October 22, 1997   
This Date's Issues: 1302 • 1303 • 1304 1305 1306 1307

Johnson's Russia List
#1307
22 October 1997
davidjohnson@erols.com

{Note from David Johnson:
1. Fred Weir in Moscow reports on CIS meeting in Moldova.
2. Moscow Times: Michael McFaul, Skewed NATO Debate.
3. Stanislav Menshikov: No surprise. (Re Yeltsin and Duma).
4. Albert Weeks: The new old Yeltsin.
5. Rob Silva: Re 1299-Weir/Foreign Policy.
6. Renfrey Clarke: RUSSIAN LABOUR'S AUTUMN OF DISCONTENT.
7. WP: Sarah Mendelson, Next Up For Reform: Russia's Military.
8. David Culp: Good news from the Russian Duma. (Re chemical
weapons convention).
9. Jamestown Foundation Monitor: YELTSIN WINS HANDS DOWN.
10. RFE/RL NEWSLINE: EXPERT SAYS RUSSIA HAS 1 MILLION HOMELESS 
CHILDREN.
11. RIA Novosti: COMMUNIST PARTY LEADER GENNADY ZYUGANOV CLAIMS 
OPPOSITION'S WITHDRAWAL OF NO-CONFIDENCE MOTION WAS "CONSTRUCTIVE
STEP."
12. RIA Novosti: KPRF FACTION'S WITHDRAWAL OF NO-CONFIDENCE VOTE 
IN GOVERNMENT SIGNIFIES "GOVERNMENT MADE COMMON CAUSE WITH LEFT
OPPOSITION", FEELS GRIGORY YAVLINSKY.
13. RIA Novosti: ILYUKHIN: MANY MEMBERS OF COMMUNIST FACTION 
DISSATISFIED WITH THE WAY THE ISSUE ON NO-CONFIDENCE WAS SOLVED.
14. Interfax: Russian Duma Initiates New No-Confidence Motion.
(Baburin).]

*******

#1
From: fweir.ncade@rex.iasnet.ru
Date: Wed, 22 Oct 1997 14:51:51 (MSK)
For the Hindustan Times
From: Fred Weir in Moscow

MOSCOW (HT Oct 22) -- The organization that replaced the
Soviet Union holds a full summit Thursday in the Moldovan capital
of Kishinev. But despite a packed agenda many analysts are
wondering whether the Commonwealth of Independent States has any
useful function -- or any future -- at all.
"The CIS survives mainly through inertia, because its actual
accomplishments are virtually nil," says Vladimir Petukhov, an
expert at the Institute for Social and National Problems.
"It is mainly a forum for maintaining a kind of symbolic
unity between countries which are increasingly going separate
ways."
The CIS is a loose confederation embracing the former Soviet
republics of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgizstan, Uzbekistan,
Turkmentistan and Tajikistan. 
The union was formed in December 1991 to manage the
dismantlement of the USSR. But there has never been agreement
among the members over what sort of new order should emerge. 
Some, like Ukraine, have tended to view the CIS as a
temporary stepping stone to joining Western organizations, such
as the European Union and NATO. Others -- Kazakhstan for example
-- have spoken of building a "Eurasian Union" or similar
permanent economic, political and security alliance of states.
Despite numerous summits and grand declarations of unity,
such fundamental disagreements have thwarted implementation of
even the most basic measures.
"We had great hopes, but the practice has been lagging far
behind, especially in the field of customs law," ITAR-Tass,
Russia's official news agency, quoted President Boris Yeltsin's 
press spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky as saying.
Leaders of all 12 member states except Turkmenistan, whose
president pleaded illness, will address a huge agenda in
Thursday's meeting, including easing of border and customs
controls, standardization of of transport fees and common air
defence.
But the only real dynamic appears to be the creation of
smaller, like-minded groups within the largely symbolic structure
of the CIS. 
Russia has formed a close alliance with neighbouring
Belarus, which includes a full customs union, common citizenship,
joint political structures and movement toward a single currency.
On Wednesday President Yeltsin met in Moscow with leaders of
three CIS countries who share Russia's vision of fast-track
integration -- Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgizstan -- to work out
joint tactics for the full CIS meeting.
Mr. Yeltsin defended the formation of smaller groups as a
force for unity within the CIS, and an engine for faster
integration.
But other CIS states may see it as big Russia manipulating
smaller states for its own advantage.
"Ukraine is very worried about Russian-Belarus moves toward
unity," says Mr. Petukhov. "Because Ukraine has a huge pro-
Russian minority of its own, it sees this as a way of putting on
political pressure.
"These stresses could break up the CIS in the near future."

