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Johnson's Russia List


October 22, 1997   
This Date's Issues: 1302  1303  1304 1305 1306 1307

Johnson's Russia List [list two]
22 October 1997


>From United States Information Agency
21 October 1997 


(Says a larger NATO will have "greater strategic depth") (5380)

Washington -- Defense Secretary Cohen says that an enlarged NATO will
provide an unusual insurance policy because the alliance will have
"additional manpower, added military capability, more political
support, and greater strategic depth."

The secretary told the Senate Appropriations Committee October 21 that
"a larger NATO will help bring stability for the 21st Century to
Central Europe -- the spawning ground of crises throughout the 20th

Cohen insisted that the new costs of enlarging NATO -- generated by
adding Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the alliance -- "are
affordable" and "modest the costs and risks of not
enlarging." He described the three categories of costs: for new
members, existing NATO countries, and both new and old members as

The alliance is currently reviewing the military implications and
costs of enlargement, the secretary said, with a new report due to be
issued in December. Based on preliminary information, however, Cohen
said he expects the new NATO cost estimates to be lower than earlier
ones which the administration provided to Congress.

He attributed this to the fact that only three, not four, countries
were invited to join NATO, and that the military situation in those
nations is better than originally anticipated. "We are increasingly
impressed by the levels of readiness, understanding, and initial
success of the invitees in working toward NATO interoperability,"
Cohen said.

He pointed out that each of the three invitees "are already
contributing to the security of Europe by restructuring and
modernizing their militaries to operate with NATO, by serving with our
soldiers in Bosnia, and by helping to make a success of the
Partnership for Peace (program)."

Following is the text of Cohen's statement as prepared for delivery:

(begin text)

It is a great privilege to appear with the Secretary of State to
discuss one of the President's top foreign policy objectives: NATO
enlargement. As you may know, we appeared together before the Senate
Armed Services Committee in April to discuss this same topic. I
welcome the opportunity to continue this dialogue with the Senate.


We are at an historic moment. By working together within the U.S.
government, and within the NATO alliance, we can change the face of
Europe forever in the next few years. It is a challenge from which we
should not retreat.

Our veterans of the First World War witnessed how even the vast
Atlantic Ocean couldn't protect us from being drawn into the fiery
hatreds of the Old World. They marched into battle singing, "We won't
be back 'til it's over, over there." But to our lasting regret, when
the guns of Autumn fell silent, America ignored the embers of hatred
that still smoldered in Europe and we missed the opportunity to
prevent another war, the deadliest in human history.

Millions of American sons returned to the very same terrain that their
fathers died defending, and thousands of them paid the ultimate price
for this missed opportunity. But those who fought in World War II gave
us a second chance to build a safer world.

President Truman, speaking of the Marshall Plan, said, "Our purpose
from the end of the war to the present has never changed. It's been to
create a political and economic framework in which lasting peace can
be constructed." Western Europe embraced the Marshall Plan, built
strong democracies and economies, and developed a strong alliance that
we call NATO. But the other half of Europe was denied the Marshall
Plan when Joseph Stalin slammed down the Iron Curtain and began a
separation of the continent which would persist for 50 years.

Today, having emerged victorious from the long winter of the Cold War,
we have an historic opportunity and a very sober challenge. We have
the opportunity to complete George Marshall's vision, and the
challenge to secure a lasting peace in Europe whose security and
stability remains a vital interest of America.


Some question whether making NATO larger is going to make NATO weaker
and, therefore, weaken America. On the contrary, our definitive answer
is that enlargement must not and will not be allowed to dilute NATO's
military effectiveness or political cohesion. A larger NATO will be a
stronger NATO and will provide a wider allegiance in Europe to our
values. It was the creation of NATO in 1949 that halted Soviet designs
on western Europe. It was the enlargement of NATO, with Greece and
Turkey in 1952, West Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982, that helped
strengthen the wall of democracy. If, in the future, another direct
threat of attack arises, an enlarged NATO would have: additional
manpower, added military capability, more political support, and
greater strategic depth. More importantly, a larger NATO will help
bring stability for the 21st Century to Central Europe -- the spawning
ground of crises throughout the 20th Century. We must seize this
opportunity to continue to shape the security environment in Europe.
In doing so, we will strengthen the political democracies and market
economies of Central and Eastern Europe, and thereby enhance stability
and reduce the risk that such a crisis will ever emerge. As was the
case with nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, in this new era NATO
enlargement is an insurance policy with an unusual twist: by paying a
modest premium, we not only will be protected in case of fire, we will
make a fire less likely to ignite.


