August 4, 1999   
This Date's Issues: 3420 • 3421   • 3422 

Johnson's Russia List
#3421
4 August 1999
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Adam Tanner, Back-room politics shape Russia's future.
2. Moscow Times: Melissa Akin, Fired Aide Hits Back At Kremlin, Voloshin. 
(Sergei Zveryev)
3. Eugene Huskey: Re: No. 3418, #3/Boldyrev.
4. Nat Hooper: Re: 3418-Golden Age of Brezhnev.
5. Andrei Liakhov: RE: 3418-Krasnow/White Series/doing business in Russia.
6. PRIVET ROSSIYA: WE WERE AT THE BOTTOM, AND THIS BOTTOM HAS SUNK.
(Aganbegyan). 
7. DJ Peterson: Re: 3418-Goble, Eberstadt, et al. on Russia's Demographic 
Crisis.
8. St. Petersburg Times: Anna Badkhen, Hometown Russian Life Offers No 
Provincial Idyll.
9. The Guardian (UK): David Hearst, Lenin to be buried at last - official. 
10. Christian Science Monitor: Judith Matloff, On these Russian picnics: 
take a flashlight. (Tunnels).
11. Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy: Morozov on Primakov's Future.
12. Stratfor Commentary: Yeltsin Plays Balance of Power Politics in 
Kremlin.]

*******

#1
ANALYSIS-Back-room politics shape Russia's future
By Adam Tanner

MOSCOW, Aug 4 (Reuters) - Grey-suited politicians have been gathering in
smoke-filled rooms, plotting a path to power in Russia's imperfect
democracy through an electoral bloc they see destined for victory even
before campaigning starts. 

Emerging from the backrooms on Wednesday was Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, a
tough politician and head of the Fatherland movement, who won the assent of
regional leaders to fuse their All Russia group into a new electoral
coalition. 

``There is no other political force, if we think about it; somebody has to
assume the responsibility now,'' Mintimer Shaimiyev, head of Russia's
Tatarstan region and a leader of All Russia, said on Wednesday after
joining hands with Luzhkov. 

Nothing is ever certain in Russian politics, but the formation of this
centre-left coalition is likely to alter the outcome of December's
parliamentary election and the summer 2000 presidential poll -- before a
single vote has been cast. 

The new Fatherland-All Russia group could vault Luzhkov into the Kremlin or
the Russian White House, the prime minister's seat. It could revive the
career of veteran spymaster and ex-premier Yevgeny Primakov, something
Luzhkov said on Wednesday was an important goal. 

Or the new coalition could fall apart amid rivalries and in-fighting, as
have many similar manoeuvres since the end of the Soviet Union in 1991. 

Success stories -- such as President Boris Yeltsin's come-from-behind
re-election victory in 1996 -- have come about when a critical mass of
political support and money fuelled a powerful campaign engine. 

Russia's vast size makes big money and ready access to the media essential
to winning a national election, and a coalition combining these assets
could prove decisive. 

Some experts already see Fatherland-All Russia as an unstoppable train,
especially if Primakov comes on board. 

Shaping up as the key opponents to the bald, take-charge Luzhkov and his
group are the Communists and their allies, and the young reformers, mostly
men in their 30s and 40s who ushered in the free-market reforms of the 1990s. 

The Communists, direct descendants of the Soviet Communist Party, retain a
loyal minority following especially among older Russians. But they are
hampered by a drab if decent leader in Gennady Zyuganov. 

The reformers, some of whom have already formed the Right Cause bloc, have
some charismatic leaders such as former Deputy Prime Minister Boris
Nemtsov. Others, like the father of the privatisation programme Anatoly
Chubais, remain unpopular because of the pain associated with economic
reform. 

A wild card remains Yeltsin, a lame-duck leader whose passion has always
been power politics rather than policymaking. He clearly wants to shape the
outcome of the upcoming ballots, and appears anxious to hinder former ally
Luzhkov. 

Early on Wednesday the president met Shaimiyev to learn more about the new
coalition, and on Tuesday he saw his ex-Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. 

Kommersant newspaper reported on Wednesday that Yeltsin suggested that
Chernomyrdin and his Our Home is Russia party join the reformers but that
the idea was rejected. 

The paper also said that some in the Kremlin are advancing the idea of
having Yeltsin ally Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin join forces with
Fatherland-All Russia to secure the election of more parliamentarians
sympathetic to the president. 

Nezavisimaya Gazeta concluded that in any case the Kremlin would soon throw
its weight into the political fray. 

``In August the presidential administration plans to strengthen its control
fully over its structures, secure the support of most of the influential
media, cut off political opponents from powerful financial companies, and
from September come down with all its might on Luzhkov's group,'' it said. 

*******

#2
Moscow Times
August 4, 1999 
Fired Aide Hits Back At Kremlin, Voloshin 
By Melissa Akin
Staff Writer

Fired Kremlin aide Sergei Zveryev jumped into the propaganda war between the 
presidential entourage and Media-MOST media empire Tuesday, accusing the 
Kremlin of attempting to impose censorship on the news media and pondering a 
ban on elections in order to keep power. 

Zveryev's days in the Kremlin had been widely seen as numbered after verbal 
warfare broke out between his patron, Media-MOST head Vladimir Gusinsky, and 
Kremlin chief of staff Alexander Voloshin. 

Zveryev was finally dumped Tuesday after sending a letter to Voloshin 
criticizing him for driving into opposition a potentially powerful new 
political bloc formed by Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov and Tatarstan President 
Mintimer Shaimiyev. 

