June 17, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4371 • 4372 • 4373


Johnson's Russia List
#4373
17 June 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com


[Note from David Johnson:
1. Financial Times (UK): Putin makes waves at fragile Lake Baikal: 
President's abolition of the state ecology body will put area's 
ecosystem under more strain, writes John Thornhill.
2. gazeta.ru: Russia’s Web Will Not Go Chinese. (Interview with 
deputy Media Minister Mikhail Seslavinsky)
3. Archie Brown: Re: 4371-Knight/Gusinsky. (re Gorbachev)
4. The Daily Telegraph (UK): James Sherr, What we know about Putin's plans.
5. CLEANING UP RUSSIA'S CAPITAL MARKETS: CSIS meeting in Washington
with Igor Kostikov, the newly appointed chairman of the Russian 
Federal Securities Commission.
6. Wall Street Journal: Andrew Higgins, Russian Tycoon Urges Reform In Protecting Business Interests. (Berezovsky)
7. wps.ru: SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF MILITARY MAY AGGRAVATE PUBLIC SITUATION. Sociologists predict growth of opposition attitude in 
Armed Forces if social benefits for servicemen are abolished.
8. APN: Outlook for our future with President Putin. Russia`s 
leading political analysts discussing new authority`s philosophy 
and make-up. (Iosif Diskin, Sergei Markov, Valery Khomyakov, 
Maxim Dianov, Viktor Militaryov, Mikhail Denisov, Vladimir 
Zharikhin)]

*******


#1
Financial Times (UK)
17 June 2000
[for personal use only]
Putin makes waves at fragile Lake Baikal: President's abolition of the
state ecology body will put area's ecosystem under more strain, writes John
Thornhill


Lake Baikal in Russia is one of the natural wonders of the world. The
oldest and deepest lake on the planet contains one-fifth of the earth's
fresh water and boasts hundreds of unique species, such as the remarkable
translucent Golomyanki fish, which grub for food at depths of more than
1,600 metres. 


Baikal is also a site of astonishing natural beauty, where there are as
many seals swimming in the crystal-clear lake as people living around its
edge. At this time of year, clouds of white butterflies float through the
lush, surrounding forests. 


But environmentalists are concerned that the lake is under severe
ecological threat in spite of its natural resilience and remoteness. In
April, a group of local environmental groups wrote to Unesco asking the
international organisation to add Baikal to the list of endangered world
heritage sites. 


Scientists have recently recorded a worrying build-up of poisonous dioxins
in the fat of the local seal population. Environmental groups chiefly blame
the pollution on the nearby Baikalsk cellulose plant, which still disgorges
partially treated effluents into the lake. 


Environmentalists have been further alarmed by a presidential decree,
issued soon after President Vladimir Putin's inauguration in May,
liquidating the state committee for ecology and the Russian forestry
committee. The functions of these two agencies are being absorbed by the
Ministry of Natural Resources, which will be placed in the seemingly
contradictory position of both promoting Russia's economic development and
protecting the environment. 


Vladimir Fialkov, the director of the Lake Baikal museum, says the
cost-cutting move threatens to repeat the sad experience of the Soviet era,
when Moscow ministries determined economic priorities with little regard
for local environmental concerns. This system allowed the Baikalsk plant to
be built in spite of the strenuous - and brave - opposition of scientists.
"Different people should perform different functions," Mr Fialkov says.
"The minister could be a wonderful man. But it is immoral to put such
pressure on any one individual by giving them such conflicting priorities." 


Sergei Tsyplenkov, the executive director of Greenpeace Russia, believes
that in abolishing the ecology committee, the government has bowed to
pressure from big corporations, which have argued that a third-world
economy cannot afford first-world standards of environmental protection. 


But he believes the government is also adopting an increasingly intolerant
attitude towards interference by outside environmental organisations,
threatening to crush one of the main buttresses of Russia's fragile civil
society. "From my point of view it is hardly likely there will be illegal
actions against NGOs (non-governmental organisations). But Russian
legislation is so unclear that there are many perfectly legal ways to put
pressure on us," he says. 


At Lake Baikal, environmentalists have been urging the local government to
shut the Baikalsk plant and provide alternative employment for the 17,000
people who live in the local town. "You cannot compromise with Baikal
because it is such a sensitive and vulnerable eco-system. Baikal must come
first," argues Jennie Sutton, an Englishwoman who helped found the Baikal
Environmental Wave. But the local administration, which originally intended
to shut the plant in 1993, is still dependent on it to generate tax
revenues. It has even softened fines, imposed by the state ecology
committee before its abolition, to stave off the plant's bankruptcy. 


Georgy Kuznetsov, who writes about ecological issues for the Eastern
Siberian Truth newspaper, says that in the real world compromises are
inevitable between economic growth, social welfare and environmental
protection. But this could result in Lake Baikal gradually losing its
unique ecosystem. 


"It is in the genetic composition of Siberians to believe that nature is
enormous and we cannot harm it no matter what we consume. Nothing has
happened to Baikal for 25m years and it is very hard to believe that
something will happen now. But such is the pace of progress that this is no
longer true. 


"The real threat to Baikal is not the oligarchs, or Putin, or the directors
of cellulose plants, but the consciousness of the people and their world
view. Unless we change that we will find it hard to preserve anything." 


******


#2
gazeta.ru
June 16, 2000
Russia’s Web Will Not Go Chinese 
By Elena Ogorodnikova 


In an interview with Gazet.Ru the deputy Media Minister Mikhail Seslavinsky 
said the Russian Internet would develop with minimum restrictions and that 
the widespread rumors about allegedly compulsory registration of web sites, 
including home pages, have nothing to do with reality. The deputy minister 
also shared his views concerning the future perspectives for Ru.Net. 


Recently the question of the Russian government imposing regulations on the 
Internet has been widely discussed. In your opinion, how will the Internet in 
Russia develop? Will it follow the so-called, Chinese way, i.e. for internal 
use only, or will it be the American way whereby government control is 
strictly limited? 


