November 21, 2000   

This Date's Issues:   4645 • 4646

Johnson's Russia List
#4646
21 November 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Vek: Stanislav Tarasov, WORLD AFTER COLD WAR. Will a New Sanitary Cordon Be Established Around Russia?
2. St. Petersburg Times: Masha Kaminskaya, Starovoitova Case Given 'Real Chance' 
3. Reuters: Putin to seal regions' defeat with new advisory body.
4. Financial Times (UK): Putin takes a tilt at Russia's 'power vertical': Andrew Jack on the Kremlin's attempt to bring regional barons to heel.
5. The Independent (UK) editorial: Mr Blair must tell Mr Putin some blunt truths in Moscow.
6. Wall Street Journal: Alan Cullison, Russian Liberal Parties Stumble In Effort to Create an Alliance.
7. Peter Lavelle: Russia in the Shadow of America's November.
8. BBC Monitoring: Putin honoured by university at anniversary celebrations. (Bauman U.)
9. Bloomberg: UES Chief Chubais Seeks State Endorsement of Plans.
10. The Times (UK): Villagers cowed under rule of fear. Alice Lagnado hears Chechen villagers talk of a life of terror in a war that Moscow says is over.
11. Trud: HOW MANY PATRIOTS IN THIS COUNTRY. (poll)
12. Rossiiskaya Gazeta - Biznes v Rossii: RUSSIAN PRESIDENT TRUSTED MORE AS HE OVERCOMES DIFFICULTIES. (poll)] 

*******

#1
Vek
No. 46
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
WORLD AFTER COLD WAR
Will a New Sanitary Cordon Be Established Around Russia?
By Stanislav TARASOV

The geography of Russian President Vladimir Putin's latest 
foreign visits to Europe, Central and Southern Asia clarified a 
new tendency. Moscow is trying to strengthen its influence in 
the periphery of the axis linking the United States, Europe, 
Russia and Asia. An attempt is being made to implement the 
so-called multi-polar world concept. However, frequent clashes 
between the major players in the so-called periphery harboring 
main world reserves of natural deposits hinder the shaping of 
the "new configuration of the international political space." 
Meanwhile the peripheral countries are less than eager to 
become objects of someone's policy. Vivid examples include the 
issues of the future of Kosovo and its Albanian population and 
the refusal of the Central Asian leaders to seek a new "big 
brother." On the other hand, this circumstance gives grounds 
for certain foreign political scientists together with 
"practicing politicians" to maintain that Russia's current 
course runs counter to Western partners. The point of view has 
become popular in influential circles worldwide that the 
Russian leadership is allegedly trying to make a certain 
breakthrough, believing that Russia was "locked" around the 
perimeter of its current territory.
Therefore, serious attempts were made to thwart Moscow's plans 
for regional cooperation (notably its union with Belarus). Its 
presence in the Caucasus and Central Asia also meets opposition 
even if leaders of these countries had asked for Russian 
assistance.
What options does Moscow have? There is an apprehension 
that Russia's new "strategic partners" will put pressure on it 
in the framework of the West-East formula. The opposite is 
unlikely.
Then it would be logical for both the West and the East to 
express an interest in Russia's deposits. However, they would 
expect Russia's ability to establish peaceful strategic and 
tactical coalitions to diminish.
Under a different scenario, Russia would prove its 
competence in structuring areas around itself. The nascent 
stabilization of Russia's economy triggered the interest of 
Western partners in working in the Russian goods and services 
market. It has become obvious that only Moscow is able to 
control "hot-spots" and ensure a stable access to natural 
deposits.
Russia is able to avert such "emergencies" as the Taliban 
invasion, inter-state and inter-ethnic conflicts and eliminate 
the expressions of international terrorism in CIS countries. 
The question is whether Russia is prepared for this role and 
wants to assume it. In the meantime, the "sanitary cordons" 
will certainly be replaced by reasonable cooperation.
There is a third option. If mutual dissatisfaction and 
animosity between the West and the East grow Russia may wish to 
isolate itself. History might set a new trap for it. Then "a 
cold peace" with foreign political friends may be transformed 
into a hot battle with "internal enemies." 

******

#2
St. Petersburg Times
November 21, 2000
Starovoitova Case Given 'Real Chance' 
By Masha Kaminskaya
STAFF WRITER

After two years of investigation into the assassination of prominent State 
Duma Deputy Galina Starovoitova, the Federal Security Service said this week 
that there is a "real chance" that the case will be solved.

The announcement, which came on Wednesday, followed a report in an Estonian 
paper last week that said detectives had traced the weapon used to kill 
Starovoitova to a criminal gang operating in Estonia.

With both Estonian and Russian officials playing down the report, however, 
some of those who have followed the investigation are skeptical of the latest 
development, saying that similar statements have been made before with no 
results.

Sergei Kuznetsov, deputy head of the investigative department of the St. 
Petersburg branch of the FSB, said Wednesday that the investigation "is going 
according to plan, and [the case] has a real chance of being solved," in 
remarks reported by Interfax.

Kuznetsov's statement was backed up by Alexei Vostretsov, head of the St. 
Petersburg FSB's press service, on Monday.

"Yes, there is a good chance of solving the case, meaning that not only the 
assassins, but the possible mastermind or masterminds of the murder will be 
apprehended as well," said Vostretsov by telephone.

"There are as yet no specific suspects, but the investigative team has 
collected enough material to start connecting leads to possible killers."

Starovoitova, who would have been 54 years old this year, was shot three 
times and killed on the night of Nov. 20, 1998, on the stairwell of her 
apartment at 91 Canal Griboyedova.

Starovoitova's aide Ruslan Linkov - now the head of the Democratic Russia 
faction's St. Petersburg branch - was with her at the time but survived the 
attack, despite being shot in the head and neck.

