January 7, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4016 4017 4018

Johnson's Russia List
#4017
7 January 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Interfax: PUTIN HOPES ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY WILL STRENGTHEN RUSSIA.    2. The Guardian (UK): John McVicar, Why I believe in a conspiracy.(re Chechnya)
3. Reuters: Putin likely to shake up security services.
4. Intellectualcapital.com: Eugene Rumer, Getting Real about Russia.
5. Interfax: RUSSIAN NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT ALTERED.
6. Karl Hanuska: response to Brian Whitmore/stock market/4011.
7. John M. Hansen: Russian Expectations after the Putin Election.
8. Business Week: Putin's Russia. Can the former KGB spymaster deliver on promises to fix the chaotic Russian economy?
9. Rossiyskaya Gazeta: Yuriy Vasilkov, Vladimir Putin's Clear Arguments.(Putin Backed To End Russia's 'Turmoil')
10. Stratfor: Putin Seeks First Round Popular Mandate.
11. Washington THE JULIAN MILLENNIUM & OLD RUSSIAN NEW YEAR'S CELEBRATION.
12. Peter Mahoney: Re: Matt Bivens/ "less but better"/4014.
DJ: A short interpolation. What JRL may need is not more Western discussants
but more Russian input. I do apologize to those who find the current email
flow too much. But it seems the right thing to do for now. 
Matt Bivens' Moscow Times provides the best coverage of Russia. Do you 
remember the Washington Post and Watergate? It took a while to catch up with 
the "third-rate burglary." In Washington we are well launched into the
umpteenth revival of enthusiasm for right-wing governance in Russia. The Yeltsin regime
has so far successfully subverted the prospect of alternative leadership 
(center-left) in Russia. The sigh of relief in Washington is audible. This 
was accomplished through an unnecessary war in Chechnya and, perhaps, a 
fraudulent election. Things to be investigated.]

*******

#1
PUTIN HOPES ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY WILL STRENGTHEN RUSSIA

MOSCOW. Jan 6 (Interfax) - Acting President Vladimir Putin issued
Christmas greetings on Thursday to Orthodox Russians, who celebrate the
festival on January 7.
"Orthodoxy has traditionally played a special role in Russian
history," Putin said in an address published by his press service.
"It has been not only a moral touchstone for every believer but
also an unbending spiritual core of the entire people and state. Based
on the idea of love for one's neighbor and on the commandments of good,
mercy and justice, Orthodoxy has largely determined the character of
Russian civilization. Its eternal truths, which have become the
indisputable laws of life, have throughout the centuries supported
people both in sorrow and in joy, returning hope to them and helping
them acquire faith."
"The transcendental values of Christianity, formulated two
millennia ago, have not lost their deep meaning to this day. It is my
firm belief as we are entering the third millennium today that its
ideals will make it possible to strengthen mutual understanding and
consensus in our society and will contribute to the spiritual and moral
rebirth of the Fatherland."

*******

#2
The Guardian (UK)
7 January 2000
[for personal use only]
Why I believe in a conspiracy 
By John McVicar
John McVicar is a freelance journalist who has specialised in Chechen 
affairs. 

The last time I was in Grozny was in December 1998, when I went out to 
investigate what seemed to me to be the grossly misreported beheadings of 
four telecom engineers - three Britons and a New Zealander. 

One of the government officials I interviewed was Chechnya's then minister of 
information, Akmed Zakaev. He is now a senior aide to President Mashkadov. 

I felt there were strong reasons to suspect that the Russian secret service, 
the FSB, was involved both in the murder of the four telecom engineers and 
the earlier assassination of six Red Cross workers. As Zakaev among others 
pointed out to me: only Russia had a vested interest in preventing the 
setting up of an independent telecommunications system and driving out 
foreign aid workers. Genuine kidnappers, on the other hand, rarely kill their 
hostages. 

This winter, after seeing what appeared to be the same gross misreporting in 
the west of the current war, I went to Moscow to interview Malik Saydullayev, 
who is a pro-Moscow Chechen who was first appointed, then sacked by Prime 
Minister Putin, as president in exile of Chechnya. He showed me footage of 
the massacre at Alkhan-Yurt, a small village to the west of Grozny where 
Russian special forces went on the rampage. 

What I found in Moscow was a deep cynicism both among Chechens and pro-war 
Muscovites themselves about the casus belli of the invasion of Chechnya. 

There is no evidence that Chechens acting for President Maskhadov or such 
mujahedin as Basayev or Khattab were in fact responsible for the apartment 
bombings that killed 293 Russians in August, which were blamed on them and 
led to the present popular war. 

Indeed, what evidence there is points again to the Russian secret service. I 
understand special security agents were actually apprehended, by local 
militia, planting another bomb in Moscow but this was explained away as a 
test of security. 

If the Chechens really were to blame, why aren't they still bombing Moscow 
apartments when they now have far greater cause? Another problem with the 
Russian version of their reasons for invading Chechnya is this: how could 
they have marshalled such an invasion force in such an impossibly short 
logistical time? 

As a result of these events, a minor FSB agent, Vladimir Putin has been 
catapulted from obscurity into the presidency. 

Meanwhile, the departing Yeltsin is given immunity from future prosecution 
for presiding over what is the embezzlement of the century. During the 
Yeltsin era more than $500bn of the proceeds of state privation and IMF 
handouts has made its way from Russia to western bank accounts. 