I consider the problems that exist in our country concerning Internet 
development practically do not differ from those existing in all other 
countries. China is a special issue and, in my opinion, is no model for 
Russia. Problems emerge due to the fact that the Internet constitutes a 
unique parallel world, spread throughout all the countries of the world, and 
any country that tries to introduce restrictions on the flow of illicit 
information, such as the promotion of drugs, gun sale, extremism, terrorism, 
child pornography, will not succeed in enforcing those restrictions. 


When a server is located in Belgium, a domain name is registered in the USA, 
and the information is intended for a Russian audience, the possibilities for 
restricting that information are inefficient and very limited. Besides, the 
Internet is attractive for users namely because it provides absolute freedom: 
people themselves choose what they are interested in. It is impossible to 
thrust data upon anyone in that space. Therefore, I think, the Internet in 
Russia will develop with minimum restrictions. However, reasonable 
restrictions are still necessary. 


What about the registration of media outlets on the net? 


Those of them, which claim a stake in that business and which strive to exert 
influence upon an audience and wish to be treated with respect register 
voluntarily. As a matter of fact we have not set ourselves the task to get 
all absolutely all Internet editions to register. We realize it is 
impracticable. The reader realizes that if, for instance, Kompromat.ru works 
along the lines of a traditional media outlet, one should not trust 100% of 
the information published on their site. Registered Internet editions enjoy 
all the rights of the ‘traditional’ mass media. 


Have you encountered situations when someone wanted to call Internet media to 
account? 


Yes, and not just once. And the Central Election Committee’s widely 
publicized demands were not the only case. I will not give names, but a 
number of governors have been very unhappy about the methods and nature of 
the coverage of their activities by certain Internet publications. Things 
like that emerge now and then and every once in a while, someone requests us 
to issue an order. The answer is easy: it is not a situation where order can 
be imposed. 


The Council of Europe is taking the problem of Internet control very 
seriously. The issue of forming of web-police has even been discussed… 


If it is a consolidated effort, I think it makes sense. 


Do you think that web-editions are in a somewhat privileged position compared 
with other media? 


Of course. But the advantages are to do with the particularities of the 
virtual world. 


What do you think the future holds for web mass media? 


I think it is very promising. One may attract investments from all areas of 
business because now there are no longer any influential editions, companies, 
legal institutions which don’t have their own Internet sites. 


There is talk that the laws on the mass media might be amended… 


No, I do not think this will happen in the near future. As for Internet 
editions, a special enactment should be adopted concerning those. Until then, 
the current laws on mass media are applicable to all registered web 
additions. 


******


#3
From: "Archie Brown" <archie.brown@st-antonys.oxford.ac.uk>
Subject: Re: 4371-Knight/Gusinsky
Date: Sat, 17 Jun 2000 


An article by Amy Knight which appears on JRL 4371 states that official
commissions into the shedding of blood in Tbilisi in April 1989 and in
Vilnius in January 1991 showed 'the trail of evidence pointing straight to
Mr Gorbachev'. This is a travesty of the truth. The official commission into
the Tbilisi tragedy, headed by Sobchak, exonerated Gorbachev and there is a
huge amount of evidence confirming that Gorbachev had asked Shevardnadze to
fly to Tbilisi precisely to avoid a violent end to the confrontation.
Gorbachev and Shevardnadze had just returned to Moscow from Cuba (via
Britain) and Shevardnadze delayed his departure to Georgia by a day. By then
it was too late. Gorbachev is criticised these days in Russia for NOT being
willing to use force to hold the Soviet Union together. The Tbilisi deaths
occurred in spite of his efforts to avoid bloodshed. The situation in the
Baltic states was different, but deliberately exacerbated by the very people
who conspired against Gorbachev in August 1991.


For a brief account of the Tbilisi events and the findings of the official
commission, I would refer JRL readers to my book, The Gorbachev Factor,
pages 264-267 and page 380. I cannot see how anyone could absorb the
evidence presented there and then endorse the statement of Amy Knight. The
less straightforward situation in the Baltic states is considered on pages
279-285 and 383-384. (May I add that, in contrast with the misleading
remarks in the article with which I take issue, Amy Knight published a
perceptive review of the Putin book, First Person, in the TLS of June 9,
2000.)


*******


#4
The Daily Telegraph (UK)
June 16, 2000
[for personal use only]
What we know about Putin's plans
By James Sherr
James Sherr is a Fellow of the Conflict Studies Research Centre, RMA 
Sandhurst. His views are not necessarily those of the Ministry of Defence
THE West is no longer captivated by Russia, merely by its leaders. The 
refrain that "we know little about Putin" reveals two things: our fondness 
for enigmas and the remoteness of experts from government. In fact we know at 
least as much about Vladimir Putin as we knew about Mikhail Gorbachev in 
1985. We know substantially more about his aims. The enigmas are twofold: 
first, his chances of success; and, second, the likely consequences, should 
he succeed or fail. Consequences there are bound to be.


In one fundamental respect, the emerging conventional wisdom is correct. 
President Putin seeks co-operation with the West, and he is shrewd enough to 
know that if co-operation is not mutually beneficial, we will have no 
interest in it. But it would be ironic if, in embracing this wisdom, we lost 
our perspective. Perspective begins in recognising that Russia has become 
cynical about the West. Since the end of the Cold War, history has been made 
in Europe, but it has not been made by Russia, let alone in partnership with 
it. To that country's political establishment, it is axiomatic that Nato 
enlargement is designed to isolate Russia.


To its military establishment, it is axiomatic that Nato used Kosovo as a 
testing ground for future "humanitarian interventions" in the former Soviet 
Union. The timing and ferocity of the Chechen war owe much to Kosovo. 
Perspective also requires us to recognise that the West ranks but third in Mr 
Putin's priorities. His overwhelming priority is to reverse Russia's decline 
and restore vertical power. His second priority is to assert Russia's 
interests actively and toughly in the neighbouring states of the former 
Soviet Union.