Investigators on the case - who include detectives from the FSB, the City 
Prosecutor's Office, the Prosecutor General's Office and St. Petersburg 
police - say they have interrogated around 800 witnesses. Kuznetsov said that 
the team had extended its investigation beyond Russia's borders. Vost ret sov 
refused to elaborate beyond the official statement.

On Monday, the team received permission from Deputy Prosecutor General Vasily 
Kolmogorov to keep the case open until May 20, 2001.

Linkov was not impressed by the FSB statement.

"For two years now we have heard about these 'real chances,' but there have 
been no real results as yet," he said in a telephone interview Monday.

"They weren't able to track the killers down [in 1998], and the only thing 
that could help them now is a lucky break. If they set one up themselves, 
we'll see they're real professionals."

Following the murder, several possible motives were sounded, ranging from 
political extremists angered at Sta ro voitova's stauch pro-democracy stance, 
to speculation that she was killed to stop her running for governor of the 
Leningrad Oblast. Rumors also flew that Starovoitova was in possession of a 
large sum of cash. None of these motives has so far been established, at 
least not publicly.

Much speculation centered on the two weapons used to kill Starovoitova. Es 
tonian daily Eesti Paevaleht reported on Thursday that both weapons - a Croa 
tian-made Agram-2000 submachinegun with an internal silencer, and a Ber retta 
Gardone handgun, which were left at the crime scene - had apparently been 
bought from an Estonian crime gang operating in the northeast of the country. 
The paper cited a source in a special anti-crime squad in St. Petersburg.

And it also quoted Estonian police commissionaire Alexander Zhegulov as 
saying that he and his colleagues were invited to consult Russian 
investigators shortly after the murder.

According to Zhegulov, a month before the assassination, St. Petersburg 
police seized three people - one of them a native of Narva, a town on the 
Estonian border - as they were trying to sell an Agram-2000, two pistols and 
a revolver. The fourth member of the gang, named Igor Kii - a reputed 
Estonian criminal ringleader and gunrunner - managed to escape and is still 
at large.

Neither Vostretsov nor Oleg Rozh kov, a spokesperson for the St. Petersburg 
Anti-Organized Crime Division, would comment on the article.

Rozhkov said, however, that while gun trade in Russia's northwest was quiter 
than in the past, there was a big increase in weapons trafficking in the 
mid-1990s, when the borders of the former Soviet union were less strictly 
guarded. Estonia, he said, had been among the major sources for illegal guns 
coming into Russia.

Terry Gander, editor of Jane's Infantry Weapons, said in connection with 
another shooting in 2000 that the Agram was a product of one of "several 
backyard industries in Croatia." Gander said the most likely reason for such 
weapons to end up in St. Petersburg was that a batch was left over "and 
flogged to the highest bidder."

He added that gun-running could have followed drug routes in Europe.

"True, international routes for weapons included Estonia in the mid-1990s," 
said Hannes Kont, an officer at the Estonian Public Safety Police in Tallinn, 
who also deals with illegal guns.

"But there were no Agrams that I know about. As for the story in the Eesti 
Paevaleht, I guess it's just speculation."

******

#3
Putin to seal regions' defeat with new advisory body
By Jon Boyle

MOSCOW, Nov 21 (Reuters) - President Vladimir Putin seals a political victory 
over Russia's powerful regional bosses on Wednesday when he inaugurates a new 
advisory body packed with men he ousted from parliament. 

Leaders from Russia's sprawling 89 regions will sit on the State Council, a 
largely toothless body set up as a sop to local leaders furious at their 
removal by Putin from the upper house of parliament. 

"First of all it is a measure of his victory," Sergei Kolmakov, deputy 
director of the Fond Politika think-tank, said of the Council's creation. 

"It's a face-saving operation for the most influential governors in the 
country," he said on Tuesday, noting their powers had been drastically 
trimmed by the new Kremlin chief. 

Russia's 89 often unruly regions amassed huge powers under President Boris 
Yeltsin, their leaders accused of regularly flouting federal laws and running 
their territories as fiefdoms. 

Putin was elected in March on a platform of restoring strong central control. 
Within weeks of taking office, he announced radical plans to oust regional 
leaders from the Federation Council upper house of parliament and replace 
them by less influential figures. 

He followed up the attack on the governors -- who often acted as 
parliamentary power-brokers between Yeltsin and a hostile State Duma lower 
chamber -- by seeking powers to sack regional bosses who broke federal laws. 

All the measures were forced through despite opposition, albeit muted, from 
regional chiefs jealous of the influence -- and immunity from prosecution -- 
membership of the upper house of parliament afforded them. 

COUNCIL WILL MEET QUARTERLY 

Political analysts say the State Council, created by presidential order on 
September 1, was devised to sweeten the pill and give regional chiefs the 
illusion of having the president's ear on important policy matters. 

The new Council's seven-strong presidium will meet on Tuesday to finalise 
Wednesday's agenda. 

Critics say the Council, which will meet quarterly, is a powerless body with 
no administration, no permanent home and no clear-cut role.Its first tasks 
will be to discuss a 10-year economic blueprint and a new national anthem. 

The previous Soviet-era tune was dumped under Yeltsin but leftists who then 
dominated parliament blocked a new text, leaving Russians with an unfamiliar 
air by 19th century composer Mikhail Glinka but no lyrics. 

Mintimer Shaimiyev, the influential president of Russia's autonomous 
Tatarstan Republic, rejected the "toothless" tag and said he hoped the 
Council would assign the regions clear powers. 

"We should define what the centre is responsible for," he told the private 
NTV channel. "And the regions should also define what they are responsible 
for." 

