October 22, 1997   
This Date's Issues: 1302 • 1303 • 1304 1305 1306 1307

Johnson's Russia List [list two]
#1303
22 October 1997
davidjohnson@erols.com

*******

>From United States Information Agency
21 October 1997 

TEXT: SECSTATE BEFORE SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE ON NATO 


(Albright says enlargement costs will be reasonable) (5360)

Washington -- The costs of enlarging NATO will be "reasonable and
equitably shared," Secretary of State Albright told the Senate October
21.

During a hearing before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Albright
provided no specific numbers for the cost of including Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO. But she cautioned against
"false economies" and urged that the United States "spend no less than
we need to keep NATO strong."

"We will not shortchange NATO's effectiveness or its necessary
investments in military readiness," she said.

According to Albright, "the first and most important principle is that
the amount we and our allies pay for a larger NATO must be a function
of concrete military requirements." The deciding factor, she said,
should be "bang, not buck."

Albright advised that the United States, in its discussions with NATO
allies, "should focus on defining the level of military capability we
want our old and new allies to have in this changed security
environment, and then making sure that they commit to that level."

Albright explained that the apportionment of NATO costs will continue
as it is now: The United States will pay 25 percent of NATO costs;
while the allies -- old and new -- will pay the other 75 percent of
the common funded costs.

Albright pointed out that when the leaders of the 16 current NATO
members met in Madrid this July, "they stated clearly in their final
communique that a larger NATO would carry costs, that those costs
would be manageable, and that they would be met."

The Secretary of State assured the Senators that the new NATO entrants
are currently enjoying growing economies and "have time to achieve a
mature military capability."

She noted that "all three have pledged to increase the percentage of
GDP they spend on their armed forces. And we have seen clear signs
that all three have the political will to carry out that commitment."

Following is the State Department text, as prepared for delivery:

(begin text)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman

As Prepared for Delivery

October 21, 1997

Statement by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
Senate Appropriations Committee
October 21, 1997

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I am very pleased to come
before you today, together with Secretary Cohen, to urge your support
for the admission of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to NATO.

This initiative is the culmination of years of hard work -- by the
United States, by NATO, and by the new democracies that wish to join
our Alliance. All 16 NATO leaders have approved it. Many members of
Congress have urged it.

Now the process of advice and consent has begun, and the fate of NATO
enlargement is in your hands. Our friends in Europe and around the
world are watching you. For they know that the United States is unique
in the power our constitutional system grants to the Senate over
foreign policy, especially over treaties.

I welcome this, because I know that the commitment NATO enlargement
entails will only be meaningful if the American people and their
representatives understand and accept it.

That is why I am glad, Mr. Chairman, that you have begun these
hearings at such an early stage in the process, and why I am happy
that you will be joined in your examination by the Foreign Relations,
Budget, and Armed Services Committees, by the NATO Observers' Group,
and by the House of Representatives.

I am hopeful that with your support, and after the full national
debate to which these hearings will contribute, the Senate will
embrace the addition of new members to NATO. I also know that before
you decide, the Administration must continue to address many
questions.

As appropriators, you will be highly focused, and rightly so, on the
issue of costs. And as appropriators, I know you believe that the cost
of any public initiative must be justified by its benefits. I want to
explain today how America will benefit from the investment we ask you
to make, and why I believe the costs will be reasonable and equitably
shared.

Let me begin by asking you to recall the situation America faced in
the world during the first year of this decade. The Cold War had
ended. Our nation would no longer face a single, overriding threat
concentrated along a well defined frontier in Europe. Many people
wondered -- and I know this is one of your concerns, Mr. Chairman --
whether we needed to continue paying such close attention to Europe
and NATO in the face of new challenges and opportunities in Asia.

But we did not lose sight of our interests across the Atlantic. Two
world wars in this century already taught us that when Europe and
America stand apart, we always pay a terrible price. What is more, we
recognized that the triumph of freedom in Europe did not mean we could
take its security for granted.

