January 7,
2000
This Date's Issues: 4016 4017
4018
Johnson's Russia List
#4018
7 January 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com
[Note from David Johnson:
1. New York Times: Neela Banerjee, Russian Chief Keeps Plans for
Economy Under Wraps.
2. Kyodo News Service: Yeltsin's resignation aimed at maintaining
influence: official. (Gleb Pavlovskiy)
3. deadline.ru: Yevgenii Gil'bo, Putin Speeds Up the Electoral Campaign
Under the Threat of a Currency Crisis.
4. Trud: Andranik Migranyan, RUSSIA AFTER YELTSIN: WHAT LIES IN STORE?
5. Reuters: Surgeon Says Health Was Factor In Yeltsin Quitting.
(Chazov)
6. San Jose Mercury News: Gail Lapidus, The Wars of the Russian Succession.
7. AP: Russia Soldiers Scoff at Quick Win.
8. The Guardian (UK): Martin Woollacott, Russia's new boss has an
extremely strange history.
9. Financial Times (UK): Political drama unfolds on the small screen.
Sergei Dorenko's one-sided coverage of December's elections is part of a broader trend of media bias writes Andrew Jack.
10. New York Times editorial: Reforms Russia Needs.]
*******
#1
New York Times
January 7, 2000
[for personal use only]
Russian Chief Keeps Plans for Economy Under Wraps
By NEELA BANERJEE
MOSCOW, Jan. 6 -- A telling moment in the high-level jockeying to influence
Acting President Vladimir V. Putin, especially his economic views, came at an
intimate party a few weeks ago, when he was still just prime minister.
At the Moscow nightclub Up-and-Down, Anatoly B. Chubais, the head of Russia's
power monopoly and the architect of Russia's market overhaul, raised a
provocative toast to Mr. Putin before the Kremlin elite.
"People say Chubais privatized Russia: What can I say? I confess," Mr.
Chubais was quoted as saying by people at the party. "People say Chubais
privatized Putin: What can I say? Things happen."
Mr. Putin was angry and apparently embarrassed, people at the party said, but
characteristically, he kept quiet, unwilling then to let on where his
sympathies lay.
Indeed, the former K.G.B. colonel has said little about the economy, devoting
himself largely to the war in the breakaway republic of Chechnya.
But if he wins early presidential elections on March 26, as he is expected to
do, he will eventually have to turn his attention to the country's moribund
reform effort.
In anticipation, Russia's most powerful vested economic interests,
represented by men like Mr. Chubais, are vying now for Mr. Putin's attention.
It is unlikely that Mr. Putin will make any serious decisions about the
economy before the presidential vote, although today he took a few steps that
suggested he was beginning to actively deal with Russia's economic problems.
Among the most significant was an order he signed that could increase exports
of platinum, an important foreign-currency earner for Russia. Platinum
exports had slowed to a trickle over the last year because of conflicting
regulations over who was authorized to sell the metal.
In an apparent attempt to increase Russia's supply of foreign currency for
coming debt payments, Mr. Putin also ordered Russian exporters to repatriate
100 percent of all revenue from abroad, up from 75 percent currently.
Mr. Putin also temporarily suspended an export tax on aluminum, another
important Russian export, and agreed to impose restrictions on oil companies
that are behind on tax payments.
But such steps provide no insight into Mr. Putin's views on exactly what kind
of economic system should evolve in Russia.
He has said little about Russia's enormous debts, or the cronyism and
favoritism that have alienated many foreign investors.
The clearest sign of his economic policy is likely to be seen in the people
he appoints to his cabinet later this spring, if he is elected.
"He's got a lot to learn about the economy," said Tom Adshead, political
strategist for the Moscow brokerage firm Troika Dialog. "People will look
very hard at Putin's post-election government because that will tell you a
lot about what's going to happen."
Despite Mr. Putin's taciturnity, Russians and foreigners alike still place
hope in him to fix the economy. People see in his youth the energy that the
ailing Boris N. Yeltsin lacked. They believe the resoluteness he has shown in
the war in Chechnya will be applied to the economy.
Last Friday, when Mr. Yeltsin resigned, investor optimism drove one of the
greatest one-day gains in the Russian stock market, pushing the benchmark
Russian Trading System index to the highest it had been since the economic
collapse in August 1998.
The U.S.-Russia Business Council, a Washington-based trade group representing
250 American companies operating in the Russian market, has welcomed Mr.
Putin's appointment, but coupled it with some caution about the vagueness of
his economic views.
Eugene K. Lawson, president of the council, said in a statement Wednesday
that the council was "reasonably confident that Mr. Putin is a strong
proponent of a market economy in Russia, but exactly what kind of market is
the question -- one that welcomes foreign investment on a level playing
field, or one that exhibits an economic nationalism that accompanies strong
Russian stances in other areas of U.S.-Russia relations."
So far, Mr. Putin's decisions on economic matters have yielded a conflicting
picture. He has let capable managers like Deputy Prime Minister Viktor B.
Khristenko and Finance Minister Mikhail M. Kasyanov handle large-scale
economic affairs from the budget to debt negotiations with little
interference.
But in a fight last fall over the illegal ouster of the head of Transneft,
the government oil pipeline, Mr. Putin stayed conspicuously silent, giving
rise to speculation that he was influenced by the people who who were said to
have engineered the ouster, including the shadowy financier Boris A.
Berezovsky.