Shaimiyev, a reluctant convert to Putin's plans for the regions, insisted the 
governors would not wage "guerrilla war" to block the president's plans to 
reassert central control, but said each party's duties should be clearly 
assigned. 

Political analyst Andrei Piontkovsy said the State Council was designed to 
reconcile regional leaders to their loss of status. 

"It could at a later stage be made use of to eliminate the Federation Council 
altogether, and give this body some status as a second chamber, but it's not 
on the immediate agenda," he said. 

"I think they wanted to test the new scheme of the Federation Council which 
will be composed of the representatives of the governors. If it proves to be 
absolutely loyal to the (Putin) administration they will not change it." 

******

#4
Financial Times (UK)
November 21, 2000
Putin takes a tilt at Russia's 'power vertical': Andrew Jack on the 
Kremlin's attempt to bring regional barons to heel 

The Volga city of Nizhny Novgorod, site of internal exile for Soviet
dissident Andrei Sakharov in the 1980s and birthplace of a generation of
liberal economic reformers in the 1990s, is becoming a symbol of a very
different type of political transformation. 

Sergei Kiriyenko, the former prime minister and rightwing politician, was
part of that wave of reformers. This summer he returned to the city where
he grew up to make it the base for implementing one of President Vladimir
Putin's most ambitious reforms: bringing tighter federal control over
Russia's 89 regions. 

With little advance warning this spring, Mr Putin unveiled a plan to split
Russia into seven administrative "super-districts". Each oversees a number
of existing political regions, and each is controlled by a pleni-potentiary
like Mr Kiriyenko who is independent of local government and accountable
directly to the Kremlin. 

The new system could help curb the corruption and excesses of regional
governors, limit administrative differences that have emerged between the
regions, and ensure the ambitious agenda of federal policy reform is evenly
implemented. 

Yet a growing number of critics warn that it is a poorly thought-through
bureaucratic measure that will at best prove ineffective, and at worst
trigger greater corruption and a rise in political tensions. Moreover, they
suggest the way the process has been carried out reflects the lack of
political experience of Mr Putin and his administration, and their
inability to tackle serious reform. 

Mr Kiriyenko himself, whose nomination reflects his firm allegiance to Mr
Putin since late last year, expresses little doubt about the need to
strengthen what Russians call the "power vertical" between the centre and
the rest of the country. After a decade during which the governors took as
much power as they wanted under former President Boris Yeltsin, he says the
time has come for change. 

"It is virtually impossible to implement economic reform in a country where
there is no unified market and legal system," he says. As an example of the
inequalities, he highlights the situation in his Greater Volga
super-district, which oversees 15 regions, where his staff have identified
nearly 570 decrees and acts approved by the governors and regional
parliamentary assemblies in recent years that contradict federal laws. 

A few, such as the land reform code in the Saratov region, are more radical
than national legislation and may be used as models for new laws to be
discussed in the parliament in Moscow. But Mr Kiriyenko says that most need
to be modified to bring them into line with federal norms. 

Ivan Skliarov, the governor of the Nizhgorodsky region, reflects the views
of many of his counterparts in - at least publicly - endorsing Mr Putin's
initiative. "A new order was justified," he says. "We needed to bring the
president and the authority of government closer to the provinces. If they
were not brought into line, we could have been faced with separatism and
other negative consequences." 

But there are others who believe just the opposite. 

Increasingly vocal critics of the regional reforms include Eduard Rossel,
governor of Sverdlovsk, and Murtaza Rakhimov, the president of
Bashkortostan, who said this month he was "categorically opposed" to the
creation of the seven new super-districts as "unnecessary". 

To some degree, such arguments represent special pleading from governors
who want to preserve the freedoms they have won over the past decade. But
critics also warn of an anti-democratic trend in Mr Putin's regional
reforms, which they say are unnecessary and ill-suited even to the stated
objectives. 

"I don't idealise the governors, but they were elected, and they are
already influential and experienced politicians," says Sergei Borisov, a
political scientist. "There is an absolute belief in Moscow that they are
bad, but all the necessary machinery already exists to curb their powers." " 

Nikolai Fyodorov, head of the republic of Chuvashia, is even more blunt,
calling the new super-districts "an extra, undemocratic, level" which will
slow decision-making, and create more opportunities for corruption. 

He argues that Mr Putin's decision to push ahead with the regional reforms
without any significant consultation reflects his background in the
security services, "where there was a much simpler management structure,
directly subordinated to him". 

In fact, while Mr Kiriyenko had a background in business and politics, all
of his six counterparts are drawn either from the security services or the
armed forces. 

"I'm afraid this reform reproduces the mentality of the totalitarian system
of a super-bureaucratised state, which is Bolshevism in its essence," says
Mr Fyodorov. 

******

#5
The Independent (UK)
November 21, 2000
Editorial
Mr Blair must tell Mr Putin some blunt truths in Moscow 

TONY BLAIR'S talks with Vladimir Putin in Moscow today will be their fifth
meeting this year, including a visit by Mr Blair to Russia even before Mr
Putin was elected. The Prime Minister has gone out of his way to seek warm
relations with the Russian president. The warmth between the two men is
emphasised by both sides. 

Questions of global climate change and Russia's planned scaling-down of its
armed forces are on the agenda today. So far, so good. Above all, however,
the talks are about "the importance of the continuing reform programme". 

Reforms in Russia are indeed essential. It is unclear, however, whether Mr
Putin's heart is politically in the right place. So far, the signals have
been mixed at best. Mr Putin was victorious in the elections in March
partly because of the brutal war that he unleashed against Chechnya last
year.The Geneva convention has been routinely trampled. To quote the title
of a recent Human Rights Watch report on Chechnya, Welcome to Hell. 

Mr Putin said yesterday that the Chechen war was "of enormous importance".
He is right - but not in the way that he meant. Conscripts are dying daily,
and the prospect of a Russian military victory is as distant as ever. In
addition, the conduct of the war is bad news for an increasingly brutalised
Russia. 

