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CDI Library > Johnson's Russia List

Johnson's Russia List
 

 

January 7, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4016 4017 4018




Johnson's Russia List
#4018
7 January 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. New York Times: Neela Banerjee, Russian Chief Keeps Plans for Economy Under Wraps.
2. Kyodo News Service: Yeltsin's resignation aimed at maintaining influence: official. (Gleb Pavlovskiy)
3. deadline.ru: Yevgenii Gil'bo, Putin Speeds Up the Electoral Campaign Under the Threat of a Currency Crisis.
4. Trud: Andranik Migranyan, RUSSIA AFTER YELTSIN: WHAT LIES IN STORE?
5. Reuters: Surgeon Says Health Was Factor In Yeltsin Quitting. (Chazov)
6. San Jose Mercury News: Gail Lapidus, The Wars of the Russian Succession.
7. AP: Russia Soldiers Scoff at Quick Win.
8. The Guardian (UK): Martin Woollacott, Russia's new boss has an extremely strange history.
9. Financial Times (UK): Political drama unfolds on the small screen. Sergei Dorenko's one-sided coverage of December's elections is part of a broader trend of media bias writes Andrew Jack.
10. New York Times editorial: Reforms Russia Needs.]

*******

#1
New York Times
January 7, 2000
[for personal use only]
Russian Chief Keeps Plans for Economy Under Wraps 
By NEELA BANERJEE

MOSCOW, Jan. 6 -- A telling moment in the high-level jockeying to influence 
Acting President Vladimir V. Putin, especially his economic views, came at an 
intimate party a few weeks ago, when he was still just prime minister. 

At the Moscow nightclub Up-and-Down, Anatoly B. Chubais, the head of Russia's 
power monopoly and the architect of Russia's market overhaul, raised a 
provocative toast to Mr. Putin before the Kremlin elite. 

"People say Chubais privatized Russia: What can I say? I confess," Mr. 
Chubais was quoted as saying by people at the party. "People say Chubais 
privatized Putin: What can I say? Things happen." 

Mr. Putin was angry and apparently embarrassed, people at the party said, but 
characteristically, he kept quiet, unwilling then to let on where his 
sympathies lay. 

Indeed, the former K.G.B. colonel has said little about the economy, devoting 
himself largely to the war in the breakaway republic of Chechnya. 

But if he wins early presidential elections on March 26, as he is expected to 
do, he will eventually have to turn his attention to the country's moribund 
reform effort. 

In anticipation, Russia's most powerful vested economic interests, 
represented by men like Mr. Chubais, are vying now for Mr. Putin's attention. 

It is unlikely that Mr. Putin will make any serious decisions about the 
economy before the presidential vote, although today he took a few steps that 
suggested he was beginning to actively deal with Russia's economic problems. 

Among the most significant was an order he signed that could increase exports 
of platinum, an important foreign-currency earner for Russia. Platinum 
exports had slowed to a trickle over the last year because of conflicting 
regulations over who was authorized to sell the metal. 

In an apparent attempt to increase Russia's supply of foreign currency for 
coming debt payments, Mr. Putin also ordered Russian exporters to repatriate 
100 percent of all revenue from abroad, up from 75 percent currently. 

Mr. Putin also temporarily suspended an export tax on aluminum, another 
important Russian export, and agreed to impose restrictions on oil companies 
that are behind on tax payments. 

But such steps provide no insight into Mr. Putin's views on exactly what kind 
of economic system should evolve in Russia. 

He has said little about Russia's enormous debts, or the cronyism and 
favoritism that have alienated many foreign investors. 

The clearest sign of his economic policy is likely to be seen in the people 
he appoints to his cabinet later this spring, if he is elected. 

"He's got a lot to learn about the economy," said Tom Adshead, political 
strategist for the Moscow brokerage firm Troika Dialog. "People will look 
very hard at Putin's post-election government because that will tell you a 
lot about what's going to happen." 

Despite Mr. Putin's taciturnity, Russians and foreigners alike still place 
hope in him to fix the economy. People see in his youth the energy that the 
ailing Boris N. Yeltsin lacked. They believe the resoluteness he has shown in 
the war in Chechnya will be applied to the economy. 

Last Friday, when Mr. Yeltsin resigned, investor optimism drove one of the 
greatest one-day gains in the Russian stock market, pushing the benchmark 
Russian Trading System index to the highest it had been since the economic 
collapse in August 1998. 

The U.S.-Russia Business Council, a Washington-based trade group representing 
250 American companies operating in the Russian market, has welcomed Mr. 
Putin's appointment, but coupled it with some caution about the vagueness of 
his economic views. 

Eugene K. Lawson, president of the council, said in a statement Wednesday 
that the council was "reasonably confident that Mr. Putin is a strong 
proponent of a market economy in Russia, but exactly what kind of market is 
the question -- one that welcomes foreign investment on a level playing 
field, or one that exhibits an economic nationalism that accompanies strong 
Russian stances in other areas of U.S.-Russia relations." 

So far, Mr. Putin's decisions on economic matters have yielded a conflicting 
picture. He has let capable managers like Deputy Prime Minister Viktor B. 
Khristenko and Finance Minister Mikhail M. Kasyanov handle large-scale 
economic affairs from the budget to debt negotiations with little 
interference. 

But in a fight last fall over the illegal ouster of the head of Transneft, 
the government oil pipeline, Mr. Putin stayed conspicuously silent, giving 
rise to speculation that he was influenced by the people who who were said to 
have engineered the ouster, including the shadowy financier Boris A. 
Berezovsky. 