Although he nominally remains the prime minister, Mr. Putin this week
appointed as his stand-in Deputy Prime Minister Nikolai Y. Aksyonenko, also
believed to be supported by Mr. Berezovsky.
The balance of power between Mr. Putin and those in the Kremlin inner circle
grooming him for the presidency, such as Mr. Chubais and Mr. Berezovsky,
could shift radically if he was elected president. Their aim is to win favors
for the companies they control and the people with whom they are allied. Yet
once vested with the enormous prerogatives of the Russian executive, Mr.
Putin may prove hard to push around.
Still, he is not willing to make enemies now, which many say explains his
silence. No one, for example, really knows who his economic advisers are.
But three days before he stepped in to replace Mr. Yeltsin, Mr. Putin issued
a broad policy statement over the Internet that slightly clarified his
economic and political leanings. He starkly detailed Russia's poverty.
He repeatedly noted that the same economic rules found elsewhere would
determine the success of Russia's economic transformation, including a sound
tax code, banking reform and increased foreign investment. But he also
maintained that the idiosyncrasies of a country that still craves a
paternalistic state necessitated greater government intervention in the
economy.
"Judging by what he has said so far, there probably will be some economic
reform," one Western diplomat said, "but it will be more Russian and it will
probably move more slowly than we all would like."
*******
#2
Yeltsin's resignation aimed at maintaining influence: official
January 7, 2000
Kyodo News Service
MOSCOW, Jan. 7 (Kyodo) - By: Shigeyuki Yoshida. Boris Yeltsin's sudden
resignation as Russian president last week was a carefully planned scenario
aimed at maintaining his political influence, a top Russian official says.
Gleb Pavlovskiy, adviser to the director general of the Russian presidential
office since 1996, said in an interview with Kyodo News on Thursday that he
and other select members of the Yeltsin administration had worked on the plan
for more than a year.
Pavlovskiy, 48, explained that Yeltsin personally made the decision to go
ahead with the plans, and that the scenario had to be performed when the
pro-Kremlin Unity party was in power, suggesting the Dec. 19 election for the
State Duma set the stage for its execution.
''It is something Yeltsin himself decided. He is not the type of politician
who can be convinced by those around him. The scenario had to be executed
when the administration's foundation was strong, so I think he made the
decision after the lower house election,'' Pavlovskiy said.
The Unity party, established in September to back Kremlin policies, posted a
strong showing in the election. On New Year's Eve, Yeltsin announced his
resignation and appointed Prime Minister Vladimir Putin as acting president.
By stepping down, Yeltsin ''in turn wanted to get a strong grip on the
political situation and secure his influence in the political world,
including that over Mr. Putin,'' Pavlovskiy said.
''With Prime Minister Putin, who has gained wide public support for engaging
Russia in a military campaign in Chechnya, placed in the position of de facto
leader, (Yeltsin) felt that waiting until the expiration of his term might
deal a blow to his own political influence,'' he added.
Originally elected president of Russia in 1991 after the breakup of the
Soviet Union, Yeltsin was to serve until the August 2000 end of his second
term.
Pavlovskiy explained that Yeltsin did not want to become another Mikhail
Gorbachev, the former president of the Soviet Union who was stripped of
political power after stepping down from the leadership post.
Asked whether the military campaign in Chechnya was part of the plan,
Pavlovskiy replied, ''No. When Mr. Putin decided to begin a military campaign
in Chechnya, I was against it. But the prime minister's decision turned out
to be correct.''
Pavlovskiy, born in Odessa, Ukraine, taught history until the 1970s, when he
became involved in the antiestablishment movement. He was arrested in 1982
for engaging in anti-Soviet activities and had been exiled from the country
until 1985.
*******
#3
http://www.deadline.ru
January 5, 2000
Yevgenii Gil'bo
Putin Speeds Up the Electoral Campaign Under the Threat of a Currency Crisis
[translation for personal use only]
Some time before Vladimir Putin's ascent to the Kremlin throne, Vladimir
Geraschhenko, the Chairman of the Central Bank, sent him, in his capacity as
chairman of the government, a humble message. In this letter, the chief
banker foresees complications in the Russian currency market. Gerashchenko
claims that already in early 2000 the complications in the Russian financial
system will be "provoked by a significant reduction of export currency
earnings arriving in the country, a reduction of about $1,5 bln., of a
seasonal nature."
What does a reduction of currency earnings mean for the present government?
First of all, an abrupt complication in the area of foreign debt payments, a
problem inherited from Boris Yeltsin who did not hesitate to borrow abroad
in order to reward the armed agencies for their support. In 1999, foreign
debt payments exceeded the amount of loans received from international
financial organizations by about $10 bln. In 2000, the government will have
to pay between $15 and $20 bln. of its own money.
In 1999, the reserves of the Central Bank were the principal source of these
repayments. The Central Bank could afford to give these funds to the
government for one reason - that is, the tangible growth of revenue from the
export of oil. Part of these earnings returns to Russia, rather than being
transferred directly to the offshore banking accounts of the "Family" and
other corporations. Of this part, the exporters are obligated immediately to
sell 75% on the currency exchange. This rule, along with some rather exotic
regulation measures, led to the formation of an exchange rate that is
substantially above the equilibrium (20-25 rbl per dollar, at the
equilibrium rate those days of 37-38 rbl per dollar). The Central Bank used
this exchange rate to replenish its reserves.
