#10 - JRL 8034
From: "Vlad Sobell" <Vlad.Sobell@dir.co.uk>
Subject: The origins and future of Putin’s “managed democracy”
Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2004

Daiwa Institute of Research Ltd.
23 January 2004
The origins and future of Putin’s “managed democracy”
By Vlad Sobell
Daiwa Institute of Research
vlad.sobell@dir.co.uk

· The ascendancy of pro-Putin United Russia in Russia’s parliamentary elections and President Putin’s unassailable position ahead of the presidential poll in March has been the triumph of his “managed democracy”. This paper acknowledges that Putin’s domination has distorted Russia’s political scene, lending credibility to interpretations of Russia’s contemporary development as rising authoritarianism.

· However, the paper argues that the undeniable parallels with the Soviet regime are apparent rather than real and that they are an inescapable product of Russia’s transition. Putin’s dominance is rooted in Russia’s spectacular recent turnaround, rather than in the regime’s authoritarian machinations.

· Furthermore, the “one-dimensional” nature of the managed democracy is bound to gradually evolve into a standard multi-dimensional system, as managed democracy is no match for a society which has slipped out of the clutches of Soviet totalitarianism.

· The emergence of centre-left Rodina and Sergei Glazyev’s presidential candidacy is an example of how this is likely to happen.

Russia’s distorted democracy

The dominant view of Russia’s evolution under President Vladimir Putin has been that, following the decade of “creative anarchy” and “real democracy” under his predecessor, the president has over the last four years put into place “controlled democracy”, where nothing significant can happen without the Kremlin’s approval.

The parliamentary elections in December and the forthcoming presidential poll in March can be interpreted in the same light, with the overbearing system taking ever-deeper roots: the president’s “pedestal party”, United Russia (UR), has secured firm control over the State Duma, while Putin’s position ahead of the March presidential elections is unassailable: the president’s support comes up to 80%, with the nearest rival managing a somewhat more modest 3% at best. In fact, the situation has reached new levels of absurdity, with the Kremlin’s “political technologists” reportedly encouraging more candidates to run to endow the elections with some credibility.[1]

It is widely believed that Putin will use his dominant position to change the constitution to permit him to run for another term in 2008, if not make himself president for life. Thus, many commentators depict the president’s controlled democracy as the final triumph of Russia’s long-standing authoritarian tradition over genuine democracy, with some going as far as to see it as the first step in the imminent arrival of a new totalitarian system ­ the Evil Empire Strikes Back!

This characterisation is not without substance, as Putin’s controlled democracy does, indeed, possess numerous and significant Soviet-like features. Over the last four years, the president has made it exceedingly clear that, unlike in the Yeltsin period, “not everything goes”: his clampdown on the oligarchs has certainly generated enough fear to convince all who needed convincing that any major political or business initiatives will not see the light of day unless it is first cleared with the Kremlin. While the press seems to be as robust as ever, it cannot be denied that elements of “self-censorship” have re-emerged. (The Communist regime would not have been able to function were it not relying on this “voluntary” fealty). The UR, with its strong saturation by officialdom, does, indeed, resemble the Communist Party and is reminiscent of the nomenklatura ­ the brotherhood of “mutually approved” government officials and party apparatchiks who ran the Communist regime and reaped access to chronically scarce goods as a reward. Not unlike his Communist predecessor, Putin’s apparatus has, indeed, used its formidable “administrative resources” (such as preferential access to the media or selective manipulation of technical rules) to the hilt, with the Council of Europe describing Russia’s parliamentary elections as “free, but certainly not fair”. And, finally, Putin’s incredibly high popular support does, indeed, look suspicious. In any case, it does suggest an unhealthy, totalitarian-style link between the “leader” and the “masses”.

In the face of these phenomena, it would seem inescapable to conclude that contemporary Russian political scene ­ and Russia’s new democracy ­ is, indeed, abnormal and distorted. President Putin may well claim, as he has done, that the December parliamentary elections were a triumph for democracy, but scepticism is in order ­ after all, no dictator worth his salt would publicly claim to be anything but a democrat. Furthermore, genuine democracy is supposed to have robust, or at least reasonably functioning, political parties, with mass membership and structures, representing the entire political (right-left) spectrum as well as the major social groups and classes. Democracy is supposed to have credible competing programmes, derived from mutually exclusive ideologies. Democracy is not an embodiment of a tribal nexus between a leader and the people, but a system in which the leader interacts with competing ideologies, interests and power centres.