Although he nominally remains the prime minister, Mr. Putin this week 
appointed as his stand-in Deputy Prime Minister Nikolai Y. Aksyonenko, also 
believed to be supported by Mr. Berezovsky. 

The balance of power between Mr. Putin and those in the Kremlin inner circle 
grooming him for the presidency, such as Mr. Chubais and Mr. Berezovsky, 
could shift radically if he was elected president. Their aim is to win favors 
for the companies they control and the people with whom they are allied. Yet 
once vested with the enormous prerogatives of the Russian executive, Mr. 
Putin may prove hard to push around. 

Still, he is not willing to make enemies now, which many say explains his 
silence. No one, for example, really knows who his economic advisers are. 

But three days before he stepped in to replace Mr. Yeltsin, Mr. Putin issued 
a broad policy statement over the Internet that slightly clarified his 
economic and political leanings. He starkly detailed Russia's poverty. 

He repeatedly noted that the same economic rules found elsewhere would 
determine the success of Russia's economic transformation, including a sound 
tax code, banking reform and increased foreign investment. But he also 
maintained that the idiosyncrasies of a country that still craves a 
paternalistic state necessitated greater government intervention in the 
economy. 

"Judging by what he has said so far, there probably will be some economic 
reform," one Western diplomat said, "but it will be more Russian and it will 
probably move more slowly than we all would like." 

*******

#2
Yeltsin's resignation aimed at maintaining influence: official
January 7, 2000
Kyodo News Service 

MOSCOW, Jan. 7 (Kyodo) - By: Shigeyuki Yoshida. Boris Yeltsin's sudden 
resignation as Russian president last week was a carefully planned scenario 
aimed at maintaining his political influence, a top Russian official says. 

Gleb Pavlovskiy, adviser to the director general of the Russian presidential 
office since 1996, said in an interview with Kyodo News on Thursday that he 
and other select members of the Yeltsin administration had worked on the plan 
for more than a year. 

Pavlovskiy, 48, explained that Yeltsin personally made the decision to go 
ahead with the plans, and that the scenario had to be performed when the 
pro-Kremlin Unity party was in power, suggesting the Dec. 19 election for the 
State Duma set the stage for its execution. 

''It is something Yeltsin himself decided. He is not the type of politician 
who can be convinced by those around him. The scenario had to be executed 
when the administration's foundation was strong, so I think he made the 
decision after the lower house election,'' Pavlovskiy said. 

The Unity party, established in September to back Kremlin policies, posted a 
strong showing in the election. On New Year's Eve, Yeltsin announced his 
resignation and appointed Prime Minister Vladimir Putin as acting president. 

By stepping down, Yeltsin ''in turn wanted to get a strong grip on the 
political situation and secure his influence in the political world, 
including that over Mr. Putin,'' Pavlovskiy said. 

''With Prime Minister Putin, who has gained wide public support for engaging 
Russia in a military campaign in Chechnya, placed in the position of de facto 
leader, (Yeltsin) felt that waiting until the expiration of his term might 
deal a blow to his own political influence,'' he added. 

Originally elected president of Russia in 1991 after the breakup of the 
Soviet Union, Yeltsin was to serve until the August 2000 end of his second 
term. 

Pavlovskiy explained that Yeltsin did not want to become another Mikhail 
Gorbachev, the former president of the Soviet Union who was stripped of 
political power after stepping down from the leadership post. 

Asked whether the military campaign in Chechnya was part of the plan, 
Pavlovskiy replied, ''No. When Mr. Putin decided to begin a military campaign 
in Chechnya, I was against it. But the prime minister's decision turned out 
to be correct.'' 

Pavlovskiy, born in Odessa, Ukraine, taught history until the 1970s, when he 
became involved in the antiestablishment movement. He was arrested in 1982 
for engaging in anti-Soviet activities and had been exiled from the country 
until 1985. 

*******

#3
http://www.deadline.ru
January 5, 2000
Yevgenii Gil'bo
Putin Speeds Up the Electoral Campaign Under the Threat of a Currency Crisis
[translation for personal use only]

Some time before Vladimir Putin's ascent to the Kremlin throne, Vladimir
Geraschhenko, the Chairman of the Central Bank, sent him, in his capacity as
chairman of the government, a humble message. In this letter, the chief
banker foresees complications in the Russian currency market. Gerashchenko
claims that already in early 2000 the complications in the Russian financial
system will be "provoked by a significant reduction of export currency
earnings arriving in the country, a reduction of about $1,5 bln., of a
seasonal nature."

What does a reduction of currency earnings mean for the present government?
First of all, an abrupt complication in the area of foreign debt payments, a
problem inherited from Boris Yeltsin who did not hesitate to borrow abroad
in order to reward the armed agencies for their support. In 1999, foreign
debt payments exceeded the amount of loans received from international
financial organizations by about $10 bln. In 2000, the government will have
to pay between $15 and $20 bln. of its own money.

In 1999, the reserves of the Central Bank were the principal source of these
repayments. The Central Bank could afford to give these funds to the
government for one reason - that is, the tangible growth of revenue from the
export of oil. Part of these earnings returns to Russia, rather than being
transferred directly to the offshore banking accounts of the "Family" and
other corporations. Of this part, the exporters are obligated immediately to
sell 75% on the currency exchange. This rule, along with some rather exotic
regulation measures, led to the formation of an exchange rate that is
substantially above the equilibrium (20-25 rbl per dollar, at the
equilibrium rate those days of 37-38 rbl per dollar). The Central Bank used
this exchange rate to replenish its reserves.

