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#13 - JRL 9050 - JRL Home
Subject: A Question for Your Readership [re: Yeltsin, Putin selection, Stephasin, Presidential Immunity, party politics, Chechnya]
From: Ethan Burger <ethansb@american.edu>
Date: Sat, 5 Feb 2005

Dear David:

I have never read a detailed explanation of the decision-making process by which President Yeltsin replaced Sergei Stepashin with Vladimir Putin as Prime Minister -- I don't think that either Matthew Evangelista or Anatol Lieven has addressed the topic (but I have not read all their works).

A story I have heard from several sources was that Yeltsin met separately with Stepashin and asked him the following questions:

1) How did he read the presidential immunity clause in the Russian Constitution? Did it apply to the president for life? Did it apply to his family? If so, how is the term "family" understood?

2) Was he willing to lead a pro-presidential party in the upcoming State Duma elections and actively campaign?

3) How should the escalating situation in Chechnya be dealt with?

Stepashin allegedly responded to the effect:

1) While he would need to review the Russian constitution, his understanding was that only the President enjoyed the immunity, though it was for life.

2) Stepashin declined organizing a pro-presidential party stating that his non-party affiliation permitted him to work with all parties and factions and that if he were a member (much less head) of a single party, it would have a negative influence on his effectiveness.

3) Given his experience as the head of the MVD, he felt that Chechnya was a morass. While it might make sense to occupy northern Chechnya up to the Terek River (which could provide a defensible physical line that could be held without a large military commitment or risk significant casualties on either side), he opposed a full-scale war that would involve occupying Grozny or other population centers.

Needless to say, these were not the responses that Yeltsin and his inner circle wanted to hear. At a subsequent meeting of officials involved with policy towards Chechnya, Putin allegedly took out his pistol calling for decisive military action. He was soon named Prime Minister.

I would be very interested to know in the course of anyone's research, whether they have heard a similar meeting. The above description may be apocryphal, but it is not altogether unbelievable.

Thank you,

Ethan S. Burger, Esq.
Scholar-in-Residence
School of International Service
Adjunct Associate Professor, Washington College of Law
American University
4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20016