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RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly
Vol. 5, No. 7, 18 February 2005
DEBUNKING THE CASE AGAINST PUTIN'S AUTHORITARIANISM
By Gordon Hahn
Gordon Hahn is a visiting scholar at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies.
Copyright (c) 2005. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036. www.rferl.org

Russia watchers have become engaged in a contentious debate over whether President Vladimir Putin's form of rule constitutes a qualitative break from the nature of the regime extant under his predecessor, President Boris Yeltsin. Some argue that Putin's regime is not fundamentally different and that both his and his predecessor's rule were authoritarian. Others argue that Putin has halted and reversed the democratization process and dismantled nascent democratic institutions to such an extent that a transition of sorts has occurred from a weak, perhaps "managed" democracy to a regime that is essentially authoritarian.

Ironically, those who espouse the former view include some who earlier claimed that Yeltsin's rule was undemocratic. Those who support the latter view never qualify their charge against Putin's authoritarianism, and sometimes use such terms as "dictatorship," "autocratic," and "police state" to characterize Putinism.

In fact, the truth lies somewhere between these two views but closer to the latter: Putin's system is neither democratic nor staunchly authoritarian. Just as Yeltsin's democracy was properly framed by considerably qualifying terms such as "weak," "limited," "illiberal," or "managed," Putin's new order should be qualified as a soft, pluralist authoritarianism. At least four major points made by those who refute Putin's authoritarianism need to be debunked.

I. Restricting independent media. The argument against the view that Putin has eviscerated free media in Russia usually consists of three points: (1) there is an abundance of print media free, willing, and able to criticize the president and his policies; (2) there is still criticism of Putin on television; and (3) under Yeltsin the media were not free, as they were dominated by the oligarchs.

On the first point: It is true that there is an abundance of print media, but the overwhelming majority of publications are completely devoid of political content. Political publications have extraordinarily low print runs and even lower real circulations. Thus, most Russians, like most people in most modern societies, obtain their news primarily from television, the true "mass" media.

Second, criticism of Putin on Russian television is rare and, as such, it is usually noteworthy. Criticism of Putin's opponents, on the other hand, is pervasive and routine. The elimination of talk shows with high-profile and charismatic hosts is part of an effort to cleanse the political space of any opinion and of political leaders independent of the Kremlin who might rally a challenge to the ruling elite. Scattered talk remains, but potential action is preempted, providing limited pluralism of opinion and only the appearance of freedom and democracy.

Third, the charge that Yeltsin quashed free media is simply false, and, moreover, if true would still not refute the authoritarian nature of Putin's limitations on free mass media. In fact, the oligarchs were not a united force and owned competing channels with opposing views that, in turn, differed from those of state-controlled television. The pluralism of television ownership guaranteed a pluralism of views, however manipulated and at times co-opted by Yeltsin. Under Putin, the much smaller space for alternative views and criticism of the authorities does not approach the level of democracy, but suffices merely to offer the illusion of press freedom.

II. Repressing opposition parties. The case against this point is that the opposition itself, communist and democratic alike, is to blame for their recent electoral failures. Debunking this point in part requires going back to the first. The authorities' hegemony (not monopoly) over the media enables it to discredit the opposition, while the opposition is afforded little opportunity either to advertise its views or challenge those of the Kremlin. More importantly, there is the regime's use of administrative resources -- financial and infrastructural resources, the tax police and other forms of police pressure, the election commissions, and the courts -- to disadvantage or remove opposition candidates from the field.

Here, the limited nature of Putin's authoritarianism is evident in the absence of a ban or crackdown on political parties. The barrier for admission to the Duma has simply been raised to 7 percent, and opposition parties' vote tallies are tamped down through administrative resources, dirty political technologies, and the limited falsification of results. Although many of these tactics were seen under Yeltsin, they were not practiced on such a grand scale.

III. De-federalization. The case is usually made against this by focusing on one aspect of Putin's federative counterreforms, rather than looking at them together and assessing their cumulative effect on federalism and democracy. These include: the creation of the extra- or unconstitutional federal districts and their coordination of the application of administrative resources; the emasculation of the Federation Council by having senators appointed by governors and regional legislatures under the pressure of the Kremlin's wielding of administrative resources and kompromat; the abandonment of federal-regional, power-sharing treaties; the re-centralization of lawmaking by requiring regional laws to comply with federal law; and, most recently, the presidential appointment of regional governors with the limited check of the regional legislatures' power to confirm the president's nominee. This last move means that now Putin will have strong indirect influence on the Federation Council, which as the federal parliament's upper house is supposed to perform the function of balancing the executive branch's power. Taken together, these changes amount to the dismantling of most of Yeltsin's nascent federative system and a considerable backsliding in Russia's democratization process.

Again, the limits of Putin's soft authoritarianism are reflected in the regional parliaments' role in appointing half of the Federation Council's senators and confirming the president's gubernatorial nominees. It should be acknowledged that this is a significant restraint on presidential power. Certainly, no Russian tsar and no CPSU general secretary would have countenanced such an inconvenience and potential obstacle to his or her arbitrary exercise of power. However, this limitation hardly warrants the nomenclature "democracy."

IV. Creating an autocratic presidency. The case against this criticism of Putinism is that under Yeltsin there was a super-presidential system and that many of today's critics of Putin's hegemonic presidentialism remained silent then. Countering this point again requires going back to prior points. The de-democratization of Russian elections and the suppression of opposition parties have secured a compliant Duma majority of the pro-Kremlin Unified Russia party, which takes its marching orders from the presidential administration. Not even the party's own leaders determine the party's positions. Putin, presidential-administration head Dmitrii Medvedev, and deputy presidential-administration head Vladislav Surkov do. Under Yeltsin, the Duma was dominated by an oppositionist Communist Party and was able to block numerous (albeit, often desirable) legislative initiatives.

V. The siloviki. One charge that Putinism's defenders rarely try to refute is that the notorious siloviki function without any civilian control except for the president. There has been little civilian control, and with the subordination of the legislature to the president, there can be none. The lack of parliamentary oversight explains in part the ability of the law-enforcement organs to run roughshod over the rights of average citizens and, especially, the citizens of Chechnya. The scope of law enforcement's arbitrariness is writ large in the case of the police marauding in Blagoveshchensk on 10-14 December, an incident in which as many as 1,000 people were allegedly detained, assaulted, and even raped by police.

The subordination of the Federation Council has secured the compliance of the upper house, completing the submission of the federal parliament to the presidential executive. The restrained character of Putin's authoritarianism is shown here in the existence of legislative bodies that discuss, debate, and often make minor amendments to legislative bills submitted by the executive.

In sum, the claim that Putin's system is democratic is weak and does not hold water. That said, we should be careful not to exaggerate, as many do, the depth and aggressiveness of Putin's authoritarian system. It is still a hybrid regime to a considerable extent. Similarly, persisting in the characterization of Putin's order as managed or some other form of democracy lets him off the hook for dismantling much of Russia's democratic infrastructure and may encourage him to go further down that road. A precise calibration and characterization of Putin's regime could facilitate, in tandem with a well-measured mix of policy carrots and sticks, turning him or his successor back toward democracy.