#21 - JRL 9097 - JRL Home
Date: Sun 20 March 05
Subject: Response to Brzezinski (Illyas Akhmadov, JRL 9096)
From: Robert Bruce Ware rware@siue.edu

Every few months the Ministry of Propaganda at the Washington Post whips itself into a frothing diatribe so egregious as to require a careful response in order to restore the vestiges of a balanced view. The latest instance, from an author named, of all things, Brzezinski, draws ad nauseum upon all of the usual Washington Russaphobes, and almost nothing else, in order to whitewash Illyas Akhmadov, the self-styled Chechen Republic of Ichkeria’s self-styled “foreign minister”. (“Surrealpolitik: How a Chechen terror suspect wound up living on taxpayers' dollars near the National Zoo” by Matthew Brzezinski, Washington Post 20 March 2005, Johnson’s Russia List #9096). On the basis of distortions, such as those rehearsed in this article, Akhmadov was granted political asylum in the United States last summer, at just about the same time that those he claims to be representing were claiming responsibility for terrorist atrocities in Ingushetia. Yet important questions about Akhmadov’s connection to these and other terrorist acts have never been adequately addressed. I will outline those questions below, and I will publicly ask those questions of Illyas Akhmadov, Matthew Brzezinski, his uncle Zbignew Brzezinski, Glen Howard, Fred Starr, and all of the others cited in Brzezinski’s article. Then, by way of illustration, I will briefly address a couple misrepresentations more or less randomly selected from Brzezinski’s article.

On August 2 and September 5, 1999, the Russian Republic of Dagestan was invaded by about 2,000 terrorists from al-Qaeda-connected bases in Chechnya. Dozens of innocent Dagestani men, women, and children were murdered. According to figures furnished by the UNHCR, 32,000 people were driven from their homes. The invasions were potentially genocidal in that they exposed to direct attack the entire ethnic territories, and all villages, inhabited by some of Dagestan’s smaller ethno-linguistic groups, such as the Andis. During these months Illyas Akhmadov was serving as Chechnya’s foreign minister. He did not resign from that position. I have been able to find no evidence that Akhmadov issued any public statement repudiating the invasions of Dagestan during the six weeks that they were in progress. During interviews with Dagestanis since that time, I have been able to find no one in Dagestan who is aware of any public statement issued either by Illyas Akhmadov or Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov repudiating the invasions while they were in progress, let alone offering to assist the people of Dagestan in resisting them.

Throughout August and September 1999, the Russian Federal Government negotiated with the Chechen government regarding at least three points: a) the extradition of the leaders of the invasion of Dagestan, such as Shamil Basayev, b) the closure of terrorist training camps in Chechnya, and c) the renunciation of terrorism by the Chechen government. Illyas Akhmadov was a principal negotiator for the Chechen side. On September 29, 1999, Vladimir Putin publicly placed these three requests to Aslan Maskhadov, whose foreign policy Illyas Akhmadov was representing at the time. Maskhadov refused the three requests. Once again, Illyas Akhmadov did not resign his position, but chose to continue as Maskhadov’s representative.

In the months after 9/11, President George Bush made essentially these same three requests of the Taliban government in Afghanistan. That is, President Bush requested that Taliban officials should extradite Al Qaeda leaders, close their terrorist training camps, and renounce terrorism. When Taliban leaders refused those requests the United States declared the entire Taliban government to be a terrorist organization, and launched an invasive war against them. We Americans can easily imagine how we would feel if we were to discover that Mullah Omar, or any other important Taliban official, had been granted political asylum in Russia.

Now here are my first questions for Illyas Akhmadov, the Brzezinski clan, Glen Howard, Fred Starr, and everyone else cited in the Brzezinski article: If the United States was correct to declare the entire Taliban government a terrorist organization, then why isn’t the Russian government correct to declare Chechen government, including Aslan Maskhadov and Illyas Akhmadov, to be a terrorist organization? If we would think it wrong of Russia to grant political asylum to Mullah Omar, then why do we not think that it is wrong for the United States to grant political asylum to Illyas Akhmadov? Why didn’t Illyas Akhmadov resign from the Chechen government when Dagestan was invaded? Why didn’t Illyas Akhmadov resign from the Chechen government when Aslan Maskhadov refused to extradite the leaders of the invasion of Dagestan? During the months of August and September 1999, Illyas Akhmadov was shuttling between Moscow and Grozny in order to negotiate these points with Russian officials. During those months did Illyas Akhmadov personally refuse, or convey refusals, of requests such as these? Exactly what record is there that Illyas Akhmadov ever issued a public statement repudiating the invasions of Dagestan while those invasions were in progress, or supporting the extradition of the invasions’ leaders?

Brzezinski’s article describes a meeting between Illyas Akhmadov and Shamil Basayev toward the end of 1999, and describes their exchange of casual remarks. It does not suggest that Illyas Akhmadov ever condemned Shamil Basayev for his invasions of Dagestan, that he sought to secure Basayev’s punishment, or that he supported Basayev’s extradition to Russia.

