the retail prices were still controlled.
In these conditions, the state ceased to receive the turnover tax which
was its main source of revenue. Not only that, in the absence of heavy
subsidy, even essential goods vanished from the shops which turned into
museums of empty shelves. Gaidar decided to cut this Gordian knot by
abolishing price controls altogether. 
Yavlinsky accepted that Gaidar did carry out some necessary
"economic dirty task". But argued that while he was in favour of the
principle of liberalisation in general, there were right and wrong ways
of going about it. The effect of Gaidar's policy was that "Vulgar
liberalisation unleashed super-monopoly monsters, traditions,
relations, systems and connections of the command economy." In other
words, the current distortions of the economy, to a large extent, are
the result of a flawed policy implemented hastily. 
The trouble is that this policy is basically in the interests of a
minority, "and any policy, based only on narrow interests - is no
democracy at all." He has succinctly pointed out: "My opponents and I
both favour liberalisation. But these are two different types of
liberalisation. Laissez-faire has so far led to liberalisation of the
totalitarian economy. We want a liberalisation, which will take us away
from the totalitarian economy altogether."
The unpublished book on economic policy due to which he was made
to suffer so much, had determined the future course of Yavlinsky. Six
years later he resolved to devote himself to politics, more accurately
to political economy because undoubtedly his primary motivation and
goal remained improvement in the functioning of the economy.
Experiences of promoting reforms also convinced him that the present
day Russian establishment was not competent to carry them out. 
What drove him to politics was not just an ordinary sense of
vocation but something more specific than that. This comes out again
and again when he speaks, in discussions, in interviews and meetings.
His approach has a missionary like dedication and zeal. But it is
without any touch of fanaticism or a false sense of personal destiny,
though he freely admits to being ambitious for his ideas. Curiously
enough, he is the least ideological of the economic reformers, as
compared to other free market and oligarchical economists currently
dominating the policy making in Russia.
This is all the more remarkable because Yavlinsky has acknowledged 
that after he took a conscious decision to go into politics, almost
immediately he felt that he had entered the public toilet of a Moscow
railway station, barefoot. The full horror of this feeling can be felt
only by those who have had the misfortune of using such a public
toilet.
In November 1992 some deputies of the Russian Supreme Soviet with
social-democratic and centrist orientation formed a parliamentary
group, "Agreement for Progress", which was at first financed by small
business interests. Yavlinsky was associated with them. At this stage
Russian politics was becoming unstable. Differences between President
Yeltsin and the Russian Supreme Soviet were moving towards violent
confrontation.
In February 1993 Yavlinsky declared his intention to stand as a
presidential candidate because it was expected that such an election
might take place soon. Attention focussed upon him. An organisation
called "Entrepreneurs for new Russia" asked him to prepare an economic
programme for it. The basic aim of the organisation was to support
Yeltsin and his economic policies. Therefore, when Yavlinsky presented
his proposals at a conference of the group in April 1993, they were
found unacceptable. However, his purpose was served because it brought
him publicity. The proposals were virtually his own election programme.
The long threatened crisis began on 20 September 1993 when Yeltsin
dissolved the Supreme Soviet and the opposition barricaded itself in.
Yavlinsky was opposed to the move and for two weeks tried in vain to
bring about a compromise, even proposed his own "zero" option.
But the crisis could not be contained and violence began on 3
October. Started by the supporters of the opposition, though this is
hotly disputed, it changed Yavlinsky's position. He went on television
to declare that after this the main task of Yeltsin was to employ all
the forces of law and order "to crush fascist, extremist, bandit
formations, gathered under the aegis of the White House (the Supreme
Soviet Building. If these forces were not enough, then it was necessary
to consider the use of regular army" and asked for "maximum harshness
and firmness" in suppressing the "bandits". It clearly implied in
principle advance approval of the shelling of the Supreme Soviet
building the next day, though in retrospect he has become critical of
this particular measure. 
