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1. Boston Globe: Bryan Bender, Specialists hits efforts to secure Russian arms. Threat is greater than Iraq, they say.
2. AP: Hurdles in Destroying Russian Missiles.
3. Luba Schwartzman: TV1 Review.
4. gazeta.ru: Europeans want Chechnya war tribunal.
5. Moscow Times: Yulia Latynina, Ministry Prepares a Heady Brew. (re vodka)
6. Jamestown Foundation Russia and Eurasia Review: Elena Chinyaeva, THE POLITICS OF GENDER IN RUSSIA.
7. Trud: ANATOLY GOLOV: WHO IS MARCHING LEFT? An interview with political analyst Anatoly Golov.
8. Moscow Times: Simon Saradzhyan, Ivanov: Russia Is Unlikely to Abstain.
9. BBC: Bridget Kendall, Igor Ivanov: cheery and direct.
10. BBC: Ask Russian foreign minister. Q&A with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. transcript concluded
11. NG Dipkuryer: IRAQI WAR MAY PROVOKE UNPREDICTABLE GLOBAL CHANGES. (interview with State Duma deputy Andrei KOKOSHIN)
12. Washington Post: Masha Lipman, A Crippling Legacy....(re Stalin)
13. Washington Post: Anne Applebaum, ...A Lesson For the West.
14. The Guardian (UK): Robert Conquest, Stalin's reputation as a ruthless master of deception remains intact.


Boston Globe
March 5, 2003
Specialists hits efforts to secure Russian arms
Threat is greater than Iraq, they say
By Bryan Bender, Globe Correspondent

WASHINGTON -- The US-led effort to dismantle the weapons stockpiles of the
former Soviet Union is beset with bureaucratic impediments, delaying
international efforts to prevent the weapons from falling into the hands of
terrorists, say government investigators and administration officials.

They told the House Armed Services Committee yesterday that Russian
foot-dragging and US mismanagement threaten to undercut progress made in
safeguarding such chemical, biological, and nuclear arms since the
Cooperative Threat Reduction program began more than a decade ago.

The specialists also warned that Washington's focus on a potential war to
disarm Iraq has diverted attention from what they consider the gravest
security threat of the modern age: a poorly secured arsenal of chemical
weapons, deadly pathogens, nuclear materials, and meagerly paid weapons
scientists in Russia and other former Soviet states.

The specialists said they fear that a US-led effort to recruit other
nations to dramatically expand the effort -- Washington has already spent
nearly $7 billion -- is suffering as a result of American inattention and
international opposition to its plans in Iraq.

Russia has the world's largest inventory of weapons of mass destruction,
inheriting from the Soviet Union an estimated 30,000 nuclear weapons, 600
metric tons of weapons-grade nuclear material, at least 40,000 metric tons
of chemical weapons, 2,100 missiles, and about 40 research centers devoted
to the development and production of biological weapons.

But the progress in reducing the danger posed by these materials faces
obstacles, officials said.

''US threat reduction and nonproliferation programs have consistently faced
two critical challenges,'' Joseph Christoff, director of international
affairs and trade at the General Accounting Office, told the House panel.
''The Russian government has not always paid its agreed-upon share of
program costs, and Russian ministries have often denied US officials access
to key nuclear and biological sites.''

At the same time, a variety of US congressional restrictions on providing
money to reduce the stockpiles and a failure to fully account for how the
money is spent have also eroded the effort, officials said.

For example, a series of presidential waivers required by law delayed the
destruction of stockpiles of Russian chemical weapons for months. Another
bureaucratic snafu blamed on both Russia and the United States was the
expenditure of $100 million of US taxpayer money to construct a facility in
remote Krasnoyarsk, Russia, to convert rocket fuel from nuclear missiles to
commercial use, only to find that after the facility was completed Russia
had diverted the fuel to its space program and that the facility was no
longer needed.

Bush administration officials testifying before the committee pledged to
work to rectify these problems.

''The past year has been extremely frustrating,'' said J.D. Crouch,
assistant secretary of defense for international security policy. ''It
serves as a reminder that we need to do better internally.

''I think we have moved quickly to put better management controls in
place,'' he added. ''But the past year also highlights how hard it is to
pursue this type of program in a state like Russia, even if we do
everything correctly.''

Crouch said that one step already being taken is to require Russia to sign
formal agreements that lay out each side's responsibilities on
threat-reduction projects.

But the success of the program also depends on international cooperation
and consensus. Washington proposed last year a global partnership against
the spread of weapons of mass destruction and materials, getting the Group
of Eight economic powers to pledge $20 billion over the next decade to
dismantle and secure former Soviet weapons. Such cooperation and
coordination has become more difficult during the charged debate over Iraq,
the specialists said.