On the freedom of the press, too, Mr Putin's performance has been dismal.
He has boasted that he is ready to beat the country's oligarchs with a
cudgel. It is surely no coincidence, however, that the only tycoons who are
seriously under attack from the Kremlin are two media magnates whose
newspapers and TV programmes have dared to criticise the regime. Now, they
are both wanted by the courts. 

Yevgeny Kiselyov, a tireless and respected television anchorman - Russia's
Jeremy Paxman - yesterday became the latest journalist to be hauled in
before the prosecutors, just days after the television channel for which he
works lost most of its independent status. Mr Kiselyov's experience is but
the latest indication that things are going badly wrong. 

It is all very well for Mr Blair's spokesman to boast that "we have
invested a lot in the relationship". But political investments only make
sense if they pay a dividend. There is no sign of that. Mr Blair must at
last speak blunt truths aloud. If he fails today to criticise Mr Putin in
connection with both the war in Chechnya and his attempted muzzling of the
media, then this trip is worse than a waste of time. 

******

#6
Wall Street Journal
November 21, 2000 
[for personal use only
Russian Liberal Parties Stumble In Effort to Create an Alliance
By ALAN CULLISON 
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

MOSCOW -- Fearful of the growing power and KGB-bred instincts of Vladimir 
Putin, Russia's two main westward-looking parties in June trumpeted their 
plans for an alliance, declaring a united front as the only way to combat a 
slide away from economic reform and Western-style democracy.

Five months on, they are still squabbling over how to unite. Grigory 
Yavlinsky, head of the liberal Yabloko party, says he is still "very worried 
by Putinism" but rules out any merger with his natural ideological allies in 
the Union of Right Forces, or SPS.

"That will never happen," says Mr. Yavlinsky. "We have differences in 
economic policy, we have differences in politics, we have differences in 
personalities."

The failure of Russia's liberals to unite, a perennial feature of Russian 
politics, has been a windfall for President Putin, who has deftly divided 
both the left and right to rule pretty much as he pleases. State-run 
television, for instance, clobbered Russia's main centrist party, 
Fatherland-All Russia, in parliamentary elections last year, and replaced it 
with a Kremlin clone, named Unity, whose main policy is obeisance to the 
Kremlin. Mr. Putin has meanwhile tamed the Communists by giving them some 
choice seats in parliament and gained the support of some liberals by 
allowing them to direct economic policy.

Two officials with close ties to the liberal party SPS -- Alexei Kudrin and 
German Gref -- have been allowed to dictate the Kremlin's economic agenda 
since spring. Anatoly Chubais, a leader of SPS, has been touted by Mr. 
Putin's inner circle as a close economic adviser to the president. "They have 
been given the keys to run the economy," said Alan Rousso, head of the 
Carnegie Center in Moscow. "As a consequence they are not as critical of 
Putin as they otherwise would be."

The disarray among opposition parties has allowed Mr. Putin to push a raft of 
long-delayed tax and spending reforms through a compliant legislature this 
summer. But this progress on a liberal economic agenda, while praised by the 
West and by lenders like the International Monetary Fund, has come at a cost 
to Russians with a westward-leaning agenda: Mr. Putin will not tolerate 
liberals who talk too much about human rights. Debate over important issues 
such as the Kremlin's attacks on the media and the brutal war in Chechnya has 
been muted.

The coziness of certain free marketeers with Mr. Putin has made other 
traditional liberals deeply resentful. Mr. Yavlinsky and his Yabloko party 
have paid particularly dearly for opposing Mr. Putin. During parliamentary 
campaigns last autumn, Mr. Yavlinsky saw his ratings plummet when he forcibly 
opposed the war in Chechnya, and called for negotiations with rebel leaders. 
One of those attacking him was Mr. Chubais, who endorsed the war and called 
Mr. Yavlinsky a traitor. The Kremlin, grateful for Mr. Chubais's support, had 
state-run television give fawning coverage to his SPS party, giving it a big 
boost in the parliamentary election.

The same channels lampooned Mr. Yavlinsky's Yabloko as the tool of Jews, 
foreigners and homosexuals. Mr. Yavlinksy came in a distant third in 
presidential elections in March. His party nearly dropped out of the State 
Duma when it barely mustered the 5% vote necessary to qualify as a 
legislative faction.

Boris Nemtsov, a leader of SPS, concedes that hard feelings remain between 
Messrs. Yavlinsky and Chubais after the elections. But he thinks both leaders 
understand their parties have little future working separately. SPS and 
Yabloko have already begun putting up joint candidates in regional elections 
for governors' seats. Results have so far been mixed. Next year, he said, he 
is hoping the parties can come to a "firm and clear agreement to present a 
single column" into parliamentary elections in 2003, and a single candidate 
in presidential elections in 2004.

"I think there's a recognition that it's getting more and more difficult for 
a party, working by itself, can bring its point of view to voters in Russia," 
he said. "The only way to survive is to strengthen our organization by 
unifying."

Mr. Yavlinsky is more skeptical and suggests that the Kremlin may help drive 
a wedge between the parties. The Kremlin has lately been tightening its grip 
on the two state-run TV stations within Russia, and has been using financial 
and legal pressure to assert control over the debt-ridden media holding 
company Media Most, which controls the country's only nationally broadcast 
independent TV channel, NTV. In coming elections, Mr. Yavlinsky said, the 
Kremlin will be able to win plenty of allies among liberal ranks by offering 
them flattering coverage, while bashing others who are less compliant. In the 
last elections, members of SPS made a "practical decision" to back the 
Kremlin. "Next time they may do the same thing," he said.