For the moment, Mr Putin personifies the mood of the country: the longing for 
a strong state, coupled with a total lack of nostalgia about Communism. 
Impressively, Mr Putin and his entourage blame Russia, not the West, for 
Russia's economic problems. They know that the legal and political framework 
will need to change if Russia is to become business-oriented.


But what kind of Russia will Mr Putin's changes produce? On May 13, his KGB 
background came out into the open. Presidential decree 849 divides Russia 
into seven federal districts, coterminous with Internal Troops districts of 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). Of the seven presidential 
plenipotentiaries - each granted formidable powers over the elected 
legislatures and governors of Russia's 89 regions, republics and territories 
- four are generals, two from the MVD and Federal Security Service (FSB). 
These and similar measures raise two questions. Will they create a market 
economy based on independent entrepreneurship, or merely incorporate 
oligarchs (and Western investors) into a system of state capitalism? Will 
they reduce democracy to ritualised elections and ritualised opposition of 
the Communist Party?


Moreover, what kind of Russia will Ukraine, Georgia and the Baltic states 
have to live with? Already, it is clear that Russia is playing by new rules. 
Like Boris Yeltsin, Mr Putin believes that Russia must be the guarantor of 
peace and stability in the former Soviet Union. Unlike Mr Yeltsin, he is 
adamant that Russia's tools of influence - energy, finance, security services 
and armed forces - be utilised to achieve clear and specific ends.


These ends are a mixture of the reasonable, the questionable and the ominous. 
Under the banner of the "struggle against terrorism and extremism", the three 
trans-Caucasian and five Central Asian states are now under pressure to 
"combine into a single fist the forces of national security and special 
services" - that is, defer to the FSB. Yet Azeris and Georgians know that the 
real issue is whether the Chechen war will bring turmoil to the country that 
launched it, as well as to its neighbours.


Under the banner of "defending our compatriots", Mr Putin has stoked tensions 
which the Baltic states have been gradually settling. More reasonable, on the 
face of it, is his determination to secure payment of Ukraine's enormous gas 
debt. Yet he seems equally determined to maintain the rigged rules of pricing 
and taxation which make this debt vastly higher than it rightfully should be. 
Subtly but unmistakably, he is also linking debt with the broader questions 
of Ukraine's foreign policy, the ownership of its economic assets and the 
conditions governing the basing of Russian armed forces in Ukraine.


Mr Putin is neither the first Russian leader to pursue a multi-dimensional 
policy, nor the first to conclude that Russia needs a "breathing space" - and 
practical support - from the West. Such support is likely to be misdirected 
unless the West invests the time and effort to understand Russia on its own 
terms. Business, free markets and political liberalism are interconnected in 
Western ideology; in Russia, as in China, they are separate things. This 
week, Vladimir Gusinsky, the owner of Russia's biggest independent media 
empire, which has frequently criticised the president, was detained on fraud 
charges. Putin claims that he had no foreknowledge of the arrest. But he 
believes that Russia cannot be part of the Western system of values. This 
does not diminish the need for agreements which advance mutual interests.


Moreover, the West needs a multidimensional, but integrated, policy of its 
own. The changes under way in Russia make Ukraine, the Baltic states and the 
Caucasus more important, rather than less. The sooner this is understood, the 
better for us. The sooner it is said, the better for Russia.


******


#5
Date: Fri, 16 Jun 2000 
From: "Keith Bush" <KBush@CSIS.ORG> 
Subject: CLEANING UP RUSSIA'S CAPITAL MARKETS


CLEANING UP RUSSIA'S CAPITAL MARKETS


Igor Kostikov, the newly appointed chairman of the Russian Federal
Securities Commission , will be speaking in English and on the record at
1:00 PM on Tuesday, June 20, at CSIS, 1800 K Street, NW. Mr. Kostikov was
appointed by presidential decree on February 1, with the rank of minister.
He succeeded Dmitri Vasiliev, who resigned from the post in October 1999. 


Mr. Kostikov is faced with the daunting task of restoring faith in the
integrity of Russia's security markets and regulating its financial
institutions. He must radically improve a dismal investment climate in the
wake of the August 1998 crash and must also correct a notoriously poor
corporate governance regime. A light lunch will be served. No admittance
fee will be charged, but please register with Jeff Thomas at Telephone
202-775-3240 or Fax 202-775-3132. 


*******


#6
Wall Street Journal
June 16, 2000 
[for personal use only] 
Russian Tycoon Urges Reform In Protecting Business Interests
By ANDREW HIGGINS (andrew.higgins@wsj.com)
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL


MOSCOW -- Russian tycoon Boris Berezovsky called for an amnesty on misdeeds 
relating to a chaotic and often corruption-tainted sell-off of state assets, 
saying the arrest earlier this week of a Moscow media mogul showed that 
Russia needed a clean slate to protect a post-Soviet division of property.


Mr. Berezovsky's comments Thursday in an interview reflect growing unease 
among Russia's business elite that the arrest of Vladimir Gusinsky for 
alleged involvement in a suspect privatization deal could presage a broader 
campaign by Russian President Vladimir Putin against businessmen who built 
their fortunes on former state property.


"Everybody who has been in business over the last 10 years may be a victim of 
this system," said Mr. Berezovsky, whose own business interests include a car 
dealership and oil and media holdings, "We need to find a solution. The 
solution is an amnesty for initial capital. We need to finalize the story of 
what happened."


Part of 'Larger Scheme'


His amnesty appeal is unlikely to gather much support. "No state can do 
this," said Mikhail Zadornov, a former finance minister and a member of 
Russia's lower house of parliament, the Duma. But he also said Mr. Gusinsky's 
arrest appeared part of a "larger scheme ... against influential businessmen 
who don't share the Kremlin's point of view."