Formal membership in NATO carries as President Clinton has said,
"(t)he most solemn security guarantees." Enlargement must not, and
will not, be allowed to dilute NATO's military effectiveness nor its
political cohesion. Sincere aspiration is not enough to guarantee
membership in NATO. New members must demonstrate a commitment to:
democracy and the rule of law, an open market economic system,
civilian constitutional control of their militaries, peaceful
resolution of disputes with their neighbors, respect for human rights,
and development over time of military capabilities interoperable with

After discussions with allies, candidate countries, members of
Congress and within the administration, the President decided the U.S.
would support extending invitations to the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland. The President met with the other leaders of the NATO nations
in a summit in July, and together they agreed to invite these nations
to begin accession talks to join the Alliance.

Enlarging NATO with these three nations will carry the promise of
peace and liberty into the next century.

You have heard it argued that by enlarging NATO we are going to create
a new dividing line in Europe. That argument fails to appreciate the
new dynamic that is underway in Europe, erasing these old lines and
avoiding time new divisions. The mere prospect of having NATO
membership has unleashed a powerful impetus for peace in Europe. Old
rivals have settled their historic disputes: Poland and Lithuania,
Poland and Ukraine, Hungary and Romania, Italy and Slovenia, Germany
and the Czech Republic. Without the prospect of NATO enlargement,
these smoldering embers -- rather than being extinguished -- would
have been fanned by nationalist fervor. This argument also fails to
realize that by not enlarging, we would allow to stand an illegitimate
dividing line drawn across the continent by Stalin 50 years ago. Some
countries would feel compelled to seek security via other avenues,
including ones potentially destabilizing and contrary to U.S.
interests. We must move, with Europe, into the future. The Poles,
Hungarians and Czechs are vital, vigorous and dynamic people. They
share our ideals. They are making remarkable recoveries from decades
of foreign domination. Now they want to return to their rightful place
as equal partners in the European family of free and democratic
nations. We need them and they need us.

If we are to ensure the achievement of our stated goal that
enlargement will not draw new dividing lines in Europe, we must
continue to give careful consideration to the security interests and
concerns of those states that were not chosen for membership at
Madrid. The door is open for future invitations, and no European
nation is excluded from consideration. We expect other nations to
become members as they meet the requirements. We need to continue to
make clear to other aspirant countries that active participation in
PfP is the prime pathway to membership in the alliance, and to a solid
security relationship with NATO. At the same time, no state among the
non-selects has an "assured invitation' in 1999, or at any time, and
future invitees will be held to the same standards as the current
three. And, of course, any future accessions will, like these three,
require Senate approval.


NATO is also embarking on a new relationship with Russia. There are
some who claim that enlarging NATO is going to feed extremism in
Russia and jeopardize Russia's move to democracy and its cooperation
with the West. We should not, these fears to overwhelm the facts. NATO
and Russia are erasing old dividing lines every day, not least of
which in our interactions in Bosnia where Russian and NATO soldiers
patrol side by side in the cause of peace.

Mr. Chairman, permit me a moment of personal reflection. In February,
shortly after I was sworn in as the Secretary of Defense, I traveled
to Bosnia, and met with some of the American troops serving there.
During lunch, a Russian soldier came up to me and gave me his beret as
a gesture of peace, saying how proud he was to be serving alongside
Americans. Two weeks ago, I was again in Bosnia and met with the new
Russian commander, General Krivolapov. He concluded the meeting by
declaring, in a Russian version of General Joulwan's motto for SFOR,
"one team, one mission." Our new relationship with Moscow must
acknowledge Russia's changing role in Europe and not be forever bound
by the notion of a Russia in confrontation with NATO.