However, even such favorable conditions did not allow the Central Bank to
replenish its reserves substantially, and they remained at the critically
low post-crisis level. With even a small reduction in the flow of
petrodollars to the exchange board, the servicing of foreign debt will
become impossible even within the frame of the newly restructured debt
parameters.

The reduction in the flow of petrodollars will deprive the Central Bank of
the opportunity to sustain the overly high exchange rate in spite of all its
efforts. In the most favorable case, it will decline to the equilibrium
level, which these days is 39-40 rbl per dollar. Under an unfavorable
scenario, as it occurred in 1998, it may jump above the equilibrium level
and provoke inflation of 150-200%, that is, on the scale of late 1998.

<...> In this case, Gerashchenko will inevitably have to make his
contribution to Vladimir Putin's electoral campaign, that is, to sustain the
unrealistic exchange rate by every means, as Sergei Dubinin did in 1998,
when he spent $13 bln. for this purpose. It is clear that Gerashchenko can
make it in these conditions through the end of March, but not until June,
simply because he does not have so much reserve. It looks possible that
these considerations figured in the decision to hold early election.

But how does Gerashchenko plan to maintain control over the situation until
March or April? In his letter, he suggests only one specific measure - to
raise the exporters' obligation to sell their currency earnings on the
exchange board from 75% to 100%. In fact, it is a suggestion to direct the
entire export revenue to foreign debt servicing and toward sustaining the
unrealistic exchange rate.

<...> But has the exporters' possible response to this been accounted for?
Will they be satisfied by these new conditions? Are they prepared to work
while having to exchange 100% of their hard currency for roubles?

Clearly not. Which means that currency earnings returning to the country
will decline much more than was foreseen by Gerashchenko. Therefore, the
situation at the exchange market will be destabilized.

One also has to take into account that the destabilization will cause
painful reaction from the capital exporters and will drastically increase
their activities, that is, the demand pressure upon the currency exchange
market. The Central Bank will have to compete with them. <...>

Under these conditions, Putin will have only one solution - that is, to
reduce import, that would enable the government to maintain the unrealistic
exchange rate despite the cutback in hard currency earnings and to preserve
the high rates of capital export for "the Family". The reduction of import
can be achieved either by import substitution through the growth of a
competitive domestic production, or by a drastic reduction in demand.

Meanwhile, the economic strategy announced by the Union of Right-Wing Forces
provisions a financial stabilization regime which will lead to a decline in
production. What remains is the reduction in demand, which can be achieved
through another large-scale reduction in the population earnings. It will
have to compensate not only for the reduction of export, but also for the
decline in GDP that will result from the reanimation of Anatoly Chubais'
experiments in financial austerity.

Thus, it will be difficult to escape a significant decline in living
standards. One can estimate a decline of about 50% by the end of this year.
And since Vladimir Putin's election as president is recognized by everybody
as unavoidable in the current conditions, this means that the population
should be preparing itself more actively for the times that lie ahead.

*******

#4
Trud 
January 6, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
RUSSIA AFTER YELTSIN: WHAT LIES IN STORE?
By Andranik MIGRANYAN

President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation stepped
down December 31, 1999, appointing Vladimir Putin in his
place. One gets the impression that Yeltsin's resignation
scenario creates a certain moral attachment between the first
Russian President, Putin and the "family" itself. And, what's
more important, part of Russian society now perceives Putin as
a hostage to Yeltsin. This can be explained by the fact that
any of his actions being spearheaded against Yeltsin's cronies
or anyone else might be viewed as black ingratitude on the
part of Putin, who had been supported by Yeltsin and promoted
to prime minister, and who has now become Yeltsin's successor.
Yeltsin has once again proved that he can (or could) make the
required tactical decisions, despite the fact that he views
such decisions as something really difficult.
Political-science experts and other analysts now
understand only too well that the incumbent Prime Minister is
highly likely to become Russia's next president after Yeltsin.
It was believed that all of the government system's
administrative, financial and mass-media resources would be
activated within the framework of Putin's election campaign.
Well, this assertion has become even more obvious today.
The new president's domestic-policy and foreign-policy
concepts, rather than triumphant elections, now constitute the
main problem for Russia and Putin himself. It would also be
quite natural to question the extent of his political
independence, as well as various options for reviving the real
economy and specific prospects for untying the Chechen "knot".
One should also keep in mind that all sorts of
constitutional-reform discussions have produced no practical
results whatsoever. Besides, the next president would inherit
unlimited powers, which any wise, wilful and energetic
politician can use for the country's benefit. Otherwise this
system would continue to breed favoritism and nepotism, also
entailing the Russian state's disintegration.

******

#5
Surgeon Says Health Was Factor In Yeltsin Quitting

MOSCOW, Jan 7, 2000 -- (Reuters) A Russian heart surgeon familiar with Boris 
Yeltsin's medical problems said on Thursday he believed the former 
president's poor health was a factor in his decision to resign.

Yevgeny Chazov, who is head of the cardiology center where Yeltsin underwent 
heart surgery in 1996, painted a picture that contrasted with Yeltsin's own 
explanation of why he resigned. Yeltsin has denied he stepped own for health 
reasons.

"I think the poor state of his health, especially last year, played a role in 
his resignation," Chazov, seated in a doctor's white coat at his office desk, 
told private NTV television.

He said Yeltsin's decision had nothing to do with the multiple bypass 
operation he underwent just over three years ago at his Russian Cardiology 
Center in Moscow.