Russia’s democracy is “one-dimensional”

It cannot be denied that Putin’s Russia fails to match this picture. The country does possess the key institutions of democracy, such as the parliament, political parties and free media. But these institutions do not determine outcomes at the system’s commanding heights. President Putin has not emerged “from below”, but was appointed by his predecessor and subsequently democratically rubber-stamped in March 2000 elections. As noted above, essentially the same procedure is taking place this time around.

Furthermore, Russia’s democracy lacks the proper party-political system supposed to animate it ­ existing parties are either movements dominated by the personality (such as Yabloko or the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)), the president’s pedestal and regime nomenklatura party (United Russia) or the progressively decaying relic of the ancien regime ­ the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF). The newly established and successful Motherland (Rodina) headed by Sergei Glazyev and Dmitri Rogozhin, which won a substantial chunk of the vote from the KPRF, appears to be a similar such entity, although it could yet mark a significant new departure (more on Motherland and Glazyev below). The programmes of these movements are not derived from distinctly divergent analyses of reality deployed in the service of competing grand visions of the future, but merely constitute different variations on the same overarching theme.

United Russia is “centrist” not only because it is a vehicle for regime officials, but also because it embraces all sections of the political spectrum. It is both liberal and state interventionist, left and right wing (in its support for the government’s liberalising reforms on the one hand and the strengthening of the state, the promotion of social justice and clampdown on the oligarchs on the other), as well as being adequately nationalistic or, rather, patriotic, as befits the activists of a regime aiming at rebuilding Russia as a great power.

The remaining parties cannot help but act as mere satellites to this all-embracing structure and reform ideology ­ their leaders may well have radically different personal histories and Weltanshauung, but their parties’ recipes for action cannot radically depart from the centrist consensus as embodied in the UR. (The reasons for this trap are analysed below).

Given this “one dimensional” (or satellite) character of Russia’s political system, it should come as no surprise that contemporary Russia is persistently misrepresented as a neo-Soviet structure. Unlike the Soviet system, Putin’s Russia has all the trappings of genuine democracy and appears to be “multi-dimensional”; but very much like the Soviet system, these trappings seem to be just that ­ not much more than ineffectual democratic ornaments.

On the face of it, this would seem a very depressing conclusion: having ditched communism and enjoyed a brief spell of real democracy and freedom in the 1990’s under President Yeltsin, Russia is reverting to its tradition of autocracy and totalitarianism.

Distortion is the product of post-Soviet transition, not Putin’s machinations

Fortunately, it is possible to provide a radically different, more hopeful and more credible interpretation. We can accept that Putin’s Russia is one-dimensional and that its democracy is distorted, but there is no need to identify the causes of this distortion in evil designs of a presidential dictator. On the contrary, the distortion flows from decidedly positive circumstances ­ the collapse of totalitarianism a decade and a half ago and the resounding success of Russia’s market economy and democracy. Furthermore, there is no reason why these distortions should not be expected to gradually wither away. This conclusion is based on facts, which appear as blindingly obvious once an analyst is prepared to look at them.

In his well-balanced and sober appraisal of UR’s dominance at the elections, the leading US-based analyst Leon Aron, under a heading of “It’s the Economy, Stupid!” notes that: “Virtually absent from the election commentary is the single largest explanatory variable: the economy”.[2] Aron then proceeds to recount the evidence of spectacular upturn during Putin’s tenure, which, in his words “has lifted enough boats to secure election or re-election of any party or president associated with it”.

In the context of this paper, Aron’s point can be taken significantly further. Apart from “It’s the Economy, Stupid!” we should really be saying “It’s Russia’s Arrival for the First Time Ever, Stupid!”

After periods of relative prosperity in the early part of the 20th century, Russia plunged into forced Communist-driven modernisation. While this turned it into an industrialised country, the effort never translated into actual adequate welfare for the populace, despite requiring untold sacrifice, including the widespread use of slave labour. The edifice that emerged was structurally misconceived, generating chronic shortages of everything and finally biting the dust in 1992 in the face of imminent starvation. (Sending rockets to the Moon and having stockpiles of nuclear missiles may well have been a source of pride, but that could be no substitute for decent consumer goods and reliable supplies of food).