However, even such favorable conditions did not allow the Central Bank to
replenish its reserves substantially, and they remained at the critically
low post-crisis level. With even a small reduction in the flow of
petrodollars to the exchange board, the servicing of foreign debt will
become impossible even within the frame of the newly restructured debt
parameters.
The reduction in the flow of petrodollars will deprive the Central Bank of
the opportunity to sustain the overly high exchange rate in spite of all its
efforts. In the most favorable case, it will decline to the equilibrium
level, which these days is 39-40 rbl per dollar. Under an unfavorable
scenario, as it occurred in 1998, it may jump above the equilibrium level
and provoke inflation of 150-200%, that is, on the scale of late 1998.
<...> In this case, Gerashchenko will inevitably have to make his
contribution to Vladimir Putin's electoral campaign, that is, to sustain the
unrealistic exchange rate by every means, as Sergei Dubinin did in 1998,
when he spent $13 bln. for this purpose. It is clear that Gerashchenko can
make it in these conditions through the end of March, but not until June,
simply because he does not have so much reserve. It looks possible that
these considerations figured in the decision to hold early election.
But how does Gerashchenko plan to maintain control over the situation until
March or April? In his letter, he suggests only one specific measure - to
raise the exporters' obligation to sell their currency earnings on the
exchange board from 75% to 100%. In fact, it is a suggestion to direct the
entire export revenue to foreign debt servicing and toward sustaining the
unrealistic exchange rate.
<...> But has the exporters' possible response to this been accounted for?
Will they be satisfied by these new conditions? Are they prepared to work
while having to exchange 100% of their hard currency for roubles?
Clearly not. Which means that currency earnings returning to the country
will decline much more than was foreseen by Gerashchenko. Therefore, the
situation at the exchange market will be destabilized.
One also has to take into account that the destabilization will cause
painful reaction from the capital exporters and will drastically increase
their activities, that is, the demand pressure upon the currency exchange
market. The Central Bank will have to compete with them. <...>
Under these conditions, Putin will have only one solution - that is, to
reduce import, that would enable the government to maintain the unrealistic
exchange rate despite the cutback in hard currency earnings and to preserve
the high rates of capital export for "the Family". The reduction of import
can be achieved either by import substitution through the growth of a
competitive domestic production, or by a drastic reduction in demand.
Meanwhile, the economic strategy announced by the Union of Right-Wing Forces
provisions a financial stabilization regime which will lead to a decline in
production. What remains is the reduction in demand, which can be achieved
through another large-scale reduction in the population earnings. It will
have to compensate not only for the reduction of export, but also for the
decline in GDP that will result from the reanimation of Anatoly Chubais'
experiments in financial austerity.
Thus, it will be difficult to escape a significant decline in living
standards. One can estimate a decline of about 50% by the end of this year.
And since Vladimir Putin's election as president is recognized by everybody
as unavoidable in the current conditions, this means that the population
should be preparing itself more actively for the times that lie ahead.
*******
#4
Trud
January 6, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
RUSSIA AFTER YELTSIN: WHAT LIES IN STORE?
By Andranik MIGRANYAN
President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation stepped
down December 31, 1999, appointing Vladimir Putin in his
place. One gets the impression that Yeltsin's resignation
scenario creates a certain moral attachment between the first
Russian President, Putin and the "family" itself. And, what's
more important, part of Russian society now perceives Putin as
a hostage to Yeltsin. This can be explained by the fact that
any of his actions being spearheaded against Yeltsin's cronies
or anyone else might be viewed as black ingratitude on the
part of Putin, who had been supported by Yeltsin and promoted
to prime minister, and who has now become Yeltsin's successor.
Yeltsin has once again proved that he can (or could) make the
required tactical decisions, despite the fact that he views
such decisions as something really difficult.
Political-science experts and other analysts now
understand only too well that the incumbent Prime Minister is
highly likely to become Russia's next president after Yeltsin.
It was believed that all of the government system's
administrative, financial and mass-media resources would be
activated within the framework of Putin's election campaign.
Well, this assertion has become even more obvious today.
The new president's domestic-policy and foreign-policy
concepts, rather than triumphant elections, now constitute the
main problem for Russia and Putin himself. It would also be
quite natural to question the extent of his political
independence, as well as various options for reviving the real
economy and specific prospects for untying the Chechen "knot".
One should also keep in mind that all sorts of
constitutional-reform discussions have produced no practical
results whatsoever. Besides, the next president would inherit
unlimited powers, which any wise, wilful and energetic
politician can use for the country's benefit. Otherwise this
system would continue to breed favoritism and nepotism, also
entailing the Russian state's disintegration.
******
#5
Surgeon Says Health Was Factor In Yeltsin Quitting
MOSCOW, Jan 7, 2000 -- (Reuters) A Russian heart surgeon familiar with Boris
Yeltsin's medical problems said on Thursday he believed the former
president's poor health was a factor in his decision to resign.
Yevgeny Chazov, who is head of the cardiology center where Yeltsin underwent
heart surgery in 1996, painted a picture that contrasted with Yeltsin's own
explanation of why he resigned. Yeltsin has denied he stepped own for health
reasons.
"I think the poor state of his health, especially last year, played a role in
his resignation," Chazov, seated in a doctor's white coat at his office desk,
told private NTV television.
He said Yeltsin's decision had nothing to do with the multiple bypass
operation he underwent just over three years ago at his Russian Cardiology
Center in Moscow.