Shaimiyev and Luzhkov announced Tuesday they had sealed a deal on their 
on-again, off-again union. 

At a news conference, Zveryev said the president's staff was dividing the 
country. 

"From a political instrument whose task it was to unify society, especially 
in view of the pre-election situation, the presidential administration 

has transformed itself into a body that is in effect tearing society apart by 

stirring up contradictions," Zveryev said. 

"Neither members of the All Russia movement nor those from Fatherland are 
opposed to the reforms that are happening in the country," he said. "These 
are supporters of progressive development." 

Zveryev said Voloshin's administration had adopted a policy of applying 
"pressure" on the news media. "The presidential administration has introduced 
elements of censorship," he said. 

Zveryev described Voloshin's administration as obedient to a narrow circle of 
financial oligarchs and bent on hounding Luzhkov and Shaimiyev. The Kremlin 
views Luzhkov, a likely presidential contender in 2000, with distrust. 

Zveryev once ran MOST-Bank, owned by Luzhkov ally Gusinsky. 

He was replaced as deputy chief of staff by Vladislav Surkov, another Kremlin 
political adviser and former banker who worked for the Kremlin-friendly Alfa 
group and Bank Menatep. 

Zveryev's main target was Voloshin, whom he called "ruinous" for Russia. 
Voloshin has spent the past several weeks locked in a propaganda war with 
Gusinsky's Media-MOST group. 

MOST's television station, NTV, attacked an ORT state television report that 
offered figures suggesting NTV was swamped with debt and living on state 
largesse. 

Voloshin - often seen as a proxy of Kremlin insider Boris Berezovsky, 
part-owner of ORT - kept up his attack Tuesday with an interview in 
Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper, saying MOST was trying to browbeat the 
government into giving it more subsidies. 

"This reminds me of a situati on where a neighbor borrows three rubles until 
payday, cheerfully drinks it away, then spitefully swears and demands another 
10," Voloshin was quoted as saying. "Who'd give it?" 

MOST group officials and journalists have accused the Kremlin of fabricating 
damaging information about their finances in an attempt to force the group's 
media empire, which include the daily newspaper Segodnya, the weekly 
newsmagazine Itogi and Ekho Moskvy radio, to toe the Kremlin line. 

Zveryev also fed widespread speculation that the Kremlin administration had 
concocted a scheme to prevent its opponents from gaining power in the 
December elections to the State Duma, the lower house of parliament, and in 
the presidential elections scheduled for next summer. 

"An emergency situation, the cancellation of elections - I can say, having 
the same information you have, it is possible that kind of plan is being 
worked up in the Kremlin," Zveryev said. 

Zveryev said Voloshin's refusal to compromise made him "ruinous" for Russia. 

"I believe that in the current situation, on the eve of elections, this post 
should be occupied by a person who knows how to make deals," he said. 

Zveryev, who served only 15 weeks in the Kremlin, was credited in 

Russian news media for a Kremlin plan to form its own political bloc out of 
pro-Kremlin, center-right forces. 

Luzhkov's Fatherland movement and Shaimiyev's All Russia were 

both considered to be both possible members of the bloc, which bore the 
working title "Russia." 

Zveryev said Tuesday the idea was dead. 

The Kremlin denied it was trying to censor the media or interfere with 
elections. "Media are on such a level of development that that would be 
suicidal," presidential spokesman Dmitry Yakushkin said. 

"No extreme situation, no cancellation of elections is being prepared. Both 
[presidential and Duma elections] will happen on time, and will be as 
civilized as possible." 

*******

#3
Date: Tue, 3 Aug 1999 
From: Eugene Huskey <ehuskey@beret.stetson.edu> 
Subject: Re: No. 3418, #3/Boldyrev

May I offer a minor correction on the Jamestown report on Yurii Boldyrev?
He was indeed fired from the presidency in 1993 for doing his job--rooting
out corruption. However, the institution he headed, the Monitoring
Administration (Kontrol'noe upravlenie) within the presidency, was not
abolished. It functions to this day in headquarters previously occupied by
the Party Control Commission, and, with over 200 officials, is one of the
largest subdivisions in the presidential bureaucracy. One may also ask
whether the best title for the head of the Monitoring Administration is
"comptroller." He is rather more like a politicized Inspector General. 

Eugene Huskey
Political Science and Russian Studies
Stetson University
DeLand, Florida

******

#4
Date: Tue, 3 Aug 1999 
From: nhoop@centuryinter.net (Nat Hooper) 
Subject: Re: 3418-Golden Age of Brezhnev 

Richard Beeston in Moscow wrote:
"LESS than a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
a record number of Russians regret the passing of their former 
empire and look back with growing fondness to the stagnant era of
Leonid Brezhnev's rule." 

And why wouldn't they? All the basic material needs were provided for. All
they had to do was hunker down and shut their minds to the negative aspects
of their lives. They could do their numbing jobs by rote and put their
minds to the arts and dreams of "the good life". 

But what have they today? Virtually nothing. A huge percentage barely
survive. Many have no job, and possibly worse, have a job that doesn't
pay.health care is a disgrace and the country is controlled by organized
crime. How to survive is a constant and very serious concern. 

Sadly, they believe this is democracy and so, turn away from the rest of
the world. Who can blame them for wanting the old system back?