The military, for their part, got revenge for their 1994-6 defeat in Chechnya 
and a strongman in the Kremlin. The most telling comment I head about Putin 
while I was in Moscow was: "He doesn't mind spilling blood." 

Russia's obsession with Chechnya, which is partly to do with state pride but 
in the last decade has been intensified by the massive oil reserves 
discovered in the Caspian basin, is corrupting its already morally bankrupt 
state institutions. 

Yet Russia cannot subdue Chechnya. It has been trying to do so for 250 years 
and never put out the spark of nationhood in the Chechen people. Every time 
the Russia state weakens, the Chechens rise up to throw off the imperialist 
yoke of their conquerors. 

*******

#3
ANALYSIS-Putin likely to shake up security services
By Martin Nesirky

MOSCOW, Jan 6 (Reuters) - Acting President Vladimir Putin looks set to 
strengthen Russia's intelligence services but seems less likely to recreate 
the omnipresent KGB he served in the Soviet era, political analysts say. 

One of his first remarks after being appointed on New Year's Eve was to 
praise Russia's acronym army of security services -- FSB domestic 
counter-intelligence, SVR foreign espionage, the FAPSI communications agency 
and GRU, the military's spies. 

``The potential of the special services will not just be maintained but 
increased,'' said Putin, a former FSB chief who is favourite to win a March 
26 presidential election largely because of his hardman role in Russia's 
campaign in Chechnya. 

Political and security analysts say Putin's expected changes stem from a need 
to get tough on organised crime, terrorism and political extremism, a wish to 
help the rickety economy and the less altruistic desire to stay ahead in the 
election race. 

``If he is going to go into the March election as the frontrunner, he wants 
to maintain the momentum as a problem solver,'' said Henry Plater-Zyberk, a 
Russian affairs analyst at Britain's Conflict Studies Centre. ``To do that he 
would have to have the law enforcement bodies well funded and shaping up.'' 

Quite how the services will shape up is not yet clear. 

Given Putin's track record, it is unlikely Russia will have to wait long to 
find out whether he wants to add extra powers to the Kremlin's hitherto 
advisory Security Council, for example, or go further and create an 
overarching national security body, perhaps even a ministry. 

Putin met Security Council Secretary Sergei Ivanov, a close associate, on 
Thursday and signed a decree altering Russia's security strategy to 
concentrate more on terrorism and organised crime. It was not immediately 
clear whether it went beyond concepts to outline specific changes in the 
security apparatus. 

NEW MINISTRY THOUGHT UNLIKELY 

Plater-Zyberk said some agencies may be merged, such as the FSB and FAPSI, 
but it was unlikely a ministry would be formed. 

``I don't think he has to do it,'' he said. ``The point is not creating a 
ministry but a body which would do the job you want.'' 

Sergei Markov, director of the Moscow-based Political Studies Institute, took 
a similar view, saying experience showed it was better to keep the various 
agencies separate. 

``I don't think a unified security service will be formed, but within the 
framework of the presidential administration a powerful structure will be 
established to coordinate these security services,'' he said. 

He said this structure could be the Security Council, an influential advisory 
body. Putin is a former Council secretary. 

Until the Soviet Union collapsed a decade ago, the intelligence services were 
grouped under the huge umbrella of the KGB, the State Security Committee, 
although GRU military intelligence was separate. 

The Bolsheviks set up the ``Cheka'' security police soon after the 1917 
Communist revolution. Its role changed little down the years but the name and 
acronym switched another six times before it became the KGB in 1954, the year 
after Josef Stalin died. 

KGB chief Yuri Andropov became Soviet leader between 1982 and 1984 and many 
Russians believe he was on the right track with his stated aim of rooting out 
corruption and tightening discipline. 

Analysts and pollsters say Putin's popularity -- his ratings are above the 50 
percent needed to win the election without a runoff -- partly derives from a 
comparison with Andropov. 

``It's clear that, having seen Putin, people decided this is the tough leader 
they have been dreaming about for years,'' political pollster Yuri Levada 
told the newspaper Trud. 

``He has no opponents,'' said Markov, referring to his seemingly unassailable 
lead. ``His only opponents are chaos and a lack of stability.'' 

Former spy Mikhail Lyubimov said it was wrong to assume all ex-KGB men were 
hardliners. Putin was an agent in East Germany. 

``Putin was in the KGB when he was very young,'' Lyubimov said said. ``Most 
of his creative years passed under perestroika.'' 

*******

#4
Intellectualcapital.com
January 6-13, 2000
Getting Real about Russia
by Eugene Rumer 
A specialist on Russia, Eugene Rumer served on the National Security Council 
staff and at the State Department from 1996 to 1999. He is currently a 
visiting fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy working on a 
study of Russian policy in the Middle East. 

Russian President Boris Yeltsin's resignation on New Year's Eve and last 
month's parliamentary election are welcome news for the United States: There 
are no more good guys in Russian politics. We finally have a chance to stop 
pretending otherwise and start rebuilding our policy toward Russia based on 
interests, not personalities. That means we will have to deal with a Russia 
we do not like.

Things are looking up for the Kremlin. And for us.

Stability is good

Acting President Vladimir Putin is well on the way to replacing Yeltsin 
permanently via election. Putin is surprisingly popular with the voters -- so 
much so that by riding on his coattails, even the radical reform party of 
Yegor Gaydar and Anatoli Chubais managed to get into the new Duma.

For the first time in a decade, Russia's executive and legislative branches 
are positioned to work together. That is good news, and let’s accept it as 
such, instead of complaining that last month’s winners did not have an agenda.