******

#2
Date: Tue, 21 Oct 1997 17:42:44 -0700
From: Michael McFaul <mcfaul@leland.Stanford.EDU>
Subject: Skewed NATO Debate

Moscow Times, October 21, 1997
Skewed NATO Debate
By Michael McFaul

Michael McFaul is a Hoover Fellow and Assistant Professor at Stanford
University and a Senior Associate at the Moscow Carnegie Center

As the debate on NATO expansion moves to the more public and open setting
of senate hearings this month, we will begin to hear the true motivations
behind those for and against extending the alliance to the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland. From the right, senators will declare that they favor
NATO expansion as a hedge against a possible Russian threat to Europe in
the future. From the left, senators will argue that they oppose NATO
expansion because the move eastward will help nationalist forces within
Russia and thereby damage U.S.-Russian relations. 
Both of these arguments will do more damage than good to American
interests in Europe. Both overestimate the positive and negative effects
of NATO expansion. By focusing exclusively on one component of our policy
in the region, both arguments also deemphasize other more central aspects
of our relations with postcommunist Europe. Ironically, at a time when we
have the unprecedented possibility to engage with the former Warsaw Pact
countries in non-military arenas, the NATO expansion debate has recast our
policy in the region in military terms. 
Traditional conservatives generally see NATO expansion as an insurance
policy against a possible return of a military threat emanating from
Russia. The history of war in the region and the shadow of guilt from
World War II (when we left allies like Poland to be colonized by the Soviet
Union) provide strong motivations for this kind of argument. The
probability of a Russian invasion of Europe is remote. But from a moral
or ethical point of view, it is hard to make the case that Poland or
Hungary do not have the right to become NATO members. 
Yet, NATO today has the potential to be more than just a military
alliance. As an institution, NATO has acted a stabilizing force between
member states in the past and can play a similar role in central Europe.
More importantly, NATO already has expanded its scope of activities by
establishing cooperative relations with non-NATO members through the
Partner for Peace program and the Founding Act signed between Russia and
NATO. By engaging non-NATO members into cooperative relationships, these
new NATO institutions can serve to obviate the threat from the East and
thereby decrease the likelihood of American soldiers actually having to go
to battle to secure Poland's borders. 
Traditional liberals generally see no need for NATO expansion. If Russia
is no longer our enemy, why do we need to spend hundreds of millions of
dollars to prepare for a war that will never occur? Moreover, liberal
leaders have pointed out that NATO expansion helps our nationalist and
communist enemies within Russia. Though presently out of power, these
forces might win the next presidential election in Russia precisely because
of foreign policy issues like NATO expansion.
Like the stark arguments provided for NATO expansion, the logic driving
this stance against NATO expansion also places the focus of our policy in
the wrong place. While overly concerned about how NATO expansion might
help nationalists and communists in Russia, these opponents of NATO
expansion have not devoted a commensurate level of attention to thinking
about how the United States should and can assist Russian democrats. 
While Russia passed a major milestone by holding elections for parliament,
president, and regional leaders in the last two years, the Russian
political system is still far from a liberal democracy. The separation of
powers between the executive and legislative branches of government is
still skewed, political parties are weak, civil society is demobilized, the
rule of law does not exist, and the media is becoming less independent, not
more. More generally, Russia has few institutions that propagate
democratic values. Russia boasts dozens of new business schools, but not
one public policy school. While my department of political science offers
roughly twenty courses a year on issues of democracy, Moscow State
University has one. Likewise, there is no standard civics course taught in
Russian secondary schools, and no textbook on post-communist Russian
government. The recent passage of law restricting religions freedoms
demonstrates that Russian democrats are still engaged in a protracted
battle to consolidate democracy in Russia. 
The United States can do a lot to assist in all of the areas. As senators
prepare to approve spending millions to expand NATO, they should devote
similar funds to promoting democracy in Russia. After all, let us not
lose sight of the critical factor that made this debate about NATO
expansion possible. While NATO has proven to be an extremely successful
institution over the last half century, NATO ultimately did not end the
Cold War; the collapse of communism and the emergence of democracy in
Russia did. Europe will be divided again if and only if democracy fails in
Russia and communist or nationalist forces assume power there.
Consequently, Europe's best guarantee for unity and peace is the
consolidation of Russian democracy. Alliances did not save Poland in 1939
from the ambitions of authoritarian dictators. While we should do all that
we can to deter a future threat to our new European allies, military
defense is only half of an effective game plan. A political offense in
support of Russian democratic institutions and Russian democrats also must
be part of the strategy. 

*******

#3
Date: Wed, 22 Oct 1997 05:42:45 -0400
From: Stanislav Menshikov <menshivok@globalxs.nl>
Subject: No surprise

Dear David:
This is a short comment on your note in JRL 1304 of Oct. 22
>DJ: I admit to surprise. Both the tone of October 
>Yeltsin's radio talk and the subsequent conciliatory developments
>are unexpected. Why is this happening? Is this a "new" Yeltsin?
>Time for pundits to earn their JRL.