On the heels of this disaster followed the decade of brutal, kleptocratic capitalism, which, while starting to deliver consumer goods for the first time in generations, was also associated with massive socio-economic upheavals and dislocation, as the ancien regime disintegrated. The stabilisation programme launched in 1992 generated rampant inflation, as prices were freed for the first time in decades. The preservation of the new regime dictated that the fruit of the labour of generations of Soviet citizens be captured by a relatively narrow coterie of lucky and/or sufficiently unscrupulous individuals, which subsequently became known as the oligarchs. (Swift privatisation was the only realistic way to politically and economically buttress the new market economy and generate political support for the regime). All along the way, the promised benefits seemed elusive. Early signs of economic growth and macroeconomic stability were extinguished in August 1998, as Russia finally succumbed to the global emerging markets’ crisis and historically low prices of oil.

Seemingly miraculously, Putin’s presidential term has coincided with the first ever reversal of Russia’s economic fortune. Russia’s economic growth has exceeded expectations, with its macroeconomic environment and critical risk ratios staging a spectacular improvement. For the first time in modern history Russia is firmly placed on the path of sustainable economic regeneration.

While President Putin cannot be credited with the post-1998 reversal ­ recovery simply became inevitable after a decade of decline and massive structural change, devaluation and the strengthening prices of oil ­ he has certainly avoided moves that might have extinguished it. He has achieved this by soliciting advice from wide-ranging quarters, establishing policy consensus, pragmatism and avoidance of potentially destabilising personnel changes. Putin may well have offended the purists and Western ambassadors by opting for his “controlled democracy” in preference to the exuberance of the Yeltsin period, but ordinary citizens see this as inescapable consequence of a necessary clampdown on the rampant power of the oligarchs. For them it is an issue of elementary justice, rather than an attack on their civil liberties. And whatever his critics may say, Putin controlled democracy ­ an expression of his cautious and deliberate approach ­ has delivered reassuring political stability after a decade of severe upheavals.

In an uncanny way, the youthful, and by all accounts very capable, president also seems to impersonate this dramatic change in Russia’s identity, having come after generations of ageing and/or physically ailing leaders (with the obvious exception of the last Soviet president, Mikhail Gorbachev).

Since these considerations comfortably explain Putin’s extraordinary popularity, there is no need to seek its causes in the machinations of a “totalitarian regime” or immaturity of the Russian electorate. The distortion of the political scene caused by the overarching Putin’s figure is the consequence of positive, not negative factors.

The origins of the one-dimensional party-political structure should also be sought in Russia’s point of departure (following the last breath of Soviet totalitarianism in 1991) and the immediate post-Soviet period. Even a cursory look reveals that Russia could not have had a well-balanced (left-right) political spectrum, simply because its dominant political issues have flowed from its process of transition and not from a stable class structure normally associated with the left-right spectrum. Logically, Russia in transition simply could not already have had the things to which it was transferring. Time cannot be compressed and miracles do not normally happen.

In terms of standard theory, the left-right spectrum is ultimately the reflection of the underlying social structure ­ briefly, the existence in most countries of prosperous middle (and professional) class on the one hand and the less prosperous unionised working class on the other.[3] But Russia’s post-Soviet society was not, and could not have been, organised in this way. Instead of issues arising from the class structure, the dominant issue was the management of the transition from a discredited and decayed communist system to a market economy and democracy. The dominant division was between the forces pushing for change and those opposing change ­ the reaction. This division cut across all layers of the Soviet society (which was, in any case, comparatively homogeneous), dividing it into the supporters of change and those fearing it. Any attempt to interpret this essentially unique revolutionary situation through the prism of the standard left-right spectrum would be futile.

Much of the transitional period of the 1990s was spent in a tug-of-war between the reaction, most directly embodied in the KPRF, and the reform regime of President Yeltsin, whose pool of talent was drawn from the ranks of youngish figures associated with the so called “liberal” parties, such as Yabloko and, currently, the Union of Right Forces (SPS). The major milestones were the 1996 presidential elections, when Yeltsin managed to avert a looming Communist victory following a late-minute deal with the oligarchs (chiefly Boris Berezovsky), who supplied the financial means needed to see off the formidable KPRF machine. Another was the denouement of the August 1998 financial crisis, after which the KPRF was revealed as having no credible economic policies, leaving the pursuit of market reforms as the only option. This culminated in the arrival of President Putin, initially as Prime Minister in August 1999 and eventually as Acting President as of 1st January 2000. (Those suspicious of Putin’s alleged reactionary instincts should, instead, marvel at the historic irony, when the victory of a liberal-democratic programme came to be consolidated by a former KGB officer).