Before long, we saw Russia, with our help, build the foundations of a
modern market democracy; but we knew and still know that its success
is not assured. We saw war and genocide spread across the former
Yugoslavia; only our leadership of a NATO coalition put an end to that
horror. On Europe's horizon, we saw rogue states develop dangerous
weapons that might have our allies within their range and in their
sights. We knew enough from history and human experience to know that
a grave threat, if allowed to arise, would arise.

In that first year of the post-Cold War era, another event proved the
importance of our transatlantic partnership. American troops were sent
to the Gulf to lead a coalition against a tyrant's aggression. And
with us stood soldiers, sailors and aviators from virtually all our
NATO allies -- joined, I might add, by men and women from some of the
brand new democracies of central Europe. We were reminded then that
when we are faced with new challenges, it helps to have old friends at
our side.

If a serious challenge were to develop in Asia or elsewhere, Mr.
Chairman, the last thing we would need is instability in Europe -- and
the first thing we would want is for our European allies and partners
to stand with us. Indeed, whatever challenges the future may bring, it
will be in our interest to have a vigorous and larger Alliance with
those European democracies that share our values and our determination
to defend them. It is that conviction we ask you to embrace today.

We recognize that NATO expansion involves a solemn expansion of
American responsibilities in Europe. As Americans we take our
commitments seriously, and we do not extend them lightly. Any major
extension of American commitments must advance our fundamental
national interests. Let me explain specifically why welcoming the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into NATO meets that test.

First, a larger NATO will make us safer by expanding the area in
Europe where wars simply do not happen. This is the productive paradox
at NATO's heart: By making clear that we will fight, if necessary, to
defend our allies, we make it less likely that our troops will ever be
called upon to do so.

Now you may say that no part of Europe faces any immediate threat of
armed attack today. That is true, for the first time in all of
European history -- in part because the existence of NATO has helped
deter such a threat. And the purpose of NATO enlargement is to keep it
that way.

It is also fair to ask if our interest in preventing war in central
Europe is vital enough to justify a security commitment. Some imply it
is not. But let us not deceive ourselves.

The United States is a European power. If we have an interest in the
lands west of the Oder River, then we surely have an interest in the
fate of the 200 million people who live in the nations between the
Baltic and Black Seas. We waged the Cold War in part because these
nations were held captive. We fought World War II in part because they
had been invaded. We know that half a continent cannot be secure if
the other half is in turmoil.

Now that the nations of central Europe are free, we want them to
succeed and we want them to be safe. For if there were a major threat
to the security of their region, if we were to wake up one morning to
the sight of cities being shelled and borders being overrun, I am
certain we would choose to act, enlargement or no enlargement.
Expanding NATO now is simply the surest way to prevent that kind of
threat from arising, and thus the need to make that kind of choice.

Mr. Chairman, the second reason why enlargement passes the test of
national interest is that it will make NATO stronger and more
cohesive. The Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs are passionately committed
to NATO and fully accept its principles of shared responsibility.
Experience has taught them to believe in a strong American leadership
role in Europe. Their forces have already risked their lives alongside
ours from the Gulf War to Bosnia. Recently, Czech soldiers joined our
British allies in securing a police station from heavily armed Bosnian
Serb extremists.

When the President went to the Madrid summit in July, he insisted that
NATO invite only the strongest candidates to join now. We settled on
three nations that will make a tangible military contribution to the
Alliance, three nations that have been our dependable partners ever
since they won their freedom -- from the fight against nuclear
proliferation, to our effort to reform the U.N., to our support for
human rights -- three nations that will be good allies.

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic do not look at NATO as a one
way street of reassurance. They are asking to assume the obligations
of mature democratic statehood and to start taking responsibility for
the freedom and security of others. That is an offer we should not
refuse.

Mr. Chairman, the third reason why a larger NATO serves our interests
is that the very promise of it gives the nations of central and
eastern Europe an incentive to solve their own problems. To align
themselves with NATO, aspiring countries have strengthened their
democratic institutions. They have made sure that soldiers answer to
civilians, not the other way around. They have signed 10 major accords
that taken together resolve virtually every potential ethnic and
border dispute in the region.