*******

#5
Date: Tue, 3 Aug 1999 
From: "Andrei Liakhov" <liakhova@nortonrose.com> 
Subject: RE: 3418-Krasnow/White Series

Comments on G.Krasnov - doing business in Russia

Please note that my view is biased as I am a firm supporter of the increase
of investment into the country. The horror stories are largely exaggerated
and caused partly by inadequate information. For example the background for
the famous '95 incident when two shareholders were excluded from the
shareholder register of Krasnoyarsk aliuminium plant was just a product of
infighting between various organised crime groupings for control of a very
lucrative business and had nothing to do with a "genuine" foreign investment
into the country. 

On the other hand the Government itself (at least the Kirienko one) was
begging large institutional investors as late as first week of August '98
not to withdraw from the GKO market and support it by additional infusions
of capital, knowing that it will default on domestic debt. I believe that
this aspect of the August saga caused the largest damage to Russia's
reputation on international capital markets.

The above are just two examples of how the lack of correct information
distort the true picture of what's happening there. Until someone takes a
bold decision to go beyond the authority of western media in Russia which in
99% of cases is too lazy to leave Moscow expat circuit and discover what
really is going on - no informed decision to invest may be taken. 
Discovery of information is thus the first task of the investor/analyst. 

As to quality of interpreters - it does not really matter whether they are
US born Russians or Russian born Russians - both may be equally bad - we had
enough experience of that. The reason for more frequent complaints about the
quality of Moscow interpreters is that interpretation is often the last
available source of income and anybody who finished an "English school" and
does not have a steady job is trying to become an interpreter. In fact it is
very difficult and unrewarding job which requires a lot of skill, certain
level of general and specialised knowledge and cultural background to become
efficient and successful. The best interpreters in Moscow are graduates of
either: Moris Torez institute, MGIMO, Higher Courses of the MFA, KGB/FSB
Academy or Institute of Military Interpreters. It's easy to get one by
calling one of these institutions - they all contract out their junior
employees.

As to various legal procedures to start up a business in Russia - they are
hardly more sophisticated for foreigners than in US or EU - a large
proportion of complaints is caused by people expecting some preferential
treatment as foreign investors. True a large part of the complaints is
caused by bureacracy and corruption but anyone who tried to get a banking
licence in the US or a broking licence (FSA Authorisation) in the UK could
tell a similar story (save for corruption bit). 

The reason for the above statement is simple - do not be expecting to be
treated any differently than a local person only because you have a fat
wallet and remember that some local wallets are much fatter than yours.

And the last bit:
Yes, Russia is a corruption infested, politically unstable country which is
on the edge of economic collapse. BUT: It has huge potential and high
skilled labour force, and enormous potential for growth. Does any sensible
investor want to miss such opportunity? Decide for yourself,
gentlemen........

*******

#6
Excerpt
Date: Tue, 3 Aug 1999 
From: "Tanya Samoiloff" <tolmach@usa.net> 
Subject: Hello Russia #41

HELLO RUSSIA
"PRIVET ROSSIYA"
FREE RUSSIAN WEEKLY NEWSLETTER # 41
August 03 1999

I. WE WERE AT THE BOTTOM, AND THIS BOTTOM HAS SUNK
In this way describes a present conditions of the Russian economy Alexander
Aganbegyan, Academician and Rector of the Academy of National Economy of
Russian Federation.

The main economic health indicator is a volume of annual gross national
product per capita. This is the indicator of the country's standard of life.
In Russia this parameter is US 3 thousand, in Baltic countries - US$ 4
thousand, in Poland - US$ 4,5, in Hungary - US$ 7, in Brazil - US$ 6,
Czechia - US$ 10, Slovenia - US$ 11, in Greece, Portugal - US$ 12, in
Spain - US$ 16, in Italy, France, England - over US$ 20, in Germany, Japan,
USA - over US$ 25.

Ten years ago we were in the 30 place on this parameter in the world, and
now we are close to the 70-th place. From six billions of global population,
one billion lives in the countries with gross national product per capita
over 10 thousand dollars. But to enter those ranks, i.e. to increase our
real income by more than three times, we need twenty years at the annual
economic growth of 6 percents. But at the same time, those countries will
also move forward, and to reach their level we'll need not twenty, but over
twenty five years. And in this way, we may only become not the advanced
country, but just to enter the ranks of civilized states. But today we may
talk only about slight recovery of Russia after the August 1998 crisis:
- Soon we'll mark 10 years from the date when Russia went into the
conditions of permanent social-economic crisis (in 1990). Since 1989 the
volume of production of big and middle industries reduced by 2.5 times, the
volume of agricultural production reduced almost twice, investment - twice,
GNP - 1,8 times, and the real income, at least twice. Until August 1998 we
were at the bottom of permanent crisis, and in 1998 this bottom had sunk
down.

The truth is that today on many indicators we are just returning back to the
period prior to August 1998. In any way it is impossible to mention these
parameters as the revival of Russia. It is necessary always to remember the
depth of our fall during the last ten years, or the reduction of production
by two and a half time.

As to the real income per capita, then it's hard to imagine how bad is the
situation. There's no any evident improvement after August 1998. In
September1998 we had minus of 30 percents compare to the September 1997, in
May 1999 - minus 23 percents compare to the May 1998. It is clear for
everybody that in the field of real income per capita we can not expect any
changes to the better. By my evaluations, only in the end of 2001, and only
in conditions of the rigid targeted policy, the standard of living of 1997
can be restored. But it is the most optimistic variant among the
professionals. Other economists believe that it can take place only in five
years. It is bad that the fall of standard of living is accompanied by the
growth of unemployment. In Russia there are 10,5 million unemployed. It is
more than 14 percents of all able population. In Europe this level is around
8 -10 percents, and in USA - 5 percents. Ours 14 percents are already below
the border of good and bad.