Nevertheless the highly emotional and rather thoughtless response
by Yavlinsky to the Black October has left a blot on his record. It is
difficult to explain why he reacted so strongly, whether he became
frightened at the prospect of a civil war or of a communist takeover.
His argument at the time was that by resorting to violence the
opposition had forfeited the right of calling themselves defenders of
democracy, law and constitution. 
A couple of episodes like this are persistently used to denigrate
and blacken him as much as possible with the purpose of imprint on
Russian minds his unfitness to govern. Another occasion is recalled
from August 1991, when Yavlinsky insisted on accompanying security
officers sent to arrest Boris Pugo, one of the leaders of the putsch,
at his residence. Meanwhile, Pugo had shot his wife and himself.
Arriving there they found their bodies in a pool of blood. Apparently
Yavlinsky fainted at the sight. His call for suppression on the night
of 3 October 1993 is also claimed to be a sign of panic, though those
who accuse him thus were themselves in favour of such measures. 
The idea sought to be conveyed is that in critical situations his
nerves fail him. Such a purposely negative propaganda about his
character leaves out of account his pluck in successfully withstanding
the Soviet period persecution or the way he has stood up for his views
in the post-Soviet period. This says much more for the steadfastness of
his character than occasional lapses. Moreover, in this insidiously
antisemitic society, Yavlinsky has courageously refused to make a
secret of his partial Jewishness. 
Yavlinsky is not perfect of course. Even those sympathetic to him
say that he has noticeable authoritarian tendencies. According to them
he maintains iron discipline inside the Yabloko group and that he is
very jealous of his reputation as an economist and brooks no advice
contrary to his opinion. As against this, it has to be noted that the
Yabloko team consists of some very brilliant economists and other
political personalities who have been with him over a long period. If
Yavlinsky's control is as oppressive as depicted, many of them would
have turned away from him, which has not happened. As for discipline,
without its strictness, a small group like it, buffeted by very
powerful adversaries on all sides, could not have survived.
Yavlinsky was evolved fast. No longer happy with the politics of
"Agreement" and rather than being tied to other groups or factions he
ventured on his own, the more so because the elections called for in
December 1993 for the new Duma required a clarity in his position. The
Black October days spurred him to even quicker action and a few days
later "Yabloko" was formed. Many of his colleagues from other political
groups with which he was formerly associated also joined. It was a
curious name for a political party because it did not convey either an
idea or an objective. It was an acronym based on the names of its three
founding leaders, Yavlinksy, Yuri Boldyrev and Vladimir Lukin. Later on
Boldyrev left the group because of policy differences but the name
remained. Coincidentally, it is the Russian word for apple.
Later, Yavlinsky was to explain the rationale for the formation
and continuation of Yabloko and answer criticism that he split the
democrats and was a traitor to the democratic cause. First of all, he
explained, it was formed in response to the October crisis in order to
overcome it, which was "caused because of mistaken identification of
democracy with the politics of President Yeltsin and the economic
course of Gaidar." He pointed out that the designation of "democrats"
has been monopolised by those who supported concentration of power in
the hands of Yeltsin and orthodox monetary policies.
He went on to argue, indirectly refuting the charge that to oppose
Yeltsin was to support communists, that pursuance of "an alternative
policy cannot be only a return to the past but another variation of
progressing towards a future, other reforms." And, "to offer
alternatives is not only a tactical but strategic task of Russian
democracy". Finally, that for the above reasons he did not favour a
monolithic democratic movement.
In the December 1993 elections, for a new and unknown group,
Yabloko did reasonably well, mainly because of Yavlinsky's fame. It
received 4.2 million votes or 7.7 percent of the total votes cast. Of
course, Yavlinsky was bitterly accused by his democratic opponents of
betraying the democratic cause. One of the charges made, quite true, is
that no other group has so frequently voted against measures adopted by
the Duma or abstained from voting. However, this only serves to
underline the political integrity of the group.