Despite this terminal blow to the reaction, the last four years should still be considered as transitional, with the conditions for the emergence of the left-right spectrum still remaining elusive and the reform-reaction spectrum losing its shine only slowly. This has been a period of consolidation of the new order and its fragile stability and the delivery of its first tangible goods ­ the spectacular economic turnaround noted above.

Russia’s political system under Putin, therefore, could not help but remain one-dimensional. As with his popularity, it is obvious that this is not the result of Putin’s devilish machinations to destroy democracy, but an inevitable outcome of recent changes in Russia. Once again, this feature is due to positive, rather than negative factors ­ the final victory of the forces of change and a growing consensus on what needs to be done in the years ahead.

Is the system growing multi-dimensional?

Nevertheless, while applauding this successful turn, it cannot be denied that the model of standard market economy and democracy, to which Russia has been moving, must entail the evolution of the right-left spectrum and party-political system reflecting it. The one-dimensional “centrist” system with Putin as its personal embodiment must gradually dissolve into a more diverse entity, both in terms of ideology and organisational structure. Have there been signs of this happening?

Those willing to take notice can be reassured. Apart from the anticipated triumph of the RU, the December parliamentary elections were memorable for the defeat of the long-standing liberal parties (Yabloko and SPS), whose presence in the Duma collapsed, as well as the KPRF (whose share of the vote fell to 12.6% and whose parliamentary presence was reduced from 113 to 52 seats). The KPRF’s traditional protest vote was severely eroded chiefly by the newly formed Rodina, led (as noted) by the economist Sergei Glazyev and foreign affairs expert Dmitri Rogozhin. The latter won 9% of the vote and 37 Duma seats, making it the third largest group in the parliament.

Most commentary has sounded alarm over these shifts, interpreting them as a setback for democracy in the face of alleged “leftist nationalism” of Rodina (the impression of resurgent nationalism was also generated by the relative success of the Liberal Democratic Party of Vladimir Zhirinovsky, a specialist in outlandish populist/nationalist stunts). Since Rodina’s launch in the summer had reportedly been sanctioned, if not initiated, by the Kremlin (as a ploy to weaken the KPRF), the headline story has been that, while engineering the ascendancy of the “new nomenklatura” in the shape of RU, the regime would stoop as low as to create a leftist-nationalist satellite to help it finish off the KPRF. (Some political rivals of Rodina have even described it as “national-socialists”, a label associating it with the German Nazi Party).

However, a below-the-headline look at Rodina and its leaders, in particular Glazyev, points to a somewhat different story. As is usual in Russia, Glazyev cannot be easily characterised in terms of the standard categories. Relatively young (now 42), he participated in the first reformist government in 1992. In 1993 he left the government and spent much of his time within the KPRF/patriotic orbit. However, he never felt comfortable with this essentially reactionary camp. In the words of a leading Western analyst he was “in but not of the KPRF”, while he could also be presented as a holder of liberal and traditional Christian values.[4] Given this background, it is not surprising that Glazyev has jumped at the opportunity to abandon the Communists and co-lead Rodina.

Buoyed by Rodina’s success, Glazyev has moved on to position himself as a candidate in the presidential poll, independently of his party (this was due to his disagreement with Rogozhin, who argued that Glazyev’s candidacy would anger the Kremlin, thus causing it to clampdown on their newly-established party). Being a credible and popular figure, it has been speculated that he could win as much as 20% of the vote, seriously denting the one-dimensional shape of the system.

The reason why Glazyev seems to be a real “out of the system” challenger is that, apart from his evident ambition and refusal to play by the Kremlin script, he also has a credible, genuinely alternative programme. He argues that Putin’s government has been drifting along the “status quo”, failing to speed up structural changes, needed to free the Russian economy from its current excessive dependence on the energy and raw materials sector.

