#16 - JRL 9085 - JRL Home
From: Eugene Ivanov (eugene_ivanov@comcast.net)
Subject: RE: Maskhadov’s death is a boost to Chechenization
Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2005

Those who believe that Aslan Maskhadov’s killing was a mistake because he was a “moderate” – or that he was killed because he was a “moderate” – are missing a larger point. From the Kremlin’s perspective, being a “moderate” or a “radical” in Chechnya hardly matters. What does matter is being pro- or anti-Moscow. Pro-Moscow “radical” Ramzan Kadyrov and “moderate” Alu Alkhanov are both perfectly acceptable as long as they fit into the Moscow’s formula to solve the Chechen conflict, a recipe known as “Chechenization.“

Maskhadov was a mortal threat to “Chechenization,” and not because he was a “moderate” or a “radical.” He was dangerous because in the eyes of many Chechens and in the West, he was a more legitimate leader of Chechnya than Moscow-backed Alkhanov. In 1997, Maskhadov became a President of Chechnya in what appeared to be a reasonably fair election and was even congratulated by Boris Yeltsin. Moscow dismissed him when the Russian troops re-entered Chechnya in 1999. Maskhado! v was the last separatist leader – assassinated in Qatar last year Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev being perhaps second to last – who could claim an aura of legitimacy to his leadership. No one among the crowd of succeeding rebel commanders and their representatives in the West can claim the same. Maskhadov’s death is therefore leaving the head of the pro-Moscow Grozny administration, Alu Alkhanov, as the only viable political figure in Chechnya whose standing was somewhat endorsed by a popular support, however questionable. This is something the Moscow’s version of “Chechenization” apparently lacked in the past.

Death of Aslan Maskhadov will not end the military resistance part of the Chechen separatism. But it may well spell out the end of the “political opposition” part of it.