But he said: "I think it was clear to anyone, not only a doctor or
academician, how often the president visited the Central Clinical Hospital
(for health checks and treatment), how often he was away. It all showed how
critical the process was."
Chazov said Yeltsin's decision must have been difficult because he loved
power.
"I have seen many patients, but Yeltsin is very attached to power," he said.
"He is a person who cannot live without power. So I can imagine how difficult
it was for him psychologically to make the decision to resign."
Yeltsin, 68, said in his resignation speech on December 31 that he was
resigning to make way for a strong person and a new generation.
"I am leaving because I have done everything I could, not because of my
health but because of all the problems taken together," Yeltsin said in his
televised address.
NTV said that Chazov had compared Yeltsin, at the end of his eight years in
the Kremlin, to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev - whom he also treated.
Brezhnev's poor health and wobbly appearance made him the subject of many
jokes.
Chazov compared Acting President Vladimir Putin, a former officer in the KGB
security police, to Soviet leader Yuri Andropov. Andropov was in charge of
the KGB before he became Soviet leader in November 1982.
"I knew Yuri Andropov very well," he said. "For me he was a very interesting
person. I consider him to be a model for a head of state. So Putin's style
reminds me of Andropov."
******
#6
For publication in the San Jose Mercury News
Perspective
January 9, 2000
The Wars of the Russian Succession
By Gail W. Lapidus (lapidus@leland.Stanford.EDU)
Gail W. Lapidus is a senior fellow at Stanford University's Institute for
International Studies. She wrote this article for Perspective.
The new millenium has brought a dramatic shift in the Russian political
landscape. In the summer of 1996, widespread popular opposition to the
brutal war in Chechnya had combined with stubborn Chechen resistance to
the Russian military campaign to compel Boris Yeltsin to conclude a peace
agreement in order to win re-election to the Presidency. Today,
three-and-a-half years later, a new war in Chechnya has been largely
responsible for the soaring approval ratings of Prime Minister -- now
Acting President Vladimir Putin. The popular war, in fact, has become the
vehicle for Putin's likely election to the Russian Presidency in March.
Boris Yeltsin's unexpected resignation on the eve of the new year was a
dramatic effort to help his designated successor capitalize as speedily as
possible on his current popularity by moving the Presidential elections
forward by three months.
These two developments are redrawing Russia's political landscape. Yet,
little is understood about why the Russian leadership has once again
resorted to military force in Chechnya and is attempting to use the war as
a vehicle for political consolidation. After its humiliating defeat in the
1994-1996 war, Russia made an explicit commitment, in peace agreements
concluded with OSCE involvement, to renounce the use of force "forever"
and seek a negotiated settlement of Chechnya's political status.
Evcen more puzzling is the apparent enthusiasm of the Russian public for a
war which is viewed in the West as savage and counterproductive. Respected
international human rights organizations have documented that Russia is
conducting its Chechnya campaign with such flagrant disregard for
international norms as to amount to massive war crimes against civilian
populations.
Russian leaders portray their actions in Chechnya as a limited and
carefully-targeted counter-terrorist operation aimed at eliminating the
threat to Russia posed by "international terrorism". They contemptuously
dismiss Western expressions of concern as unwelcome interference in a
purely internal affair, or as further evidence of Western interest in
promoting the weakening and fragmentation of Russia. In a November 14
article in the New York Times, Prime Minister Putin sought to deflect
American criticism of the Russian military campaign. In an effort to win
American acquiescence, if not sympathy, he likened Russia's effort in
Chechnya to U.S. anti-terrorist actions and insisted that the Russian
military had chosen "accurately targeted strikes on specifically identified
terrorist bases" to avoid direct attacks on Chechen communities.
It's a novel presentation and it seeks to exploit Western concerns over
international terrorism. But the Russian campaign in Chechnya is in fact a
resumption of the 1994-1996 war, now pursued with even greater
determination, with even less regard for civilian casualties, and with a
more sophisticated military and public relations strategy. What has been
labelled a "counter-terrorist operation" has expanded into a full-scale
war involving over 100,000 Russian troops aimed at avenging a whole
succession of humiliating military defeats as well as ending the
quasi-autonomy of Chechnya and bringing the republic under complete Russian
control. As Major-General Vladimir Shamanov, commander of Russian forces in
Western Chechnya put it, "for me this war is above all to restore the
trampled-upon honor of my motherland".
The war serves another purpose as well. It furthers the larger political
agenda of Prime Minister and Acting President Putin. It is intended as a
demonstration of energetic and decisive leadership capable of defending
Russia's national interests, even in the face of Western criticism,
restoring Russia's power, and winning the support of a broad spectrum of
the Russian population in preparation for the upcoming presidential elections.
Several developments over the past year played a key role in the renewal of
the war in Chechnya. First and foremost was pressure from an increasingly
assertive military leadership which was never reconciled to the earlier
cease-fire and peace agreements and blamed weak and vacillating political
leaders for depriving them of military victory in 1966. Secondly,
internal breakdown and anarchy in Chechnya itself, in which abductions and
hostage-taking by armed gangs had become an increasingly important source
of income, eroded whatever residue of sympathy the earlier war -- and a
long history of victimization, thnic cleansing, and exile of the Chechen
nation -- had elicited. Third, the incursion this past summer of a group of
armed Islamist guerillas into the neighboring republic of Dagestan in an
effort to establish an Islamic republic further contributed to popular
alarm in Russia about the Chechen threat. The successful repulsion of the
guerillas, and the severe repression of Dagestani Wahhabis by Russian
military forces was widely welcomed by a Russian public frustrated by past
passivity and confusion in Moscow and yearning for strong and decisive
leadership that would restore order to the country.