''There is no doubt that the focus on Iraq has made it harder to get the G8
up and running,'' Jon Wolfsthal, deputy director of the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace in Washington said in an interview. The president's
''almost exclusive focus on Iraq has made it much harder to invest the time
needed for the G8 initiative.''

He said he believes that the fervor over US plans for Iraq has dampened
ongoing discussions with Germany and France over what G8 role they will
play. ''It is already clear that in terms of the frequency of our dialogue
and the overall atmosphere of those talks the war on Iraq is spilling
over,'' Wolfsthal said.

Others suggested that the White House is not paying sufficient attention to
what is potentially a greater threat than Iraq's suspected arsenal.

''The news is filled with debates about the cost of war in Iraq,'' US
Representative Ike Skelton, a Missouri Democrat and the ranking member of
the House panel, said at the hearing.

''But for approximately $1 billion a year,'' the United States has ''racked
up a real success story in diminishing the threat that terrorists will get
weapons of mass destruction,'' Skelton said.

Wolfsthal said he believes that priority should be given to securing
weapons in the former Soviet Union.

''We're about to spend upwards of $100 billion on handfuls of weapons'' in
a possible Iraq campaign, he said. ''Alternatively, we have trouble getting
$2 billion a year [over the next decade] to deal with a poorly protected,
poorly accounted for arsenal.''


Hurdles in Destroying Russian Missiles
March 4, 2003

WASHINGTON (AP) - Bush administration officials acknowledged frustrations
Tuesday in a program to dismantle weapons held by the former Soviet Union,
including the failure of two projects costing a total of $200 million.

But the benefits of the program in keeping weapons out of terrorists' hands
far outweigh the problems, they told the House Armed Services Committee.

``The question isn't will we have setbacks, but how effectively we respond
to this because in my view, the programs are too important to be allowed to
fail,'' said Linton Brooks, acting administrator of the National Nuclear
Security Administration.

Over 12 years, the United States has spent $7 billion to help Russia and
other former Soviet republics dismantle weapons of mass destruction and
keep them from being used against Americans. The program, strongly backed
by Democrats and Republicans, has eliminated 6,032 war heads, 847 ballistic
missile launchers and 856 ballistic missiles, according to the Defense

Rep. Duncan Hunter, R-Calif., the committee chairman, said the program
``has accomplished a great deal.'' But he said it has expanded from a
program specifically targeting nuclear weapons to include projects
``sometimes only tangentially related to the original purpose or to the
principle of reducing direct military threats to the United States.''

A congressional auditor told the committee that Russia has also often
denied U.S. officials access to nuclear and biological sites. Joseph A.
Christoff of the General Accounting Office also said the Russian government
has not always paid its share of program costs.

Hunter focused on the program's two ``white elephants'': One was a $106
million plant in Krasnoyarsk that the United States built to dispose of
liquid missile fuel. When the plant was completed, U.S. officials were told
that the fuel had been diverted to Russia's civilian space program.

More recently, U.S. officials spent $95 million for designing and testing a
facility in Votkinsk to remove solid propellant from Russian rocket motors,
only to have the project blocked by local officials because of pollution

``These are remarkable stories of massive waste of American taxpayer
dollars,'' Hunter said. ``I think we are all troubled when we think about
the amount of dismantlement that could have taken place with the hundreds
of millions of dollars had they not been wasted.''

J.D. Crouch II, assistant defense secretary for international security
policy, told Hunter the money wasted on the liquid fuel plant ``was a major
wake-up call for us.''

It prompted the Defense Department to re-examine all projects in the
program, begin semiannual reviews with Russian officials, and push for
greater access to Russian nuclear weapons storage sites. It also began
replacing informal agreements with signed contracts.

In the case of the Votkinsk plant, U.S. officials had been working with
Russians who wrongly thought they would be able to get the permits needed
for the project, Crouch said.

He said the administration would continue to pursue worthy projects
``though we will not be naive in the way we pursue them.''

Democrats on the committee were in the odd position of defending the Bush
administration from Republican criticism.

``I'm very concerned that we're hypercritical of the programs right now,''
said Rep. Ellen Tauscher, D-Calif.

Rep. John Spratt, D-S.C., said ``I've seen these programs in place and I'm
here to testify, they work.''

Hunter and the committee's vice chairman, Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Pa., stressed
their support for the program, but said they want to see it administered
better and have the Russians more open and accountable.

The two have been in an unusual public dispute with another influential
Republican chairman, Sen. Richard Lugar of the Foreign Relations Committee.
Lugar, of Indiana, and former Sen. Sam Nunn, D-Ga., were the founders of
the program to dismantle Soviet weapons.