Mr. Berezovsky said Mr. Gusinsky's arrest recalled his own legal problems 
last year, when Russian prosecutors issued an arrest warrant against him 
after allegations that companies he controlled siphoned off $600 million 
(624.8 million euros) from Russia's national airline, Aeroflot. The warrant 
was later lifted and the government that initiated it sacked.


Mr. Berezovsky said the absence of clear rules governing business in the 
early stages of reform and frequent changes in the law since had pushed 
businessmen into a gray area and left them vulnerable to prosecution if they 
fall foul of the Kremlin. "If the [state] powers want to incriminate anybody 
they have a lot of opportunity," he said. All Russian businessmen, said Mr. 
Berezovsky, risk imprisonment at "any moment like Gusinsky."


Mr. Gusinsky was detained Tuesday in connection with an investigation into 
the privatization of a St. Petersburg television company, Russkoye Video. The 
state-owned company merged with a small private firm in December 1996 and was 
renamed OOO Russkoye Video-11 Canal. Mr. Gusinsky's media conglomerate, 
Media-Most, purchased a 75% stake in this new company in May 1997. 
Prosecutors say they suspect the deal involved a kickback to an executive who 
helped broker the transaction, and defrauded the state of $10 million.


At Odds With Kremlin


Mr. Gusinsky hasn't yet been charged and has denied any wrongdoing. In a 
handwritten note passed from Moscow's Butyrskaya jail Thursday and read by 
his attorney, he blamed his detention on "political intrigue, organized by 
high-ranking representatives of the government who consider freedom of speech 
a danger."


He has been at odds with the Kremlin for months. His television network, NTV, 
has been critical of the war in Chechnya, aired allegations of corruption and 
features a weekly satirical puppet show that has mocked Mr. Putin as a 
midget, an impotent newlywed and a vengeful deity. Mr. Gusinsky's other media 
outlets, which include a daily newspaper and a radio station on which 
President Clinton spoke during his recent visit to Moscow, also frequently 
criticize the Kremlin.


His detention has stirred a storm of protest in Russia and abroad. Mr. Putin, 
who was in Spain when the arrest took place, says he wasn't informed of it in 
advance. In Germany Thursday he described the arrest as "excessive."


Andrei Piontkovsky, director of the Center of Strategic Studies, a Moscow 
think tank, said the case reflects a struggle inside the Kremlin between 
newly installed advisers who worked in the Soviet-era KGB and holdovers from 
Mr. Yeltsin's administration who had close ties to Russian business moguls. 
"There are two competing groups. They have very different backgrounds and 
very different credit histories," said Mr. Piontkovsky.


Mr. Putin, himself a former KGB agent, has sought to maintain a balance but, 
say political analysts, has increasingly tilted towards security service 
veterans, who include Sergei Ivanov, the head of the Kremlin's powerful 
Security Council. Business tycoons, meanwhile, have been scrambling to retain 
their influence.


Prominent among these so-called oligarchs is Mr. Berezovsky, who also has a 
seat in Parliament. An influential Kremlin insider under then-President Boris 
Yeltsin, Mr. Berezovsky played a role in the political machinations that 
helped bring Mr. Putin to power but has recently condemned what he says is a 
drift towards dictatorship.


He said Thursday that his relations with the Kremlin are "the same as before" 
but said he hadn't spoken with Mr. Putin for a month. Before Russia's March 
presidential election Mr. Putin pledged to eliminate oligarchs "as a class." 
Mr. Berezovsky said this "is impossible because capital and power need to 
have good relations... . Everywhere capital and power are together."


******


#7
wps.ru
Defense and Security
Issue No. 69, 16 Jun 2000
SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF MILITARY MAY AGGRAVATE PUBLIC SITUATION
Sociologists predict growth of opposition attitude in Armed Forces if
social benefits for servicemen are abolished 


On June 7, the Duma supported the governmental proposal regarding 
implementation of the flat tax rate of 13% on incomes of all private 
individuals, including the servicemen. The new governmental initiatives 
regarding the military, such as the cancellation of benefits in payments for 
public transportation, payments for public utilities, and so on, are waiting 
for their turn. In his interview to Krasnaya Zvezda on June 7, Finance 
Minister Alexei Kudrin said that implementation of monetary compensations 
after implementation of the new tax and cancellation of such social benefits 
as the free use of public transportation, low payments for public utilities, 
and so on, "are necessary to balance the budgets of all levels, and to give 
money for education, health care and so on to the local budgets."


According to reports from garrisons, the Armed Forces are very averse to the 
intention of the government to cut the social guarantees for servicemen. 
Officers and warrant officers are not sure that the compensations will be 
paid on time. They fear that after the tax novelties their already bad 
financial condition will be worsened.


At present it is difficult to say how will cutting of social benefits 
influence ability of the Armed Forces to function, but it is already evident 
that the troops' morale will worsen. Military ideological structures already 
predict growth of suicides in the Armed Forces. We also cannot rule out that 
politicization of the Armed Forces and their opposition attitude may also 
grow.


The recent elections have demonstrated an exceptional loyalty of the Armed 
Forces to their President. Sociologists predict that due to cutting of social 
benefits the rating of the President and his government among the servicemen 
may sharply decrease, and the Communists and LDPR may become more popular.


Some other factors, besides the benefits' abolishment, will also aggravate 
financial condition of the servicemen and their morale. The first factor has 
to do with Chechnya. From May 31, financial subsidies for the group of 
federal forces in the North Caucasus are seriously reduced. Henceforth, 
servicemen will receive the so-called "war money" only for real participation 
in the antiterrorist operation. The rest will receive only the so-called 
"field money," twice as much as their regular pay.


Meanwhile, servicemen are still dying in Chechnya, and combat operations will 
hardly be stopped soon.