But he said: "I think it was clear to anyone, not only a doctor or 
academician, how often the president visited the Central Clinical Hospital 
(for health checks and treatment), how often he was away. It all showed how 
critical the process was."

Chazov said Yeltsin's decision must have been difficult because he loved 
power.

"I have seen many patients, but Yeltsin is very attached to power," he said. 
"He is a person who cannot live without power. So I can imagine how difficult 
it was for him psychologically to make the decision to resign."

Yeltsin, 68, said in his resignation speech on December 31 that he was 
resigning to make way for a strong person and a new generation.

"I am leaving because I have done everything I could, not because of my 
health but because of all the problems taken together," Yeltsin said in his 
televised address.

NTV said that Chazov had compared Yeltsin, at the end of his eight years in 
the Kremlin, to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev - whom he also treated. 
Brezhnev's poor health and wobbly appearance made him the subject of many 
jokes.

Chazov compared Acting President Vladimir Putin, a former officer in the KGB 
security police, to Soviet leader Yuri Andropov. Andropov was in charge of 
the KGB before he became Soviet leader in November 1982.

"I knew Yuri Andropov very well," he said. "For me he was a very interesting 
person. I consider him to be a model for a head of state. So Putin's style 
reminds me of Andropov."

******

#6
For publication in the San Jose Mercury News
Perspective
January 9, 2000
The Wars of the Russian Succession
By Gail W. Lapidus (lapidus@leland.Stanford.EDU)
Gail W. Lapidus is a senior fellow at Stanford University's Institute for
International Studies. She wrote this article for Perspective.

The new millenium has brought a dramatic shift in the Russian political
landscape. In the summer of 1996, widespread popular opposition to the
brutal war in Chechnya had combined with stubborn Chechen resistance to
the Russian military campaign to compel Boris Yeltsin to conclude a peace
agreement in order to win re-election to the Presidency. Today,
three-and-a-half years later, a new war in Chechnya has been largely
responsible for the soaring approval ratings of Prime Minister -- now
Acting President Vladimir Putin. The popular war, in fact, has become the
vehicle for Putin's likely election to the Russian Presidency in March.

Boris Yeltsin's unexpected resignation on the eve of the new year was a
dramatic effort to help his designated successor capitalize as speedily as
possible on his current popularity by moving the Presidential elections
forward by three months. 

These two developments are redrawing Russia's political landscape. Yet,
little is understood about why the Russian leadership has once again
resorted to military force in Chechnya and is attempting to use the war as
a vehicle for political consolidation. After its humiliating defeat in the
1994-1996 war, Russia made an explicit commitment, in peace agreements
concluded with OSCE involvement, to renounce the use of force "forever"
and seek a negotiated settlement of Chechnya's political status. 

Evcen more puzzling is the apparent enthusiasm of the Russian public for a
war which is viewed in the West as savage and counterproductive. Respected
international human rights organizations have documented that Russia is
conducting its Chechnya campaign with such flagrant disregard for
international norms as to amount to massive war crimes against civilian
populations. 

Russian leaders portray their actions in Chechnya as a limited and
carefully-targeted counter-terrorist operation aimed at eliminating the
threat to Russia posed by "international terrorism". They contemptuously
dismiss Western expressions of concern as unwelcome interference in a
purely internal affair, or as further evidence of Western interest in
promoting the weakening and fragmentation of Russia. In a November 14
article in the New York Times, Prime Minister Putin sought to deflect
American criticism of the Russian military campaign. In an effort to win
American acquiescence, if not sympathy, he likened Russia's effort in
Chechnya to U.S. anti-terrorist actions and insisted that the Russian
military had chosen "accurately targeted strikes on specifically identified
terrorist bases" to avoid direct attacks on Chechen communities. 

It's a novel presentation and it seeks to exploit Western concerns over
international terrorism. But the Russian campaign in Chechnya is in fact a
resumption of the 1994-1996 war, now pursued with even greater
determination, with even less regard for civilian casualties, and with a
more sophisticated military and public relations strategy. What has been
labelled a "counter-terrorist operation" has expanded into a full-scale
war involving over 100,000 Russian troops aimed at avenging a whole
succession of humiliating military defeats as well as ending the
quasi-autonomy of Chechnya and bringing the republic under complete Russian
control. As Major-General Vladimir Shamanov, commander of Russian forces in
Western Chechnya put it, "for me this war is above all to restore the
trampled-upon honor of my motherland". 

The war serves another purpose as well. It furthers the larger political
agenda of Prime Minister and Acting President Putin. It is intended as a
demonstration of energetic and decisive leadership capable of defending
Russia's national interests, even in the face of Western criticism,
restoring Russia's power, and winning the support of a broad spectrum of
the Russian population in preparation for the upcoming presidential elections.

Several developments over the past year played a key role in the renewal of
the war in Chechnya. First and foremost was pressure from an increasingly
assertive military leadership which was never reconciled to the earlier
cease-fire and peace agreements and blamed weak and vacillating political
leaders for depriving them of military victory in 1966. Secondly,
internal breakdown and anarchy in Chechnya itself, in which abductions and
hostage-taking by armed gangs had become an increasingly important source
of income, eroded whatever residue of sympathy the earlier war -- and a
long history of victimization, thnic cleansing, and exile of the Chechen
nation -- had elicited. Third, the incursion this past summer of a group of
armed Islamist guerillas into the neighboring republic of Dagestan in an
effort to establish an Islamic republic further contributed to popular
alarm in Russia about the Chechen threat. The successful repulsion of the
guerillas, and the severe repression of Dagestani Wahhabis by Russian
military forces was widely welcomed by a Russian public frustrated by past
passivity and confusion in Moscow and yearning for strong and decisive
leadership that would restore order to the country. 