Today, Mr. Yavlinsky said, he mostly approves of Mr. Putin's economic agenda. 
Earlier this year he was pleased that long-sought reforms like an overhaul of 
the tax code and a realistic budget passed by parliament with the help of the 
pro-Kremlin party, Unity.

The problem, Mr. Yavlinsky said, is priorities. "There are certain people who 
think that economic growth is everything and we can concentrate on that 
alone," he said. "I am not prepared to sacrifice economic success for 
freedom. We cannot change that."

Write to Alan Cullison at alan.cullison@wsj.com

******

#7
From: "Peter Lavelle" <plavelle@metropol.ru>
Subject: Russia in the Shadow of America's November
Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2000

SKATE'S Capital Markets Russia: Peter Lavelle, Russia in the Shadow of
America's November 

Putin and his government still have to prove three things to be considered
a meaningful and durable separation from the past and a serious partner
building a post-Cold War world order. First, to develop an alternative and
unique political personality - signaling a clear discursive and corporeal
departure from the recent past. Second the development of a civil society
independent of the state. Third, a state that demonstrates the ability to
accept a modicum of change benefiting society at large. These three
elements define a departure toward the future; benchmarks foretelling what
may or not come. The first and third points, in an interesting way, also
have meaning if applied to a George W. administration. 

Without meaningful progress in these three areas, Putin is at best an
expression of "Judo Democracy". (I promise to dispense with the multitude
of obviously pithy and cute play on words). Much like during the reign of
Nicholas I, Putin is presented with tantalizing opportunities as well as
with a fearfully routinized and a still well entrenched old establishment.
In terms of change, Putin is a hybrid of the past and present moving
forward - reflecting his logical place in Russia's revolutionary scheme of
things. 

Putin's dilemma thus is the following: Revolution? Very unlikely,
benefiting whom? Return to the past? This is just as unlikely for the same
reason. Then maybe a self-limiting revolution? Possibility, depending how
it is defined. This obviously is a term allowing numerous interpretations
of Putinism - something I am sure the President greatly appreciates. I
suppose Putin's Judo Democracy is not necessarily impecunious substitute
for the time being given Russia's last inextricable decade of multi-task
challenges. Reclaiming control of the economy in a regulatory sense is a
positive evolution; blocking the development of a self-reflexive civil
society and limiting a free media are not. Now the international
"correlation of forces" comes into play. 

A hypothetical Bush administration, for lack of a better term, faces
something akin to a "Menshevik majority", America's November 1917 (actually
October) in the new century. All right, this is bit of an exaggeration,
but many in the US do have lingering doubts as to the authenticity and
right if Bush takes the oath of office in January. The self-conscious
power of civil society in the US is clearly evident, a fact that will turn
a Bush "honeymoon" into a "one night stand". This is a historically
"predictable crisis" of a particular - even peculiar - institution (the
Electoral College), not any deep-rooted non-acceptance of the democratic
process. Though, at the same time, domestic concerns will easily be echoed
as a foreign policy weakness. There is no shortage of countries overjoyed
at this prospect - some even that might surprise many Americans. 

America's real or perceived current "crisis of self-confidence" is one of
the worst possible conditions for Russia in this stage of its revolution.
Confusion in America will only embolden elements of Russia's recent past to
continue to derail movement of reform, convincing Russia's President to
rely past practices and ideas. Democratic behavior is now more than ever
a matter of perspective. For some, this means Putin's "new family" ranks
in the same category with the Bush family at FOX TV and the governor of the
state of Florida (not to speak of George Senior). I suppose this is a
comparison we derived the phrase "a kettle calling a pot black" or
"nepotism is alright as long as you keep it on the family". Nonetheless,
this is bad form for a country claiming to be the beacon of democracy in
the world. It is difficult to convince many Russians otherwise. Is this
politics as usual? 

The practice of Judo Democracy should be clear to all: force applied with
precision with the specific end of leaving only one winner standing, in the
shortest most effective manner. The democracy part is obviously the junior
partner in the appellation. This application of democracy isn't interested
in common ground or respect for compromise. Actually, it is not much about
democracy. It is more about recreating a "general will" around issues
promoting Kremlin policy aims. Essentially, Judo Democracy is about a
manipulated democracy from the top down, representative institutions
designed for such a purpose. 

Ultimately civil society must find itself - challenging the state - to
realize its strength. There is the persistence of the Kursk sage in the
Russian consciousness. Russians equate democracy with egalitarianism.
This is something that cripples the development of civil society from the
start. For the most part, this egalitarianism is only translated in mutual
suffering and common ill fate. Though this may be changing. A recent NTV
program on the Kursk tragedy tells so much of the consciousness and
frustration of many Russians. The regime's fear of the people is still so
obvious. The crusade against the oligarchs, like war in Chechnya, is
essential to build confidence in the state and not for the benefit of civil
society. For most Russians the state's very purpose is to protect society
in a corporeal sense, and not to defend society's interests in any other
meaningful manner. As long as this proportion is not purposefully tested,
civil society will remain weak - nullifying a meaningful sense of a
democratic polity. 

The discursive strategy of the Soviet past and inheritance is still
attempting to indenture, making its presence tempting in the present. Like
an idiom that is familiar yet not understandable, the promise and the
tragedy of Lenin's radiant future still attempts to seduce and to
intimidate. Why it should is not hard to explain? This is like speaking
the same language without the same rendered meaning. The "rule of law" is
not enough. There is still too much "rule without law". Busting the
oligarchs is a great public relations ploy for a time, but the same number
of pensioners - if not more - across my path on the metro on my route to
and back to work. On top of all of this, America's November may,
unfortunately, continue to allow Putinite Russia to postpone conclusive
definition of itself. 

