RIA Novosti
June 10, 2005
DAGESTAN: A SLEEPING VOLCANO IN A LAND OF ETHNIC CONTRADICTIONS
MOSCOW (Sergei Markedonov for RIA Novosti) - Dagestan, a North Caucasus republic of Russia, has always been in the shadow of neighboring Chechnya, even though it has the power to change the ethnic-political lineup of forces in the region.
In the early 1990s, when the federal center was involved in the standoff between the president and parliament or solving social and economic problems, Dagestan was left to its own devices in the sea of ethnic-political chaos, fighting hard to survive in the race of Russian republics for sovereignty. Refusing to make the choice in favor of separatist or Islamic revolutions, the republic remained in the mainstream of Russian politics and statehood.
Dagestan suffered from all the consequences of the Soviet Union's dissolution, including ethnic and religious extremism and human rights violations. But despite those acute problems, it managed to avoid open conflicts, like the Ossetian-Ingush one, and armed confrontations between rebellious provinces and the federal center.
The Dagestani elite, which was not used to European and American norms of democracy, formulated its own system of checks and balances, adjusting the principles of ethnic representation in the bodies of power and administration to local conditions. Simply put, power in the republic was divided between ethnic clans.
The top of the power pyramid was the State Council, a collegiate body of 14 people who represent the main ethnic groups and were elected by the Constitutional Assembly (242 delegates, 121 of whom are now members of the republican parliament). Its permanent chairman is Magomedali Magomedov, called "Granddad" for his venerable age (74) and political authority.
"Granddad," who is an ethnic Darghinian, successfully acted as the intermediary between the leaders of various ethnic groups, formally respecting the collegiality of power in the republic and the involvement of other Dagestani ethnic groups in it.
The majority of the people confirmed their acceptance of this structure of power at several referendums held in the 1990s. But they refused to see the procedure for choosing the republic's head at a general election as legitimate. The fear of losing their ethnic place in business and administration proved stronger than support for the principle of a general election of the republic's leader.
The three referendums held in Dagestan split the republic along the ethnic border: Most Avars and Laks support the idea of presidency in the republic, while Lezghinians and Darghinians oppose it.
The desire to keep the fragile political and administrative balance on the basis of ethnic representation became a Dagestani talent for governance. It has little in common with the European and American models of democracy but is the most democratic system possible in the republic.
The republic's people firmly believe that the collegiate form of government (even a curtailed one) prevents the monopolization of power and property by an ethnic community. The ethnic elite and the people of Dagestan think that a rejection of ethnic collegiality would lead to a redivison of property, power and administrative benefits and hence plunge the republic into chaos and arbitrariness.
But these achievements of the Dagestani model of power were disregarded in the recent version of a reform of the political and legal system there. It began in 2003, when the Kremlin decided to spotlight the region, which had been neglected for years. Despite the results of the three referendums in Dagestan, it planned a constitutional reform there that stipulated the general election of the republic's president as the main political and legal innovation.
The first presidential election was set for 2006. But the federal authorities abandoned the idea of direct elections of regional heads in 2004, after the Beslan tragedy. The question of what to do with Dagestan and its specific features remained unanswered.
The State Council pretends to provide collegiate governance to the republic, which is actually ruled by its chairman, "Granddad" Magomedov. But it was thanks to this that Dagestan avoided full-scale ethnic conflicts and the split of the republic into ethnic segments in the 1990s. I doubt that the appointment of the republic's head by the federal center will bring political stability to Dagestan. The very fact of such appointment may create conditions for a split of the republic into ethnic segments and revive ethnic movements. The three plebiscites of the 1990s nearly led to such a split, and we can assume that the situation can be recreated again. But the political stake will be much higher this time.
Taking into account the gulf between the authorities and the people, which cannot be bridged by the appointment of republican heads, the people may form groups based on tried and tested models. Such a model in the Caucasus is Islamic radicalism.
If the Kremlin appoints "Granddad" Magomedov to the post, this would have a tranquilizing effect on the ordinary people in Dagestan, who have grown used to his political longevity and managerial style. But Magomedov is a survivor both politically and physically. He is 75 years old, which is not the best age for making a debut appearance in a new political role.
If the Kremlin puts its stakes on some other candidate (Abdulatipov or Makhachev), such a decision may provoke massive ethnic-political fears. Even if we assume that the new broom will refuse to sweep clean, it will take a very long time to convince the people of this. Stability in the republic could be shattered by the introduction of new rules of the game that most Dagestanis do not understand.
Sergei Markedonov, candidate of history, is head of the department of ethnic relations at the Institute of Political and Military Analysis.