The final and decisive catalyst was a series of explosions in several
multi-storied apartment complexes in Moscow and Volgodonsk resulting in
nearly 300 casualties. Russian leaders blamed Chechen terrorists. But no
persuasive evidence was ever presented to support the allegation and a
number of Russian analysts and political figures have alleged that the
explosions were in fact the work of the Russian security services who were
presumably trying to mobilize public support for the war. The explosions
triggered panic among ordinary Russians and unleashed a dramatic surge of
anti-Chechen sentiment, providing both a rationale and widespread popular
support for the ensuing military campaign. 

The military campaign has clearly been designed to avoid the mistakes of
the earlier war, and above all to prevent the tide of public opinion from
turning against it. Drawing on the examples of Desert Storm and the NATO
intervention in Kosovo, the military tries to hold down its own casualties
by avoiding or minimizing direct combat engagements with guerilla forces.
They rely instead on massive aerial and artillery bombardment of cities and
settlements. The strategy has resulted in enormous casualties among
civilian populations, the destruction of much of Chechnya's remaining
infrastructure, already devastated by the previous war, and large numbers
of refugees. Over 200,000 refugees have made their way to the neighboring
republic of Ingushetia, while countless thousands of civilians remain
trapped in basements in Grozny and other settlements. 

Public support for the war has been further maintained by tight control
over the media and by limiting the access of Russian and foreign
journalists to Chechnya. As in the last war, official military sources
magnify the extent of military successes and minimize the scope of both
military and civilian casualties. Unlike the last war, this time there is
little reportage and virtually no filmed coverage from the battle zone to
challenge these official accounts or provide a Chechen perspective.

This situation is unlikely to last. As fighting in Grozny and in the
southern regions of the republic intensifies, casualties mount, and more
information seeps out of the battle zone, and the effects of the conflict
spill over into neighboring regions and states, questions about the
campaign are likely to grow, along with pressure for negotiations. The
Russian government has rejected repeated calls for negotiations by
Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov, and has been searching for more pliable
Chechen partners to install in power in the region of northern Chechnya
under its control. Russian has also rejected any political role for the
OSCE or other international bodies. But for the Putin government, the
uncertainties ahead make it all the more imperative to capitalize swiftly
on the wave of popularity it is enjoying. 

Already in December parliamentary elections, Russia's fluid party system
began showing signs of reconfiguration. Unity, a newly-created political
party allied with Putin, surged into second place in the elections. Other
opposition parties - most notably, Fatherland-All Russia, the coalition
identified with former Prime Minister Primakov and Moscow Mayor Luzhkov -
have fragmented and a succession of political figures are jumping on the
Putin bandwagon. Putin's victory in the March presidential elections
would confirm and stabilize the post-Yeltsin political succession. But
his victory will have been achieved on the back of the brutal campaign
against Chechnya: a sobering thought as the United States seeks to
formulate its attitude toward Yeltsin's successor. 

******

#7
Russia Soldiers Scoff at Quick Win
January 6, 2000
By MAXIM MARMUR

BACHI-YURT, Russia (AP) - While Russian leaders make bold predictions of 
imminent victory in Chechnya, the weary paratroopers fighting rebels in the 
hills say the bloodshed is far from over. 

``We know that we will have to go into the mountains, and very tough fighting 
is ahead,'' says Lt. Col. Mikhail Sukhovskoy, commander of a paratroop 
battalion. ``We won't be able to defeat the rebels with aircraft and armor. 
We will have to go there on foot. And it will take a long time.'' 

After overrunning the northern plains of Chechnya with little trouble, the 
Russian military now faces the far more difficult challenge of taking on the 
rebels in the southern mountains. 

The military has relied on massive artillery and air bombardment during the 
current campaign, trying to avoid the heavy losses its forces suffered during 
the 1994-96 war, when poorly trained Russian infantry was outfought by the 
Chechens. But the tactics won't work in the mountains, which shelter the 
rebels. 

Small units from both sides play cat-and-mouse in the forests covering the 
mountains and the surrounding foothills. The rebels are skilled guerrilla 
fighters who know the terrain intimately and can attack and disappear without 
warning. 

For weeks, the Russian military has been sending some of its best units into 
the southern mountains to fight the rebels. The paratroop and commando units, 
draped in combat harnesses festooned with grenades, ammunition clips and 
combat knives, emulate the rebels' guerrilla tactics. 

``We will act in small groups of 10 to 15 men, which would set ambushes and 
hunt for militants,'' said a paratroop captain commanding a unit assigned to 
hunt rebels in the mountains. 

``My soldiers are well-prepared for the action and have all the necessary 
gear,'' said the officer, who asked to be identified only by his first name, 
Vasily. 

But officers and soldiers admit the fighting is exhausting and difficult. 
Patrols trek through the mountains for days, often catching no sight of the 
Chechens or seeing them only in fleeting engagements in the forests. 

They often slog through deep snow on the steep slopes, and thick fog 
frequently enshrouds the mountainsides, leaving the patrols stranded for 
hours. 

``The fighting is getting increasingly hard,'' Maj. Farid Shaikhullin said. 

The paratroopers' green-and-brown camouflage uniforms haven't been washed in 
weeks, and the men themselves go without baths for days on end. Some joke 
grimly about lice. 

Although the Russian government says the war will soon be won, many of the 
soldiers on the ground say the Chechens won't stop fighting and that they can 
blend into the terrain or hide among the civilian population. 

