Date: Thurs 27 July 05
From: Robert Bruce Ware (rware@siue.edu)
Subject: Chechnya and Dagestan (re Akaev, JRL9211)
I wish to offer a limited reply to Vakhit Akaev, whose article titled “NEW ETHNOGRAPHIC METHODS OR SAME OLD ANTI-CHECHEN PREJUDICES?” appears in the current issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Chechnya Weekly (JRL 9211). Dr. Akaev’s article is a review of Valery Tishkov’s book, Society in Armed Conflict: Ethnography of the Chechen War. Without getting into Dr. Akaev’s critique of Dr. Tishkov’s book, I would like to offer three points of clarification concerning Dr. Akaev’s discussion of remarks by Enver Kisriev about Chechens, which are cited in Dr. Tishkov’s book. I am well acquainted with Enver’s views about Chechens, because Enver and I have co-authored several articles about Dagestan and have discussed the ethnography of the region in considerable depth over a period of several years.
First, Enver is not anti-Chechen. I am in an excellent position to know this since Enver has been strongly critical of my own articles about Chechnya, which is why Enver and I have never published an article about Chechnya together. In fact, Enver has been consistently sympathetic toward Chechens.
Second, the joke that Enver is cited as having told about Chechens is taken out of its cultural context. It’s cultural context is one in which Dagestanis, such as Enver, are routinely telling ethnic jokes about themselves. There are jokes about most of Dagestan’s numerous ethnic groups (including Dagestan’s indigenous Chechen-Akkins), and no one in Dagestan takes any of them very seriously. Among the social functions of humor is the relief of social tensions. With more than 30 ethno-linguistic groups, there are inevitably ethnic tensions in Dagestan, and the multitude of ethnic jokes are a kind of pressure valve. Ethnic jokes are out of fashion in the West, but they are a vibrant part of Dagestani culture, and if we westerners wish to understand the North Caucasus, then we must stop imposing our own cultural preconceptions upon it. What is offensive in one culture is commonplace, or even humorous in another. Dagestanis, who contend with so many cultures, are well aware of this, and that is why they prefer making jokes to taking offense.
For example, here is a Dagestani joke about Lezgins (whose culture emphasizes education) that was told to me by a Lezgin. A man walked into a library and said, “I’m looking for a book about a brave Lezgin.” The librarian replied, “Science fiction is on the second floor.” Avar’s, whose culture traditionally emphasizes boldness and daring, are the topic of other jokes: “An Avar was driving across Makhachkala with a Lak in the passenger seat. When they came to a red light, the Avar hit the accelerator and went speeding through it. “You just ran a red light,” exclaimed the Lak. “Avars don’t stop for red lights,” said the Avar. When they came to the next red light, the same thing happened. But when they came to a green light, the Avar stopped and waited. “Why did you stop?” asked the bewildered Lak. “Can’t you see the light is green.” “Sure,” said the Avar, “but you can’t be too careful, an Avar might be coming the other way.” Dagestanis also tell jokes on themselves collectively. Here’s my favorite: “Only one in five Russians realizes that Dagestan is part of the Russian Federation. The other four sleep peacefully.”
Taken in the context of a culture in which jokes are commonly told about all ethnic groups, there is nothing particularly derogatory in a joke about any ethnic group. On the contrary, ethnic repartee is part of any large Dagestani gathering, and that is something that a visitor to Dagestan must simply accept. Of course, Dr. Akaev’s point is that Dr. Tishkov’s book is not a compendium of Dagestani ethnic jokes, and that the joke about Chechens is therefore presented out of context. Be that as it may, it is only fair to consider Enver’s remarks within their cultural context, which is one in which the sharing of ethnic jokes is routine and non-pejorative.