The final and decisive catalyst was a series of explosions in several
multi-storied apartment complexes in Moscow and Volgodonsk resulting in
nearly 300 casualties. Russian leaders blamed Chechen terrorists. But no
persuasive evidence was ever presented to support the allegation and a
number of Russian analysts and political figures have alleged that the
explosions were in fact the work of the Russian security services who were
presumably trying to mobilize public support for the war. The explosions
triggered panic among ordinary Russians and unleashed a dramatic surge of
anti-Chechen sentiment, providing both a rationale and widespread popular
support for the ensuing military campaign.
The military campaign has clearly been designed to avoid the mistakes of
the earlier war, and above all to prevent the tide of public opinion from
turning against it. Drawing on the examples of Desert Storm and the NATO
intervention in Kosovo, the military tries to hold down its own casualties
by avoiding or minimizing direct combat engagements with guerilla forces.
They rely instead on massive aerial and artillery bombardment of cities and
settlements. The strategy has resulted in enormous casualties among
civilian populations, the destruction of much of Chechnya's remaining
infrastructure, already devastated by the previous war, and large numbers
of refugees. Over 200,000 refugees have made their way to the neighboring
republic of Ingushetia, while countless thousands of civilians remain
trapped in basements in Grozny and other settlements.
Public support for the war has been further maintained by tight control
over the media and by limiting the access of Russian and foreign
journalists to Chechnya. As in the last war, official military sources
magnify the extent of military successes and minimize the scope of both
military and civilian casualties. Unlike the last war, this time there is
little reportage and virtually no filmed coverage from the battle zone to
challenge these official accounts or provide a Chechen perspective.
This situation is unlikely to last. As fighting in Grozny and in the
southern regions of the republic intensifies, casualties mount, and more
information seeps out of the battle zone, and the effects of the conflict
spill over into neighboring regions and states, questions about the
campaign are likely to grow, along with pressure for negotiations. The
Russian government has rejected repeated calls for negotiations by
Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov, and has been searching for more pliable
Chechen partners to install in power in the region of northern Chechnya
under its control. Russian has also rejected any political role for the
OSCE or other international bodies. But for the Putin government, the
uncertainties ahead make it all the more imperative to capitalize swiftly
on the wave of popularity it is enjoying.
Already in December parliamentary elections, Russia's fluid party system
began showing signs of reconfiguration. Unity, a newly-created political
party allied with Putin, surged into second place in the elections. Other
opposition parties - most notably, Fatherland-All Russia, the coalition
identified with former Prime Minister Primakov and Moscow Mayor Luzhkov -
have fragmented and a succession of political figures are jumping on the
Putin bandwagon. Putin's victory in the March presidential elections
would confirm and stabilize the post-Yeltsin political succession. But
his victory will have been achieved on the back of the brutal campaign
against Chechnya: a sobering thought as the United States seeks to
formulate its attitude toward Yeltsin's successor.
******
#7
Russia Soldiers Scoff at Quick Win
January 6, 2000
By MAXIM MARMUR
BACHI-YURT, Russia (AP) - While Russian leaders make bold predictions of
imminent victory in Chechnya, the weary paratroopers fighting rebels in the
hills say the bloodshed is far from over.
``We know that we will have to go into the mountains, and very tough fighting
is ahead,'' says Lt. Col. Mikhail Sukhovskoy, commander of a paratroop
battalion. ``We won't be able to defeat the rebels with aircraft and armor.
We will have to go there on foot. And it will take a long time.''
After overrunning the northern plains of Chechnya with little trouble, the
Russian military now faces the far more difficult challenge of taking on the
rebels in the southern mountains.
The military has relied on massive artillery and air bombardment during the
current campaign, trying to avoid the heavy losses its forces suffered during
the 1994-96 war, when poorly trained Russian infantry was outfought by the
Chechens. But the tactics won't work in the mountains, which shelter the
rebels.
Small units from both sides play cat-and-mouse in the forests covering the
mountains and the surrounding foothills. The rebels are skilled guerrilla
fighters who know the terrain intimately and can attack and disappear without
warning.
For weeks, the Russian military has been sending some of its best units into
the southern mountains to fight the rebels. The paratroop and commando units,
draped in combat harnesses festooned with grenades, ammunition clips and
combat knives, emulate the rebels' guerrilla tactics.
``We will act in small groups of 10 to 15 men, which would set ambushes and
hunt for militants,'' said a paratroop captain commanding a unit assigned to
hunt rebels in the mountains.
``My soldiers are well-prepared for the action and have all the necessary
gear,'' said the officer, who asked to be identified only by his first name,
Vasily.
But officers and soldiers admit the fighting is exhausting and difficult.
Patrols trek through the mountains for days, often catching no sight of the
Chechens or seeing them only in fleeting engagements in the forests.
They often slog through deep snow on the steep slopes, and thick fog
frequently enshrouds the mountainsides, leaving the patrols stranded for
hours.
``The fighting is getting increasingly hard,'' Maj. Farid Shaikhullin said.
The paratroopers' green-and-brown camouflage uniforms haven't been washed in
weeks, and the men themselves go without baths for days on end. Some joke
grimly about lice.