``Some rebels have simply hidden their weapons and are posing as civilians. 
Others retreated into the mountains, but you may expect them to strike at any 
moment,'' Capt. Roman Starkov said. 

Like soldiers anywhere, the paratroopers are addicted to rumors. The current 
scoop is that the war will end soon because soldiers get combat bonuses of up 
to $40 a day - an average monthly salary in Russia - and the government wants 
to save money. 

The soldiers' morale is good and most support the war, but their weapons and 
equipment are often worn out and replacements and supplies often are hard to 
obtain. 

Sometimes, supplies arrive from unorthodox sources. 

One unit of paratroopers got a shipment of delicacies, expensive Western 
medicine and satellite positioning equipment - unheard of luxuries in the 
cash-strapped military. The men said the shipment was a gift from a 
paratrooper's father, an organized crime boss in Moscow. 

******

#8
The Guardian (UK)
7 January 2000
[for personal use only]
Russia's new boss has an extremely strange history 
Martin Woollacott

Who would have dreamed only a few months ago that the first new national 
leader to emerge in the 21st century would be a 47-year-old ex-spy who 
virtually nobody had heard of before last August? The name of Vladimir Putin 
does not appear in Leon Aron's just published biography of Boris Yeltsin, 
because Putin was not even a spear carrier on the Russian political stage 
when Aron was finishing his book. Yet everything now suggests that Putin is 
the man who is going to rule Russia for the next decade or even longer. 

Some might argue that it is equally surprising that a superannuated actor 
should have served two terms as US president, or even that a boy from a 
Scottish public school should be Britain's Labour prime minister. It is true 
that there is a sense in which everything in life is surprising. These men, 
however, like those now contending for presidential office in America, served 
an apprenticeship within the political class, as did Boris Yeltsin and 
Mikhail Gorbachev before him. Yeltsin was a politician experienced and 
especially gifted in seeking and, until recently, in holding popular support, 
and he was a nationally known Soviet figure long before he became president 
of Russia. 

Putin is a man whose adult years are shadowy. There is no documentation on 
his time in Germany as an agent, except that his job was probably commercial 
espionage. His later career, slightly more public, carried on the economic 
theme for a while, and he has associations with a number of the country's 
economic reformers. He then became one of the presidential fixers, before 
returning to the intelligence service as head of the FSB, successor to the 
KGB. 

Putin recently praised not only the FSB and the KGB but, by implication, 
their predecessors the Cheka, the OGPU and the NKVD, in a speech on the 
anniversary of the foundation of the Cheka. As the Russian expert Richard 
Pipes has pointed out, this tribute to the Soviet state's instruments of 
repression must give pause. It was almost as if Putin was implying that these 
agencies were the keepers of the flame - organisations that placed the 
maintenance of Russian power and Russia's defence against its enemies above 
other considerations. Even given the novel nature of Russia's democracy, 
Putin's profile as agent-politician is a strange one, which he shares with 
Yevgeni Primakov, who most seem to think is the only man who could best him 
in the March elections. 

Primakov has much more of a proper public record than Putin, but after 
defections from his camp this week his chances in March are much diminished. 
It is truly odd that if there is to be a real contest it will be between two 
spies, and that other politicians of the new Russia are likely to be either 
out of it or struggling to rack up a respectable losing vote. 

Is it only that Putin, who could have been just one of the many 
revolving-door figures that Yeltsin popped in and out of the cabinet, 
happened to be there when a popular war was being waged? 

Between the first Chechen war and the second there was a change in the 
Russian mood. There was a shift from popular hostility toward a shambolic 
imperial operation to keep the Chechens in a federation to which they did not 
wish to belong, to popular support for a necessary and more efficient 
operation to defend Russia against extremists. Chechen banditry played its 
part in the transition, but so did a broader yearning for strong government 
in every sphere, not just the military. 

It was this sea change which gave Putin his opportunity, and which produced 
the huge vote at last month's elections for a new political grouping which 
had no other platform but the war. The success of the Unity party and other 
factions supporting Putin is what allowed Yeltsin to make his exit. He could 
do so with reasonable certainty that President Putin would be a sufficiently 
strong and long-lasting leader to ensure that Yeltsin's allies would have 
immunity against investigation and prosecution and a continued share in 
power. 

That the Russian intelligence services, in spite of reforms, have continued 
in some ways unchanged is widely acknowledged. It is a long jump from that to 
the view that Putin's ascension is the result of a conspiracy that may have 
involved the deliberate planting of bombs in Russian cities. For this there 
is no evidence, and the likelihood remains that it was Chechen extremists who 
were responsible. 

Still, Putin's elevation strengthens the security state in Russia. His belief 
in the important role of the secret agencies, and his support for a large 
increase in military spending could, if more than rhetorical, partially 
reverse Yeltsin's policies of reducing the size, costs, and institutional 
prominence of the armed forces and intelligence services. A full reversal, of 
course, is beyond the means of the Russian state, but even a limited swing of 
the pendulum would be a damaging development. 

Belief in a strong Russia in a more general sense is hardly to be condemned. 
Putin's recent comments about economic health, competitiveness, and the need 
to deal with western countries on more equal economic terms could have come 
out of the mouth of a Russian reformer of a century ago. Nor are his views on 
the role of the state necessarily ominous. The shrinkage of the central 
government's real capacity to influence events, while its theoretical 
capacity to do so was supposedly enhanced by new laws and decrees, was a 
marked feature of both Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's rule. 