I know that some of you have been concerned that a larger NATO might
involve us in border and ethnic conflicts such as the one in Bosnia.
On the contrary. The decision to expand the Alliance has encouraged
the resolution of exactly the kind of disputes that might have led to
future Bosnias. In fact, the three states we have invited to join NATO
have resolved every potential problem of this type.

I have been a student of central European history and I have lived
some of it myself. When I see Romanians and Hungarians building a
genuine friendship after centuries of enmity, when I see Poles,
Ukrainians and Lithuanians forming joint military units after years of
suspicion, when I see Czechs and Germans overcoming decades of
mistrust, when I see central Europeans confident enough to improve
their political and economic ties with Russia, I know something
remarkable is happening.

NATO is doing for Europe's east precisely what it did for Europe's
west after World War II. It is helping to vanquish old hatreds, to
promote integration and to create a secure environment for economic
prosperity.

This is another reminder that the contingencies we do not want our
troops to face, such as ethnic conflict, border skirmishes, and social
unrest are far more easily avoided with NATO enlargement than without
it. And if such contingencies were to arise, let me remind you that
NATO operates by consensus, and that the NATO treaty preserves a role
for our judgment and constitutional process in deciding how to
respond.

In short, Mr. Chairman, a larger NATO will make America safer, NATO
stronger, and Europe more peaceful and united. That is the strategic
rationale. But I would be disingenuous if I did not tell you I see a
moral imperative as well. Indeed, there is no contradiction here
between realism and idealism, between pragmatism and principle,
between security and justice.

NATO defines a community of interest among the free nations of North
America and Europe that both preceded and outlasted the Cold War.
America has long stood for the proposition that this Atlantic
community should not be artificially divided and that its nations
should be free to shape their destiny.

We should also think about what would happen if we were to turn new
applicants away. That would mean freezing NATO at its Cold War
membership and preserving the old Iron Curtain as its eastern
frontier. It would mean locking out a whole group of otherwise
qualified democracies simply because they were once, against their
will, members of the Warsaw Pact.

Why would America choose to be allied with Europe's old democracies
forever, but its new democracies never? There is no acceptable answer
to that question. Instead, it would probably be said that we blocked
the aspirations of our would-be allies because Russia objected. And
that, in turn, could cause confidence to crumble in central Europe,
leading to a search for security by other means, including arms
buildups and competition among neighbors. This would be the price --
the very high price -- of not enlarging NATO.

We have chosen a better way. We have chosen to look at the landscape
of the new Europe and to ask a simple question: Which of these nations
that are so clearly important to our security are ready and able to
contribute to our security? The answer to that question is before the
Senate, awaiting your affirmation.

Mr. Chairman, I know I do not need to tell you that our security has
never come without a price. So let me address the very real costs that
this initiative will entail.

Last February, at the behest of Congress and before we had decided
which nations to invite to membership, the Administration made a
preliminary estimate of the total costs of a larger NATO. We projected
how much our new allies would need to spend to adapt and modernize
their militaries, the investments our old allies would need to make to
extend security commitments eastward, as well as the direct costs
related to enlargement, including those that would be covered by
NATO's three common funded budgets.

Since then, we have settled on three candidates and we are gaining a
much clearer understanding of the capabilities they will bring to the
Alliance. NATO staff are now assessing the resource implications of
enlargement for NATO's common funded budgets -- civil, military, and
infrastructure. That assessment will be submitted to us and the other
NATO ministers for approval at the December ministerial meeting of the
North Atlantic Council.

This process is important because the conclusions it reaches about the
commonly funded cost of enlargement will represent more than just
another estimate. They will represent a commitment.

NATO is also engaged in an intensive effort to determine the level of
forces our current and future allies will need to put at the disposal
of the Alliance to meet their new commitments. The NATO cost study
will not place a price tag on these military improvements, which are
national responsibilities. But the requirements it defines will be
part of NATO's next round of force planning, which will begin next
spring.

I can assure you that we will continue to approach this process with
several basic principles in mind.