This development is surprising only to those who have failed to see
the new alignment of opposition forces in Russia that occurred in the last
few months, namely the emergence of a wide informal political block which
includes the communists, Rokhlin's army movement, the rising strength of the
governors and the Russian Senate (remember my pieces about its June session
which proclaimed Chubais's policies unsatisfactory and also quotes from
Stroyev's article), and the continuing struggle of most of the banking
oligarchs to unseat Chubais and Nemtsov which makes part of the
bank-controlled media (particularly TV) critical of the president and the
government (but excluding Chernomyrdin). Add Yavlinsky's liberal opposition
and you have a rare and unprecedented anti-Yeltsin informal coalition. 
As a result, Yeltsin who came back from his July vacation with plans
for a third term and destroying the Duma all over, has been forced to recede
and agree to some "reconciliation". There is no way he could win in this
situation. The story of his alleged omnipotence which has been spread
by most Western media is simply in conflict with the facts.
Yeltsin, of course, is a sly political player who knows when to
recede but who always has revenge and counter-attack on his mind. Remember
his defeat in December 1992 when he had to fire Gaidar and in April 1993
when he narrowly avoided being impeached. Those two episodes explain much of
what happened in September-October 1993 when he shelled the parliament.
The situation right now is very different from what it was in
October 1993. There was no organised communist party at that time and no
communist-dominated parliament at that. The parliament was lead by Mr.
Khasbulatov, who was NOT a communist and happened to be a Chechen by ethnic
origin (and therefore not particularly popular with the Russian population).
There was no organised opposition movement in the army, no independently
elected local administrators, no Senate, and business was solidly behind
Yeltsin. The radical reformers (Gaidar-Chubais) were then politically
prominent, but are now in disarray (they even lack an organised faction in
the Duma and have tiny representation in both houses of parliament). Even
then, in 1993, Yeltsin was within a hairbreadth of defeat. Today his defeat
was practically certain.
So in the coming weeks and months Yeltsin will pretend to conciliate
and will work for consolidating his position and trying to break up the
unofficial front which he faces today. All this in order to strike back when
he feels that the time is right. As the French say, " Reculer pour mieux
sauter" ("Take a step backward in order to make a bigger jump"). Lenin loved
that phrase, and remember, Yeltsin is a deep rooted Leninist, in political
tactics if not in ideological principles.

*******

#4
Date: Wed, 22 Oct 1997 05:11:30 -0400
From: Albert Weeks <AWeeks1@compuserve.com>
Subject: The new old Yeltsin

Do you know your W. C. Fields, a Yeltsin look-alike? In one of his
movies, he stays at a hotel known as the "New Old Lompoc House." We're
seeing, I think, a new old Yeltsin. "Old," because of another aspect to Mr.
Yeltsin's makeup--his "volleyball" personality. As we know, Yeltsin takes
that sport very seriously, both as an erstwhile player as well as a coach.
Sports, as we know, mirror and also affect cultures and the personalities
of their zealots (cf. anthropologist Geoffrey Gorer, et al.). 
Now, in volleyball there are moments when the play calls for the
tactic of an offensive "spike": players at the net mercilessly smacking
("spiking") the ball downwards at a violent clip. The driven ball is all
but impossible to return by the other side (hence, by analogy, October
1993). But a different set of circumstances during the play may demand
gentler tactics: e.g., the "lob." This is when a "hot ball" is kept aloft
adroitly by Team A before it is returned "conventionally" over the net
toTeam B. 
This is precisely where the (political) "game" is now as Yeltsin
views it: pre-Nov. 7 80th anniversary with a loaded-for-bear Team B out to
defeat Yeltsin's Team A both in the Parliament and on the streets.
Dissolving the Duma (letting the ball return to Team B), which
would be a risky, unpopular move according to the Russian opinion polls, is
not a good tactic and could bring an unexpected "rebound." Aggravating the
political situation with anything resembling a "spike" likewise is
precluded by the fact that the public has enough creature worries without
going out to the polls--what? again. Yeltsin calculates that the population
may be ready to hear a purring president speak in dulcet, politically
mature, good-sportsman tones. In any case, as long as the ball is kept from
the other side by Team A by delaying tactics and lobbing, Team B can't make
trouble. Hence, Yeltsin's "new" forthcomingness.
This is the appearance Mr. Yeltsin at this time wishes to convey.
There's an old Russian saying: "Vidno ptitsu po polyotu." "A bird is known
by its flight"--ergo, a person is judged by his behavior and actions.

*******

#5
Date: Wed, 22 Oct 1997 02:34:57 -0400
From: rsil2694@uiacc.uri.edu (Rob Silva)
Subject: Re: 1299-Weir/Foreign Policy

In various commentary regarding the current situation in Russia, there
is a turn with which we are familiar; clearly, and in the tradition of
an oft beleagured nation, Russia has returned to her paranoid autocratic
tradition. While I don't necessarily disagree with the reasons for
Russia's souring stance toward the United States, I do feel it necessary
to call attention to the anti-american rhetoric unleashed by Mr.
Yeltsin. In the language of the Marxist-Leninists, he is arguing that
the United States seeks to set herself into a state of hegemony over the
world. This I believe is a misperception. Further, we can see in the
case of Nikitin, who is charged with treason for publicising the
ecologically disasterous northern fleet, that iron-fisted constant
mobilisation of the people. Perhaps Stalin is still holding on here. 
We have an enemy within and without. It seems that once again, the
names only have changed. But then again, perhaps i oversimplify, and in
that oversimplification have lost something.