Putin's probable victory will make Russia more stable and prosperous

We want Russia to put its house in order. A weaker and less stable Russia is 
in nobody's interest. If the December vote and Putin's probable victory in 
March can make the country more stable and prosperous, it is good for Russia 
and for the United States.

But the positive news comes at a price. The party of war won the Duma poll. 
The campaign was dirty even by the rough-and-tumble standards of Russian 
politics. Russia's once-independent media have become propaganda tools for 
the clans that own them. And the vote has confirmed what opinion polls have 
been telling us for months: The people of Russia support the war in Chechnya. 
The winners understood it. The losers did not.

Our favorite Russian reformer, Gaydar, endorsed the war. The most respected 
Russian politician in Washington, Chubays, welcomed it and accused its 
critics of treason. On the other hand, the long-despised spymaster, Yevgeni 
Primakov, and Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, tainted by allegations of 
corruption, called for a negotiated solution. Chechnya has done away with 
good guys in Russian politics.

Talk loudly ... and drop the big stick

The Chechen war, the parliamentary election and Putin's elevation have erased 
the last pretense at partnership between Russia and the United States. That 
partnership was hollow. It was built on promises and personal preferences of 
our leaders, not accomplishments. Can anybody imagine Vice President Al Gore 
or Texas Gov. George W. Bush, the presidential front-runners, having the same 
“special relationship” with Vlad the ex-KGB officer as Bill had with Boris?

The partnership of summit declarations had neither the political nor the 
economic foundations, nor the commonality of strategic purpose, required for 
a true partnership between nations. We can stop pretending now.

Politically and strategically, we may never be partners with Russia, as our 
difficult relations with China demonstrate. But we must deal with Russia. 
Strategic arms control and ballistic-missile defense are at the top of the 
agenda. Russia's wealth and economic potential may serve as the foundation 
for the economic leg of the relationship -- some day.

We have to recognize that we cannot punish or change Russia. The options 
before us to affect Russian behavior in Chechnya are either irrelevant or 
counterproductive. International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans matter more to the 
fund itself than to Russia, which generates billions of dollars in capital 
flight each month.

Halting IMF loans merely would mark another unfortunate chapter in the fund's 
highly politicized relationship with Russia. If Russia can meet the technical 
criteria, it deserves to get the money. Nor should we use Export-Import Bank 
loans to signal our displeasure. All these are inconsequential, feel-good 
measures that run counter to our own principles.

But we must not keep silent about Russia's brutal war in Chechnya. We should 
criticize Russia's excessive use of force. The demise of the hollow 
partnership is all the more reason not to pull punches in statements from the 
White House and the State Department.

No more pretense

The private sector could be far more important and effective than anything 
our government can do in this situation. Russia's new moneyed class treasures 
its access to the international business and financial community. The 
prospect of losing access in the West worries Russia's new owners.

Top executives from major U.S. corporations have been meeting regularly twice 
a year with Russia's leading "oligarchs" – men who own much of Russia, its 
media and its government. That dialogue has a far better chance of 
influencing Russian behavior than official pressure.

We have a chance to return our relationship with Russia to a more sound 
footing as we approach a new chapter in Russian history and U.S.-Russian 
relations. No longer burdened by pretenses at partnership, we can be honest 
about our interests and disagreements with Russia.

Some honesty in the relationship would be welcome news in both Washington and 
Moscow. To pretend that we can punish or influence Russia with 
inconsequential sanctions would serve nobody's interests -- not ours, not 
Russia's and not the Chechen people's. 

******

#5
RUSSIAN NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT ALTERED

MOSCOW. Jan 6 (Interfax) - Acting Russian President Vladimir Putin
has signed a decree introducing alterations to the national security
concept.
The work on these alterations began as long ago as the present head
of state was the secretary of the Security Council, Secretary of the
Security Council Sergei Ivanov told the press after a meeting with
Putin.
The alterations are aimed to "more distinctly outline the
definition of a multi-polar world and the way Russia will work on
safeguarding national interests," Ivanov said.
"In an absolutely new way" the problem of terrorism is considered,
the secretary said, pointing out that the national security concept
adopted in 1997 had to be seriously revised in this sphere.
Besides this, the problem of organized crime is now "interpreted
not as a purely criminal, but political problem."
A number of other avenues of safeguarding national security in the
spheres of ecology, health-care etc., are also subject to alterations,
as well as proposals to neutralize threats to national security, the
secretary of the Security Council said.

*******

#6
Date: Thu, 6 Jan 2000
From: Karl Hanuska <karlhan@yahoo.com>
Subject: response to Brian Whitmore's Globe article/4011

In reply to Brian Whitmore’s January 4 article from
the Boston Globe (Johnson’s list Jan 5 – #4011), I
think it is worth noting that the Russian stock market
did not suddenly just spring to life after Boris
Yeltsin’s resignation and it is not fair to call it
“long-stagnant”.

While in terms of daily turnover the local bourse is
vastly smaller than major world markets, it has been
climbing more or less steadily since late September -
that after strong gains in April to July ahead of a
late summer fall.

Strong oil prices and relatively low production costs
for domestic companies in the wake of rouble
devaluation have been behind most of the gains.
However, investor optimism in the weeks before and
just after December’s State Duma elections also helped
fuel growth and saw several key indices return to
pre-crisis levels prior to Yeltsin’s resignation.