The objectives of NATO's new relationship with Russia are: to
recognize Russia's inherent importance in European security -- after
all, they have been a major player in European security for 300 years;
to engage Russia in the new European security order, to facilitate a
security dialogue and; when desirable and appropriate, to cooperate
with Russia. Equally important to articulate are the things that
NATO's new relationship with Russia does not do: it does not allow
Russian participation in internal NATO issues; it does not give Russia
a voice or a veto over NATO's decisions; and it does not give Russia a
de facto membership in NATO.


And now, let me turn to a topic I know is of particular importance to
members of the Appropriations Committee. How much will enlargement
cost? And inextricably linked to the matter of cost -- in fact the
driver of how much it will cost -- is a second question: what exactly
are the military requirements of enlarging? These are complicated
questions on which reasonable people will disagree, and have already
disagreed. But let me walk you through the work we have done so far
and the work we are now doing.

There are new costs to enlarging, but these costs are affordable. They
are modest compared both to our total defense spending -- and to the
costs and risks of not enlarging. To frame our discussion let me
sketch for you the three categories of costs.

First, there are the costs to new members to be able to develop
interoperable military forces to contribute to their own defense, the
defense of other NATO members and other NATO operations. While they
currently make a contribution, in order to be producers of security
over time, the new members must re-build, re-equip, and re-train their
forces. They must have smaller, better equipped, better supported, and
better led forces.

Second, there are also the costs to current members to meet the
requirements of NATO's new Strategic Concept, which is based on power
projection rather than positional defense, and which meets the needs
of an enlarged alliance. Current members must do what they already
have undertaken to improve mobility, deployability, interoperability,
and flexibility. The key need for the current members is to proceed
with these efforts.

I want to stress that these two categories of costs are all actions
that the countries concerned would have to take to provide for their
own defense, with or without NATO enlargement. Indeed, to get
comparable levels of security without NATO enlargement the new members
would have to spend more. But for NATO to ensure its military
potential with enlargement, the capabilities which these other costs
will fund, will be needed. So it is important that the commitments
actually be met.

Finally, there are the costs to both new and old members of
integrating new members into NATO. These direct costs to enlarging,
costs which NATO would not have incurred but for enlarging, are
relatively modest. These direct costs are associated with enhancing
interoperability, extending NATO's integrated command, communications
and air defense surveillance.

>From one point of view, these could be considered the only true costs
of NATO enlargement since they are the costs that would not be
incurred if NATO did not add new members. But we have also thought it
night to identify the first two categories of costs that will need to
be paid to ensure that an enlarged NATO is able to meet its


So, those are the categories of costs. As you know, the Department of
Defense developed a notional estimate of the costs of enlarging at the
end of last year. This estimate was part of the report, requested by
the Congress, that the President submitted to you in late February of
this year.

Let me begin to make the link between costs and the military
requirements of enlarging. Our initial estimate assumed that while
there would be a need for serious defense capabilities for an enlarged
NATO, there is currently no threat of large-scale conventional
aggression in Europe, and that any such threat would take years to
develop. This is, of course, the same assumption as we make for our
own national planning.

Total costs for achieving all time categories were estimated as $27-35
billion, These costs would be spread over the 13-year time frame of
1997 through 2009 -- ten years after accession of new members. Now,
using the breakdown of responsibility for these costs which I just
outlined for you, the three categories of costs, let me give you what
we estimated each group would have to bear:

New member costs for restructuring their militaries were estimated at
about $10-13 billion over that time frame or about $800 million to $1
billion per year. These costs would all be borne by the new members,
except to the limited extent Congress decides to continue limited
support to Central European militaries. (As you know, the U.S. now
provides about $100 million in Warsaw Initiative funding to all PfP
countries combined to support their participation in PfP.)

Current allies' costs for NATO regional reinforcement upgrades were
estimated at about $8-10 billion, or about $600-800 million per year.
These costs would be borne by the current allies. For decades now, the
U.S. has made no contribution to Allies' defense budgets (except for
some loans to Greece and Turkey).

It is important to note that our cost estimates to date do not
anticipate any added costs to the U.S. in this category because U.S.
forces are already readily deployable and sustainable. The requirement
to deploy to meet a contingency in places like Korea or Southwest Asia
is more demanding than a hypothetical crisis in Central Europe.