The first and most important principle is that the amount we and our
allies pay for a larger NATO must be a function of concrete military
requirements. Our discussion in these hearings, and our consultations
with our allies, should focus on defining the level of military
capability we want our old and new allies to have in this changed
security environment, and then making sure that they commit to that
level.

This may seem counterintuitive, Mr. Chairman, but it now appears, as
we examine the assets and infrastructure our new allies bring to NATO,
that the commonly funded cost of integrating their armed forces will
turn out to be lower than we estimated in February.

Either way, the deciding factor will be bang not buck. If we can
integrate these nations into the Alliance, maintain NATO's
capabilities and acquire the new ones we need at a lower cost than we
expected, that will be good news. But we must also be wary of false
economies and spend no less than we need to keep NATO strong. We will
not shortchange NATO's effectiveness or its necessary investments in
military readiness. Even as we work to ensure this initiative does not
cost too much, we will also be careful that it does not end up costing
too little.

A second principle is that costs within NATO's common funded budget
must be equitably shared. The United States pays about 25 percent of
these costs. That will not change. Our allies pay roughly 3/4 of
NATO's costs today. And that will still be the case in a larger
Alliance, as old and new allies will pay 75% of the common funded
costs.

A third principle is that each ally, old and new, must do its share at
home to meet its military obligations to NATO and to preserve the
credibility of NATO's security guarantees. NATO's members contribute
in many different ways, from the United States, with our unequaled
military arsenal, to Iceland, which provides bases, but no army.
Still, NATO is a collective defense Alliance. We need to know that at
moments of crisis, each member will be able to deliver on its
commitment to help defend new allies.

Mr. Chairman, the President, Secretary Cohen and I have been making
these points loud and clear to our current and future allies. Our
message has been received. As a result, I am confident that the costs
of a larger Alliance will be real, but affordable, and that NATO will
emerge from this process with its military capabilities as strong and
credible as ever.

Let me explain why I feel so confident, with respect to our new and
old allies alike.

First of all, I know many of you are worried that Poland, Hungary and
the Czech Republic may not be able to pull their weight in NATO. As we
all know, just 10 years ago they were members of the Warsaw Pact.
Their militaries are not as advanced as those of most NATO allies.

I know that you, Mr. Chairman, have expressed concern that we will
have to fund a massive program of assistance to help these countries
meet their new obligations, just as we used the Marshall Plan and
military assistance to help our original NATO allies half a century
ago.

I can assure you this will not be necessary. These countries do not
face the kind of threat our allies faced in the 1950s. They have time
to achieve a mature military capability. After taking a hard look at
what they already bring to the table, we have no doubt they are on
their way to meeting that goal.

What is more, these are not ruined nations recovering from the
devastation of a hot war. If you go to Budapest, Prague and Warsaw you
will see some of the most vibrant economies in Europe. These economies
have grown by an annual average of 4% in the last three years, and
that trend is likely to continue for some time. Each of these nations
is a member of the OECD, which admits only the most advanced
industrial economies. Each has graduated, or is about to graduate from
our SEED aid program, because they just don't need that kind of help
any more.

In fact, Poland now funds its own military assistance program to
support its neighbors, Ukraine and Lithuania. It has expanded its
global responsibilities by joining KEDO, which funds the dismantlement
of North Korea's nuclear weapons program. All three of these nations
have paid their own way to send troops to Bosnia and to other trouble
spots in Africa, Latin America, and Asia.

All three have pledged to increase the percentage of GDP they spend on
their armed forces. And we have seen clear signs that all three have
the political will to carry out that commitment.

Poland already has the most advanced armed forces in the region. The
Polish government recently unveiled a 15 year defense plan, which
includes substantial resources for further modernization. There was no
controversy whatsoever on this issue during Poland's recent election
campaign.

The Czech government has pledged to increase defense spending by .1%
of GDP a year for the next three years. It recently unveiled a new
budget that completely fulfills that commitment, and it did so after
this summer's costly flooding disaster. As a result, Czech defense
spending will rise by 17% next year -- about the equivalent of a
one-year $40 billion increase in America's defense budget. The Czech
Republic still has much work to do, but it is clearly committed to
getting the job done.