The second factor is the real financial condition of the Armed Forces. The 
military budget is still scarce. It is lower than 3% of the GDP, which is set 
up by the relevant presidential decrees and resolutions. In 2001, military 
expenditures will total just 2.63% of the GDP. Along with this, the debts of 
previous periods for the Armed Forces have already reached about 20 billion 
rubles, which is slightly less than 50% of the entire defense order value in 
2000. The Armed Forces assign practically nothing for combat training, and 
buy only a handful of new armament and materiel. In the first half 2000, the 
defense order was financed only by 6%. About 80% of the sums transferred to 
the military accounts in 2000 was spent on social needs. Almost one-third of 
this sum was spent on the troops in the North Caucasus. At any rate, even 
these sums are far less than enough for full payment of money allowances. 
Officers and warrant officers have not received yet the compensation for food 
rations and the so-called "13th wages" (a yearly bonus).


The housing problems of servicemen represent the third factor. About 210,000 
families of servicemen and retired officers and warrant officers need 
housing, two-thirds of them in the Armed Forces. These figures are included 
into the new version of the special federal program "State housing 
certificates."


According to the program, every year 42,000 families of servicemen and 
retired officers and warrant officers should receive housing. Unfortunately, 
the government fails to meet this requirement. In 1998, more than 26,000 
officers and warrant officers of the Armed Forces were eager to buy 
apartments with state housing certificates. The Finance Ministry has issued 
the necessary documents only for 10,200 servicemen, and only 4,800 of them 
received the real apartments. In 1999, 18,400 state housing certificates were 
issued. In 2000, the federal government plans to issue 24,000-25,000 
certificates for retired officers of the Armed Forces, and other security 
agencies, like the Interior Ministry, the Federal Security Service, and the 
Ministry of Justice. This figure is 50% less than the figure stated in the 
program.


The fourth factor is represented by the political steps of Russian 
authorities aimed at further reduction of strategic arms. The military can 
take this policy, which is right for the country, as a weakness of the 
country's authorities and making advances to the US and the West. Moreover 
so, that the US has not signed the comprehensive test ban treaty yet. The US 
is averse to the Russia's offers of nuclear inventory limitation to 1,500 
warheads.


Thus, the threat is looming that the Armed Forces will not be loyal to the 
Kremlin. Are the servicemen capable of active support of some opposition 
forces, like this happened in August 1991 or October 1992? Analysis of 
answers to this question leads to the conclusion that, if the government 
seriously infringes on social rights of the servicemen, the negative 
processes will dominate in the troops' morale. So far the servicemen believe 
Putin, and officers and generals hope that the government and the Duma will 
not liquidate the social benefits.


Meanwhile, if the social condition of the Armed Forces worsens, and massive 
unrest against the ruling regime begins in the country, in certain 
circumstances the Armed Forces may be unable to obey the law enforcement 
orders of authorities partially or fully.


At any rate, military analysts again conclude that the Armed Forces are not 
capable of independent open anti-Constitution actions. Open disobedience in 
the Armed Forces can start only if a comprehensive chaos begins in the 
country.


Translated by Pavel Pushkin
Observer of WPS agency


******


#8
apn.ru
16 Jun, 2000
Outlook for our future with President Putin
Russia`s leading political analysts discussing new authority`s philosophy and 
make-up

Agency of Political News is privileged to open today a discussion titled 
Outlook for our future with President Putin. Make-up, philosophy and 
technology of the new authority. All our permanent authors and you, our dear 
readers, are welcome to speak out within the next few days. Pillars of 
domestic political analyses, permanent APN commentators, are first to take 
the floor. They have to answer some questions they put to themselves.


At the meeting of the APN-club of experts presented were: Iosif Diskin, 
Sergei Markov, Valery Khomyakov, Maxim Dianov, Viktor Militaryov, Mikhail 
Denisov, Vladimir Zharikhin, and APN editor-in-chief.


APN editors


Question 1. PRESIDENT PUTIN`S IDENTITY


President with western cast of mind


Sergei Markov: As I see it Putin`s identity was being formed as a style of 
political manager even when he was premier-minister. It was seen in the 
course of North Caucasus campaign when the Russian State system was 
threatened with dissolution. Putin has solved the problem: there is no threat 
of collapse there at present. However he will have to form a presidential 
style. Putin is a well educated person with western cast of mind, belongs to 
new generation. It`s quite natural these features will contribute a lot in 
his future political identity.


Putin is led by the «family»


Valery Khomyakov: There is general opinion: President Putin`s identity hasn`t 
yet formed. I agree there is a touch of western politician in Putin. But I`d 
like to underline another stroke ­ his rush pronouncements which he has to 
repudiate later. He resembles Yeltsin in this aspect. Inauguration was 
demonstrative, in my opinion, when we could see the two presidents staying 
next to each other. Putin appeared unpleasant because Yeltsin was very close 
behind him. Putin is still led by the «Family», he likes to be free but 
fails. That results in such rush moves, and it`s a style in a sort.


Putin is not a silly man to envy Pavlovsky


Mikhail Denisov: His identity has not yet formed. He displays prudence. His 
accession to the throne urges him to act discreetly. Some people think he 
envies talented and bright persons and he will make them leave. He was 
expected to replace Pavlovsky with Maxim Meyer. As for me, I think Putin 
could envy Pavlovsky only if he were a silly man. He could envy Stepashin or 
Primakov. He could envy Primakov, for instance, for that he had not pretended 
to be a greenhorn in front of Yeltsin. Putin proves to himself all the time, 
to my mind, that he did everything in a proper way.


Human being Putin hampers President Putin


Viktor Militaryov: As for Putin`s identity is concerned I`d distinguish three 
basic components: Putin`s identity as an individual, his identity as a 
political manager and political technologist and his presidential identity 
which is being formed.