Direct enlargement costs for new and old allies were estimated at
about $9-12 billion, or about $700-900 million per year. This again,
is the cost of items such as communications, reinforcement reception
infrastructure, and other interoperability measures. We estimated that
about 60% of these costs, or about $5.5 -- 7 billion would be paid for
out of NATO common budgets over the ten years following accession,
that NATO budgets would be increased accordingly, and that the U.S.
would pay its standard 24% share of the NATO common budget. With these
assumptions, the U.S. share of the direct costs of enlargement would
be about $150-200 million per year.

These costs are manageable. Projected U.S. requirements to meet direct
enlargement common budget costs is only a fraction of a percentage
point when compared with total U.S. defense spending ($266 billion in
1997). The projected U.S. requirement is also modest when considered
in relation to total NATO common budget spending. In 1997, these
budgets totaled about $1.8 billion. The total U.S. contribution to the
three budgets was about $485 million, while the allies contributed the
other $1.3 billion. We expect these relative percentage cost shares
will stay the same -- three European to one U.S. -- in the period when
NATO is meeting the requirements of enlargement.


Several weeks ago, this Committee asked me for a refined cost
estimate. On 16 October I submitted a report based on our work done to
date. Since our work to respond in greater detail to your request will
dovetail with work being done at NATO, let me first tell you about
what the Alliance is doing. NATO has undertaken a review of the
military implications and costs of enlargement, what new members will
bring to the alliance, and any additional requirements for current
allies. The U.S. has long argued that any NATO cost estimate must be
driven by the military requirements of enlargement. We were successful
in pressing that argument in the alliance, and a review of the
military requirements is currently under way by the NATO staff. This
level of detailed information, was obviously not available to us when
we did our first cost study and it is still being formulated.

These reviews are ongoing at NATO this fall, with recommendations to
be completed in November for consideration by ministers in December.
The invitees worked with the NATO international staff to fill out a
special Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) as their initial step
into the NATO Defense Planning Process. All NATO allies fill out a DPQ

In an effort to better understand requirements as well as the current
capabilities of the invited nations, members of NATO's international
military staff have been conducting site visits at various military
facilities in the invited countries this summer. They visited
airfields and railheads in each country. This month they are visiting
other facilities in each country to try to ensure that the first
facilities they inspected are representative of the condition of the
majority of facilities in that country.

The international staff of NATO will then cost those new requirements.
That is part of the work that is to be completed in time for the
December ministerial. These estimates will therefore be available to
Congress well before any vote on enlargement.


Based on what we know now, I believe that the NATO cost estimates will
be lower than those which you received from us in February. First the
initial U.S. cost assessed four, not three, new members. Further, the
NATO estimate will address only the direct, common-funded costs.
National costs borne by each ally or prospective ally are separate
from, and will not be estimated by, the NATO work.

But I also expect the NATO cost estimates will be lower because some
things are better in the invited nations than people thought. As a
result of assessments NATO planners and logisticians have been
conducting, we believe the additional investment required to prepare
each of these nations, their military forces, and their
infrastructures for full NATO membership will be less than initially
anticipated. Let me share some examples of our experiences during
these assessments to show why this is the case.


When the American general heading a small NATO team visiting Kecskemet
Air Base asked his Hungarian host how he might accommodate a squadron
of NATO F-16s, he was surprised by the precision and detail of the
Hungarian response -- and the level of installation readiness already
achieved. He commented that the Hungarians had done some excellent
research. He was told it wasn't just research. Hungary had hosted a
squadron of Dutch F-16s for several weeks in 1996, and a United States
Air National Guard squadron was scheduled to arrive the week after the
general's visit. The Dutch and American planes were in Hungary as part
of a series of PfP exercises designed to improve interoperability.
Thus Hungarians are already capable of handling NATO aircraft at some
of their airfields. There is less work that needs to be done -- and in
turn -- less money to be spent to improve these airfields than we had
estimated earlier this year. This example also shows how PfP has
contributed in direct and practical ways to preparing for NATO

In another example, an analyst monitoring the NATO Common Fund Cost
Study's progress noted that even though communications and information
systems requirements were increasing, the prospective costs to the
Czech Republic kept dropping. Upon closer inspection, it turned out
the Czechs had already anticipated requirements for secure and
non-secure digital communications programs and had applied NATO
standards to the national program they are pursuing on their own. In
short the Czechs had already spent their own money to fund some
projects that we had assumed would be paid for by NATO as a whole
through the common budgets.