Although the Russian government says the war will soon be won, many of the
soldiers on the ground say the Chechens won't stop fighting and that they can
blend into the terrain or hide among the civilian population.
``Some rebels have simply hidden their weapons and are posing as civilians.
Others retreated into the mountains, but you may expect them to strike at any
moment,'' Capt. Roman Starkov said.
Like soldiers anywhere, the paratroopers are addicted to rumors. The current
scoop is that the war will end soon because soldiers get combat bonuses of up
to $40 a day - an average monthly salary in Russia - and the government wants
to save money.
The soldiers' morale is good and most support the war, but their weapons and
equipment are often worn out and replacements and supplies often are hard to
obtain.
Sometimes, supplies arrive from unorthodox sources.
One unit of paratroopers got a shipment of delicacies, expensive Western
medicine and satellite positioning equipment - unheard of luxuries in the
cash-strapped military. The men said the shipment was a gift from a
paratrooper's father, an organized crime boss in Moscow.
******
#8
The Guardian (UK)
7 January 2000
[for personal use only]
Russia's new boss has an extremely strange history
Martin Woollacott
Who would have dreamed only a few months ago that the first new national
leader to emerge in the 21st century would be a 47-year-old ex-spy who
virtually nobody had heard of before last August? The name of Vladimir Putin
does not appear in Leon Aron's just published biography of Boris Yeltsin,
because Putin was not even a spear carrier on the Russian political stage
when Aron was finishing his book. Yet everything now suggests that Putin is
the man who is going to rule Russia for the next decade or even longer.
Some might argue that it is equally surprising that a superannuated actor
should have served two terms as US president, or even that a boy from a
Scottish public school should be Britain's Labour prime minister. It is true
that there is a sense in which everything in life is surprising. These men,
however, like those now contending for presidential office in America, served
an apprenticeship within the political class, as did Boris Yeltsin and
Mikhail Gorbachev before him. Yeltsin was a politician experienced and
especially gifted in seeking and, until recently, in holding popular support,
and he was a nationally known Soviet figure long before he became president
of Russia.
Putin is a man whose adult years are shadowy. There is no documentation on
his time in Germany as an agent, except that his job was probably commercial
espionage. His later career, slightly more public, carried on the economic
theme for a while, and he has associations with a number of the country's
economic reformers. He then became one of the presidential fixers, before
returning to the intelligence service as head of the FSB, successor to the
KGB.
Putin recently praised not only the FSB and the KGB but, by implication,
their predecessors the Cheka, the OGPU and the NKVD, in a speech on the
anniversary of the foundation of the Cheka. As the Russian expert Richard
Pipes has pointed out, this tribute to the Soviet state's instruments of
repression must give pause. It was almost as if Putin was implying that these
agencies were the keepers of the flame - organisations that placed the
maintenance of Russian power and Russia's defence against its enemies above
other considerations. Even given the novel nature of Russia's democracy,
Putin's profile as agent-politician is a strange one, which he shares with
Yevgeni Primakov, who most seem to think is the only man who could best him
in the March elections.
Primakov has much more of a proper public record than Putin, but after
defections from his camp this week his chances in March are much diminished.
It is truly odd that if there is to be a real contest it will be between two
spies, and that other politicians of the new Russia are likely to be either
out of it or struggling to rack up a respectable losing vote.
Is it only that Putin, who could have been just one of the many
revolving-door figures that Yeltsin popped in and out of the cabinet,
happened to be there when a popular war was being waged?
Between the first Chechen war and the second there was a change in the
Russian mood. There was a shift from popular hostility toward a shambolic
imperial operation to keep the Chechens in a federation to which they did not
wish to belong, to popular support for a necessary and more efficient
operation to defend Russia against extremists. Chechen banditry played its
part in the transition, but so did a broader yearning for strong government
in every sphere, not just the military.
It was this sea change which gave Putin his opportunity, and which produced
the huge vote at last month's elections for a new political grouping which
had no other platform but the war. The success of the Unity party and other
factions supporting Putin is what allowed Yeltsin to make his exit. He could
do so with reasonable certainty that President Putin would be a sufficiently
strong and long-lasting leader to ensure that Yeltsin's allies would have
immunity against investigation and prosecution and a continued share in
power.
That the Russian intelligence services, in spite of reforms, have continued
in some ways unchanged is widely acknowledged. It is a long jump from that to
the view that Putin's ascension is the result of a conspiracy that may have
involved the deliberate planting of bombs in Russian cities. For this there
is no evidence, and the likelihood remains that it was Chechen extremists who
were responsible.
Still, Putin's elevation strengthens the security state in Russia. His belief
in the important role of the secret agencies, and his support for a large
increase in military spending could, if more than rhetorical, partially
reverse Yeltsin's policies of reducing the size, costs, and institutional
prominence of the armed forces and intelligence services. A full reversal, of
course, is beyond the means of the Russian state, but even a limited swing of
the pendulum would be a damaging development.
Belief in a strong Russia in a more general sense is hardly to be condemned.
Putin's recent comments about economic health, competitiveness, and the need
to deal with western countries on more equal economic terms could have come
out of the mouth of a Russian reformer of a century ago. Nor are his views on
the role of the state necessarily ominous. The shrinkage of the central
government's real capacity to influence events, while its theoretical
capacity to do so was supposedly enhanced by new laws and decrees, was a
marked feature of both Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's rule.