Not only is this a justifiable and constructive attack on the regime (as indeed, the Russian “economic miracle” will not be properly tested until the prices of oil turn weak), Glazyev is, moreover, delivering it from a very appealing left-leaning and anti-oligarch platform. Far from being an oligarch-basher, Putin, in Glazyev’s view, has been too soft on the oligarchs, failing to extract appropriate revenue from Russia’s energy and raw-materials sector. Glazyev is not calling for more persecution and arrests, but for a systematic increase of taxation of what he calls the sector’s “rent”, directed especially at the “super-profits” generated by the windfall of strong global energy prices and the rising value of oil companies’ assets. The increased flows to the state budget would be channelled to neglected sectors such as social security, health, education and research and development. Glazyev correctly maintains that a robust and healthy market economy cannot function unless it is accompanied by a strong dose of social justice, with the state taking responsibility for social security.

In short, Glazyev has come up with a credible, distinctly social-democratic alternative to President Putin. It is notable for its emphasis on the management of Russia’s recent success and more rational and equitable distribution of its fruits, rather than on the protest at the transition to a market economy. It is, therefore, a thoroughly post-transition political programme. Furthermore, the focus of Glazyev’s programme ­ the economic and political management of the energy sector ­ cuts right into the heart of Russia’s complex political economy.

Intriguingly, there is some evidence that, far from exploiting primitive nationalism, Rodina seems to be appealing to the educated and professional sections of the electorate, as well as the rising business class. The party performed particularly well in Moscow and St Petersburg, the traditional bastions of the reform-liberal parties. While some analysts have ascribed this to the appeal of Rogozhin’s “nationalism”, others have noted that Rodina’s social-democratic message has found some resonance among Russia’s emerging middle-class.[5]

On the face of it, this would seem very odd, while undermining the above claim that Rodina/Glazyev programme is essentially social democratic. Surely the successful and prosperous social strata would be expected to support the liberal/reformist parties. However, this phenomenon need not necessarily be as puzzling as it appears, as several factors can explain it. First, the liberal parties suffered from a catastrophic failure to present a unified programme and coalesce into single organisation (they are now taking appropriate lessons from their failure). Secondly, their key ideas have now become a part of the post-transition consensus, being embraced by the RU as well as Rodina (with different emphasis). Finally, the politics of post-industrial societies can no longer be analysed in simplistic class-based terms; a serious social-democratic programme need not necessarily be unappealing to the emerging middle class, especially in the absence of a credible centre-right alternative.

Conclusions: Glazyev and his likes should be the ones to watch

Having analysed the “one-dimensional” nature of Russia’s political system under Putin and its prospects of becoming “multi-dimensional”, this note does not necessarily claim that Glazyev/Rodina is the agent to perform the trick. The claim is, rather, that Glazyev/Rodina has the potential to do so. Other groups and figures, most likely from a reconstructed centre-right are bound to emerge in due course. The key point is that even if we accept that Putin is running a “controlled democracy”, with the Kremlin orchestrating the creation of Rodina and other political developments, events will ultimately slip out of control. Glazyev has already provided sufficient ammunition to prove this point. The opposing notion ­ that having overcome Soviet totalitarianism, the Russian political culture is unable to slip out of the “controlled democracy” ­ is simply implausible.

[1] Long-standing familiar faces on the Russian political scene ­ the Communist leader Gennadi Zyuganov, Yabloko leader Grigori Yavlinsky and the Liberal Democratic Party leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky ­ have apparently opted to “boycott” the elections, passing their candidatures to lesser known figures. [2] Leon Aron, “The Duma Election”, American Enterprise Institute. [3] This description is of necessity extremely sketchy and we do recognise that the structures of modern post-industrial societies can no longer be described in this simplistic way. Nevertheless, the shorthand used here is adequate for the specific purposes of the present note. [4] A Russian observer has made the following characterisation of Glazyev: “Lengthy association with the Communists has given his rhetoric a persistent leftist tone, but he can still be presented to voters as a fairly ambivalent “academic”, “clever guy”, “economist” ­ or even a right-winger, given his Orthodox faith and support for traditional values”. [5] As noted, press commentary has characterised Rodina as “leftist-nationalist”. While a careful and objective examination would be beyond the scope of the present note, this is likely to be yet another misleading label so frequently applied in the analysis of Russia. Greater national assertiveness and emphasis on careful husbandry of a country’s natural resources (which may imply justified efforts to ensure that these assets do not fall under foreign control) does not necessarily add up to nationalism. As argued in the main text, the most significant strain of Rodina/Glazyev political philosophy appears to be social democracy.

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