By December 30, the benchmark RTS1-Interfax index was
already up around 150 percent for the year indicating
that, though highly turbulent, the Russian market was
among the world’s best performing in 1999. From there
the market climbed further after Yeltsin announced his
decision to step down.

Without a doubt Yeltsin’s resignation has helped the
market by removing some doubts about political
stability in Russia, but it was only one of a number
of development that gave this fledgling market a boost
in 1999.

Sincerely,
Karl Emerick Hanuska, Moscow 

*******

#7
From: "John M. Hansen" <jmhansen@erols.com>
Subject: Russian Expectations after the Putin Election 
Date: Thu, 6 Jan 2000 

For what it's worth, I would personally expect the following
changes to take place under Putin, once he is officially elected.
Should he not be elected all bets are off.
1. - Now that the old KGB has effectively been divided into
three different entities, I would expect that the border guards and
the Interior Police would be gradually increased and given more
authority. In some of the regions of Russia, particularly in the
Far Eastern Islamic Regions, the interior police are not taken very
seriously at the present time. The major crime fighting tasks,
particularly in the area of combating smuggling, will fall on their
shoulders. How the interior police respond to the smuggling problem
will be a clear indication of the seriousness with which the
Russians are confronting their overwhelming criminal problem, which
has made the large cities unsafe.
2. - The Foreign Intelligence Service will step up its attempts
to gain high technology for other companies in all nations of the
world. Putin was leading the chase in this direction in Germany,
and he knows what can be gained from this kind of work. If he has a
good opportunity to serve a full eight year term, this gaining of
technology could go forward under rather favorable auspices. (I
understand that the Chinese have a text book on how to obtain
foreign intelligence, which has recently come to light. Perhaps
Putin will have it translated into Russian and used as a text at
their Intelligence school.)
In many cases the transfer of technical intelligence may be
accomplished by making Russia, particularly western Russia, into a
favored manufacturing arena. Western investment in manufacturing
using Russian labor could be quite productive in the short term for
the western company, and in the long term for the Russian economy.
In this regard, I am reminded that the Singer Sewing Machine
Company introduced precision machining into Czarist Russia, at their
expense, so as to manufacture the sewing machines that they sold in
that country. A similar tactic would be quite effective with
precision electronics I am certain.
3. - A campaign will probably be undertaken to popularize the
individual farm, including making the individual farmer something of
a romantic figure. This will be something of the opposite view
point as was taken under the Soviets to popularize the collective
farm. Efforts in this regard have so far not been very productive.
More individual farming is needed all through the nation to turn
Russia into a net exporter of farm goods. This is a very necessary
long term program, and if the Russian state is to become self
supporting, it should be undertaken as soon as possible. The speed
with which the individual farming campaign is actual undertaken will
indicate the real goals for the stability of the new leaders of
Russia.
There are a few other things as well, Putin will wish to
stabilize the financial laws of the nation, by bringing bank
reporting rules in line with those in other nations. Strengthening
the authority of the courts, and increasing criminal sentencing is
anther area that will have to be undertaken before many people take
the Russian government seriously. Again, the speed and the effects
by which this is accomplished will all be indicators of the true
desires of Putin to build a solid Russian government.
On the other hand, he may wish to simply turn to the aristocracy
of the Cheka, which under many guises has been the real driving
force behind Russia since the time of the Oprichnina. It will be
difficult for him to turn his back on the long accepted practices of
relying on the secret services, and actually building a new nation.
Those who are students of Russian genealogy will find these lines of
inquiry quite rewarding.

John M. Hansen
I have been retired for some time, and no longer have any
contact with matters of intelligence or politics, other than my
daily commute on the Internet.

******

#8
Business Week
January 17, 2000
[for personal use only]
International -- European Cover Story
Putin's Russia (int'l edition)
Can the former KGB spymaster deliver on promises to fix the chaotic Russian 
economy?
By Paul Starobin in Moscow, with David Fairlamb in Frankfurt and Stan Crock 
in Washington 