*********

#6
Date: Wed, 22 Oct 1997 18:26:21 +0400 (WSU DST)
From: austgreen@glas.apc.org (Renfrey Clarke)
Subject: Russian labour's autumn of discontent

#RUSSIAN LABOUR'S AUTUMN OF DISCONTENT
#By Renfrey Clarke
#MOSCOW - Unpaid in many cases for months, large numbers of
Russian workers are spoiling for a fight. After record-setting
levels of strike activity during the first half of 1997, the
autumn has seen a renewed rise in labour struggles. The bitterest
of these disputes - in the Maritime District of the Russian Far
East during September - brought much of the regional economy to a
near-standstill.
#In almost all these struggles, wage arrears have been a key
element. But in a growing number of cases, the clashes have also
involved issues that are familiar fare for labour activists in
the West. Amid the pressures of the capitalist market, employers
are making increasingly blunt calls for long-established benefits
to be surrendered and for jobs to be slashed. The traditional
relationships of the Russian workplace, based on paternalism and
on concepts of ``partnership'' between management and labour, are
slipping into history.
#If statements by union leaders are to be believed, the changes
in the industrial climate will now be reflected in a major shift
of orientation by Russia's mass labour organisation, the 50-
million-member Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia
(FNPR). Talking to journalists in mid-October, FNPR chairperson
Mikhail Shmakov indicated that the FNPR's strategies were now
being redirected away from attempts to influence federal
government authorities. Instead, the emphasis would be on winning
disputes with specific employers, mainly in the provincial areas
where most Russian industry is located. ``The centre of the
struggle for the rights of workers now has to be shifted to the
regions,'' the newspaper <I>Trud<D> on October 15 quoted Shmakov
as saying.
#According to figures from the State Statistics Committee, the
number of strikes in Russia in the first half of this year was
five times greater than in the corresponding period of 1996. The
number of participants was up by three times, amounting to about
3 per cent of Russia's total employed population. By far the most
numerous group among the strikers were teachers, who in some
cases had gone unpaid for more than six months.
#Concern in the Kremlin at the potential for labour revolt
increased in March when the FNPR called an all-Russian day of
protest, around demands that included the prompt payment of back
wages. The labour federation claimed that as many as two million
workers joined in the protests, either striking, demonstrating or
participating in workplace meetings.
#After this, the government's attitude to unpaid budget-sector
workers became more accommodating. A presidential decree in July
ordered all back wages to state employees to be paid by January
1. On September 1 Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Sysuev claimed that
the government had begun ``intensive work'' to pay off the wage
debts to teachers.
#Sysuev insisted, however, that half the funds for back wages
would have to be found by the authorities in Russia's 89
administrative regions. Meanwhile, large numbers of teachers
refused to front up to classes until their wages were brought up
to date. Russia's main education trade union reported that when
the educational year began on September 1, some 1130 schools were
shut because of strikes.
#Forcing tax arrears out of large corporations, and selling off
state assets, the government has in fact made big inroads into
the budget-sector wage debt. There are doubts, however, that this
debt will be reduced much further; federal tax collection in the
first nine months of this year was only 52 per cent of target.
Meanwhile, the overall wage backlog has not fallen significantly.
In recent months it has been more or less static at 54-55
trillion rubles (about US$9.2 billion).
#With workers across broad swathes of industry still denied their
earnings, labour actions have resumed strongly after the
customary summer lull. The Moscow daily <I>Nezavisimaya Gazeta<D>
on October 4 spoke of ``almost incessant'' strike activity in
various regions of the country. In the Kuzbass heavy industrial
region of Siberia, coal miners struck during September in the
cities of Prokopyevsk and Berezovsky. The most notable actions,
however, have been in the Maritime District.
#Notorious for its erratic, populist leadership and corrupt
administration, the Maritime District has long suffered from
problems with its energy sector. Here, the impact of non-payments
by district authorities and federal military installations has
been augmented by losses due to a criminalised energy wholesaling
system; the latter has allowed resellers to cream off much of the
revenue from electricity sales. As a result, both power station
workers and the coal miners who supply the district's generating
facilities with fuel have gone unpaid for long periods.
#On August 11 the 3000 workers at the Luchegorsk open pit, which
provides 40 per cent of the Maritime District's coal, stopped
loading supplies for non-paying customers. On September 14 all
extractive activities at Luchegorsk were halted. Workers in the
district's other mines then stopped loading coal. On the evening
of September 16 more than 500 miners and energy workers picketed
administrative offices in the district capital, Vladivostok. As
energy officials debated whether to burn winter coal reserves,
power station repair workers joined in the stoppage. Power cuts
in Vladivostok soon reached twelve hours per day.
#The Luchegorsk miners went back to work on October 1 after
receiving 17 billion rubles ($2.9 million) in back wages, and
after federal officials had intervened with moves to reform the
Maritime District's energy payments system.
#Another recent victory has been scored by Russian air traffic
controllers. On September 29 members of the Federation of Trade
Unions of Air Traffic Controllers began an indefinite national
strike over wage arrears and efforts by the Federal Aviation
Service to cut annual leave entitlements. About 50 airports were
affected. The strikers' triumph was swift; an hour after the