Human being Putin hinders President Putin`s identity to be formed. Putin 
dislikes making decisions, he is at a loss until a certain moment, prone to 
lagging decisions. At the same time he has a very strong personal feature ­ 
honey is sweet, but the bee stings. People consider him sometimes too 
compliant, sometimes too adamant. He is friendly and humble in manner but he 
is adamant inside. To all appearances, he prefers to have complete 
information at his disposal.


If Yeltsin was satisfied with reading analytical summaries Putin seeks to get 
vast and reliable information provided it comes from reliable analysts. In 
this case he is ready to make decisions. If there is no information of this 
kind he composes something on the spur of the moment which is rather a result 
of his shyness. 


I believe he isn`t a person of a Yeltsin-like type. Getting access to basic 
information sources he tries to prepare his speeches by himself with no help 
of speechwriters and PR specialists.


By the way, few people know that Vladimir Vladimirovich began his career not 
as an intelligence officer. He worked at the Fifth General Department 
(dissidents` problems) and was attached to the KGB First General Department 
(external intelligence service). Taken this into account one can say his 
style varies somewhere between Filipp Bobkov (KGB first deputy chairmen at 
Soviet time and head of Media-Most security service now) and Anatoly Sobchak 
(late St. Peresburg governor).


The last thesis: His manner to lag decisions results in refusing to make 
decisions. He shows appearance of liberalism for the West and builds command 
economy inside the country. However the second factor is stronger and can be 
realized under Russian reality. Given the Chechen war it can lead to the 
situation that the style acts independently on its bearer.


Political technologist Putin will define President Putin`s identity


Vladimir Zharikhin: Putin has no identity as president so far. Putin is a 
person experienced not in politics but in political technology that is a men 
who influenced on the events but he did it through a shadow mechanism.


It`s quite another matter that Putin is not successful as a political 
technologist. Pay attention: The person who headed a governor (Sobchak ­ APN 
comment) election campaign stated he refused to conduct his own election 
race. In my opinion, he had lost some 10% of vote due to it. He showed no 
respect to people and a lot of them has been alienated from him.


Many problems arose from his negative political technological experience. 
That`s why it`s not clear yet what kind of politician and what kind of 
president he is going to become. As far as the present is concerned he is 
somewhat of a man who rejects European experience. I know none of western 
politicians who would refuse to conduct his own election campaign.


Putin fouls the trail


Maxim Dianov: I think Putin has his own internal presidential style: to 
confuse the players around him. In his 12-minute speech in the «Unity» 
congress he pronounced three absolutely contradictory standpoints: the first 
one was left, the second ­ centrist, the third ­ right, conservative. These 
viewpoints came from three different groups.


If he demonstrates his will he will have his identity. If he is not able to 
(he is afraid, it can be seen from Matvienko`s and Seleznyov`s behaviour) the 
system of favoritism and oligarchy will be formed. In this case the 
resolutions will be made not by Putin but by his favorites. And his identity 
will be defined by those who are closer to him. His improvisations are not of 
Yeltsin`s type, they present viewpoints of different groups.


Hamlet sitting on the Yeltsin`s throne


Iosif Diskin: practically everybody agree that Putin inherited his human 
style from the Yu.V. Andropov Institute and from his German experience: his 
strong authoritarian instincts.


Second, his identity bears the marks of political technologist. Political 
technologist is a person not to make decisions but prepare and analyse them. 
At the present time Putin has to act. Therefore his identity looks like 
Hamlet on the Russian throne. This throne`s legs are tycoons` hands. This 
throne belongs to Yeltsin. Putin is Hamlet sitting on the Yeltsin`s throne.



Question 2. CHARACTERS IN THE NEW REGIME.


President Putin`s friends and enemies


«Soyuz» system in a new Kremlin way


Vladimir Zharikhin: No wonder Putin has problems concerning his team. 
Russians and Americans differ in a manpower policy in the same way as in the 
field of spaceships. The «Soyuz» space system is in effect in our country: 
first, the first stage is exhausted and helter-skelter falls down to the 
earth then the second and third ones. And after all a tiny little spaceship 
achieves orbit. The work with the team is based on the same principle: an 
allies` «stage» is eliminated on every lap and helter-skelter falls down to 
the earth.


The Marshal Zhukov`s team was a rare example. It accompanied him with its 
permanent complement till he remained regiment commander. Kosygin was one 
more example. No other examples in our new and newest history. Putin has to 
form «his team» afresh from the persons around him. The circle is formed by a 
cut-and-try method. This is the Yeltsin`s way. Enemies are formed during this 
selection. There are no enemies until there are no friends.


Putin dreams about playing a gambit


Viktor Militaryov: Putin`s identity is a determinative factor in forming his 
present and future enemies. He is balancing between his indecision and his 
dream about strong executives, his personal power system. He seeks to be in 
friendly terms with anybody but at the same time he prepares a lot of gambits 
which he hasn`t played yet.


For instance, apart from the resolution on federal districts, governors` 
recall, appointment of the Federation Council by election which have been 
already passed, a possibility is under discussion to appoint government heads 
in regions from Moscow. A more acute gambit has been disputing in narrow 
circles: to held, in a half a year or so, a referendum on the executive in 
regions and federal districts.


Fairly speaking, the situation today is as follows: if Putin is a success he 
will realize his dream about political will, if he fails he will find himself 
under the Yeltsin regime with no Yeltsin.


Putin + Communists - «Unity»


Mikhail Denisov: I`d like to draw your attention to an eccentric detail in 
political alignment. It highlights the political forces which can be 
temporary Putin`s allies. In particular, CPRF proved to be a major hurdle in 
Putin`s party construction. Putin doesn`t want to form his party as the 
Communists are his allies now; when he wants to he will have to get rid of 
them. That means he will get enemies in their faces.