Until a few months ago, he was virtually unknown even in his own Russia. 
Trained as a lawyer, he spent much of his working life as an economic spy in 
Germany, scooping up Western technology for the KGB, whose successor agency 
he eventually came to run. Now, at 47, Vladimir V. Putin has been catapulted 
into the Russian presidency by Boris N. Yeltsin's surprise resignation on 
Dec. 31. Unless he makes a horrible mistake, the former spymaster is almost 
certain to win a mandate to lead Russia for a four-year term when voters head 
to the polls for early elections on Mar. 26.
Will Putin's rise to power usher in a new era of stability in Russia? From 
Moscow to Washington to Tokyo, politicians and diplomats are debating whether 
Putin, who spent only four months as Prime Minister, will be his own man or a 
mere puppet of Yeltsin's entourage. Many note with alarm that Putin's first 
move as Acting President was to sign a decree immunizing Yeltsin from future 
prosecution on any corruption charges. ``This is an attempt to consolidate an 
old regime,'' warns Moscow political scientist Boris Kagarlitsky. ``Putin is 
a weak person with the image of a strong man.''
RADICAL REFORM, NYET. But Putin may surprise his doubters. Even if he has 
lacked a political base before, he now has supreme institutional power as 
President. Three days before his appointment, he put out a sweeping manifesto 
on the Internet outlining his vision. It will be a ``long and difficult 
journey,'' he says, but Russia will regain its former status as a ``great 
power.'' Don't expect Putin to import American or European models, and 
radical reform is out. He calls for a gradual program based on ``a new 
Russian idea'' that emphasizes patriotism, social protections, and a strong 
state. ``For Russians, a strong state is not an anomaly,'' Putin says online. 
``Quite the contrary, [Russians] see it as a source and guarantor of order'' 
and the ``main driving force of any change.''
But Putin's philosophy of a strong state does not hark back to the Soviet 
era of central planning. In his years as an economic spy in Germany, Putin 
came to understand that Russia can only be a great power if it is 
economically as well as militarily strong. Putin's KGB experience ``drove 
home to him that the old command economy was like a dinosaur,'' says Michael 
Steiner, foreign policy adviser to German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder. ``He 
knows that Russia needs a fully functioning, well-regulated, private-sector 
economy to thrive.''
Both Mikhail Gorbachev and Yeltsin tried, but failed, to strengthen 
Russia's economy. Now, Putin seems determined to build a stronger central 
government in Moscow and use it to tackle Russia's problems, from its 
struggling economy to its unruly regions. Putin is calling for an ``active 
offensive'' on crime, a stronger role for the judiciary, and the 
establishment of a civil-service meritocracy. On the economic front, he has 
created an advisory group that is looking into closing inefficient industrial 
enterprises such as truck-and-limo maker Zil. New social programs would 
cushion the blow to workers.
Already, Putin has shown he's not afraid to use the power of the state. 
He is using all-out force against rebels in Chechnya. Many fear that Putin's 
Russia could be more authoritarian than either Yeltsin's or Gorbachev's. It 
will certainly be less amenable to Western ideas. But so far, Putin claims 
that he will abandon neither market economics nor democracy--only ``adapt'' 
them to the ``realities of Russia.''
It will likely be months before Russians learn the exact nature of Putin's 
program. Right now, his most important aim is to win the election. A chief 
priority is avoiding heavy Russian casualties in Chechnya, where the rebels 
are putting up a tough fight. He also must decide how to deal with Yeltsin's 
former entourage. Voters are disgusted with the way tycoons such as Boris 
Berezovsky wielded power in the Kremlin. ``Putin would send a very strong 
signal if he removed from his government those considered to be close to Mr. 
Berezovsky,'' says Michael A. McFaul, a Russia analyst at the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace in Washington.
But Berezovsky and other so-called oligarchs have the money and media 
outlets that could swing the election. Putin simply may not be able to 
distance himself from the elite until after the vote, though he can make a 
start. He recently visited the Federal Railways Ministry, headed by 
Berezovsky crony Nikolai Aksyonenko, and blasted its employees for corrupt 
practices. Putin has also dismissed from the Kremlin staff Yeltsin's 
daughter, Tatiana Dyachenko, a target of corruption allegations who is close 
to Berezovsky. Some Russia watchers think Putin may try to ease the 
oligarchs' grip by offering immunity in exchange for returning part of their 
ill-gotten assets.
But Putin may already be too compromised to make any such deals. After 
leaving the KGB in 1990, he went to work for then-Mayor Anatoly Sobchak in 
St. Petersburg. That's when he developed ties to Anatoly B. Chubais, later 
architect of Russia's much-criticized privatization program and now a 
political adviser to Putin. He also met emerging titans such as Vladimir 
Potanin, who is firmly backing the new President. Political opponents accused 
Putin of rigging privatization deals in favor of his buddies. Some Moscow 
sources predict that the only big change in Putin's Russia may be a 
reshuffling of the players, as a new crowd of Kremlin leeches replaces the 
old one.
Still, if Putin could take on the tycoons, his popularity among ordinary 
Russians would soar. Russians are fed up--with greedy oligarchs, Mafia gangs, 
Chechen rebels, and shady banks that can't be trusted with savings. ``People 
are thirsty for a strong leader,'' says Yuri Levada, a sociologist at 
Moscow's National Public Opinion Research Institute. ``They are afraid of 
general disorder.''
DISASTROUS EFFECTS. The worst disorder is in the economy. It's still a mess, 
even though gross domestic product grew 1.5% in 1999, the best performance 
since the Soviet Union's breakup in 1991. Higher oil prices are helping 
Russia. But thousands of Russian companies barely function. They don't have 
the cash to buy materials or pay their workers, and they stay afloat by 
barter. Millions of Russians survive by growing their own food and working in 
the black market, estimated at 40% of GDP. And all through the Yeltsin years, 
the government failed to collect taxes efficiently, with disastrous effects 
on the country's medical and education system. It's a vicious circle that 
won't be broken until Russia reforms its tax and bankruptcy laws.
Putin aims to use his ``stronger state'' to do that. For starters, he has 
charged a group of Western-minded liberal economists with crafting a new tax 
system. Putin wants to cut rates on businesses and individuals and simplify 
the Byzantine tax code. A likely target is the payroll tax, now a huge 40% of 
workers' wages. And while others before him have failed, Putin is likely to 
take a tougher line on tax cheats. About half of Russia's tax bill goes 
uncollected.
Another key plank in Putin's plan is a government-run ``industrial 
policy.'' Putin thinks the way to get growth is to encourage state, private, 
and foreign investment in high-tech industries such as aerospace. Defense 
enterprises, such as tank builders, are also expected to benefit from fresh 
subsidies or tax preferences. At the same time, Putin's advisory commission 
is examining an overhaul of the bankruptcy code to speed up the closure of 
unprofitable factories.
Meanwhile, exporters to Russia should take note: If the Russian economy 
continues its recovery and the ruble strengthens, Putin may erect barriers to 
imports of such big-ticket items as cars and refrigerators. The new President 
also hopes to boost Russia's exports--not only of raw materials like oil but 
of manufactured goods, too. He'll create an agency that will offer exporters 
government guarantees for commercial loans. And he'll eventually push for 
Russian membership in the World Trade Organization.
So far, Russian businesspeople and markets are reacting favorably to 
Putin. Shares of Gazprom and other companies have jumped. ``He's the best 
choice of all available,'' says Alexei Krivenkov, co-founder of Port.Ru, a 
Russian-language Internet portal company based in New York and Moscow. ``Give 
Putin the benefit of the doubt,'' adds Josef A. Bakaleynik, chief financial 
officer at Tyumen Oil Co. He is hopeful that the new President will slash the 
bureaucracy, then raise the remaining bureaucrats' salaries--so they will 
demand fewer bribes.
BIG LAG. Still, it could take a generation for Russia to fix its economic 
problems. Putin seems to realize that. Even if Russia grows at the phenomenal 
rate of 8% a year, he says, it will take the country 15 years to reach the 
per capita GDP level of today's Portugal or Spain. Russia's per capita GDP of 
$1,800 is now about one-sixth that of Portugal and one-eighth that of Spain. 
Its paltry GDP of $190 billion is just one-fifth as big as China's and about 
one-fiftieth the size of America's.
The long road ahead may be one reason he is appealing to Russians' 
patriotism. For now, at least, the Chechen war is playing into his hands. 
Even though the assault on Chechnya has been waged brutally, most Russians 
back the war. Indeed, the threat to the integrity of Russia from Chechnya is 
quite real. The current conflict began last August when Chechen-based rebels 
tried to declare an Islamic republic in next-door Dagestan, against the will 
of the Dagestanis.
``ABSOLUTELY CYNICAL.'' If the war drags on, however, even the most patriotic 
Russians will grow weary. That's why Putin may have to reach a political 
agreement with the Chechens. He may turn out to be the only person in Russia 
with the credibility to cut a deal--just as general-turned-statesman Charles 
De Gaulle extracted France from Algeria, or retired Russian General Alexander 
Lebed ended the first Chechen war in 1996. ``I don't exclude the possibility 
that a President Putin will grant Chechnya independence,'' says Andrei 
Piontkovsky, director of the Moscow-based Center for Strategic Studies. ``He 
is an absolutely cynical man.''
Is Putin dangerous for the West? In the short term, probably not. But the 
longer term could be rockier, particularly if NATO angers Russia by inviting 
the Baltic states to become members. ``Things are on a fine edge right now,'' 
says Robert Legvold, a Russia specialist at Columbia University. ``You don't 
want to push the Russians too hard.''
Russia has drifted and suffered under the rule of the aging and ailing 
Yeltsin. Now it has a young and healthy leader, and millions of Russians are 
relieved. But they will be watching closely to see if Vladimir Vladimirovich 
is a nation-builder, a dictator--or both.