stoppage began, aviation service chiefs agreed to the workers'
demands.
#Relatively few workers in Russia have the strategic muscle of
the miners or air traffic controllers. Often, their most
effective weapons are pickets, hunger strikes, and bluntly worded
denunciations of government policy. Typical of such protests have
been actions in recent weeks by scientific workers.
#Nuclear weapons designers and assemblers, who are legally banned
from striking, have held protest meetings and threatened
stoppages in at least three centres. The nuclear workers charge
that pay delays of three and four months, together with shortages
of essential funding, are jeopardising safety. On October 1
thousands of researchers of the Russian Academy of Sciences
picketed government offices in a long series of cities. As well
as calling for increases in the allocations for science in the
1998 federal budget, the scientists were demanding that the
government pay debts to the academy still owing from 1996.
#An ominous political sign for the government has been labour
ferment in the 1700 enterprises of the devastated ``military-
industrial complex''. The government owes the defence plants some
19 trillion rubles (US$3.2 billion), and the plants in turn owe
their workers the equivalent of close to a billion dollars in
back wages. Defence workers held protest meetings and pickets in
numerous Russian cities during the second half of September. In
Moscow several hundred representatives of defence enterprise
labour collectives picketed federal government offices for three
days from September 22.
#The tempo of labour struggles now seems to be accelerating.
Interviewed by the news agency RIA-Novosti on October 2, FNPR
secretary Andrey Isaev reported that 13 of the federation's
territorial and sectoral affiliates were calling for indefinite
strikes. These affiliates included trade union federations in St
Petersburg and Murmansk; in Yaroslavl, Sverdlovsk, Omsk and
Sakhalin provinces; and in the Altai district of Siberia. Also
demanding resolute strike action were workers in the defence,
radio-electronic and aviation industries. Another 14 affiliates
pledged their willingness to organise protest marches, rallies
and pickets.
#In the more notable labour actions this year, the ultimate
targets have mostly been the federal government and its austerity
policies. But more than 80 per cent of wage debts are now owed by
privatised companies, allowing the government and its supporters
to claim that workers are misdirecting their protests.
#To win payouts from private firms in the past, FNPR unions have
mostly sought to join with management in placing pressure on the
government. Together with enterprise directors, union leaders
have called on the state authorities to pay for goods delivered
and to grant subsidies or other forms of relief. Meanwhile,
workers have often been convinced that the ``inability to pay''
of these employers has been fraudulent.
#The approach to defaulting employers obviously needs to be much
tougher, and to listen to FNPR leaders, an age of determined,
factory-by-factory struggles for wage arrears is now to dawn.
Outlining the FNPR's new orientation at the beginning of October,
federation secretary Isaev noted that it was no longer rare for
unions in Russia to take on private employers in more-or-less
classic industrial disputes. Isaev cited struggles at the Ryazan
Electronic Devices plant south-east of Moscow, where workers are
demanding the dismissal of the director, and also at the
Novomoskovsky Household Chemicals plant in Tula Province, 200 km
south of the Russian capital. The Novomoskovsky plant has been
taken over by the US firm Procter and Gamble, which is trying to
shut down several production sections and cut 700 employees.
#The union at the Novomoskovsky plant has fought the bosses tooth
and nail, but it remains to be shown that the FNPR leadership is
correspondingly serious. The FNPR leaders have not, for example,
posed an obvious demand: that non-paying employers hand over all
their financial records for scrutiny by workers. At best, Shmakov
and his colleagues seem intent on leading their fight against
delinquent employers from behind, coordinating initiatives taken
by local union bodies.
#Meanwhile, labour activists have been dismayed to find that the
FNPR has not called another all-Russian day of protest for the
current autumn. This is despite the fact that the government's
wage debt remains massive. The FNPR leadership's shift thus looks
suspiciously like an excuse to relax the pressure the federation
has until now placed on the government, while failing to develop
serious campaigns in other areas.
#Derelictions by the FNPR leaders will not necessarily have the
effect of demobilising worker activism. The thinking of Russian
workers may now be reaching a point where no efforts to stifle
workplace militancy would have much effect. For months, the pro-
government media have been trumpeting the argument that the
economy has ``bottomed out'', and that recovery is at hand.
Although there is no hard evidence of material improvement,
surveys point to a lift in the popular mood. In the history of
economic depressions in the West, it has been at this point, when
confidence in the future has begun to revive, that millions of
workers have decided: ``Now there has to be something for us!''
#Paradoxically, the lack of vigorous leadership from the FNPR is
causing some of the more thoughtful supporters of Russian
capitalism real disquiet. ``Convinced of the powerlessness of
their trade union leaders,'' <I>Trud<D> wrote on September 18,
``workers are beginning to look for defenders in the ranks of
left political parties, among extremist figures and groups.''
#Fears that radicalised workers will flock into the ranks of the
Stalinist-nationalist opposition are almost certainly misplaced.
But in conditions of rising confidence and militancy, the
increasing politicisation of the Russian labour movement is
inevitable. The autumn and winter hold the prospect not just of
big, hard-fought strikes, but also that workers will make
progress toward creating a political leadership that defends
their interests consistently and effectively.