Thirdly, Dr. Akaev’s account of Enver’s position touches upon a point that deserves more serious consideration, because he has (and I have) presented it in scholarly contexts. Briefly, the argument offers a structural explanation for the relative stability in Dagestan as compared with conflict in neighboring Chechnya, despite the fact that Dagestanis led the Chechens in their resistance to Russian expansionism from 1831 to 1859. Enver’s argument (which I have borrowed) is that Dagestan has been relatively stable because of its five-hundred-year tradition of djamaats, a.k.a. “mountain republics”. A djamaat is a Dagestani village or an historically connected group of villages. Each Dagestani djamaat contains multiple clans (tukhums), whose disputes are mediated by the traditional djamaat council. So Dagestan is relatively peaceful because there is a tradition in which political structures trump kinship structures, such as clans. Now an ethnic group is a kinship structure, just as a clan. So when Dagestan’s thirty-plus ethnic groups were organized within the Russian empire, within the Republic of Dagestan, within the Soviet Union, and within the Russian Federation, all of these larger political structures were, from a Dagestani perspective, essentially the djamaat writ large. Since they were accustomed to settling kinship disputes within overarching political structures, it was relatively easy for them to resolved their numerous inter-ethnic disputes politically, and therefore peacefully, within the political structures of the Republic of Dagestan, the Russian Federation, etc.
By contrast Chechens have a complex multi-tiered social structure. At the bottom is the nuclear family; at the top is the Chechen nation as a whole. Yet the preeminent Chechen social structure is the teip (clan). Chechens have never had an overarching political structure that trumps this multi-tiered kinship structure, and which trumps the powerful teip relations in particular. Hence, in Chechnya, there is no tradition of resolving kinship disputes (such as ethnic disputes) within overarching political structures (such as the Russian Federation). Hence, Chechens found it relatively difficult to settle into the Russian Federation, whereas Dagestanis found it relatively easy.
I should note that some Chechens offer similar explanations for the difficulty of Chechnya’s integration into Russia’s traditionally hierarchical political structures. However, Chechens tend to place the emphasis upon their traditions of egalitarianism and democracy. Certainly these are important, and admirable, traditions in Chechen culture. The theoretical problem with this explanation, however, is that Dagestani highland cultures are equally egalitarian and democratic, yet they have found it much less difficult to integrate into Russian culture. Moreover, in the literature by Chechen social theorists, there has been some discussion of kinship structures as impediments to authoritative political organization, though I know of no Chechen author who makes the same argument as Enver and myself.
Of course, both Enver and I recognize the limitations of structural explanations such as this. We each recognize that the Chechen case is deeply complicated by factors such as the brutal deportation that they suffered in 1944, the devastation of the wars in Chechnya, etc. Yet several other ethnic groups were deported along with the Chechens without spending the last ten years in violent conflict. And of course, some thinkers commit an obvious fallacy when they attempt to explain the Chechen conflicts in terms of the Chechen conflicts themselves (e.g. Chechens are exceptions among their Caucasian neighbors because they were devastated by the wars, and that is the reason why they were involved in the wars). As social theorists, it is necessary for us to attempt to account for the differences between the fates of Chechens and Dagestanis. How else should that be accomplished? I ask this question in all earnestness of Dr. Akaev and anyone else.
Of course, it is unappealing to consider that there may be structural issues in a culture that has suffered as much as that of Chechnya. Yet if there is to be any hope for this tortured region, social theorists, both in Chechnya and abroad, must consider all reasonable explanations.
For my part, I am an American. Living abroad, I have encountered considerable anti-Americanism. In fact, I think it is safe to say that, worldwide, Americans are currently disparaged more than any other national group. Usually, what I hear begins (though it never ends) something like this: Americans are arrogant, uninformed, unsophisticated, and self-absorbed. While I don’t like to hear anti-American sentiments such as these, I have to admit that I think there is an element of truth in such characterizations of American culture. Moreover, I think that America would get into less trouble in the world if Americans would seek the element of truth in criticisms such as these.
For a time, I lived in Germany. I found that many Germans are remarkably self-scrutinizing and self-critical, and I have generally admired them for it. On the other hand, I have been disappointed that the Japanese are not more self-scrutinizing, at least with respect to their role in the second world war. Similarly, there is room for most cultures to be more self-critical and more self-scrutinizing. But having vastly more experiences with cultural differences than most of the rest of us, the Dagestanis are way ahead: they laugh about it all.
I should add that I am hesitant to speak for Enver. He and I generally disagree about many things, and we disagree about Chechnya in particular. But Dr. Akaev’s review was published in my language, not Enver’s. I’m acquainted with Enver’s views, and Dr. Akaev should rest assured that Enver is not anti-Chechen.