A president who had a substantial body of support in the Duma, as Putin would 
have, if successful in March, could make serious inroads into the problems of 
overmighty corporations, unresponsive provincial governments, and obstinate 
bureaucracies. That same president, having secured office, could also make 
unpopular decisions about Chechnya, building on military victory to open the 
road to transitional autonomy and then independence as long as there were 
proper guarantees of Russian security. 

"Could" is the word. The leadership of Russia has been placed within Putin's 
grasp before Russians, or anybody else, have had a chance to measure his real 
capacity as a politician or to judge his programme - if, beyond the war, he 
has one. "The attributes of the traditional Russian state - authoritarianism, 
imperialism, militarism, xenophobia - are far from extinguished," Aron writes 
in his book. "Yet more and higher hedges have been erected against their 
recurrence under Yeltsin... than at any other time in Russian history." 

It would be irony indeed if Boris Yeltsin were to prove to have undermined 
that achievement by the manner of his going. Whether he has done so is a 
question to which only Vladimir Putin may have the answer. 

Boris Yeltsin by Leon Aron is published by HarperCollins. 

*******

#9
Financial Times (UK)
7 January 2000
[for personal use only]
Political drama unfolds on the small screen: MEDIA 
RUSSIAN TELEVISION: Sergei Dorenko's one-sided coverage of December's 
elections is part of a broader trend of media bias writes Andrew Jack

Sergei Dorenko makes no effort to hide his feelings towards two of Russia's 
best-known politicians. "I have very difficult relations with Yevgeny 
Primakov and Yuri Luzhkov," he says, referring respectively to the former 
prime minister and the mayor of Moscow. "I know what the Primakov-Luzhkov 
system is like, and I decided I had to do something against their party."

Such sentiments might not seem shocking coming from an individual citizen. 
What is troubling is that Mr Dorenko presents the main weekly evening news 
analysis programme on ORT, Russia's largest and state- owned television 
channel. And he has no qualms about expressing his private beliefs publicly 
throughout his broadcasts and attacking his chosen targets.

For observers and participants in the campaign, Mr Dorenko's "killer 
journalism" had a significant impact on the outcome. In spring last year, 
conventional wisdom had awarded Mr Luzhkov the role of the next president of 
Russia. By autumn, Mr Primakov had taken on the mantle.

But between September and December, as Mr Dorenko's broadcasts geared up 
their assault, support for the Fatherland party had halved, leaving Mr 
Primakov's popularity lagging well behind that of Vladimir Putin, the former 
spymaster and KGB agent who is acting president. Mr Luzhkov seemed to have 
abandoned hope of even competing for the Kremlin.

Mr Dorenko regularly launched accusations of corruption and even criminality 
against Mr Luzhkov. He focused on the supposed ill-health of Mr Primakov, 
suggesting he was not up to the stress of high office.

The "Dorenko effect" was one of the most striking aspects of the 1999 
elections. It was part of broad trend to media bias among broadcasters and 
print publications that permeates Russia, and which are set to play an 
important role in the build-up to Russia's presidential elections.

His slick and aggressive style has began to rub off on his counterparts. 
Sober and distinguished-looking, Mr Dorenko worked as a correspondent for CNN 
in Latin America, but rose to prominence at ORT, where he became anchor of 
Vremiya, the evening news analysis programme.

The EU-funded European Institute for the Media, which monitored election 
coverage during the last month of the campaign, concluded "smear tactics and 
unsubstantiated accusations" characterised much media coverage. It said the 
ability of the electorate to reach a well-informed conclusion about how to 
vote had been undermined and both the democratic process and public 
confidence in the media had been damaged.

The Institute singled out ORT's coverage of the campaign. It said the station 
failed to respect election laws demanding equal time to all parties. The 
Unity party, closely linked to Mr Putin, received 28 per cent of total 
election news coverage, while Fatherland-All Russia received less - 14 per 
cent - than the oddball one-time ultra-nationalist movement led by Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky. What coverage was provided to Fatherland was normally "extremely 
negative", it concluded, and singled out Mr Dorenko's broadcast.

Sitting in his cramped office in ORT's decrepit headquarters next to the 
Moscow television tower, his bodyguard in the adjacent room, Mr Dorenko does 
little to hide the element of vendetta in his approach. He says frosty 
relations with Mr Primakov first developed in 1996, when he criticised the 
then foreign minister over the planned Russia-NATO treaty, and then chided 
him about his health.

He says that Mr Primakov, on becoming prime minister in late 1998, called the 
cash-strapped ORT with an ultimatum: either Mr Dorenko was sacked, or the 
company would not receive a pledged grant of Dollars 100m from the government.

With Mr Luzhkov, "a man who prohibited criticism", the tensions began with a 
report Mr Dorenko made on ORT about the mayor's links with the controversial 
Georgian sculptor Tsereteli. The result was intense pressure, including 
efforts to get the journalist sacked and an investigation into his personal 
affairs.

Mr Dorenko says that last August, when Mr Primakov appeared to be the 
frontrunner for the presidency, he concluded he was under certain threat, but 
that he preferred to go down fighting. He was offered the chance by Boris 
Berezovsky, the "oligarch" close to President Boris Yeltsin's entourage who 
also reputedly controls ORT, even though the state holds 51 per cent of the 
shares.

He was hired to anchor the Sunday evening programme named after himself with 
the objective of attacking Fatherland. As telephone conversations leaked to 
the Russian media indicate, he regularly discussed the show's contents with 
Mr Berezovsky. He fishes out two thick transcripts of televised statements by 
his two targets, which provided much of his material. "I decided to use words 
from their own mouths," he says.