A president who had a substantial body of support in the Duma, as Putin would
have, if successful in March, could make serious inroads into the problems of
overmighty corporations, unresponsive provincial governments, and obstinate
bureaucracies. That same president, having secured office, could also make
unpopular decisions about Chechnya, building on military victory to open the
road to transitional autonomy and then independence as long as there were
proper guarantees of Russian security.
"Could" is the word. The leadership of Russia has been placed within Putin's
grasp before Russians, or anybody else, have had a chance to measure his real
capacity as a politician or to judge his programme - if, beyond the war, he
has one. "The attributes of the traditional Russian state - authoritarianism,
imperialism, militarism, xenophobia - are far from extinguished," Aron writes
in his book. "Yet more and higher hedges have been erected against their
recurrence under Yeltsin... than at any other time in Russian history."
It would be irony indeed if Boris Yeltsin were to prove to have undermined
that achievement by the manner of his going. Whether he has done so is a
question to which only Vladimir Putin may have the answer.
Boris Yeltsin by Leon Aron is published by HarperCollins.
*******
#9
Financial Times (UK)
7 January 2000
[for personal use only]
Political drama unfolds on the small screen: MEDIA
RUSSIAN TELEVISION: Sergei Dorenko's one-sided coverage of December's
elections is part of a broader trend of media bias writes Andrew Jack
Sergei Dorenko makes no effort to hide his feelings towards two of Russia's
best-known politicians. "I have very difficult relations with Yevgeny
Primakov and Yuri Luzhkov," he says, referring respectively to the former
prime minister and the mayor of Moscow. "I know what the Primakov-Luzhkov
system is like, and I decided I had to do something against their party."
Such sentiments might not seem shocking coming from an individual citizen.
What is troubling is that Mr Dorenko presents the main weekly evening news
analysis programme on ORT, Russia's largest and state- owned television
channel. And he has no qualms about expressing his private beliefs publicly
throughout his broadcasts and attacking his chosen targets.
For observers and participants in the campaign, Mr Dorenko's "killer
journalism" had a significant impact on the outcome. In spring last year,
conventional wisdom had awarded Mr Luzhkov the role of the next president of
Russia. By autumn, Mr Primakov had taken on the mantle.
But between September and December, as Mr Dorenko's broadcasts geared up
their assault, support for the Fatherland party had halved, leaving Mr
Primakov's popularity lagging well behind that of Vladimir Putin, the former
spymaster and KGB agent who is acting president. Mr Luzhkov seemed to have
abandoned hope of even competing for the Kremlin.
Mr Dorenko regularly launched accusations of corruption and even criminality
against Mr Luzhkov. He focused on the supposed ill-health of Mr Primakov,
suggesting he was not up to the stress of high office.
The "Dorenko effect" was one of the most striking aspects of the 1999
elections. It was part of broad trend to media bias among broadcasters and
print publications that permeates Russia, and which are set to play an
important role in the build-up to Russia's presidential elections.
His slick and aggressive style has began to rub off on his counterparts.
Sober and distinguished-looking, Mr Dorenko worked as a correspondent for CNN
in Latin America, but rose to prominence at ORT, where he became anchor of
Vremiya, the evening news analysis programme.
The EU-funded European Institute for the Media, which monitored election
coverage during the last month of the campaign, concluded "smear tactics and
unsubstantiated accusations" characterised much media coverage. It said the
ability of the electorate to reach a well-informed conclusion about how to
vote had been undermined and both the democratic process and public
confidence in the media had been damaged.
The Institute singled out ORT's coverage of the campaign. It said the station
failed to respect election laws demanding equal time to all parties. The
Unity party, closely linked to Mr Putin, received 28 per cent of total
election news coverage, while Fatherland-All Russia received less - 14 per
cent - than the oddball one-time ultra-nationalist movement led by Vladimir
Zhirinovsky. What coverage was provided to Fatherland was normally "extremely
negative", it concluded, and singled out Mr Dorenko's broadcast.
Sitting in his cramped office in ORT's decrepit headquarters next to the
Moscow television tower, his bodyguard in the adjacent room, Mr Dorenko does
little to hide the element of vendetta in his approach. He says frosty
relations with Mr Primakov first developed in 1996, when he criticised the
then foreign minister over the planned Russia-NATO treaty, and then chided
him about his health.
He says that Mr Primakov, on becoming prime minister in late 1998, called the
cash-strapped ORT with an ultimatum: either Mr Dorenko was sacked, or the
company would not receive a pledged grant of Dollars 100m from the government.
With Mr Luzhkov, "a man who prohibited criticism", the tensions began with a
report Mr Dorenko made on ORT about the mayor's links with the controversial
Georgian sculptor Tsereteli. The result was intense pressure, including
efforts to get the journalist sacked and an investigation into his personal
affairs.
Mr Dorenko says that last August, when Mr Primakov appeared to be the
frontrunner for the presidency, he concluded he was under certain threat, but
that he preferred to go down fighting. He was offered the chance by Boris
Berezovsky, the "oligarch" close to President Boris Yeltsin's entourage who
also reputedly controls ORT, even though the state holds 51 per cent of the
shares.
He was hired to anchor the Sunday evening programme named after himself with
the objective of attacking Fatherland. As telephone conversations leaked to
the Russian media indicate, he regularly discussed the show's contents with
Mr Berezovsky. He fishes out two thick transcripts of televised statements by
his two targets, which provided much of his material. "I decided to use words
from their own mouths," he says.