The outlook into our future development in many respects depends on the
course of new elected Duma, new president, and new government. From my point
of view, at reasonable economic policy a certain revival of the national
economy may begin already in 2001. I understand revival as the growth of
production at the rate not less than 4 percents per year. When the fall
since 1990 is so great, than the growth of 1-2 percents is a miserable
figure. A parameter of good rise may be 8 percents of production growth. But
for this purpose are required only serious measures. And, first of all, the
solution of three big interconnected problems.

First - it is necessary legally to transfer a significant part of property -
by my evaluations it is half of the property of Russia - from the
inefficient proprietors to the effective ones. Money is necessary for
development of production, and nobody will give it to the inefficient
proprietors. We need a new stage of privatization, but not that stupid one,
which we already had, but something similar to the Thatcher's privatization
in England, or which is going on today in France. It is not a difficult
task, as many portfolios of shares are in hands of the state, and it needs
only a reasonable manager.

The second and more serious point is change of our tax system. We must
remove a heavy tax burden from the enterprises, and to give them an
opportunity to accumulate funds for the production development. But for
changing of the tax laws it is necessary to change all social spheres. Today
our budget pays 70 percents of residential-municipal costs, the budget
completely pays to 38 millions pensioners and etc., etc. We must to raise
salaries in few steps, and introduce full payment by residents for their
housing, to make transition to the personal pension accounts, to introduce
the real health care insurance.

And the third point - it is necessary to restructure all debts of the
enterprises, because it is impossible to ensure any revival and economic
growth with such heavy burden. As for the enterprises, it is necessary to
treat them like the world community treats Russia. Russia also owes much,
but as you may see nobody seizes its property. Our debts are restructured,
and our creditors have agreed to wait. Nobody imposes penalties, but we
impose them on our enterprises. We treat our economy much worse, than the
foreigners treat us.

In the nutshell, the main problem is creation in Russia of such conditions,
which may stimulate development of production. The history knows many cases
of the fast economic growth, like for example in Spain after Franco.
Southern Korea fast entered the number of countries with US$ 10 thousand
dollars GNP per capita. And all these transformations have taken place only
as the result of creation of stimulating economic mechanism.

*******

#7
Date: Tue, 03 Aug 1999
From: DJ Peterson <djp@rand.org>
Organization: RAND, Santa Monica, California
Subject: Re: 3418-Goble, Eberstadt, et al. on Russia's Demographic Crisis

Talk about a "demographic crisis" in Russia is dramatic, but it also may be
misleading.

In 1995, researchers from RAND and the Center for Demography and Human Ecology
(Moscow) undertook a collaborative venture to investigate Russia’s current
demographic patterns. To paraphrase a summary of project conclusions:

• Russia’s current population decline may not be a short-term crisis, but the
continuation or resumption of several long-term trends, such as declining
fertility and high mortality.

• While economic upheaval, has exacerbated the situation, there is no strong
evidence linking these problems with current economic and political reforms. 
Other recent factors may also be at stake: the anti-alcohol campaign of the
1980s, for instance.

• The demographic situation in Russia is not fundamentally different from most
industrial nations—a decreasing population, aging, shifts in family
composition.

• Current demographic trends in Russia clearly impose a greater policy burden
on Russia in areas such as care for the elderly, but alarmist talk of a
"crisis" may be diverting attention (towards, say, getting women to have more
children—a difficult task) and slowing the adoption of more feasible policies
to meet the new realities of economic and family behavior. Indeed, current
demographic trends may be attributable to a delay in serious reforms, such as
those needed for the health-care system.

• Finally, much more research is required to disentangle the effects of
earlier policies, current reforms, and other factors in explaining Russia's
demographic patterns.

For interested researchers, an excellent summary of the project’s findings may
be found at http://www.rand.org/publications/IP/IP162/ and extensive
conference proceedings with reports by Russian experts may be accessed at
http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF124/.

DJ Peterson
Associate Policy Analyst

*******

#8
St. Petersburg Times
August 3, 1999
Hometown Russian Life Offers No Provincial Idyll 
By Anna Badkhen 
Anna Badkhen is a staff reporter with The St. Petersburg Times.

"VOLZHSKY - the town of my fate," reads the sign on Prospekt Lenina, the main 
street of the southern Russian town of Volzhsky. We drive past the sign to my 
mother-in-law's khrushchyovka apartment, which is carpeted wall-to-wall as 
well as floor-to-ceiling - a decorative must in Volzhsky. The town smells of 
blooming lilacs and tulips. 

Andrei and I have lived together in St. Petersburg for four years, but this 
is my first time in his Volgograd region hometown, the first time I meet his 
relatives other than Maria Petrovna, his mother. We ring the doorbell and the 
next thing I know, a stranger tugs me inside by my forearm so hard that I 
almost trip. In no time, I am separated from Andrei and our 2-year-old son by 
the receptive kinsmen, and across rows of southern-style gold teeth I see 
someone pulling my son's moccasins off. My face is wet with kisses. 

Our welcome party coincided with the second anniversary of the death of 
Vladimir, Andrei's older brother. Vladimir died at the age of 34 of a heart 
attack - the same way their father died at 37. Andrei speculates that both 
deaths were triggered by alcohol abuse. 

Despite the family's alcohol-derived tragedies, skyscrapers of booze of all 
kinds overlook the table, which is stocked with salads, bread, homemade 
pelmeny and borshch. Maria Petrovna instructs the guests: "The first two 
shots to Vovka, then we drink to Andrei and his family!" 