Now some solid advice: Watch out George W, you are neither smart enough nor
sufficiently experienced to take on someone who knows and will act take
upon - at every turn - the advantage of his country's interests. George W.
you just made the world so much more interesting. Again, America you
disappoint and George W. it will certainly be interesting to watch you in
court (somewhere) to answer your thoughtless accusations against
Chernomydin. The rhetoric of the Bush campaign appears to resemble some
new form of "American Judo Politics". Who was willing to say anything to
get elected?

There are no secrets in Russia, just mysteries. George W. you have entered
into a world which your privileged and inconsequential career has not
prepared you for given what is at task. I suggest you don't ask your
father and his cronies for advice about Russia - they too all failed. Play
your cards badly; you just might engender a "Judo Foreign Policy" from the
Russians. This is in the interests of no one. 

Peter J. Lavelle
Head of Research
IFC Metropol
Moscow, Russia
plavelle@metropol.ru
plavelle@skatefn.com

******

#8
BBC Monitoring
Russia: Putin honoured by university at anniversary celebrations 
Text of report by Russian Public TV on 21st November 

[Presenter] On the 170th anniversary of the Bauman Moscow State Technical
University, Vladimir Putin today took part in a ceremonial meeting of that
academic establishment's scientific council. 

Our correspondent Anton Vernitskiy has the details. He is now joining us
live. Good afternoon, Anton, and over to you. 

[Correspondent] Good afternoon, Igor. Vladimir Putin has just left the
university for the Kremlin where, as you have heard, he is to meet British
Prime Minister Tony Blair. At the university, Putin, indeed, took part in a
ceremonial meeting of the university's scientific council on a very special
occasion - its 170th anniversary. 

Among its alumni, perhaps the names of such scientific theoreticians and
practitioners as Zhukovskiy, Tupolev and Korolev stand out, a fact noted by
Vladimir Putin in his speech at the council. This is what Vladimir Putin
also said: 

[Putin] One hundred and seventy years is, of course, a very auspicious
anniversary for any educational establishment. However, it is not only its
graduates and not only those who will try to become its students or future
postgraduates who greatly respect the Bauman. 

Many of your graduates are now in great demand abroad, which is both good
and bad, so much so that it is even hard to say whether there is more good
or bad in it. Perhaps, one must acknowledge that it is characteristic of
our labour market today that it does not absorb the quality product on
offer from universities such as yours. 

The danger here, however, is not so much the so-called brain drain. It
seems to me that the danger here is in something else, namely in that the
level of education here may decline, precisely to meet the requirements of
the labour market today. It is this that you and primarily your tutors -
and of course the state - must beware and prevent as a negative though
possible development. 

[Correspondent] Vladimir Putin also presented state awards to university
staff and tutors, who in turn presented the president with a university
silver emblem. 

[University official] Vladimir Vladimirovich, you are not a Bauman
University graduate. However, we shall deem it our honour if you accept an
academic emblem of the Bauman University. It is a silver academic emblem we
present to those who graduate from the Bauman University with distinction. 

[Putin] I shall work for it. Thank you. 

[Correspondent] While the council was in session, classes continued as
normal. So Vladimir Putin toured the lecture rooms, much to the
astonishment of the students some of whom, however, did not omit to ask the
president for an autograph. 

While still at the university, the president made an impromptu
announcement. After a speech by a female student at the ceremony, who had
been awarded a so-called personal presidential scholarship, he said -
completely on the spur of the moment - that he had decided after her
emotional speech to double the size of all presidential scholarships. 

*******

#9
UES Chief Chubais Seeks State Endorsement of Plans

Moscow, Nov. 21 (Bloomberg)
-- RAO Unified Energy Systems Chief Executive Anatoly Chubais today will 
outline plans for breaking up Russia's energy monopoly, seeking state 
endorsement of a reorganization that has angered many minority shareholders. 

The cabinet meeting with Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov is unlikely to 
result in any decision, analysts said. 

``Most likely, the cabinet will schedule the discussion for Dec. 14,'' said 
Alexander Branis, director at Prosperity Capital Management, with $110 
million of Russian assets under management. ``We do not expect sharp 
discrepancies to arise today.'' 

The fate of the reorganization plan is key to investors' outlook for the 
Russian stock market. The company, which accounts for about half of all 
transactions on the Russian Trading System every day, is about 32 percent 
owned by foreign shareholders. With 41 billion shares outstanding, UES's 
performance often is viewed as bellwether for investor sentiment about 
Russia. 

The stock was little changed at 11.34 cents today. It's down 28 percent in 
the past three months, compared with a 22 percent drop in the RTS index. 

``Any developments on the restructuring side will be priced in immediately,'' 
said Dmitry Roenko, in charge of asset management at Olma brokerage, which 
has about $8 million in Russian assets under management. Roenko said he 
doesn't own UES stock because it's too risky. ``UES will underperform the 
market if negative news break out.'' 

Wholesale Market 

The aim of the reorganization plan is to create a competitive wholesale power 
market and spin off generating companies from the main power grid. The 
government probably will endorse the proposal as part of a larger long-term 
energy strategy, analysts said. 

Chubais's initial proposal raised concern among investors earlier this year 
because of worries he would sell assets at below market value to investors 
not interested in improving the companies. 

``We are supportive of the restructuring proposal, but we dislike the 
management's decision not to pay heed to outside shareholders in drafting the 
proposal,'' said Kakha Kiknavelidze, utilities analyst with Troika Dialog 
brokerage. 

Investors' protests forced UES managers to change tactics, shifting the 
responsibility for reorganization to the government, the company's majority 
shareholder. Now UES is seeking government backing while pursuing initial 
reorganization projects. 

Last week, the UES board agreed to set up a new company to manage its Volga 
region units, a step towards creating regional generating companies. 