The effect was so strong that when asked which party won the election
campaign, Grigory Yavlinsky, leader of the reformist Yabloko party, just
says: "ORT". He says Mr Dorenko reflects a continuation of the tradition of
news-readers on Vremiya mouthing propaganda on the same channel during the
Soviet period.
Some are more sceptical. Dmitri Konovalenko, research director of the media
analysis company Tsircon, argues that Mr Dorenko's effect can be exaggerated.
He shows a graph indicating Mr Luzhkov's popularity fell not just among
viewers who watched ORT, but among those who watched other TV channels (NTV
is broadly pro-Fatherland) or read newspapers such as Moskovsky Komsomolets
that were sympathetic to Mr Luzhkov.
There is also little doubt that much of Fatherland's former support was
drained by the Unity party linked closely to Mr Putin, whose ratings soared
on the back of his tough military approach to resolving problems in the
breakaway republic of Chechnya - a strategy portrayed very uncritically on
ORT.
Asked whether he considers himself a journalist, Mr Dorenko expresses
indifference. "I am a human being. I don't want to be classified." He prefers
to call his broadcast a "show".
Whatever his role, the outcome of the elections means he is likely to remain
a fixture of "public" broadcasting in the coming months and is unlikely to
change his style. In the programme on the Sunday after the elections, he
maintained the pressure on Fatherland, giving a hint of things to come.
There were reports on electoral fraud but only in districts where alleged
vote-rigging was carried out by Fatherland-All Russia officials. . There were
fresh "revelations" in a US court case brought by relatives of Paul Tatum,
the US businessman and joint operator of a Moscow hotel who was shot dead in
1996. It accuses Mr Luzhkov of a role in the assassination, a charge he
vigorously denies. And there was an interview with Yabloko's Mr Yavlinsky,
who - when provoked by Mr Dorenko that his 4.5m voters were not great -
replied it was better than the eight who in 1968 demonstrated against the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia before being arrested in Red Square. But
his riposte was edited out of the version broadcast that evening.
Mr Dorenko is close to Anatoly Chubais, the much-criticised reformer said to
be an adviser to Mr Putin. Although Mr Dorenko was invited to a meeting with
Mr Putin last autumn, he says he is not in the entourage of any political
group.
In the run-up to the March 26 presidential elections viewers will be studying
Mr Dorenko's programme to gauge his position towards Mr Putin. For his part,
Mr Dorenko says his meeting with the presidential frontrunner last autumn was
like a "recruiting session", though he adds, "I wasn't sure who was
recruiting whom".
******
#10
New York Times
January 7, 2000
Editorial
Reforms Russia Needs
Russia spent much of the past decade stumbling toward a new political and
economic system without coherent direction from the Kremlin. Boris Yeltsin's
early departure is a chance to halt this costly drift. His successors must
put in place the missing but essential building blocks of a new society,
including the rule of law, a financial system free of corruption and a
central government able to collect taxes and provide competent and
enlightened administration throughout Russia's vast territory.
Vladimir Putin, who now serves as acting president, has endorsed these goals
and has begun his tenure with a show of personal energy and heightened
governmental activism. But it is too soon to tell if he will become the
constructive democratic leader Russia needs. His background in Soviet
intelligence and his close links to Mr. Yeltsin's compromised entourage leave
his true intentions in doubt. Mr. Putin often speaks of his goal of creating
a strong state. But it is not clear whether he means that state to be
authoritarian or democratic.
Historically, Russian governments have used their power to stifle freedoms
and carry out the orders of czars and Communist tyrants. What is needed now
is a government that is democratically accountable, but strong enough to
collect taxes, restore basic services, control crime and create an
environment conducive to democratic politics and freely competitive markets.
To make that possible, Mr. Putin and the Parliament must radically simplify a
tax system so complex and unfair that millions of Russians feel justified in
simply ignoring it. Once the tax code is rationalized, Moscow must develop
mechanisms to enforce it. As tax revenues flow in, the new government will
have to use them to urgently repair a health care system and social
conditions that have fallen into deep crisis. In the past decade, life
expectancy for Russian males has plunged to a shockingly low 58 years.
The Kremlin will also have to promote the creation of honest police forces
and independent courts to rein in a violent new criminal class, which has
exploited the breakdown of public institutions to muscle in on legitimate
businesses and terrorize would-be entrepreneurs. Moscow must also carry out a
rational downsizing of Russia's military forces. Over the past decade, large
forces have been kept in place but subjected to brutal budget cuts that have
left many officers and soldiers irregularly paid, miserably housed and deeply
embittered.
Finally, in the run-up to the March 26 presidential elections, Mr. Putin
should make clear that he expects independent and fair political coverage in
the government-controlled and pro-Kremlin media. The distortions in coverage
that marked December's parliamentary election campaign ill served Russia's
democratic aspirations. More evenhanded coverage of the presidential race
would help enhance the legitimacy of the eventual winner, which now appears
likely to be Mr. Putin.
In the five months since his emergence as a political leader, Mr. Putin has
emphasized military action in Chechnya at the expense of these more
fundamental and important issues. With that ugly campaign now bogged down
amid heightened Chechen resistance, there is a serious risk of rising
casualties among Russians as well as Chechens. If Mr. Putin's goal is to
build a strong Russian democracy, the assault on Chechnya is the wrong way to
begin.
******
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