Putin inherited enemies and friends


Valery Khomyakov: He inherited friend and enemies from Yeltsin. Remember 
Fatherland ­ All Russia movement, Luzhkov and others. Later at the end of the 
Putin`s election campaign his enemies were ready to play part of his friends. 
The situation has not changed inside. It`s difficult to say something about 
his new friends.


As for his new enemies, recently Roman Abramovich invested a large sum of 
money in aluminum industry. Abramovich has secured himself from his own 
protege Putin: - to take away a bag of money without further social 
consequences is one matter, and to collide with aluminum industry of Russia 
is quite another one.


Furthermore, now that Putin acts actively in regions, tries to break down 
governors and, what is more serious, republics` presidents, the enemies will 
not keep waiting.


However the gaffes or hasty steps Putin is prone to will be his bitterest 
enemy. If they concurs with his rating`s drop his opposition will be great. 
However it`s quite another issue.


Friends and enemies bless Putin for feat


Sergei Markov: I think Putin has no enemies at all now. Vote in favor of him 
was vote in favor of one`s own hopes. Political and business elite seems to 
wish a strict host. It is aware that it hasn`t provided an economic surge, it 
hasn`t made but stolen money and sooner or later Russian people kick them 
out. Everybody want a strong person to come and put an end to this chaos.


Governors understand they rule their regions quite wretchedly, the population 
dislikes them. If Putin promotes less reforms he will have even less enemies. 
He may produce enemies not with his activity but with his inactivity. Any 
drastic decisions will be taken as a justified punishment because everybody`s 
blameful.


As for the friends, I believe no team of this sort has been formed yet, 
nevertheless it exists and works. It comprises the remainder of the Yeltsin 
team, including Voloshin, Surkov, and his private friends from KGB and 
liberal St. Pete community. Those belong to a new and western-like generation 
who wants to make Russia strong and free. Men around Putin including 
Illarionov, Gref and even Voloshin want so far to help him perform a feat. 


It`s quite another matter not all of them will be able to survive the feat 
they expect of him. Therefore I think the presidential team is expected to be 
drastically changed shortly.


Putin setting up a single-party multi-entrance system


Iosif Diskin: With Putin the way itself has been changed to qualify friends 
and enemies. The opposition is assimilated through mechanisms of his direct 
backing as it was in Soviet time when the system was single but 
multi-entrance.


It`s essential his election campaign Putin built on promises of everything to 
everybody as it was in Soviet time. So his opponents had a chance to 
associate themselves with his circle: either with us or no other way. Even 
Zyuganov find himself integrated into the configuration of this 
establishment. Who are outsiders? Those who show ostentatious loyalty but, in 
fact, are positively against Putin`s drastic moves. I cannot imagine 
Shaymiev, Rakhimov, Dzasokhov within this team…


As for enemies, until there are no real decisions taken there are no enemies. 
It`s not only governors that are potential Putin`s enemies but the real 
sector of Russian economy. Everybody see Putin missed the opportunity of 
economic rebound. He did nothing to back it when the growth started and when 
it was possible to be kept on. For the first time during many years the real 
money appeared in the real sector and even in agriculture. The chance may be 
lost. Being embittered (getting no timely support) our manufacturers may play 
their own reckless play.


SUMMARY. Putin has been governing Russia for over half a year. The only thing 
he has been doing is to provide execution of the budget through a traditional 
way - oil and gas export. Putin seeks to clean the political mechanism from 
ugly details. He demonstrates his capability to act in a civilian way. New 
political and bureaucracy configuration is defined by the means Putin intends 
to apply to in the work with his friends and enemies. No actual opposition 
has been observed for the time being.



Question 3. NEW OPPOSITION: PARTIES, LEADERS, RESOURCES


Zyuganov stabilizing Putin`s regime


Sergei Markov: Several types of oppositions have been formed. First, it`s a 
right protective opposition. It consists of the persons for whom any power is 
an evil whichever it is. Such opposition has always a social bases of several 
percent of population. In any case it will have no influence on the power, 
besides through world public opinion. Second, there is a Zyuganov`s 
opposition. It plays a very important part effectively stabilizing the 
existing power. Third, an opposition of various terrorist exists, first of 
all, the Chechen one. Left terrorist political forces (ultra left) are 
forming. This opposition will be disseminated and become influential as 
politicization of a new generation and crystallization of a new bourgeois 
regime take place.


Until now terrorism, as we see, in fact, promoted stabilization of the 
regime, - it was the Chechen war that forced Yeltsin to hand down his throne 
to his successor.


Awkward actions by the Center against regional leaders may promote regional 
opposition. In case a superliberal economic program is conducted a trade 
union labor social democratic opposition is expected to be set up. The 
beginning of it one can espy in «May» movement.


Putin seems to face a centrist opposition


Valery Khomyakov: The speed of appearance of the new opposition, in my 
opinion, will be connected with a social basis which has been formed for the 
last 10 years in other words with successful all-sufficient businessmen who 
have come into collision with their regional authorities and want Putin to 
establish order. Such social basis appears to exert a strong influence, for 
instance, on Union of Right Forces. A timber merchant said: «If Putin has 
done nothing until this fall we`ll demand some opposition moves from Union of 
Right Forces. Everything will be depend on the economic policy the government 
pursues ­ whichever it is: oil-and-gas-export economy or an effort to recover 
science intensive production and military-industrial establishment.


Putin`s missing the opportunity to initiate an economic rebound is a 
prognostic event. However he has chances. He is able to ram any law through 
the Duma, initiate new reforms more radical than Gaydar ones but with less 
social-economic costs and shocks. However Putin appears unlikely to do it 
now. The only thing the government seems to do is to improve Russia`s image 
abroad by means of programs existing only on the paper and try to raise money 
as if to realize them. I think, a serious anti-Putin opposition appears to 
have been formed by the Duma`s election provided Putin as a state leader will 
arose disappointment in himself.