The alcohol disappears in no time. 

Volzhsky was built in 1954 across the Volga River from Volgograd to house the 
builders of the Volzhskaya Water Power Plant. Today, the majority of 
Volzhsky's 281,000 residents work at more than 20 factories that refine oil 
and produce everything from tires to organic chemicals. The odors from the 
factories are absorbed by an extraordinary number of trees, which all have 
been hand-planted in this steppe town. 

They drink a lot in Volzhsky. In fact, the town hardly offers any 
entertainment other than booze: Cinemas show outdated movies, palaces of 
culture offer sporadic discotheques; occasionally, soccer fans watch a game 
at the city stadium. After 6 p.m. on weekdays, it is common to see people 
grabbing hold of walls in order not to fall. At lunchtime on weekends, 
couples and trios of drunk men hold onto each other as they stumble down the 
streets in marvelous curves. 

As far as drinking is concerned, Volzhsky women can compete easily with the 
men. Anna Ilyinishna, 54, a neighbor of Maria Petrovna's, dropped by one 
evening, tipsy but firm in her desire to celebrate Andrei's visit with the 
bottle of champagne she had brought and Maria Petrovna's samogon - the 
Russian moonshine made with yeast and sugar - which she expected to be 
offered. After a couple of hours, Anna Ilyinishna insisted that Andrei walk 
her home across the courtyard. When they got out of the building and onto 
what in Andrei's opinion was firm ground, he let go of her arm. Anna 
Ilyinishna tripped and smashed against a nearby tree. She spent the next 
three days in bed with a black eye. 

Born during World War II in Orenburg to a family of exiled Ukrainian 
landowners, Maria Petrovna came to Volzhsky in 1959. She married Andrei's 
father when she was 17. Since the age of 16, she has worked as a telephone 
operator. Although she officially retired five years ago, she still works at 
the same post office, adding $40 a month to her meager pension of about $18. 
In her dacha garden, she grows enough vegetables and fruit to keep her 
supplied through the winter. She dries the fruit on the dacha roof, makes 
dozens of jars of jam and pickles, and uses the garage she inherited from her 
late husband to store carrots and potatoes. She dries her own fish and salts 
her own salo, or pork fat. 

Almost every other household in Volzhsky owns equipment to make samo gon. 
Maria Petrovna places the yeast to ferment in her bathroom, which therefore 
smells strongly of fungus. She makes three liters of the transparent drink at 
a time, and uses boiled sugar to color it a light shade of yellow. It tastes 
like whiskey. 

"How many times a year do you brew?" I asked her as she and two older women 
sat on a bench at the dacha, sipping the 100-proof liquor from shot glasses. 
The three women laughed and the sun reflected off their golden teeth. 

"A year?! You should ask 'how many times a month, dochenka!" she said. "Every 
weekend, I take three liters to the dacha so Aunt Anya and I have something 
to drink." 

In fact, during our week-long stay, Maria Petrovna brewed her moonshine 
twice, and it was consumed instantly by the countless family friends and 
relatives who came to see Andrei and our son. Andrei tried inefficiently to 
stick to beer, and they called him a sissy. I protested that I don't drink, 
and they looked at me with concern. "It's all right. We'll teach you," they 
said. 

The morning after we arrived, we went to the cemetery to visit Vladimir's 
grave. In a town that just celebrated its 45th anniversary, traditions are 
followed almost religiously, and we did the obligatory two shots of moonshine 
at the grave. Vladimir's 9-year-old daughter, Yana, hung bliny on the arm of 
the iron cross. It drizzled, and the meatballs, bread and boiled eggs of the 
traditional repast were soaked with rainwater. 

Maria Petrovna has said that she will never leave Volzhsky because she has 
"graves to look after."

"I can drink an entire bottle of vodka at the cemetery," she says. "I have 
seven graves to drink at, two shots at each grave." 

*******

#9
The Guardian (UK)
4 August 1999
[for personal use only]
Lenin to be buried at last - official 
David Hearst in Moscow

After 75 years in Moscow's Red Square mausoleum, Lenin's mummified remains 
are to be "definitely removed" and buried, President Boris Yeltsin's chief of 
staff says in a newspaper interview today. 

It is the first official indication after 10 years of furious debate that a 
decision has been taken to bury the Bolshevik leader. The move is certain to 
bring large numbers of communist supporters on to the streets, stepping up 
the tension as Russia enters a critical election season. 

Lenin's corpse is the most powerful symbol of the communist era in Russia, 
and burying him would send a strong signal that that era is over. Alexander 
Voloshin, Mr Yeltsin's top aide, would not say when Lenin would be taken from 
the mausoleum. He told the mass-circulation Russian daily Komsomolskaya 
Pravda: "Let me remain meaningfully silent." 

In a sign of the prevailing atmosphere, a former aide to Mr Voloshin, 
speaking on the eve of the publication of the interview, claimed that Mr 
Yeltsin was planning to introduce emergency rule and scrap elections. 

Yesterday morning the mausoleum was still open to the public. Long queues of 
visitors from all over the former Soviet Union have been forming in recent 
weeks, to get a last glimpse of the Bolshevik leader, as rumours have spread 
that he is about to be removed. The visitors fear a rerun of the events of 
1961, when the body of Stalin which had lain beside Lenin's for eight years, 
disappeared overnight on the orders of Krushchev. 