Finally, an American general asked a Polish major familiar with the
details of a particular rail complex whether we could reasonably
expect to transport a NATO armored division through it in one week's
time. The amused major replied by asking the general how many Soviet
heavy divisions he thought they planned on moving through the same
location when trains were going the other way?

These examples demonstrate an important point. When we conducted our
initial cost study, we assumed a greater need for improving some
military bases and equipment. As we spend more time on the ground in
the countries of each of the invitees, learning the details of their
military forces and infrastructure, we are gaining a better
appreciation for just how well prepared they were to fight against
NATO. We will be modernizing from an extremely robust foundation. We
will not be building airfields from scratch. Accordingly, the direct
costs of enlargement will likely be less than we originally estimated.
In fact, NATO will be inheriting a great deal of usable

During the Cold War these levels of capabilities would have been bad
news stories, but today they are all good news stories. What I am
attempting to demonstrate is that we are increasingly impressed by the
levels of readiness, understanding, and initial success of the
invitees in working toward NATO interoperability. These capabilities
will contribute to driving down the need for NATO common-funded
improvements once they become members of NATO. These capabilities are
generally higher than we assumed in our February study on the
requirements and costs of enlargement. I'm convinced, as we delve
deeper into the circumstances in these countries, we will discover
more examples of infrastructure capabilities either inherited from the
Cold War or built up over the past three years through the Partnership
for Peace.


We will, of course, likely also find some deficiencies -- especially
regarding personnel, specialized training, communications, and the
levels of funding for force modernization. While the three cannot be
expected to "fix" everything by 1999, each must have a serious program
that lays out a defined path toward the enhancement of their defense

We have told each invitee that its highest priority should be
investing in quality personnel. They must develop effective systems
for recruiting and retaining good troops. Key to this is the
development of an effective NCO (Non-Commissioned Officer) corps. The
next priority is training -- including English language training --
for personnel and equipment are meaningless without adequate training.
The next priority is achievement of a real degree of interoperability
with NATO, including communications, logistics, infrastructure for
reinforcement, and air defense.

While it is clear that each of the invited nations must undergo
modernization of major weapons systems in the years ahead if it is to
remain a contributor to overall alliance security, acquiring high tech
weapons systems should not be a high priority.

These three countries are working hard to demonstrate that they are
ready for membership in NATO. After the Madrid Summit, I traveled to
Budapest while the President and Secretary Albright traveled to Warsaw
and Prague. We made these trips not only to congratulate them but to
remind them that the journey to Alliance membership had just begun,
not ended. In the past month Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs Kramer has traveled to each of the
invitees to discuss their preparations for membership. Each of these
nations wants to be a contributor to, not just a consumer of,
security. They are already contributing to the security of Europe by
restructuring and modernizing their militaries to operate with NATO,
by serving with our soldiers in Bosnia, and by helping to make a
success of the Partnership for Peace.

Each country has some work to do, The Czechs for example, in their
original DPQ responses to NATO, did not commit enough of their forces
to NATO missions but their most recent response commits virtually all
of their forces to NATO. Their future budgets need to allocate greater
resources for defense; they have promised to increase their defense
budget, currently 1.7% of GDP, to 2% by the year 2000. While both
Poland and Hungary have had similar deficiencies they are overcoming
them. Hungary has increased its budget and Poland has an extensive
fifteen year plan. I am encouraged by the rapid Czech response to our
and NATO's constructive criticism during the past few weeks.


The NATO staff work I have been outlining for you, when forwarded to
ministers in December, will provide the basis for a more refined
assessment of the costs associated with NATO enlargement. In order to
support the Congress' review of issues associated with enlargement, I
will, as I stated in my 16 October letter to Senator Stevens, provide
you with an update based on these NATO efforts in early 1999.

Once the military requirements and cost estimates are agreed to in
December, we will move forward to make good on the commitment
undertaken by national leaders at Madrid that, "the resources
necessary to meet (the costs of enlargement) will be provided." Three
weeks ago in Maastricht, at the informal NATO defense ministerial, I
led the discussions on this issue.