*******

#9
Putin Backed To End Russia's 'Turmoil' 

Rossiyskaya Gazeta
5 January 2000
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Yuriy Vasilkov: "Vladimir Putin's Clear Arguments" 

For some time politicians have resembled actors and 
sportsmen. They do their previously defined jobs, but the results of 
their actions are assessed by sociological "ratings" -- along the lines 
of "goals, points, or seconds." 

It seems as though we are finally approaching the end of the 
transitional period in which the political elite has lived on the basis 
of scenarios created deep within yesterday's nomenklatura -- a kind of 
Soviet aristocracy. Dozens, hundreds of "parties," "movements," 
"associations," and "clubs" have suddenly leapt into the blinding 
footlights to replace the ossified one-party system. Following all the 
laws of creative competition, certain "stars" have come to the fore. Some 
have found their place in withering criticism of the "regime" of which 
they were themselves part and parcel. Some have struck an advantageous 
pose as smart skeptics, preserving their prestige from risky concrete 
action. And some have simply donned top hat and tails to dance the 
can-can with devil-may-care girls from the cabaret. 

The important aspect of the rivalry among political stars has somehow 
receded into the background unnoticed. 

All this has been accompanied by unhurried arguments from well-fed 
political scientists and by unpretentious national totalizers showing 
which "horse" has gained or lost how many percentage points over the past 
week. Meanwhile life has irreversibly brought the election hour of 
judgment closer. It seems that nothing prevents the puppeteers from 
putting the marionettes on the shelves they have predetermined. A cynical 
theory of "spin doctoring" even emerged, claiming that, if necessary, any 
politician could be "launched" or "destroyed." Just like show business! 
All these plans have been thrown into confusion by the first Russian 
president, who had long seemed to be "above the struggle." Admittedly, he 
tried on several occasions to break with the lulling rhythm of a 
political show that was further and further removed from people's real 
aspirations and the country's problems. But abrupt personnel reshuffles 
were received with irritation, and attempts were even made to write them 
off to the inadequacies of a sick man. But ultimately B.N. Yeltsin 
demonstrated the originality of his political thinking, his willpower, 
and the consistency of his strategy. He finally found a figure to drag 
the public process out of its increasing stagnation. 

The phenomenon of V.V. Putin, who has turned into the favorite in the 
presidential race in just a couple of months and who became acting 
president in the last few hours of 1999, is giving analysts no peace. He 
does not fit any of the norms elaborated during the transitional period. 
Most probably he marks the start of a new period, when Russia will 
finally move from inevitable and necessary revolutionary reforms to a 
normal process of evolutionary development. 