Mr Voloshin said he was sure that the burial of the leader of the 1917 
Revolution would not cause a public protest. He was being more than 
disingenuous, knowing that the move will bring large numbers of communist 
supporters on the streets and split the powerful anti-Yeltsin coalitions 
being formed between centrist nationalist parties in the state Duma. 

The communist leader, Gennady Zyuganov, has already claimed to have prepared 
"emergency measures" when rumours suggested Lenin's body would be taken away 
through a secret tunnel connecting the underground chamber in the mausoleum 
to the Kremlin. 

His party, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, already funds the 
costs of preserving the remains. Mr Zyuganov has been engaging in a war of 
words with the government and the presidential administration, who have been 
dropping hints that they would like to seek an excuse to ban the party 
altogether. 

On his recent visit to Washington, the Russian Prime Minister Sergei 
Stepashin said the communists would never win an election in Russia: "They 
will never come back again. No-one will allow them to do so." 

Mr Zyuganov claimed his comment was a breach of election law. 

Political observers are suspicious at the timing of today's interview. They 
say Mr Yeltsin has been pursuaded by a hardline group of advisers, including 
Mr Voloshin, to create a political crisis in which it will be more difficult 
for powerful anti-Yeltsin coalitions to form. 

********

#10
Christian Science Monitor
4 August 1999
[for personal use only]
On these Russian picnics: take a flashlight
By Judith Matloff

Welcome to a world that gives a whole new meaning to the phrase "underground 
culture." 

A small entrance, on the banks of the Pakhra river 25 miles south of Moscow, 
might be mistaken for a fox den - or the burrow of a large white Lewis 
Carroll rabbit. 

For this is a portal into a Russian Wonderland, where visiting Alices can 
suddenly find themselves in a mélange of a Soho art gallery, a museum of the 
absurd, and an ever-nocturnal wilderness retreat. 

The maze of man-made tunnels carved out of limestone some 200 years ago is 
now the locale of a subculture both literally and figuratively. It's a 
happening, an escape, and an alternative to anything mainstream. 

Spelunkers come here for adventure. Musicians enthuse about the subterranean 
acoustics. Rave artists say the best New Year's parties are thrown down 
under. And some folks come just to get away from the hectic pace of life on 
the surface. "I'm resting from the bad life above," says a man who simply 
calls himself Sergei, sitting contemplatively in the dark on a rock. He says 
he has spent every weekend underground for the past 20 years to get away from 
"chaos." Others come to the cool tunnels to simply escape the summer heat. 

This network has a long and, sometimes dark, history. It was first tunneled 
out in the 18th century to extract stones for Moscow buildings. Since then, 
the man-made caves, known simply as the sistema (or system), have served 
alternatively as a bunker hospital during World War I, a meeting ground for 
clandestine political gatherings under the Soviets, and a garbage dump. 

These days, less-desperate people come here, equipped with flashlights - and 
a sense of whimsy. The walls of the sistema are decorated with modern relics 
collected from the world above. These galleries include highway and traffic 
signs, car license plates, and billboards that hang incongruously on the 
smooth, cool rock faces. They serve to orient meandering explorers as well as 
provide amusement. 

"If you want to check the schedule for the 439 bus to Moscow, you'd most 
likely find it here," says Oleg Bondarenko, a regular visitor to the sistema. 

There are other similar tunnels near Moscow, including some constructed by 
Ivan the Terrible more than 400 years ago to get stone to build the Kremlin. 
This sistema is particularly favored by the bohemian set. But it's not well 
known, even to locals. Here on the banks of the Pakhra river, the picnickers 
and sunbathers on the surface are sometimes surprised to see adult men and 
women slithering out of, or disappearing into, a muddy hole in the earth. 

Sign in here, please 

A blue sign with the Russian word Kassa (cashiers) marks the start of our 
journey. Here cavers sign their names in a log book with joking comments, 
nicknames, and warnings. Someone who goes by the nom de plume "Greenpeace 
Emergency" writes: "I'm sick and tired of oatmeal. I want something else to 
eat." First-time visitors identify themselves in the log book as chainiks or 
teapots, the name given to the novice car drivers, too. 

Further into the tunnel, one walks past signs proclaiming "House for Sale," 
"No Entrance," "How to Use the Elevator." And there's the periodic painted 
advisory "Boom" - a warning not to bump your head. 

The sense of humor extends to the names of the various grottos and galleries 
with such descriptive sobriquets as "Banana Islands," "Hamster Hall," and 
"The Coffin." There is a special room designated as the kitchen, which is 
complete with cupboards. The dining room is equipped with a stone table 
draped with a white table cloth and cups. "I use my torch instead of candles 
for a romantic touch," says Bondarenko. 

The subterranean bedroom has a large rock "bed" that sleeps 12 (fitfully, one 
presumes), and there is even a designated bathroom, which regulars insist is 
hygienic. 

Music that resonates 

The "Flying Room" derives its name from iron radiators that someone suspended 
from wires attached to the rock ceiling. It is here that musicians hold jam 
sessions because, they say, of the unique acoustics. 

The most notorious room is the "Mausoleum," heralded with signs taken from a 
cemetery. First-time visitors are met with the macabre sight of a skeleton 
laid down on a slab of rock. He is dressed in a workman's coveralls and 
boots, and his skull is covered by a gas mask and World War I metal helmet. 

"Everyone calls him Aristarkh, but no one knows who he was," says Bondarenko. 
There are many legends, the most common of which is that he was a soldier who 
deserted his platoon and lost his way while hiding in the cave. 

