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RIA Novosti
February 11, 2005
THE CAUSES OF POLITICAL STABILITY
MOSCOW (RIA Novosti political commentator Yury Filippov)

The no-confidence vote in the Russian Cabinet, which was initiated by the Communist faction in the State Duma, ended in defeat, but not only in the sense of its numerical result, as the outcome of the voting was predictable. Most importantly, though, the opposition failed to move the discussion on replacing benefits in-kind with cash, a reform that has ended the social policy the country has pursued for decades (including Soviet times), to the political plane.

During the State Duma session, deputies mostly talked about the government's technical and organizational errors, without paying any particular attention to the overall failure of the government's policy to replace the benefits in-kind. The conclusion is although the social reform still faces a number of obstacles, it will be probably impossible to politicize it in the future.

Why? First of all, because in contrast to many other reforms in Russia that were launched but never completed, for example the pension and the natural monopolies reforms, the current reform was prepared thoroughly, at least in economic terms.

In the last five years, Russia has run a well-balanced budget surplus. The state's overall revenues have been steadily growing. The taxation system is working efficiently and the system of tax payments has been tuned well. The country now has the Stabilization Fund, which will soon have accrued $30 billion owing to the super profits of raw material exports. In times of a social crisis, the state can rely on guaranteed sources of financing to eliminate a possible deficit of funds to conduct the benefit reform.

The political aspect of the reform is also very important. It would not be an exaggeration to point out that President Putin has been preparing for this reform in his five years in office. During that time, he has managed to create political instruments and institutions that allow him to govern and control effectively socio-political processes while preserving political stability in the country. As a rule, Mr. Putin's predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, would simply approve the proposals and programs of liberal ministers without bothering to monitor their implementation. The creation of daring liberal programs under Mr. Yeltsin turned into a form of state activity and helped many bureaucrats forge brilliant careers. However, most of those programs remained on paper. The state apparatus was in such dismal shape that it was simply unable to ensure their implementation.

Today, the situation is drastically different. Government officials and Duma deputies mostly complain that the population took the idea of the benefit reform in the wrong way, and the reformers have not put forward clear explanations or effective information support. However, nobody doubts that the state will be able to implement the reform.

In addition, the reform has solid legislative support. Contrary to reformist legislation in the 1990s, which often suffered from half-measures because it was the result of "shadow deals" and compromises between left- and right-wingers in parliament, the current constitutional 307-vote majority of pro-presidential United Russia allows parliament to adopt laws proposed by the government without distorting the original ideas contained in the drafts.

As to the Cabinet, Mr. Putin's reshuffle last spring eliminated any possibility of opposition to the benefit reform. For example, prior to being dismissed as premier, Mikhail Kasyanov openly expressed his doubts to the State Duma about doubling GDP in ten years, the goal set by Mr. Putin in his address to the Parliamentary Assembly. Following these comments, analysts started to consider the possibility that Mr. Kasyanov would lose his position and become a political counterweight to the president, one able to rival Mr. Putin at the next presidential election.

Such schemes are absolutely impossible in the current situation. Mr. Putin conducts regular meetings with the Cabinet members responsible for implementing the benefit reform. He sets operational tasks and demands that government officials carry them out without a hitch. If any of the Cabinet members is dismissed (for example, a group of United Russia deputies has called for the resignation of Health and Social Development Minister Mikhail Zurabov, who, in their opinion, committed grave mistakes in the implementation of the reform), it will be a simple technical correction rather than a drastic change in policy. A less successful administrator might be easily substituted with a more effective one, but it will be regarded as a pragmatic move rather than a political measure.

Mr. Putin has also applied mechanisms of political stabilization to the regional level. At the end of last year, the Duma adopted a law on the appointment of regional governors. The new legislation envisions that the president will submit gubernatorial candidates to regional parliaments for approval. In the past, they were elected by direct popular vote.

Seven to eight years ago, when Russia was tackling the problems of macroeconomic stabilization, a wave of protests against wage arrears swept the country. In some regions, governors, who owed their mandates to electorate rather than the president or regional deputies, literally led the columns of protesters. Today, many governors, facing the task of implementing the benefit reform without serious delays, are searching for sources of financing and are attempting to explain social policies of the government to the population. They are the stabilizers of the situation rather than instigators of social tensions.

The Russian opposition, both radical and leftwing-patriotic, has been put in a difficult situation. After the December 2003 parliamentary elections, the opposition forces have been politically marginalized by the pro-Kremlin United Russia, and the current crisis of the social reformhas given them a perfect opportunity to increase their political authority. However, nothing has happened so far. The right-wingers keep silent because the replacement of benefits in-kind with money is their major goal. They talked about the reform throughout the 1990s, but never attempted to implement it. The left-wingers and the nationalists try to protest, but they are split by internal conflicts and their reputation is blemished by compromises with authorities during the last decade (the above-mentioned "shadow deals" and compromises). In essence, even the most radical criticism of the social reform from Homeland nationalists mostly contains demands to make certain corrections to the process. In any case, it deals with technicalities and tactics rather than with goals or strategies.

It is the president who determines strategy in today's Russia. By positioning himself in the world and in Russia as a right-centrist politician, Mr. Putin presses forward his policies with support of the state mechanism he has carefully created. This mechanism has served as a reliable guarantor of political stability in Russia and is so far continuing to work without serious failures.