The effect was so strong that when asked which party won the election 
campaign, Grigory Yavlinsky, leader of the reformist Yabloko party, just 
says: "ORT". He says Mr Dorenko reflects a continuation of the tradition of 
news-readers on Vremiya mouthing propaganda on the same channel during the 
Soviet period.

Some are more sceptical. Dmitri Konovalenko, research director of the media 
analysis company Tsircon, argues that Mr Dorenko's effect can be exaggerated. 
He shows a graph indicating Mr Luzhkov's popularity fell not just among 
viewers who watched ORT, but among those who watched other TV channels (NTV 
is broadly pro-Fatherland) or read newspapers such as Moskovsky Komsomolets 
that were sympathetic to Mr Luzhkov.

There is also little doubt that much of Fatherland's former support was 
drained by the Unity party linked closely to Mr Putin, whose ratings soared 
on the back of his tough military approach to resolving problems in the 
breakaway republic of Chechnya - a strategy portrayed very uncritically on 
ORT.

Asked whether he considers himself a journalist, Mr Dorenko expresses 
indifference. "I am a human being. I don't want to be classified." He prefers 
to call his broadcast a "show".

Whatever his role, the outcome of the elections means he is likely to remain 
a fixture of "public" broadcasting in the coming months and is unlikely to 
change his style. In the programme on the Sunday after the elections, he 
maintained the pressure on Fatherland, giving a hint of things to come.

There were reports on electoral fraud but only in districts where alleged 
vote-rigging was carried out by Fatherland-All Russia officials. . There were 
fresh "revelations" in a US court case brought by relatives of Paul Tatum, 
the US businessman and joint operator of a Moscow hotel who was shot dead in 
1996. It accuses Mr Luzhkov of a role in the assassination, a charge he 
vigorously denies. And there was an interview with Yabloko's Mr Yavlinsky, 
who - when provoked by Mr Dorenko that his 4.5m voters were not great - 
replied it was better than the eight who in 1968 demonstrated against the 
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia before being arrested in Red Square. But 
his riposte was edited out of the version broadcast that evening.

Mr Dorenko is close to Anatoly Chubais, the much-criticised reformer said to 
be an adviser to Mr Putin. Although Mr Dorenko was invited to a meeting with 
Mr Putin last autumn, he says he is not in the entourage of any political 
group.

In the run-up to the March 26 presidential elections viewers will be studying 
Mr Dorenko's programme to gauge his position towards Mr Putin. For his part, 
Mr Dorenko says his meeting with the presidential frontrunner last autumn was 
like a "recruiting session", though he adds, "I wasn't sure who was 
recruiting whom".

******

#10
New York Times
January 7, 2000
Editorial
Reforms Russia Needs

Russia spent much of the past decade stumbling toward a new political and 
economic system without coherent direction from the Kremlin. Boris Yeltsin's 
early departure is a chance to halt this costly drift. His successors must 
put in place the missing but essential building blocks of a new society, 
including the rule of law, a financial system free of corruption and a 
central government able to collect taxes and provide competent and 
enlightened administration throughout Russia's vast territory. 

Vladimir Putin, who now serves as acting president, has endorsed these goals 
and has begun his tenure with a show of personal energy and heightened 
governmental activism. But it is too soon to tell if he will become the 
constructive democratic leader Russia needs. His background in Soviet 
intelligence and his close links to Mr. Yeltsin's compromised entourage leave 
his true intentions in doubt. Mr. Putin often speaks of his goal of creating 
a strong state. But it is not clear whether he means that state to be 
authoritarian or democratic. 

Historically, Russian governments have used their power to stifle freedoms 
and carry out the orders of czars and Communist tyrants. What is needed now 
is a government that is democratically accountable, but strong enough to 
collect taxes, restore basic services, control crime and create an 
environment conducive to democratic politics and freely competitive markets. 

To make that possible, Mr. Putin and the Parliament must radically simplify a 
tax system so complex and unfair that millions of Russians feel justified in 
simply ignoring it. Once the tax code is rationalized, Moscow must develop 
mechanisms to enforce it. As tax revenues flow in, the new government will 
have to use them to urgently repair a health care system and social 
conditions that have fallen into deep crisis. In the past decade, life 
expectancy for Russian males has plunged to a shockingly low 58 years. 

The Kremlin will also have to promote the creation of honest police forces 
and independent courts to rein in a violent new criminal class, which has 
exploited the breakdown of public institutions to muscle in on legitimate 
businesses and terrorize would-be entrepreneurs. Moscow must also carry out a 
rational downsizing of Russia's military forces. Over the past decade, large 
forces have been kept in place but subjected to brutal budget cuts that have 
left many officers and soldiers irregularly paid, miserably housed and deeply 
embittered. 

Finally, in the run-up to the March 26 presidential elections, Mr. Putin 
should make clear that he expects independent and fair political coverage in 
the government-controlled and pro-Kremlin media. The distortions in coverage 
that marked December's parliamentary election campaign ill served Russia's 
democratic aspirations. More evenhanded coverage of the presidential race 
would help enhance the legitimacy of the eventual winner, which now appears 
likely to be Mr. Putin. 

In the five months since his emergence as a political leader, Mr. Putin has 
emphasized military action in Chechnya at the expense of these more 
fundamental and important issues. With that ugly campaign now bogged down 
amid heightened Chechen resistance, there is a serious risk of rising 
casualties among Russians as well as Chechens. If Mr. Putin's goal is to 
build a strong Russian democracy, the assault on Chechnya is the wrong way to 
begin. 

******



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