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Moscow Times
March 10, 2005
With Maskhadov, Hope Dies
By Yulia Latynina

Aslan Maskhadov was killed in Chechnya. He was killed by the FSB's special forces, despite Deputy Chechen Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov's repeated assurances that he was about catch Maskhadov any day now. This makes sense: Chechens don't kill other Chechens to help out the Russians.

Then again, there are rumors circulating among Moscow Chechens about exactly how Maskhadov was killed. Apparently, he was talking to Kadyrov about turning himself in and had gone to the Chechen town of Tolstoy-Yurt for talks. The feds intercepted their radio exchange and decided to conduct a special operation. These rumors are wrong, more likely than not. Maskhadov was indeed seeking peace, but with the Kremlin and with Russia, not with the pro-Moscow puppet regime of Kadyrov and Chechen President Alu Alkhanov. Yet the rumors got it wrong in a very telling way: They show Maskhadov in an unflattering light and make the federal authorities look bad, but they make Kadyrov look extremely good.

Maskhadov's death was a huge propaganda victory for the Kremlin. But the death of the president of Ichkeria will not end the war in Chechnya, just as the death of former Chechen president Dzhokhar Dudayev didn't stop the fighting. Because no war that is being waged by the people will end when one of the representatives of the people dies. Moreover, now that Maskhadov, a former Soviet army colonel, is gone, there is no one left among the separatists who wants to hold talks with Russia and who will work within the Western -- or at the very least Russian -- framework.

From the point of view of military tactics, Maskhadov's death has left the Russians in a less-than-favorable position.

The second Chechen war is not merely a war of Chechen against Russian. It is also a civil war of Chechen against Chechen. It began before the invasion of Dagestan in 1999. It began inside Chechnya itself. It began because Maskhadov could not keep control of field commanders or stop the increasingly popular Wahhabis from fighting with proponents of more traditional forms of Islam. Maskhadov was not able to prevent this war and did not want to take part in it.

When top mufti and deceased Chechen President Akhmad Kadyrov, a believer in traditional Sufi Islam, began demanding that Maskhadov get rid of Wahhabis like warlord Shamil Basayev, Maskhadov replied that he wasn't about to start a civil war. So Akhmad Kadyrov went over to the Russians because as someone used to ruling the hearts, minds and pocketbooks of the faithful, he found the Wahhabis far more terrifying than the Russians.

Maskhadov had legitimacy, but he didn't have enough strength. He could not manage the field commanders while at the same time acting as president of Chechnya. He was a symbol of the resistance, but not its driving force. His death will give field commanders an excellent excuse to band together in a very real way.

However, the strategic consequences of his death could prove even more dangerous.

Russia is successfully fighting the separatists.

Once upon a time, it battled them successfully in Chechnya. Now it is successfully fighting separatists all across the North Caucasus.

In the past, Russia fought Chechen field commanders. Now it is fighting Wahhabi jamaats, or religious cells. What began as a civil war in Chechnya has now turned into a holy war across the entire North Caucasus.

Field commanders and their guerrillas are a kind of military organization. Jamaats are a way of life. Field commanders can't gather and elect a president of the North Caucasus, for example. Jamaats, in contrast, can get together and choose a Wahhabi imam for the North Caucasus. Whether that imam will be Basayev or someone else is a question of secondary importance.

The Kremlin has not killed a separatist leader. The Kremlin has killed Russia's last hope of maintaining control over the North Caucasus.

Yulia Latynina, who hosts a talk show on Ekho Moskvy, contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.