Nowadays the sistema is a much more sociable place. Two juvenile groups, who 
aren't known for their interpersonal relations on the streets above, visit 
the caves regularly and coexist peacefully here. Bohemians hold annual 
meetings - including humor contests, singing fests, and recitals of poetry. 
Local teenagers come to the place to do what teenagers do. Some people camp 
down here for an entire weekend. 

Among them was a group of five who bounded out of the darkness with miners' 
lamps on their foreheads and camping gear on their backs. 

"This is the max, it is an incomparable activity," enthuses Roman Artyomov. 

The unofficial record for the remaining underground is held by a man who 
claimed to last for more than a month. But it was later reported that he had 
made periodic forages above ground in search of beverages. 

Our foursome had enough of the dankness and stooping in the darkness after 
three hours. Literally spotting a light at the end of the tunnel, we "threw 
ourselves out" as cavers describe the exiting procedure. We crawled on our 
stomachs for the final 15 feet and emerged blinking at the blinding light of 
day. "It's like being reborn," said one member of our group overwhelmed by 
the colors, the sound of birds, and smell of grass. 

*******

#11
Morozov on Primakov's Future

Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy
2 August 1999
[translation for personal use only]

[Presenter] It is 1835 in Moscow [1435 gmt]. 
Good evening. Irina Merkulova is at the studio, and I welcome our guest, 
Oleg Morozov. Good day, Oleg Viktorovich. [Morozov] Good day, Good evening. 
[Presenter] Yes, good day, good evening. Oleg Morozov is coordinator of the 
All Russia movement and leader of the Russian Regions group of deputies [in 
the State Duma]. Oleg Viktorovich, will there be a merger between All 
Russia and [Moscow mayor Yuriy] Luzhkov's Fatherland? 
[Morozov] From the point of view of all the political signs which have 
emerged 
on the Russian political horizon, what has happened in our country, as 
the president went to the Kremlin and as preliminary talks were held -- 
if one collects all these signs together, then it seems that on 4th 
[August] a joint session of the presidium of the All Russia bloc and the 
political council of the Fatherland organization will be held, at which a 
basic decision will be taken to ultimately create a single electoral 
bloc. Naturally, when the elections are announced, this bloc will appear. 
But now we will adopt a basic decision so that we follow that path. So I 
think that this merger will take place on 4th [August]. [Passage omitted: 
Morozov says that there is a need for the merger and that the whole 
country will benefit from this]. 
[Q] How many percent of the votes are you going to get together in 
December 1999 [the parliamentary elections]? 
[A] Luzhkov gave a very good answer to this question. He said more than 
5 percent at the very least. [Passage omitted: Morozov says that, because 
of the five-per-cent barrier in the previous parliamentary elections, 
many votes which were cast in favour of some parties and movements were 
lost. Morozov says that a proper election campaign needs to be launched 
involving prominent figures]. 
[Q] Whom do you mean when you refer to prominent political leaders in 
the country? 
[A] They also include activists in favour of our bloc, such as Yevgeniy 
Maksimovich Primakov. I would like to say clearly, and anticipating your 
question, that at present I have no answer as to whether Primakov will be 
with us or not. That is a subject for further talks. 
[Q] Are you holding talks with him? 
[A] Yes, of course, we are maintaining constant contact with him. 
However, Primakov has already said that, if he joins any political 
construction -- let me use this term -- then firstly, it should be a 
nonradical one. In other words, it should not be far right or far left. 
In other words, it would be of the political centre. Second, among 
potential partners in this case he mentioned Fatherland and All Russia. 
That is why, in my opinion, there is a chance of Primakov becoming our 
political partner, a very great chance, and his ratings are fantastic. 
They are fantastic in the sense that he has not been involved in active 
politics for several months and his ratings are not decreasing, but 
increasing. This also brings up the issue of the niche we occupy, 
All-Russia and Fatherland. We occupy a position of political and economic 
stability. We occupy a position saying we will not be rushing to any 
extremes, and this is the niche which Primakov is objectively occupying 
at present. This soundness and the fact that he is not an extremist and 
the fact that he personifies stability and hope of a stable future, that 
is the image to which we also aspire. That is why we are potentially very 
compatible with Yevgeniy Maksimovich. [Passage omitted: Morozov says that 
the leadership for the merger with Fatherland has not been discussed yet]. 
[Q] St Petersburg governor [Vladimir] Yakovlev said today that [Prime 
Minister] Sergey Stepashin can lead the joint bloc. 
[A] Unless I am mistaken, Yakovlev said something slightly different. He 
said that Stepashin could be one of the leaders of our bloc. I have not 
heard anything about him leading the bloc. Perhaps I am mistaken. The 
whole point is that Stepashin is an extremely worthy partner for our 
bloc, I mean our alliance, Fatherland and All Russia, both in personal 
qualities and in his official capacity as the prime minister. The whole 
point is how to bring Stepashin into our alliance. If we are talking 
about the top job, then there may be a problem with someone else whom we 
have just mentioned, Primakov. There will be a problem: who is in charge 
- Stepashin or Primakov? [Passage omitted: Morozov says that they welcome 
any cooperation from the current Russian premier. All Russia will hold 
its second congress in Ufa on 21st August to decide on partners. Morozov 
defends All Russia, which includes many governors, and says that it is 
quite all right for governors to express their political views] 

********

#12
Stratfor Commentary
www.stratfor.com
0100 GMT, 990804 - Yeltsin Plays Balance of Power Politics in Kremlin

On August 2, Russian President Boris Yeltsin dismissed two top officials – 
Deputy Foreign Minister Yuri Proshin and General Director of the 
Rosovooruzheniye state arms exporting company General Grigori Rapota – from 
their posts. On August 3, Yeltsin also fired his Deputy Chief of Staff Sergei 
Zverev. All three executives were officially dismissed due to their transfers 
to other jobs, though on August 2 on ORT national television, Yeltsin’s 
personal spokesman Dmitry Yakushkin accused Zverev of political posturing. 