Russians are unlikely to face a real opposition within the next four years


Mikhail Denisov: social basis of the opposition is of interest and consists 
of two parts: first, a steady Yabloko`s electorate (5-7%), second, an 
electoral «swamp» (25-30%). Different movements such as Civil Union, 
Renovation, etc. laid claim to the second part from time to time. Primakov 
and Luzhkov were on the point to entice away this electorate last year 
however their party dissolved. Theoretically, opposition can be made of those 
whose salary totals $40-60 a month. Great funds are needed to set up a worth 
party, however, nobody will give them. It follows from this the next four 
years raise no hopes.


Putin selecting enemies: «collective» Vyakhirev or Russian people


Viktor Militaryov: Putin`s opposition for the next 4-8 years depends on the 
path he will move along and on a current political situation. Should he 
choose the «Chubas` path» he will be Russian shah or Ro De Uh, should he 
choose «Berezovsky`s path» he will be Russian Ferdinand Marcos, in case Putin 
goes along a patriotic way he will be somewhat between Peron and Roosevelt.


The following thing is essential: if a natural rent will be redistributed, 
partly at any rate, in favor of population. It`s in our way to discuss 
financial oligarchs «collective» Vyakhirev, «collective» Alekperov and 
personal Bogdanov (AO Surgutneftegaz head ­ APN comment), however, are major 
oligarchs. The issue is brought to the following: in what way forces in the 
triangle will be correlated: the Kremlin ­ the fuel generals ­ processing 
industry.


If the decision is taken in favor of, at any rate, partial natural rent 
redistribution not only the fuel generals but also political forces directly 
or indirectly standing behind, in other words liberals, will turn into 
enemies. In this case Putin will enjoy backing from the army, 
military-industrial establishment, developing sectors in light industry and 
food processing, and, above all, he will manage to conciliate the population.


It`s a strong position however it`s strong in strategic terms, in medial- and 
long-term prospect. To defend this position Putin needs a great political 
will combined with a direct support from bureaucracy and special services. If 
the situation is different that is economy continues to be based on oil and 
gas export everyone who at present has confidence in Putin will be his 
enemies. The fate of the country will depend on which process is more rapid: 
social outburst, decay or corrosion.


Chubais and governors are likely to join Putin`s opposition


Stanislav Belkovsky: I think there will be no real opposition until Putin is 
a success in advancing a myth about himself as a strong ruler because either 
strong power or strong opposition may exist in Russia but not both 
simultaneously. If Putin has failed to keep on maintaining this myth by 2003 
an opposition will surface, first, from some strong persons (Chubais` type), 
second, from impetuous governors with their unsatisfied federal ambitions.


Persons with western cast of mind are not going to act the liberal with the 
opposition


Vladimir Zharikhin: I`d like to cite our friend and colleague Sergei Markov: 
«Real opposition and real party`s structure will appear only when an 
opposition party comes to power through election. Until this time any 
opposition is virtual.» There are two mechanisms to built a powerful 
opposition party. The first implies powerful financial and economic 
structures capable to fund a political party. This is a mechanism to form a 
right opposition.


The second mechanism is designed for a left opposition. It may be formed on 
the basis of acting trade unions which really unify working people but are 
not only engaged in defense property they retained from Soviet time. Efforts 
to form independent trade unions have failed.


One more issue. Our so-called westerly-thinking men actively come out against 
those who try to oppose them within the system. The fight appears to stick to 
no liberal rules. Even if some financial groups and trade unions appear the 
situation will be difficult due to destructive methods applied.


That`s why I pessimistically consider real opposition prospect.


Retired persons become younger and more efficient


Maksim Dianov: First of all one should take into consideration it was the 
Communists not at all «Unity» that won the last Duma`s race. Moreover, the 
support of the Communists increasingly rose in the 1993-1999 parliamentary 
elections. This is a real opposition. Retired persons who are considered its 
major resources are becoming younger and more efficient. We`ll see in what 
way they will react on a proposal to increase a retired age up to 65 years.


Putin spoke about a two-party system at the «Unity» congress: party of power 
and party of opposition should be set up. He said we have an opposition 
party, this is CPRF, we should set up, however, a party of power. In Putin`s 
opinion, Union of Right Forces meets requirements best of all. Chubais and 
Kirienko already try to claim they are an opposition but they do not say 
which one exactly.


Putin is not a political trend, he is a public opinion


Iosif Diskin: The existing power will instinctively eliminate any legal 
permanent opposition. Any opposition, in its turn, will try to survive within 
the existing system. However passivity of the authorities, the lack of a 
proper strategy, missed economic rebound will lead the situation in regions 
into disaster.


Elections in 50 subjects of the Russian Federation scheduled to be held 
within the next two years will lead to the situation when presidential and 
governor candidates initiate a major opposition to Moscow and President`s 
policy. Andrei Levinson, one of those who formed pre-election strategy for 
Putin and a very talented man, in my opinion, said: «Putin is not a political 
trend, he is a public opinion.» If the governors in opposition are a success 
the current «public opinion-Putin» may be changed by «public opinion-protest».


During the next election campaigns in regions the funds will be injected to 
back the fight against a oil-and-gas-export policy in support of industry 
production. The funds are available. It`s quite another matter that the new 
opposition has no ideology, no comprehension that one should know how to 
conduct political fight and master political technology. All these people are 
Soviet directors and dentists who became hosts of giant enterprises by 
chance. They were in difficulty to introduced order in their enterprises and 
now they are certain they will manage to establish order in politics in the 
same way.


If a new strong populist-politician appears Putin is likely to face serious 
problems. «Unity» also may be disappointed with its chief. In this case the 
evil which is «Hamlet on the Yeltsin`s throne» may hurt the present favorite 
of public opinion.


Summary. The presidential administration is likely to instinctively seek to 
destroy any powerful opposition including to integrate it inside the power 
system. The Kremlin`s objective is to turn the opposition into a part of the 
ruling family. The authority is not interested in setting up parties for the 
time being.


******

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