*********

#7
Washington Post
22 October 1997
[Too significant to ignore but destroy after reading]
Next Up For Reform: Russia's Military
By Sarah E. Mendelson (sarahm@ceip.org) 
The writer is a resident associate at the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace. 

If American policymakers want to help ensure a democratic future for 
Eastern Europe, then they should focus on helping ensure a democratic 
future for Russia. If American policymakers see the condition of Eastern 
European militaries as an important aspect in determining this future, 
then they should view the condition of the Russian military as equally 
important. As senators debate NATO expansion, they should support a next 
phase of U.S. democracy assistance to Russia aimed at military reform.
A few years ago, many in Russia and in the United States believed that 
the establishment of an electoral process should be a major priority; 
indeed, some called it an obsession. Despite all the naysayers and much 
doom and gloom, several national elections have been held, political 
parties are developing, the parliament generally functions, and a large 
cohort of Russian political consultants have experience running national 
campaigns. According to many Russians, Western efforts helped Russia 
achieve this goal.
In addition to the development of political parties through competitive 
elections, initial American (and European) efforts at assistance focused 
on encouraging the development of other institutions, such as an 
independent media and judiciary and public interest advocacy groups. 
While nothing about the process of democratization is easy or perfect, 
the diffusion of ideas and ideals affected how such institutions have 
developed. The United States should continue democracy assistance, but 
the focus should now shift to an important institution that was left 
largely untouched by the first wave of assistance: the Russian military.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, two dangerous dynamics have 
characterized the Russian military: politicization, with many men in 
uniform serving as deputies in the parliament, and a stark decline in 
professionalism, where suicide, hunger and insubordination are 
increasingly routine. These dynamics are in part due to the fact that 
the defense sector has been deeply and adversely affected by the 
government's policy of economic reform. Not surprisingly, this situation 
is seen by many in Russia as unacceptable. Recently, it led Gen. Lev 
Rokhlin, chairman of the State Duma's Defense Committee, to form the 
movement "In Support of the Army, Defense Industry and Military 
Science," a growing nationwide political group that taps into military 
dissatisfaction and that of various opposition parties, including the 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation. As is, the military is the 
largest institution in Russia that is the least reformed; the condition 
of the military poses a threat to the democratization process in Russia.
What can U.S. efforts do to change the situation? They cannot rebuild or 
reform the military, but as in other types of democracy assistance, they 
can make a difference. The Pentagon's program designed to reduce the 
nuclear threat in Russia (called Cooperative Threat Reduction, or CTR) 
has included small amounts of money to promote democratization in the 
defense and military sectors. The focus has been on efforts to build 
support for political reform, to expose the different branches of the 
Russian military to the nature of civil-military relations in a 
democratic state and to institutionalize professional relationships with 
counterparts in democratic states. These efforts are particularly 
important when geared to both the junior- and senior-officer level; 
transformative relationships and experiences should affect the 
generation that will be influencing policy for the next 20 years as well 
as the one that is making policy today. Of the $1.8 billion allocated 
between 1992 and 1997 to CTR, however, only about $50 million has been 
spent on these types of efforts. In contrast, the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (AID) allocated $44 million in 1994 alone to 
democracy initiatives in Russia.
A first-line response would be to increase and expand the important work 
the Pentagon has been doing with CTR for several years. CTR's main 
mission to de-nuclearize Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus and the safe 
demobilization and storage of 4,700 nuclear warheads in the region has 
been largely successful. While CTR should and will continue to support 
the safety and security of Russian nuclear weapons and nuclear 
materials, funding should increasingly be directed toward supporting 
efforts at reform within the Russian armed forces.
Additionally, AID and its democracy initiatives in Russia should 
coordinate with the Department of Defense and add a component that 
specifically addresses civil-military relations in Russia and the proper 
role of the military in a democratic state.
Multilateral institutions offer important opportunities to work with 
Russia on military reform. The Permanent Joint Council, set up under the 
NATO-Russia Founding Act, provides opportunities for officers from the 
alliance to meet and develop contacts with Russian military officers. 
Topics of universal concern include defense budgeting, public relations, 
legislative relations, social problems within the armed forces, problems 
associated with the transition from a conscript to a professional 
military and the role of noncommissioned officers.
Civilian and military decision-makers at the highest levels in both the 
United States and Russia must assign the highest priority to straight 
talk about the state of the Russian military. As Grigory Yavlinsky, the 
Russian reformist politician, recently told U.S. policymakers on a visit 
to Washington, American influence in Russia has declined and will 
continue to decline unless American policymakers are willing to take a 
more "open and honest approach" about the difficulties involved in 
reform. This means talking in 1997 about the perilous state of the 
military and the need for immediate reform in the same way that American 
decision-makers talked in 1995 and 1996 about the necessity for Russian 
elections to take place.
Former secretary of defense William Perry characterized spending Defense 
Department dollars in Russia to reduce the nuclear threat as "defense by 
other means." U.S. efforts to ensure that Russia's military assists 
rather than impedes democratization are just that.

********

#8
Date: Wed, 22 Oct 1997 08:05:16 -0400
From: DCulp@nrdc.org (David Culp)
Subject: Good news from the Russian Duma
Good news from the Russian Duma

While there are conflicting reports, it appears that as of yesterday 
(Tuesday, October 21) the Russian Duma has scheduled a ratification 
vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) for Thursday, October 
30. Observers believe the treaty has the votes to be adopted.