Hunter and Weldon maintain they were unfairly criticized last fall by Sen.
Richard Lugar, now chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who said at
a public hearing they were blocking funding for the program.

Without mentioning Lugar, by name, Weldon said his comments were
``categorically, absolutely and outrageously false.''

After Crouch told him that conditions set by the committee to make Russia
more accountable have proven to be helpful, Hunter said, ``Would you send
that message to Sen. Lugar's staff? I think he needs to have that.''


TV1 Review
Compiled by Luba Schwartzman (luba_sch@hotmail.com)
Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information, Moscow office

Tuesday, March 04, 2003
- Russian President Vladimir Putin asserted that the refusal of the
Turkish parliament to allow American troops to set up a base on the
border with Iraq was the most important event in recent days. He
noted that Russia was not surprised by the decision.
- Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov met with his British
counterpart in London to discuss the Iraqi problem, preparations for
Putin's state visit to Great Britain, the conflict in the Middle East,
and the situation in the Koreas and in Afghanistan. Aleksandr
Yakovenko, an official representative of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, declared that the difference in the positions on Iraq will not
hamper cooperation on other international issues.
- Security measures for the Referendum on the Chechen
Constitution were discussed at today's joint meeting of the
governmental commission for the restoration of Chechnya and the
regional operational headquarters.
- 100,000 brochures with the Chechen text of the draft of the
Constitution were delivered to Grozny. Representatives of the
local electoral commission say that they now have enough copies to
give to every one of the 537,000 registered voters.
- The Saratov Oblast plant for the destruction of chemical weapons
will have 10 days to improve work with toxic waste and control
over the atmospheric emissions. If it fails to do so, it will be shut
down. Russian Security Council Chairman Vladimir Rushailo
declared that the plant, currently operating as usual, poses no
environmental risk.
- The Cultural Center of the Theater Union of the Russian
Federation will be opened after 13 years. The old building, which
stood on Gorky Street, was almost entirely destroyed in a fire in
1990. The new center will have an exhibit hall, rehearsal space and
an auditorium equipped with the latest technology
- The United Russia Party has pledged to improve conditions for
working women. A support hotline for women has been opened in
the Yaroslav region, with the help of United Russia.
- President Putin asked the Cabinet to focus on compensations to
residents of Chechnya who have been left without homes. There
are approximately 280,000 people who lost homes in Chechnya,
185,000 of whom currently live in the republic. Putin also
criticized the ministers for allowing an 8% growth in unpaid wages
to state employees and emphasized the importance of paying
special attention to medical insurance.
- An album of Pablo Picasso's lithographs was sold for $20,000 at a
Moscow auction. The buyer desired to remain anonymous.
- Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov told President Putin that
only 30-35,000 troops will remain in Chechnya. 1,270 men and
about 200 units of military equipment will be removed in the near
- Tomorrow will mark the 50th anniversary of the death of Joseph
Stalin. Public opinion polls show that 53% of Russians believe that
Stalin played a positive role in history. Only a third disagree.
- Stalin's grandson, Vissarion Dzhugashvili has asked the US for
political asylum after being attacked by hooligans. He said that his
family has been harassed with threats and insults for the past ten
- One of Georgia's most influential politicians, Dzhuba Ioseliani,
died today. He was hospitalized with a stroke on February 26th.
- Five people died and 17 were injured in a 20-car pile-up on the
Moscow-Don federal highway. An investigation is underway.
Traffic violations, as well as heavy fog were at fault.


March 5, 2003
Europeans want Chechnya war tribunal
By Yelena Shishkounova

A prominent German human rights expert and head of the PACE Legal Affairs
and Human Rights Committee, Rudolf Bindig, has tabled a motion envisaging
the establishment of a war crimes tribunal for Chechnya, similar to that
for the former Yugolsavia. Pro-Kremlin Russian politicians have slammed the
initiative as anti-Russian, and even those in favour of the initiative
have said it is unfeasible.

At the session of the PACE Legal Affairs Committee earlier this week Rudolf
Bindig tabled a motion calling for the creation of a tribunal to
investigate war crimes in Russias separatist province of Chechnya. In the
opinion of the European parliamentarian, the court ought to be set up as a
judicial body analogous to the International Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia. Bindig said that the Chechen tribunal would deal, first and
foremost, with cases of human rights abuses on the part of the Russian
military, as well as of the Chechen separatists.

The author of the initiative hopes that the new body would help restore
peace in Chechnya. According to Bindig, legal prosecution of concrete human
rights violations will play a key role in the settlement of the Caucasian

The German deputy admitted that all previous initiatives of the Council of
Europe and of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) aimed at restoring law and order in the region had so far not met
with any success. The European parliamentarians have also failed to reach
an understanding with the Russian judicial authorities, which PACE has
urged to investigate human rights violations in Chechnya.