Hungary has also committed to increase defense spending by .1% of GDP
a year over the next five years. And while Hungary may not yet be in
NATO, NATO is already in Hungary. More than 100,000 American troops
have passed through NATO bases in that country on their way in or out
of Bosnia. The Hungarian parliament approved NATO's request to use
Hungarian territory within 72 hours of being asked. Without
hesitation, Hungary has fulfilled its responsibilities as the supply
lifeline for the largest and most complex deployment in NATO's
history.

Some people have argued that these new democracies should not be asked
to bear additional military burdens at a time when they are still
undergoing difficult economic transformations. But these nations plan
to spend roughly 2 percent of GDP on defense, a figure in line with
the defense burden shouldered by many NATO countries, and one that
their dynamic economies can readily sustain without neglecting other
priorities. They will be modernizing their armed forces in any case,
and they understand that in the long run, it will be cheaper to do so
within NATO than outside it. NATO's prospective members know they will
not have to fend for themselves if peace is threatened in their
region. This gives them a reason to avoid mortgaging their future on
the arms market. In fact, it has already given them the confidence to
support new limits on conventional arms in central Europe.

Ultimately, only the people of these countries can decide what is best
for their future. Today, in all three, solid public majorities and
every mainstream party support membership in NATO. They are telling us
they see no contradiction between security and prosperity, and we
should not substitute our judgment for theirs.

Mr. Chairman and members, I know that many of you are equally
concerned, if not more so, about the willingness of our old allies to
meet their commitments to a larger NATO. Many of our western European
allies are facing economic difficulties of their own. Many are
reducing public spending so they can participate in a single European
currency.

Fiscal constraints are well known to this committee. But when the 16
allied leaders gathered in Madrid in July, they made a commitment.
They stated clearly in their final communique that a larger NATO would
carry costs, that those costs would be manageable, and that they would
be met.

I am confident that our allies will pay their fair share of the
commonly funded costs of enlargement because we are going to determine
those costs together. NATO's history gives us ample reason to believe
that once we set a long term goal together, we will meet it together.

As for our allies' national defense spending, that is something that
we obviously cannot control. But they understand the need to ensure
that their armed forces can meet the new commitments NATO is taking
on. What is more, some of the costs we expect our allies to incur
would need to be faced even if NATO were not growing, since they would
in any case have to adapt their power projection capabilities to meet
new challenges. Enlargement simply underscores the issue. So I believe
that over time they can and will take the necessary steps.

I am confident that our allies are not going to be free riders on
American leadership in central and eastern Europe because, frankly, up
to this point they have not been. The western European countries have
committed over $80 billion to support the central European democracies
through the end of the decade. The European Union has invited five
central European countries, including two that are not being
considered for NATO membership, to begin the process of joining its
ranks. America's efforts on behalf of democracy and peace in the world
are unparalleled, but in this region our European allies are making
substantial contributions.

Our European allies' commitment to the cause of a larger, stronger
NATO is as deep as ours, and that is no surprise. They need this
Alliance. They provide the majority of its ground troops. Over the
course of history, they have provided the battlefield. They have the
greatest possible stake in seeing our initiative succeed.

Mr. Chairman, those are my reasons for confidence. I base my
assessment on my experience as Secretary of State in dealing with our
current and future allies in Europe, as well as on the experience of a
lifetime before that. I base it on my best judgment of what the
immediate future may bring. But you know, there is one piece of
equipment that I do not have at the State Department, although I hope
one day the Appropriations Committee will fund it: and that is a
crystal ball. None of us can know precisely what challenges we will be
facing in Europe 10 or 20 or 50 years down the road.

As you know, President Clinton has pledged that the process of
enlargement will continue after 1999. A new round of enlargement will
carry cost implications that we cannot predict today. I can assure
you, however, that the Senate would still have to ratify the admission
of any additional members. Any new costs would have to be approved by
the entire Congress.