Previously, UES said it would split generation into 15 regional production 
units. In recent weeks, it has called for creating about 30 smaller 
co-generating companies in addition to large regional energy utilities. 

Other Plans 

The Nuclear Ministry has made a separate proposal, to split off the energy 
transportation business into a state-owned company. Chubais's proposal, 
however, is the main plan under discussion, analysts said. 

``Discrepancies are not as large as they were when the cabinet met to discuss 
overhaul of the railroad monopoly,'' Branis said. 

After today's discussion, the Ministry of Trade and Economic Development, 
Anti-Monopoly Ministry, Fuel Ministry and others probably will consider the 
draft and meet for more talks Dec. 14, analysts said. 

Changes in legislation will be necessary to enact the plan. 

Chubais is pushing ahead with the reorganization as the company continues 
efforts to step up cash collection and cut off supplies to non-paying 
customers. In recent weeks, UES has moved to limit supplies in the Far East, 
where its local subsidiary Dalenergo has been unprofitable for years. 

Several cities and villages, including Artyom and Kavalerovo, have been 
without heat because of unpaid bills and the poor infrastructure of municipal 
heating systems. 

*******

#10
The Times (UK)
NOVEMBER 21 2000 
Villagers cowed under rule of fear 
Alice Lagnado hears Chechen villagers talk of a life of terror in a war that 
Moscow says is over 

THE elderly Chechen couple had just arrived at the home of their daughter, 
Sobi, in Itum Kale, deep in the snow- covered Caucasus Mountains after a 
gruelling four-day trek from a refugee camp in Georgia. The house was a pile 
of rubble, with just one small room left standing. 
In spring they had been driven away by fierce bombing. Now it seemed safe 
enough to return, but the dreams of Sultan and Tashkho Shakh-bulatov were 
torn apart when Russian soldiers stormed the village, brutally beating two 
Chechen men and threatening those who tried to intervene. 

The Kremlin says that the year-long war in Chechnya is largely over and that 
the Russian Army is only pursuing rebel bands hidden in the southern 
mountains. In reality, Russian jets regularly bomb Grozny and the mountain 
regions while the Chechen rebel commanders, whose whereabouts are known to 
the Russians, remain untouched. 

Thousands of ordinary families live in terror, caught between Russian 
soldiers playing Rambo for extra pay and rebel leaders greedy for money and 
oil. The villagers of Itum Kale have discovered that they are still under 
siege, even though the bombing may have stopped. 

In the late afternoon of November 2, 60 troops from the GRU, the Russian 
Army's security service, left their base in Borzoi and drove south towards 
Itum Kale. The soldiers, some in masks, looted the village of Ushkaloi. Their 
six-vehicle convoy was then waved through several Russian checkpoints on the 
road. 

At about 7pm they swerved into Itum Kale. The soldiers attacked two unarmed 
Chechen policemen who asked them what they were doing. "I heard men screaming 
'God help me' in Chechen and went out into the road," Sobi said. "The 
soldiers told me: 'Get back inside, bitch.' They grabbed my arms. I said: 
'I'll go back in, just don't touch me.' " 

Sobi crept into her barn just yards away from the soldiers and listened in 
horror. "I heard blows and I heard the men moaning. They were being tortured. 
I can't tell you how. I don't want to bring shame on these men." 

The soldiers stopped only when General Aleksei Kuzmich, the village's 
military commandant, arrived 15 minutes later. They told him that they were 
carrying out a "war assignment". The Russian Army has always denied the 
claims of abuse by Chechen civilians, but, in an unprecedented move, General 
Kuzmich, officers from the FSB -- the successor to the KGB -- and the head of 
the Russian army division in the village confirmed the incident to The Times. 
The Defence Ministry has begun an investigation. 

The general, who is in charge of running the village, has been frustrated in 
his efforts to restore some normality, such as rebuilding the local school. 
"My main concerns are old people and children, restoring electricity and 
healthcare," he said. "My biggest problem is that there are soldiers who 
come here and want to make war." 

The general has already dismissed 200 contract soldiers because they were not 
up to the job. He breaks official rules to share medicine intended for 
soldiers with Chechen children and he paid for a sick child to be taken to a 
hospital outside Chechnya. He is the exception to the rule, however. 

Living in fear has become a way of life for many Chechens. Sobi, 41, who is 
in charge of the district education department, was one of 11 villagers who 
stayed in Itum Kale throughout the war. "I didn't want to be a refugee," she 
said. "I am probably soft in the head. It was a game with death. We laughed 
and joked a lot." 

She is used to death: her brother was murdered by Russian gangsters in 1995; 
her cousin, who was eight months pregnant, was shot dead with her husband and 
son in Grozny in February. 

Chechens expect to be treated badly by the Russian Army, but they also feel 
let down by Aslan Maskhadov, the elected Chechen President, and rebel 
commanders such as Shamil Basayev and Khattab, whom they say have failed to 
do anything to support ordinary families. 

*****

#11
Trud
November 18, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
HOW MANY PATRIOTS IN THIS COUNTRY
By Vitaly BORISOV

One of the subjects of a regular sociological survey 
conducted by the VTsIOM, or the All-Russia Public Opinion 
Research Centre, was patriotism. The answers are given in 
percent of those polled.

Do you consider yourself a patriot?
------------------------------------
Yes 77%
No 16%
Undecided 7%
------------------------------------

Obviously, more than three-fourths of pollees consider 
themselves patriots. A logical question is: Why didn't all 
respondents give affirmative replies? One of the most likely 
reasons that comes to mind is the low standard of living amidst 
millions of the country's residents. More than 30% of Russians 
are dragging miserable existence below the poverty line. "How 
can I love this country when it treats me so badly?," complains 
Olga Pirozhkova from Chita in her letter to the editor. Ms.
Pirozhkova's point is disputable, but that is a totally 
different subject. Arguments aside, many might find it 
remarkable that all these hardships haven't obliterated the 
patriotic feeling amidst the majority.