Zverev was replaced by Vladislav Surkov. Rapota, who headed Rosovooruzheniye 
since November of 1998, was replaced by Kremlin staffer Alexei Ogaryov. In 
his post, Proshin was in charge of economic issues and headed the main 
production and commercial directorate for the diplomatic corps. His 
replacement has not been announced. Following personnel changes made earlier 
this week, Yeltsin met in the Kremlin with former Prime Minister Viktor 
Chernomyrdin, expressing his interest in Chernomyrdin’s current and future 
political role. This latest Kremlin personnel shuffle and the meeting with 
Chernomyrdin were both aimed at consolidating Yeltsin’s grip on power and 
undermining the two leading presidential candidates and their parties in 
advance of the December 1999 parliamentary and June 2000 presidential 
elections. The moves were textbook Yeltsin balance of power politics. 

Rapota was one of former Prime Minster Yevgeni Primakov’s men. During his 
September 1998 to May 1999 stint as Russia’s Prime Minister, Primakov 
appointed former KGB colleagues to key positions in Russia. Rapota, who had 
worked for the KGB since 1966 as a Western Europe and U.S. agent, was named 
by Primakov in 1993 as the number three man in the Russian intelligence 
service. In November 1998, Primakov succeeded in installing Rapota, although 
he lacked experience in weapons trade, as the head of the arms exports 
monopoly Rosvooruzheniye. Primakov faced serious obstacles in winning the 
Rosvooruzheniye post for Rapota and succeeded only due to his post as a chief 
of the state military-cooperation committee. Rosovooruzheniye’s arms sales 
are a major tool in Russian foreign policy and, as one of the few competitive 
Russian export businesses, the firm is also a useful domestic economic crutch.

Rapota has now been replaced as Rosovooruzhenie head by Alexei Ogaryov, who 
served as Presidential Deputy Chief of Staff in 1997-99 and since February 
1999 as Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council. According to the 
Russian press, Ogaryov is a political ally of Yeltsin’s daughter and most 
trusted advisor Tatyana Dyachenko. By dismissing Rapota, Yeltsin weakened the 
influence of top presidential candidate Primakov and strengthened his own 
grip on power.

By dismissing his Presidential Deputy Chief of Staff, Sergei Zverev, Yeltsin 
undermined the political influence of another strong presidential candidate – 
Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov. Zverev, Yeltsin’s Deputy Chief of Staff in May 
1999, was a former head of MOST Media group and a director of Gazprom Media. 
His dismissal from the post of Deputy Chief of Staff is clearly the result of 
Zverev’s loyalty to Luzhkov, in the current media war between MOST Media 
Group and Luzhkov on one side, and the state controlled ORT TV on the other. 
Early this week, Zverev sent a letter to President Yeltsin, criticizing the 
administration for pressuring the independent media in Russia. Zverev said 
the Kremlin was using tax inspectors against MOST Media in, "a political 
battle," and was, "pushing into opposition," political forces that otherwise 
would support the President. Zverev also charged the Kremlin with 
implementing censorship. Following Zverev’s dismissal, the vacant post has 
been filled by Vladislav Surkov, who held executive positions at ORT TV since 
1998.

By sacking Zverev and Rapota, Yelstin is effectively lessening the political 
influence of Primakov and Luzhkov, two strong presidential contenders who 
have accumulated much popular support. According to the latest presidential 
election polls from July 10 -11, Primakov would lead in the presidential 
elections with 17 percent of the vote, and Luzhkov would finish second with 
13 percent of the vote. Yeltsin is still officially not running for 
reelection, but as a chronically weak leader, he makes it his business to 
keep political stars from rising unless they serve his purpose. Yeltsin likes 
to maintain a balance of power below him, temporarily raising particular 
politicians’ fortunes and exploiting them to carry out his agenda, then 
crushing them after they have served his needs.

In this context, it is interesting that, after sacking Luzhkov and Primakov’s 
men, Yeltsin met August 3 with former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. 
Chrnomyrdin’s premiership lasted from 1992 to 1998, when he was sacked by 
Yeltsin amidst an economic crisis and replaced by Sergei Kiriyenko. Recently, 
Chernomyrdin served as Moscow’s mediator in the Kosovo crisis. During his 
August 3 meeting with Chernomyrdin, Yeltsin reportedly expressed his, "great 
interest," in the role of Chernomyrdin, and said the former Prime Minister 
had a very efficient election team. According to recent polls, however, 
Chernomyrdin is in ninth place in the presidential contest with 2 percent of 
the vote, and his party, "Our Home is Russia," is seventh in the 
parliamentary race with four percent of the vote. Chernomyrdin, therefore, is 
far from having any real chance for a bright political future in Russia, at 
least not if the political future of Russia is to be determined by a popular 
vote. Chernomyrdin, in other words, currently poses a zero political threat 
to Yeltsin. That, together with a common political platform the two 
politicians share, could mean Yeltsin might be considering reviving 
Chernomyrdin’s political career at the expense of Luzhkov and Primakov, at 
least until he finds another feasible candidate for the June 2000 
presidential elections.

*******