If that vote is positive, the Russian Federation Council will vote on 
CWC ratification on Tuesday, November 11. There the treaty has more 
support. Treaty ratification in Russia requires a simple majority vote 
in both houses.

If the CWC is ratified, the Yeltsin administration plans to push for 
START II ratification by the end of December, when the Duma adjourns 
for a winter recess.

Keep your fingers crossed.

| David Culp | E-mail: dculp@nrdc.org | 
| Plutonium Challenge | Tel. +1 (202) 289-2388 | 
| Washington, D.C. | Fax +1 (202) 289-1060 |

*******

#9
Jamestown Foundation Monitor
22 October 1997

YELTSIN WINS HANDS DOWN. The Communist faction in the Russian Duma decided
yesterday to withdraw the parliamentary vote of no-confidence in the
government that it and its nationalist and agrarian allies had been
threatening to hold today. It did so after President Boris Yeltsin promised
to consult parliament leaders on a regular basis, doubled the amount of
airtime given to parliament on state-controlled television and radio, and
withdrew his government's controversial tax code for reworking. The latest
confrontation between Yeltsin and the Duma is over. (RTR, October 21)

The opposition is claiming a victory for reason and common-sense, but it
emerges considerably weakened from the contest. As soon as the Yabloko
faction announced last week that it intended to put forward its own
no-confidence motion and would not support the Communist-drafted one, it
became doubtful whether the Communists and their allies could win a
no-confidence vote. By making conciliatory noises, Yeltsin offered the
opposition a dignified way to climb down from what looked increasingly like
a no-win situation. The opposition could either have voted no-confidence in
the government, in which case Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin said he
would immediately resign. That would have opened the way for Yeltsin to
dissolve parliament and for a general election in which the Communist party
might, at best, lose ground to supporters of more radical leaders such as
Aleksandr Lebed, or, at worst, split itself into radical and moderate
factions. Or opposition leaders would suffer the humiliation of calling a
no-confidence vote and losing it. Yeltsin offered them a dignified way out
of this dilemma and they have accepted it gratefully. 

In so doing, the Communists have put themselves in Yeltsin's debt in return
for little but airy promises. Yeltsin has promised extraconstitutional
consultations which are entirely at his discretion. The "Big Four" and
"roundtable" are toothless mechanisms with no constitutional grounds to
enforce their decisions. They sideline parliament, strengthen the president
still further, undermine the constitution, and slow Russia's progress toward
an accountable democracy. Yeltsin has made it clear all along that he will
not part with his unpopular first deputy prime minister, Anatoly Chubais, or
change the basic principles of his economic policy. This is not because
Yeltsin is fond of Chubais but because, for the present, he has no-one so
skillful to do what he wants done. In return for Yeltsin's concessions, the
Communists have had to drop their demand for a much needed change in the
constitution to water down the powers of the president. They have also
agreed to pass the 1998 federal budget by the end of this year. 

Yeltsin's agreement to withdraw the draft tax code and refer it to a
parliament/government conciliation commission is a concession not to the
Communists, but to Yabloko. The tax code was drafted in a great hurry and
even government sources admit that it could be improved. The Duma had
already approved the tax code in the first reading, on June 19, subject to
the government's pledge to revise it. Yeltsin's promise to recall it removes
the ground from Yabloko's threat to press ahead with its no-confidence vote,
while giving the government an opportunity to improve the faults in the
draft to which Yabloko has drawn attention.

********

#10
RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol 1, No. 144, Part I, 22 October 1997

EXPERT SAYS RUSSIA HAS 1 MILLION HOMELESS CHILDREN. Aleksei
Severnii, the president of the Independent Association of Children's
Psychiatrists and Psychologists, told Interfax on 21 October that
there are at least 1 million homeless children in Russia. (According to
the State Statistics Committee, Russia's population was 147.2 million,
as of 1 August.) Severnii estimated that Moscow and St. Petersburg
each have some 60,000 homeless children, not including the
offspring of refugees and immigrants. He added that the State Youth
Committee has estimated that 40 percent of children suffer from
psychological or physical violence from teachers. In 1996, he said,
200 children were killed by family members and some 2,000
committed suicide.

********

#11
COMMUNIST PARTY LEADER GENNADY ZYUGANOV CLAIMS OPPOSITION'S
WITHDRAWAL OF NO-CONFIDENCE MOTION WAS "CONSTRUCTIVE STEP"
By RIA Novosti correspondent Alexandra Utkina
MOSCOW, OCTOBER 22, RIA NOVOSTI - Communist Party (KPRF)
leader Gennady Zyuganov has expressed the view that the
opposition's withdrawal of a motion of no-confidence in the
government "was a constructive step". 
Speaking at a news conference in Moscow today, he noted
that the left opposition, by doing so, "laid down the foundation
for peaceful solution of the country's systemic crisis".
His view is that "the Leninist party would have done the
same".
The Communist leader reaffirmed the left's intention "to
act at grassroots levels, through picketing" if their demands
are ignored by the executive branch of government. 
Zyuganov credited the handling of the Duma situation to his
faction, saying that "it is the first time in Russia that the
popular patriotic opposition has been not only recognised, but
proved to be one of the country's leading political forces".
"Contrary to all comments, we forced the authorities to
heed the people's voice and address its needs," he claimed. 
After labelling State Duma deputy Sergei Baburin's
intention to begin collecting signatures for a repeat motion of
no-confidence in the government as "an open farce", he remarked
that the opposition was soon going to draft its next proposals
on a coalition government. 
Zyuganov expressed hope that the 10 million people who
signed the opposition's civic protest would appreciate the
Communist faction's step. 
A statement from the presidium of the Communist Party and
its State Duma faction, which was circulated among journalists
today, says that the Communists expected their decision to be
backed by Communists "and all patriots and express confidence
that most of the Russians are well aware that the main duty and
main job of State Duma deputies were and remain to be
safeguarding the country's interests, of Russian statehood, and
the working people's interests." 