Yeltsin did not keep his promise of holding presidential elections
in 1994. However Yabloko, though in a minority, began functioning as a
promising political group and playing a conspicuous role in the Duma.
During the election its slogan was, "There is another way to
development." A variant of this slogan was also used in the 1995
elections to the Duma. 
But from the very beginning it was caught in a highly complex
dialectic of the situation from which it has not been able to extract
itself so far. Due to circumstances, it suffers from some inherent
disabilities such as relatively low level of public support, except in
big cities like Moscow, St. Petersburg and a few others. Its inability
to visibly influence the policies of the administration or of the Duma
in a significant manner because of its minority status. Its main
dilemma, also unresolved, is whether to remain in opposition or
integrate into power. So far it has remained a clean opposition.
This suggests that Yabloko might be in danger of becoming an
permanent minority in the political system. On the other hand, in the
present circumstances it cannot find suitable partners for a coalition
which might help in broadening its influence. This risk is aggravated
by the maximalist character of Yavlinsky's approach. He very often
wants all or nothing which him appear inflexible.
Yabloko has not found a way to popularize its economic message in
a way which would get over to a larger electorate in simple political
terms. People do not vote on economic policy distinctions but on broad
political issues or on attraction to personalities. While Yavlinsky has
a great deal of personal appeal for a section of highly educated young
generation, his economisation of political issues comes over as
professorial to the general public, and has attached itself to his
public personality.
His personal shortcomings are not alone to blame for lack of
greater success. It is closely connected with the generaL climate of
opinion against the democrats. In the first place this is due to the
widespread distrust and resentment of the democrats because of the
policies pursued by Gaidar and his followers. People in general feel
angry that they have been experimented with and then left to their own
devices to sink or swim. Indeed, a total lack of concern for the
welfare of the people in general has been and continues to be the
hallmark of pro-Yeltsin democrats. Although Yavlinsky and his group do
not belong to this category, they too suffer from this feeling of
public anger because they fall under the category of democrats.
The election results clearly showed that the balance of forces in
the Duma was in no way in favour of the liberal or democratic groups,
which reflects the state of public opinion. This has become a source of
permanent political tension. Yeltsin and his supporters dislike and
fear the left- nationalist predominance in the new Duma and have
proceeded to downgrade it in their calculations and constantly
denigrate it. The threat of a premature dissolution by the President
always hangs over it. Consequently its conduct lacks confidence which
shows in its contradictory and contrary behaviour, occasionally verging
on indecorous and hysterical.
Tolerance and mutual respect are not particularly distinguishing
features of the present day Russian political culture. This has made
the task of Yabloko even more difficult, the more so because it is
victimized and vilified by all sides. Given its firmly anticommunist
philosophy and stand, the communist hostility to it is understandable
enough. It is also out of favour with other nationalists and radicals
like Zhirinovsky. All these groups, in one way or another accuse or
suspect Yabloko of being part of the government establishment by
inclination, if not association, and of being pro-western. Yavlinsky's
brief association with Harvard University is constantly slapped on his
face like a wet whiplash.
It is certainly true that Yavlinsky has consulted Western
economists. But he is not their acolyte. In fact, he is bitterly
critical of some of these economists who have led the Yeltsin
administration up the garden path and encouraged misguided policies. He
has written:
"I have always felt uneasy when I think about the reasons behind
such irresponsible behaviour by some of my colleagues among Western
experts and advisers. I reached a very sad conclusion - they just did
not care. In February 1992, at the outset of yet another ill-designed
reform attempt, I remember talking to one such contended adviser in
Moscow. I told him at the time that he was making a fatal mistake, as
Russia is not a whore you can sleep with, get your satisfaction and
then pass on to someone else. In the old days in Russia, the engineers
who built a railway bridge had to stand underneath it when the first
train crossed. You either stake your life in this transformation, or
you should go and do something else. I want to...
Continued in second part

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