I understand that for the Congress, our experience in Bosnia
introduces another element of uncertainty. I acknowledge that our
mission in that country has cost more than the Administration
originally estimated. But I honestly believe that the circumstances of
NATO enlargement are different.

It is intrinsically difficult to predict the cost of an overseas
military deployment in a potentially hostile setting. It is virtually
impossible to plan for every contingency, and once our troops are on
the ground, we have a moral obligation to give them the support they
need, even if it exceeds our original expectations. The costs of NATO
enlargement, on the other hand, are more straightforward; they are
budgeted in advance and we have a veto. We do not run our Alliance on
supplemental appropriations.

I know history offers other reasons to doubt our ability to predict
future costs. You have reminded us, Mr. Chairman, that when NATO was
created, Secretary of State Acheson was asked by Senator Hickenlooper
of Iowa if it would require the permanent stationing of American
troops in Europe. He replied it would not. Today, you understandably
fear that history will repeat itself.

If you were to ask me today whether our continuing commitment to NATO
requires the continued stationing of U.S. troops in Europe, my answer
would be yes. We made that decision decades ago and reaffirmed it
after the Cold War. If you were to ask me if our commitment to a
larger NATO will require expanding our military presence across the
Atlantic, my answer would be that in the current and foreseeable
security environment in Europe, we simply see no need, and nor do our
future allies.

But I agree that this story is instructive. It helps us remember that
when we decided to keep our troops in Europe in the 1950s, it was not
just to meet a formal obligation. We did so because there were new
signs of communist expansion in the world, because we were concerned
about the survival of democracy in Europe, and because it was in our
national interest to meet that threat.

I do not believe we will face such a threat in Europe in the
foreseeable future. If I am proven wrong, and we are called upon to
send troops to defend our new allies, the cost of defending a larger
NATO would obviously grow. But then, if such a dire threat were to
arise, the cost of our entire defense budget would grow, whether we
enlarge NATO or not. If I am wrong about our allies' willingness to
pay their share of the costs, that too is a problem we would face with
or without enlargement. For if our interest in the fate of Europe's
newly free nations were put at risk, we would not stand idly by,
whether we had a formal treaty commitment to defend Poland, Hungary
and the Czech Republic or not.

The effect of NATO enlargement is to state plainly in advance what we
would in any case wish to do if the security of central Europe were
threatened. In this way, it is more likely that we will be able to
deter such a threat from ever arising. And our friends in the region
will gain the confidence and the time they need to build strong,
stable, prosperous democracies.

That is why I am more comfortable facing an uncertain future with a
larger, stronger NATO than I would be were NATO to stand still. I
believe, as President Vaclav Havel so crisply put it when he came to
Washington earlier this month, that "even the most costly preventive
security is cheaper than the cheapest war."

So as you consider the cost issue, Mr. Chairman, I ask you to consider
that there is an even more fundamental issue at stake. It is the value
of military alliances to America's security and the importance of our
partnership with Europe.

Here is the strongest, most successful, most dependable Alliance
America has ever had. Here are three democracies that wish to share
the responsibilities of that Alliance. Here are three nations that I
believe will help us bear the cost of defending freedom, in Europe and
beyond, because they know the cost of losing freedom.

In the conduct of foreign policy, we are often preoccupied with
crisis. We spend much of our time managing disagreements with nations
that do not see the world exactly as we do. In a world where attention
to what is wrong often drowns out attention to what is right, we must
take care not to forget our friends. We must not take for granted
those upon whom we can rely.

Mr. Chairman, the first commandment of foreign policy is much the same
as the first commandment of politics: Secure your base. Indeed, across
the whole scope of human activity, from the life of the family and the
neighborhood, to the politics of our nation and the world, when we
want to get something done, we start by banding together with those
who are closest to us in values and outlook.

That is why we cultivate our partnership with Europe. That is why we
seek to extend that partnership to those newly free nations that have
always been our allies in spirit, if not in fact. We do so not just to
advance our interests across the Atlantic, but because we need
dependable democratic allies to advance our interests in every part of
the world.

*********