V. Putin's opponents shrug their shoulders -- his political leanings 
are unclear, they say. He supports Just Cause and shakes hands with the 
Communists. But that is precisely the strong side of a man who clearly 
understands what our people -- tired of political shenanigans -- now 
need. They do not need mysterious statements along the lines of "we know 
what to do," but concrete action to improve the quality of life. 
The second "anti-Putin" argument is that he has allegedly built the 
surge in his prestige on the basis of a "small, victorious war." But the 
war in the North Caucasus is by no means "small" and is not striving for 
a "victory." The nest of banditry that has emerged in Chechnya reflects 
in concentrated form the terrible vices manifest in our society in the 
course of restructuring. If we succeed in eradicating these scum it will 
not just be the peoples of Chechnya and the North Caucasus who will 
breathe more easily. The ground will be cut from under the feet of 
corruption, anarchy, and chaos, and the conditions will be created for 
overcoming the gangster "morality" that has, sadly, infected quite a 
broad swath of the active part of society. So even in this area Putin is 
acting in the main direction, taking no account of the crude pressure 
from both outside and inside the country. And this is really 
strengthening his prestige and, above all, sowing in Russians' hearts the 
hopes they cherish so much. 

It is said that Putin has no economic program. Gentlemen, we did not 
all just do simple arithmetic in school! We realize that Putin has at his 
disposal dozens or hundreds of different kinds of economic programs, 
including an incredibly large number presented to him by one of his 
contemporaries. What would be the point in the premier and acting 
president's proclaiming his knowledge of one of these brochures or even 
the aforesaid bundle, but remaining deaf to the most acute woes of 
society?! Yet Putin began his premiership by increasing pensions -- 
albeit modestly, but by more than 10 percent on the miserable level of 
those benefits! And he began as acting president with an appeal to the 
Central Bank chairman to think about boosting the population's buying 
power. The economic tasks are more than clearly outlined: People's 
everyday needs come first. And specialists -- in which Russia is by no 
means wanting -- should be found to resolve them. 

Thus, Putin has seemingly secured the rapid rise in his prestige in a very 
simple fashion: He has gotten down to concrete work with no 
shilly-shallying. In that sense he is not alone. After all, Unity ensured 
its staggering Duma election victory not by widely trumpeted political 
statements or esoteric economic programs, but by its modest promise to 
get down to concrete work. The greedy showmen of "spin doctoring" have 
been put to shame -- the people do not want to witness political 
tragicomedies. They yearn for specific work, clear-cut and 
well-thought-out action. 

We are starting the new year in a quite unexpected way. And it is 
gratifying that this time things do not boil down to communal quarrels 
between long-standing behind-the-scenes acquaintances. We have been given 
a chance to make our own choice on the basis of something other than 
prolonged, tumultuous applause. We already know what we can expect of our 
possible elected representative in deeds, not just words. We believe that 
the turmoil and uncertainty of the transitional period will be replaced 
by an era of painstakingly building the new Russia. 

*******

#10
Stratfor Commentary
January 6, 2000
Putin Seeks First Round Popular Mandate 

Acting Russian President Vladimir Putin may soon have only Communist Party 
leader Gennady Zyuganov as real competition in the upcoming presidential 
elections. Parties that initially opposed Putin have since deserted their own 
candidates and thrown their support behind Putin. 

Most recently, the All Russia party ended its coalition with the Fatherland 
party, breaking up a once powerful electoral alliance. The All Russia party 
announced its support for Putin rather than the coalition's candidate, former 
Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov. Now Primakov who actually advanced much of 
the perestroikist agenda that Putin now champions needs to decide whether 
he should still run, or step aside and support his own values in another 
leader. 

To defeat the remaining liberal and pro-Western competitors, Putin wants to 
win a decisive victory in the first round of the election and avoid a runoff 
vote. So far, he has effectively controlled events to his advantage. Most 
significantly, Putin is credited with pursuing Russia's war in Chechnya, 
which has rocketed him into popularity since his appointment as prime 
minister in August. He has the power to control not only the war but also the 
news about the war, which gives him an incomparable advantage in the polls as 
long as the war remains popular. Also, the resignation of former President 
Boris Yeltsin gave Putin total, albeit temporary, control of Russia as both 
acting president and prime minister. 

Increasing support from former oppositional parties, likely influenced by 
Putin and his supporters, is also narrowing the race. Former Prime Minister 
Sergei Kiriyenko's Union of Rightist Forces and former Prime Minister Viktor 
Chernomyrdin's Our Home is Russia support Putin's presidential bid. And now 
even Primakov, who was only months ago the most popular politician in Russia, 
has lost his support base to Putin. 

The candidate pool is down to five men, although only Putin and Zyuganov are 
true contenders. Yabloko party leader Grigory Yavlinsky is running, although 
he admits that Putin's victory may be a foregone conclusion, especially since 
Yabloko only picked up about 6 percent of the vote in the parliamentary 
election. Nationalist leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky is running, although it is 
fairly likely that his unconventional method of politicking will get him 
disqualified, as it nearly did during the Duma race. 

Primakov remained silent for the past several days, failing to comment even 
when his coalition crumbled and abandoned him. If he runs, he will manage to 
distract some of the centrist voters from Putin, potentially forcing the 
election into a runoff, but he will not win the presidency. 