The invasions of Dagestan were not the last terrorist act connected with Aslan Maskhadov and those who claimed to represent him. On June 22, 2004, terrorists staged a series of raids in the Republic of Ingushetia. The terrorists had no military targets. Instead they killed approximately 60 police officials and 40 civilians, some of whom were hacked to death. The terrorists took approximately 20 hostages. Three weeks later Aslan Maskhadov publicly claimed responsibility for the Ingushetia raids.

When Osama Bin Laden killed police officers and civilians in the World Trade Center no one hesitated to level charges of terrorism against him, his organization, and all who supported it. When Timothy McVeigh killed law enforcement officials and civilians in a blast in Oklahoma City, no one hesitated to call him a terrorist.

Here are my further questions for Illyas Akhmadov, the Brzezinski clan, Glen Howard, Fred Starr, and everyone else cited in the Washington Post article: If the 9/11 made Bin Laden a terrorist, and if the Oklahoma City blast made McVeigh a terrorist, then why didn’t his public acceptance of responsibility for the Ingushetia raids make Aslan Maskhadov a terrorist? And if his public acceptance of responsibility for those raids made Maskhadov a terrorist, then why doesn’t it implicate those who represented him, such as Illyas Akhmadov, in charges of terrorism? And if it does make Illyas Akhmadov a terrorist then why is he enjoying political asylum and a prestigious professional position at the expense of the American taxpayer? Why are people like the Brzezinski clan, Glen Howard, Fred Starr, Ted Kennedy, John McCain, Frank Carlucci, Madeline Albright, James Woolsey, etc., concerned about the suffering of civilians in Chechnya, but not concerned about the suffering of civilians in Dagestan and Ingushetia? Why are they concerned only about the suffering of only those North Caucasians who are fighting the Russians?

I understand that Matthew Brzezinski will be answering questions about the Washington Post article on Tuesday March 22, and I would genuinely like to know his response to these questions at that time, or at some point prior to that time.

I must add that I understand concerns that Illyas Akhmadov might not receive due process in Russia. That is why I argued prior to his reception of political asylum that he should be quietly urged to slip out of the United States to some third country. Now that he has been granted political asylum this does not appear to be an option.

I cannot conclude without drawing some attention to the numerous distortions and misrepresentations contained in Brzezinski’s article. Consider the following: “…Putin accented the run-up to his 2000 presidential bid by launching a second military campaign in Chechnya.” Sorry, but Putin defended the people of Dagestan against terrorist attacks. After Maskhadov refused Putin’s extradition request in September 1999, Putin did almost exactly what President Bush did to protect American citizens in the autumn of 2001. Following the invasions from Chechnya, Dagestani officials requested Russian federal assistance on more than one occasion, and people throughout Dagestan responded warmly and appreciatively to federal troops who fought on their behalf. Survey research that I conducted throughout Dagestan in March and April of 2000 showed that the overwhelming majority of Dagestanis considered the most serious external threats as coming not from Moscow, but from Chechnya. When asked who they would trust in a crisis, by far the largest block of Dagestanis (approximately two thirds of the 1001 respondents) named Russian federal officials. Everyone of Dagestan’s 14 principal ethnic groups, including (by a slight margin) Dagestan’s indigenous Chechen Akkiins (who, by the way, have remained unmolested by federal troops throughout recent hostilities) said that desired closer relations with Russia.

Here’s another misleading passage, selected more or less at random from Brzezinski’s Post article: “While realpolitik arrangements similar to the one with Putin were concluded after 9/11 with various regional dictators, military strongmen and warlords deemed critical to the war on terror, the consequences of the White House seal of approval arguably have been most apparent in Russia….. And in Chechnya, where the Kremlin has ensured that there are virtually no outside observers, Putin, by most accounts, has elevated the scale of violence as a growing number of insurgents are adopting terrorist tactics in retaliation.”

Throughout his article, Brzezinski cynically assumes that U. S. policy on Chechnya is based upon “realpolitik arrangements” between Washington and Moscow, and not upon the sort informed considerations that I have outlined above. While this cynical assumption is ubiquitous in the American media, it has never been substantiated. How can journalists like Brzezinski be certain that U. S. policy on Chechnya is not based upon the sort of balanced view of the issue that articles such as his continuously ignore?

At the end of the same paragraph, Brzezinski tells us that “the Kremlin has ensured that there are virtually no outside observers” in the region. I am an outside observer who visited this region regularly during the years that the Russians pulled out, from 1997 to 1999, and one thing that I observed was that there were no other outside observers. The reason that there were no outside observers was because the Chechnya-based hostage industry was targeting foreigners for kidnapping and mutilation. As a consequence, the region was abandoned by nearly all outside observers, including nearly all journalists, nearly all academics, and all major relief and rights organizations. They did not return until the end of 1999, when their safety once again could be guaranteed by the Russian military. But then they did not busy themselves documenting the massive and horrific human rights abuses that occurred during their absence. Instead they reported only the abuses committed by the Russians, which were also massive and horrific.

Apart from his enjoyment of a few beers with Illyas Akhmadov and the strong anti-Russian sentiments that have come to be associated with his family’s name, there is no indication that Matthew Brzezinski has any basis for understanding any of this. Illyas Akhmadov does not appear to be in any position to instruct him, nor to instruct any other American. Akhmadov should be asked to leave the United States as soon as possible.

Robert Bruce Ware
Associate Professor of Philosophy
Southern Illinois University Edwardsville.