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TITLE: POLITICAL ANALYSTS SERGEI KARAGANOV AND LILIA SHEVTSOVA ON RUSSIA-US ANTI-TERROR COOPERATION
[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, P. 1, 5, SEPTEMBER 2, 2004]
SOURCE: FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE (http://www.fednews.ru/)

OUTSIDE HELP, OR THE CRISIS OF GREAT-POWER MENTALITY

Leading Political Scientists on the International and Internal Policy Aftermath of the Terrorist Acts in Russia

The US has officially expressed its readiness to help Russia in fighting terrorism. Can one expect a closer cooperation with the West in this area in the wake of the latest terrorist acts? What exactly will be the shape of foreign assistance? What concessions will Moscow have to make in return? We put these questions to noted political scientists: Sergei Karaganov, President of the Foreign and Defense Policy Council, and Lilia Shevtsova, senior expert with the Moscow Carnegie Center.

Sergei Karaganov: Differences and Mutual Suspicion Remain

Q: Sergei Alexandrovich, can we accept American help and if so, in what form? Russian special services are clearly short of experience in detecting Arab terrorist organizations, while the US has already got such experience.

A: Until recently, it was the Americans who were thought to be short of experience while we had more experience and we were anxious to share it with others. True, our experience was not taken into account and that is why the Americans find themselves in such a plight in Iraq. It's another question that exchange of experience is necessary, just like exchange of information between special services. Such exchanges are taking place. But the special services, both Russian and American, even in spite of political directives from their leaders, are cooperating reluctantly and are afraid to disclose their sources of information. This has been a general problem for many years. Perhaps now that it is clear that practically everyone suffers from terrorism almost every day, some of these obstacles will be overcome. In general, Russian-American cooperation is not as effective as it could be because though grand decisions are taken they are not fulfilled at the lower level. No permanent structures have been created while some are only in the process of being created. The bureaucracies in the two countries still view each other with a good deal of suspicion, an attitude that is a hangover of the Cold War. The old stereotypes are still in the way and from my observations our side is afflicted more severely: over here anti-Americanism is much stronger than anti- Russian sentiments in the States.

Q: But Washington is known to take a very critical view of Russia's policy in Chechnya. Just recently statements were made that practically denied recognition to the latest presidential elections in the republic. Given such a position, can the Americans really help us to fight the Chechen separatists?

A: First, we are also critical of the Americans over what they are doing in Iraq. And secondly, more often than not such statements appear not so much in connection with the situation in Chechnya as in connection with differences in other areas. For instance, America is unhappy because Russia is not contributing to reducing oil prices.

Q: So, the public position on Chechnya does not mean that the Americans will not help us, for example, to expose the organizations that finance Chechen resistance?

A: Only a few years ago cooperation in this sphere was minimal. Now it is much stronger simply because the same organizations that finance Chechen separatists -- mainly Wahhabi, Saudi and other funds -- finance all the other terrorists.

We have found that we do have common interests up to a point. Of course, the situation is not ideal. I repeat, there are differences and mutual suspicions. But change is already visible. In order to secure Russia's support of the Bush policy in Iraq, the Americans have pointedly dissociated themselves from Saakashvili and his actions. This despite the fact that the American officialdom has traditionally backed Georgia. The Georgian leader has put everyone on their guard by his unpredictability. And when Saakashvili started provoking a conflict and turned to the Americans, he got what the Americans call a "cold shower".

Q: If the US makes a more substantial contribution to Russia's battle, can it expect Moscow to reciprocate? For example, it has been hinted that Russia may send troops to Iraq, even concrete divisions have been mentioned.

A: There have been no official hints. So far, this is ruled out for Russia. As for the theoretical possibility of preparing military units and shipping weapons and sending military advisers, that is possible, but only under the UN aegis. As for the strange rumors about three divisions for operations in Iraq..., may I ask, where are these three divisions that are in constant combat readiness and are capable of fighting in Iraq? Does anyone have such divisions except the US?

Q: Nevertheless, the anti-terrorist coalition, which includes both Russia and the US, still exists de jure. Can it be expected to get a further political impetus in the current situation?

A: Yes, such an impetus will certainly be given. But not until after the US elections. Before the elections, Washington has only one concern, and that is to conduct the elections. So, all the statements of the US administration will be connected with electioneering. Criticism of Russia will continue, but in a soft form.

Lilia Shevtsova: The Regime Can't Cope with the Disease That Is of Its Own Making

Q: Can the Russian state crush terrorism by itself?

A: I think the answer is no and it doesn't even need detailed arguments. The system and the regime cannot cope with the disease which they have generated themselves. Obviously, a change of personalities, a change of leaders is needed on both sides of the barricades in order to start looking for common ground and initiate a peaceful dialogue. It is a question of time. In general, I think that only international interference, only international moderators can put an end to this crazy confrontation, just like international assistance and arbitration helped to stop the escalation of violence in Northern Ireland.

Q: Is there a chance that Russia will turn for help to international institutions or other countries? And not only consultative or information help.

A: This is impossible at present at least for three reasons. First, it would mean a final renunciation of the claims to great power status which influential forces in the Russian political community are desperate to restore for the country. Secondly, it would be an admission of weakness and even of the impotence of the political regime and its leader, which the Kremlin, of course, cannot afford. Thirdly, I don't think that international organizations and Western powers are eager to be approached on this issue because it would inevitably drag them into the dramatic Russian problems and would turn these states and organizations into targets for our Caucasus terrorists.

Q: Can the recent series of terrorist acts provoke a serious internal political crisis?

A: These events are unlikely to lead to a systemic political crisis. What is happening in Chechnya or what originates from Chechnya is still seen as a marginal phenomenon, so, the terrorist acts, however bloody they may be, cannot provoke even a resignation of the government. We remember the price the Spanish government had to pay for the terrorist act in Madrid when it lied to society about the causes of the terrorist act. But in Russia, unfortunately, there is no tradition of answering for lies or for failures. Putin may still derive certain lessons from this wave of terrorist acts. For example, he may sack the incompetent leaders of the security structures which are concerned with the security of the regime and not of the society. Eventually, the president may come to the conclusion that such a situation is dangerous even for him and for the regime. But there we are moving into the realm of surmises.

(Interviewed by Maxim Glikin, Anatoly Kostyukov)