Primakov needs to decide if it is acceptable to step aside and allow a fellow 
believer to slide into victory easily. This would require that he overlook 
his personal aspirations with the hope that Putin will carry forward his 
agenda. If he does so, he may retain his dignity and could even hope to be 
appointed prime minister under Putin. If he does run against Putin and 
Zyuganov, he could do more harm to Putin than the Communists could. Due to 
their similar agendas and support bases, Primakov would have to steal support 
away from Putin, possibly fracturing the strong centrist bloc. Likely, he 
would only postpone the inevitable Putin victory. 

*******

#11
Date: Thu, 06 Jan 2000 
From: "Gerard Janco" <caesarevents@hotmail.com> 
Subject: THE JULIAN MILLENNIUM & OLD RUSSIAN NEW YEAR'S CELEBRATION

Washington DC
The Eurasian Center & Friendship 2000 present:
THE JULIAN MILLENNIUM &
OLD RUSSIAN NEW YEAR'S CELEBRATION

JANUARY 13th, 2000
(7:30 p.m. - Onward)

Sponsored by KREMLYOVSKAYA VODKA

Featuring OPEN BAR - and the BEST RUSSIAN
VODKA, CAVIAR, WINES, hors d'oeuvres and CHAMPAGNE

THE RUSSIA HOUSE
1800 Connecticut Ave., NW
(DuPont Circle -- Conn & Florida Aves)

Bring friends, make new friends. Enjoy millennium entertainment & celebrate 
the true Millennium, read information on the Julian Millennium and Old 
Russian Christmas below.

Dress code: Festive/Elegant
$20 per person, $30 per couple
?'s 202-966-8651 or Eurasia@aol.com

Millennium & Old Russian New Year's Entertainment
Award Winning Russian Pianist: Anna Ouspenskaya
The St. Petersburg Conservatory & Moscow Conservatory

International Millennium Trio
Sarah Mechanic, Violin
Ikuko Takahashi, Violin
Jorge Espinova, Cellist

Popular Music, Dance Music, and Old Time Favorites

THE JULIAN MILLENNIUM & RUSSIAN NEW YEAR'S: Pope Gregory XIII commissioned 
Christopher Clavius, a friend of Galileo, to reform the calendar...he did so 
using mathematics and astronomy to calculate the new calendar year. His 
Gregorian reform of the Julian calendar was not accepted by the Orthodox 
Church which saw it as a Roman intrusion (which it was), and Protestant 
countries were reluctant as well. England did not adopt the modern 
calendar until 1751, while Orthodox Russia was forced to adopt the new 
changes after the Bolsheviks took over in 1917.

Russians today still celebrate Christmas and New Year's 13 days later, 
Christmas on January 7th, and New Year's on January 13th. If you have never 
been to a Russian New Year's celebration we are planning a special treat for 
you, with music and merriment. Please join us for what will be a fabulous 
event, CELEBRATION OF THE TRADITIONAL JULIAN MILLENNIUM!!!!

******

#12
Date: Thu, 6 Jan 2000 
From: pmah@glasnet.ru (Peter Mahoney)
Subject: Re: Matt Bivens/ "less but better".../4014

I certainly hope Matt Biven's tongue was planted firmly in his cheek when he
called for "one single, brief and absolutely correct analysis of recent
events", authored by David Johnson, to replace the cacaphony of JRL. If
not, then I'm afraid Mr. Biven's foot was planted firmly in his mouth. As
he must well know, there ain't no such thing.

Mr. Bivens certainly seems to make ample professional use of JRL. On a
number of occasions, I have noticed that obscure news points or analyses
which first appear on JRL have subsequently turned into articles in the
Moscow Times, and on at least one occasion, an essay direct from JRL turned
up on the Moscow Times Op-ed page a few days later.

While I agree that the mountain of information we daily receive from DJ is
somewhat unwieldy (and for someone like me, working on an ancient 386
computer with 2 mgs of memory over dirty suburban Moscow telephone lines,
enormously time-consuming to access, much less read), I believe that most
sophisticated JRL readers have devised their own systems of bringing
personal order to the information, consistent with the amount of time they
have available to devote to JRL. I have certain topics I'm interested in
and certain analysts whose opinions I find insightful. I scan the tables of
contents, and if nothing appears there which interests me, it's trash-can
city.

If I were to suggest an improvement in JRL, I would cut back severely on the
amount of western press reports presented. On the one hand, for someone
like me who has virtually no access to western reporting on Russia other
than CNN, a small sampling of western press reports and commentary is useful
to get the flavor or trend, but the western press all tend to take the same
four or five universally accepted facts about a given event in Russia, and
re-hash those facts ad nauseam until the next set of universally accepted
facts is established. The fact that those universally accepted facts are
often at odds with Russian reality only makes western press reports even
more irrelevant to JRL.

Of course, DJ has a certain daily level of production he is attempting to
keep up. If we are to reduce the number of innocuous western press reports
on JRL, then it seems we need a greater level of contribution from the JRL
community to replace it. I have been a member of this list from its
inception during the presidential campaign in '96. In the early days, as I
remember, the bulk of the postings on the list came from those who received
the list. It was a forum for debate, for an exchange of ideas, where
uncredentialed non-entities like me got the opportunity to toss our two
cents on the table with the big boys (and girls). This, to me, is the
essence of JRL. 

JRL is not just DJ losing sleep and surfing the net for Russia-related
information. JRL is all of us. If we want to make JRL better, then some of
those passive users out there -- expert and amateur alike -- need to get off
their backsides and become active participants.

Peter P. Mahoney
Moscow

******


Web page for CDI Russia Weekly:
http://www.cdi.org/russia