I reminded my colleagues that at our defense ministerial in June, we
all pledged to play our full part: 1) in preparing the nations invited
to join NATO for their future roles and obligations as alliance
members; 2) in providing sufficient resources to maintain the
alliance's ability to perform its full range of missions; 3) in
implementing the alliance's decisions to further enhance its relations
with partners; and 4) in acknowledging that, "the admission of new
members ... will involve the alliance providing the resources which
enlargement will necessarily require." These commitments were
reaffirmed at the Summit in Madrid, where our Heads of State agreed:
1) that there will be costs associated with the integration of new
members; 2) that these costs will be manageable; and 3) that the
resources necessary to meet these costs will be provided. There was no
disagreement on this topic among my colleagues in Maastricht. Still
under discussion is whether that portion of the direct costs of
enlargement which are a shared responsibility must result in a dollar
for dollar increase in the NATO common budget -- or whether some can
be offset by reductions in lower priority programs currently in the
common budget. We continue to believe that additional resources will
be required.

We will keep you informed over the coming months as this discussion


Let me turn to the topic of burdensharing. Both the U.S. and our NATO
allies have made big cuts in our defense budgets since the end of the
Cold War. But, using the key indicators of burdensharing, as set by
Congress, most of our NATO allies still make very substantial
contributions to the common defense. For example, more than two-thirds
of the troops participating in SFOR are non-U.S. forces.

We believe the allies can and should do more to improve their
capability for this sort of mobile, flexible operation NATO will need
to be ready for in the future. Most have already made improvements,
and are committed to more. For example, Britain provides NATO's only
rapidly-deployable corps headquarters committed to NATO and British
forces are the backbone of the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid
Reaction Corps (ARRC). The U.K. also has the capability to deploy and
sustain a division-sized force of 20 to 25,000 personnel in a Gulf
War-style scenario.

France, in general, is restructuring its armed forces to be more
mobile and easily deployable. The French are establishing a Rapid
Action Force (FAR) designed for rapid response in both European and
overseas contingencies. France also participated heavily in IFOR
efforts to implement the Dayton peace accords in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. With nearly 10,000 troops, France was the third largest
troop contributor, after the U.S. and Britain, and was responsible for
one of the three geographic sectors -- and continues to be in SFOR.

Likewise, Germany is standing up a Rapid Reaction Force of some 53,000
fully- equipped troops from the Army, Navy and Air Force. The first
units stood up in 1996 and the force will be fully capable in 1998. In
general, German armed forces are in the process of re-creating
themselves into a mobile, deployable -- rather than static home
defense -- force.

The smaller European nations are also improving their forces. For
example, the Royal Netherlands Navy and Air Force have improved both
their transport and air defense capabilities with new procurements
such as: two KDC-1O transport/tankers (the Dutch can now deploy their
own F-16s without reliance on the U.S.); an amphibious-lift ship to
make the marine brigade self-deployable; and upgrades to their F-16
fleet and their Patriot systems.


Before I leave the topic of costs, I would like to reiterate what the
President said in the Administration's February report: the costs of
enlargement must be balanced against the costs of not enlarging. If we
fail to seize this historic opportunity to help integrate, consolidate
and stabilize central and eastern Europe, we may pay a much higher
price later. If NATO fails to enlarge, the risk of instability or
conflict in the region would rise, with far reaching consequences for
the U.S. and our allies. The most cost effective way to guarantee the
stability of the region is to do so collectively with our European
partners through NATO.

The bottom line is that alliances save money. Collective defense is
more cost effective than national defense. NATO will allow the three
invitees to acquire the same degree of security their western European
neighbors already enjoy and to do so at a lower cost than would
otherwise be the case and enhance our own security in the process.


Mr. Chairman, if this century has taught us anything, it has taught us
that our security is inextricably tied to peace and security in
Europe. We must hold up the lamplight of history so that we do not
stumble on the footpath to the future. Most importantly, we can
promote U.S. interests by increasing the security and stability of
Europe. In so doing, we are building the Europe of the 21st Century in
Europe, whole, free and at peace.



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