What does being a patriot mean to you personally?
(Pollees were allowed to choose several variants of 
answers.)
-----------------------------------------------------------
Patriots Non-patriots
-----------------------------------------------------------
Love for one's country 70% 27%
Working for the sake of the
country's well-being 40% 14%
Protecting the country against
attacks or accusations 26% 16%
Trying to change the country's
situation for the better 24% 21%
Believing that one's country is
better than the others 18% 15%
----------------------------------------------------------

There is a certain paradox here. About one-third of those 
who claim to be patriots think that "patriotism" does not 
necessarily mean love for one's country. Three-fourths of 
self-proclaimed non-patriots think the same. But then, that's 
perfectly natural. Conflicting answers signify the muddle that 
we're in which needs some clearing up. Still, the percentage of 
patriots in this country (77%) is reassuring.

******

#12
Rossiiskaya Gazeta - Biznes v Rossii
November 21. 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT TRUSTED MORE AS HE OVERCOMES DIFFICULTIES
By Yekaterina TITOVA

The Russian Independent Institute of Social and National 
Problems (RNISiNP) conducted a nationwide research of Russian 
society in October 2000. The Institute polled 1,750 people in 
11 social groups.

The catastrophes of August 2000 certainly made an impact 
on Russians, the sociologists said. People became more critical 
of the situation in the country. Half of those polled blamed 
the August catastrophes on negligence and lack of 
responsibility permeating Russia. According to 39.1% of the 
respondents the tragedies were unavoidable and consequence of 
Russia's economic and technical degradation. Just 4.2% said 
that Russian President Vladimir Putin and the current 
leadership were responsible for the events. More that a half, 
54.1% of those polled concluded that Russia should focus on 
reviving a capable army equipped with up-to-date weaponry.
The overall public opinion has become more tough in 
autumn, RNISiNP said comparing it with its last poll in summer. 
In June 55% of the respondents considered the situation in 
Russia critical and 18% said that it was catastrophic. In 
October, these figures rose to 59% and 22%, respectively. Sharp 
assessments are more often registered among the elderly people, 
24.9% of them see the current situation as a catastrophe. 
However, young generation is less dramatic, 69% of respondents 
from 27 to 30 years old said that Russia was in crisis. This 
opinion is shared by 60.7% of the respondents under 21 years 
old.
The population of megalopolises and principal cities is 
more reserved in their assessments than people living in towns 
and villages. Over a third of respondents living in the Central 
Black-Soil and Far Eastern districts maintain that Russia is 
going through a catastrophe.
Individual prosperity is another important factor in how 
Russians view the situation in the country. The worse-off 
people are more critical than the respondents who are doing 
well.
Moreover, the so-called middle class feels more confident today 
than truly wealthy people. The situation in Russia is 
considered normal by 26.1% of the middle class members and only 
by 11.1% of the wealthiest respondents.
A many as 40% of those polled have generally negative 
feelings while 17.9% feel comfortable on the whole. The 
traditionally disgruntled groups are pensioners, unemployed, 
the rural population and the people working in the service 
sector.
The rate of discontent is highest among the Communists (60.1%) 
and the supporters of the renewed and reformed socialism 
(51.5%).
Among democrats and liberals these figures stand at 29.9% and 
17.1% respectively.
Despite the August tragedies, 37.1% expect life to 
gradually improve during Putin's presidency, which is also 
borne out by his popularity rating. The autumn poll revealed a 
higher popularity rating of Putin along with a larger number of 
negative assessments. Over half, 51.5% of Russians positively 
viewed Putin's activity in autumn (compared with 45.5% in 
June), while 16.3% disliked Putin's work in autumn (11.2% in 
June). Neutral feelings were expressed by 32.2% and 43.4%, 
respectively. The number of Putin's supporters was high in all 
age groups: 50% among the young and 62.9% among the old. 
Pensioners, military, small-scale businessmen and intellectuals 
studying humanities back Putin more frequently than other 
social groups. The growing living standards account for Putin's 
higher popularity. The monthly income of Russian families 
increased by 70% in October 2000 compared with June 1999, and 
by 40% compared with March 2000.
However, Putin's rating is not as stable as it might seem.
The August tragedies prompted a lot of Russians to change their 
attitude to Putin. Some 29.1% of the respondents no longer 
consider Putin a determined president. Less than half (46.4%) 
did not change their opinion of the president and 24.5% were 
undecided. An average difference of around 15 percentage points 
between the opposite opinions was registered across all age 
groups.
Furthermore, 24.3% of the respondents are confident that 
all oligarchs are Putin's enemies, 18.4% see Communists as his 
main opponents, 15.1% are sure that Berezovsky and allies are 
his worst adversaries. Putin's other alleged enemies include 
influential governors (according to 11.4% of those polled), 
Gusinsky and his associates (11.2%) and the inner circle of 
first Russian President Boris Yeltsin (11%).

Table

----------------------------------------------------------------

Assessment of Putin's presidency in Russian districts
Assessment
	Districts	Positive	Negative
1.	Moscow	45.4	18.4
2.	St. Petersburg	56.9	12.3
3.	Northwestern	57.9	21.0
4.	Northern	58.3	13.9
5.	Volga Vyatka	46.1	16.4
6.	Central	49.1	16.4
7.	Central Black-Soil	61.0	19.0
8.	Volga	58.9	14.5
9.	North Caucasus	55.9	15.8
10.	Urals	52.4	14.0
11.	Western Siberia	40.7	17.5
12.	Eastern Siberia	44.8	19.8
13.	Far Eastern	52.3	16.6

----------------------------------------------------------------

******

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