*******

#12
KPRF FACTION'S WITHDRAWAL OF NO-CONFIDENCE VOTE IN
GOVERNMENT SIGNIFIES "GOVERNMENT MADE COMMON CAUSE WITH LEFT
OPPOSITION", FEELS GRIGORY YAVLINSKY
By RIA Novosti correspondent Alexandra Akayeva
MOSCOW, OCTOBER 22, RIA NOVOSTI - Withdrawal by the
Communist Party, or KPRF, faction of a no-confidence vote in the
government is evidence that "the government has teamed up with
the left opposition".
This is the conclusion formed by Duma Yabloko faction
leader Grigory Yavlinsky as he was interviewed in the corridors
of the State Duma after the session.
He emphasised that it was now perfectly clear that the KPRF
was the main assistant of the government.
Yavlinsky observed that the Yabloko faction, actively
urging no confidence in the government, "is not backing down
from its stance".
"We still have 53 signatures, and as soon as the total
comes to 90, we will launch a fresh process," stressed
Yavlinsky. 
He expressed doubts, however, if that could be done in the
near future. 

******

#13
ILYUKHIN: MANY MEMBERS OF COMMUNIST FACTION DISSATISFIED
WITH THE WAY THE ISSUE ON NO-CONFIDENCE WAS SOLVED
MOSCOW, OCTOBER 22 (RIA NOVOSTI CORRESPONDENT YULIYA
PANYUSHKINA). "All passions on the issue on no-confidence in the
government have been calmed down in the Duma communist faction,
everything what was possible to tell people on this issue was
said at the Saturday plenum and at the faction sessions,"
representative of the communist faction in the State Duma Viktor
Ilyukhin told a RIA NOVOSTI correspondent. However, despite the
fact that the faction has taken the decision to take off the
issue on no-confidence in the government having realized and
coordinated it, "in their souls many members of the faction have
remained dissatisfied by the tactics of solution of this
problem."
Ilyukhin believes that the opposition "could receive more
weighty guarantees of fulfilment of its demands from the
government and the presidents." However, neither the communists,
nor their supporters "do not intend to surrender and are ready
to behave rather toughly and tactfully in a dialogue with the
executive power."
As for the position of the parliamentary chamber, which has
supported the communists` decision to remove the issue on
no-confidence in the Cabinet from the agenda by the overwhelming
majority, this is explained by the authority of the communist
faction and by the fact that "deputies of the State Duma listen
to its opinion," Ilyukhin assumed. "Everybody understands quite
well that it is impossible to solve the problem on confidence or
no-confidence in the government without our faction," he
emphasized. 

*******

#14
Russian Duma Initiates New No-Confidence Motion

MOSCOW, Oct 22 (Interfax) - The Popular Rule faction in the State Duma
initiated another process of collecting signatures for a no-confidence vote
in the government. 
The Communist party faction Wednesday morning withdrew the
no-confidence issue from the Duma agenda. However, Popular Rule leader and
Duma Deputy speaker Sergei Baburin and his supporters made public another
no-confidence statement proposing deputies sign it. The initiators of the
motion said they want to "reaffirm their unchanged position on the
currently most important political problem in the country." 
"We are convinced the government of [Prime Minister Viktor]
Chernomyrdin, [First Deputy Prime Ministers Anatoly] Chubais and [Boris]
Nemtsov together with "President Boris" Yeltsin are fully responsible for
the catastrophic situation in the country and the grave drawbacks in the
economy and the social sphere, in the domestic and foreign policy," their
statement reads. 
This government "must be immediately dismissed" as a result of its
activity, Baburin said. The authors of the statement said they did not
cancel their signatures under the current motion of no-confidence in the
Cabinet Ministers. The deputies, including Communist Party members Tatyana
Astrakhankina and Nikolai Bezborodov strongly denounced the decision to
withdraw the motion of no confidence in the bankrupt government from the
agenda.
"This decision is a grave strategic mistake of the leftist opposition.
It is a vivid example of an outcome triggered by the faulty practice of
constant maneuvering and unjustified concessions," the statement reads.
The decision would lead to serious consequences for the leftist
opposition in the first place. It will contribute to its further political
degradation and discrediting in front of the people, the statement reads. 
Asked by Interfax, Baburin said their aim was to collect 300 signatures
of the Duma deputies under this statement. Baburin said they did not inform
the Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov of the initiative as they "were
never subordinate to him." 

********
-