In his draft Bindig directly accuses Moscow of denying journalists and
human rights activists access to combat areas, making it is impossible to
establish what is really going on in Chechnya, the deputy said.

This is not the first time that Rudolf Bindig has criticized Russian policy
in Chechnya. ''We have been watching the restoration of Chechnya, but we
cannot see an observation of human rights there, and this is what we are
most concerned about. So far, we can ascertain that human rights abuses in
Chechnya continue, searches are being conducted, as well as purges, and
people continue to disappear,'' Bindig said at one session of the Legal
Affairs Committee.

It is no wonder that the State Duma deputies representing Russia at PACE
sessions wince at the mention of Bindigs name.

Chairman of the State Dumas international affairs committee and the head
of the Russian delegation to PACE Dmitry Rogozin said on Tuesday that
nothing good can be expected from Bindig. Materials concerning the human
rights situation in Chechnya on which he tries to voice an opinion are
often based on unverified information and ''are beyond decency''. Rogozin
said members of the Russian delegation to PACE have repeatedly had ''to
raise their voices when talking with Bindig, but we must admit this has not
affected his biased approach''.

In Rogozins opinion, Bindigs idea is doomed to failure. ''The paper drawn
up by Bindig is frenzied work done by a frenzied foe of Russia,'' Rogozin
said on Tuesday. ''The draft cannot even be commented on - it must be
rejected at once,'' he said.

On Wednesday Yevgeny Voronin, spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry,
said, ''The call to establish a tribunal for Chechnya similar to the
tribunal in the Hague, is absurd, which must be clear to its authors, who
are deputies of European parliaments. Russia has its own judiciary system
and no one can take away its sovereign right to administer justice on its

State Duma deputy and prominent human rights activist Sergei Kovalyov,
known for his harsh criticism of the Kremlins policy in Chechnya, told
Ekho Moskvy radio station on Tuesday, howevere, that he would welcome
Bindigs idea, but doubted its feasibility. ''The Caucasian tribunal is
unlikely to be set up. This is just a wonderful demonstration, a beautiful
idea. It could be viewed as a sort of desperate gesture,'' Kovalyov said.
It is unlikely that the Council of Europe will endorse the decision,
however, because the Committee of Foreign Ministers takes any final
decisions in the CE. ''So how do you think the Russian Foreign Minister,
Igor Ivanov, will react to a proposal to set up such a court?''


Moscow Times
March 5, 2003
Ministry Prepares a Heady Brew
By Yulia Latynina

The Agriculture Ministry, headed by Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Gordeyev,
has put forward a new "alcohol policy" plan. If the plan is implemented it
could lead to a doubling in the price of vodka -- Russia's main consumer

The plan envisages banning the construction of new distilleries, as well as
introducing quotas for the production of pure alcohol and liquor. If one
accepts Gordeyev's version, the plan was inspired purely by the deputy prime
minister's love for his fellow man and desire to battle alcoholism.

Allow me to explain in more detail the philanthropic process according to the
Agriculture Ministry. Currently, the ministry only distributes quotas for the
purchase of pure alcohol. In other words, if you are a private vodka
producer, you cannot simply go and buy spirit from a distillery. First, you
must go to the Agriculture Ministry and declare that you would like to buy X
liters of spirit from distillery Y. Then, ministry officials will sign a
quota for you -- or perhaps they won't.

They might instead say: "Listen, you want to buy spirit from a private
distillery, but we need to keep the state distilleries employed." To which
you counter, "But the spirit they produce is foul -- you can't make decent
vodka out of that stuff!"

"So," the officials will say, "you need spirit from that distillery and not
this one? Let's see if we can come to an arrangement."

Or to give a very simple analogy -- it's as if before going to the baker's to
buy a loaf of bread, you had to go to a committee, which would sign a form
authorizing the purchase of the specific loaf in that particular bakery.
Bearing in mind the behavioral characteristics of those that sign quotas in
this country, it is pretty clear that in reality you will have to pay twice:
once for the loaf and once to get the quota signed.

This may explain why Gordeyev's approach to fighting alcoholism involves
multiplying the number of quotas his ministry gets to distribute.

Indeed, many Agriculture Ministry regulations start out life exclusively with
the common weal in mind, and end up just serving the interests of petty
bureaucrats. Not long ago, the ministry introduced quotas on meat imports in
order to protect domestic producers. However, importers are complaining that
the procedure for receiving meat import quotas is identical to the procedure
for winning additional "scientific"quotas for catching crab -- as described
in a recent criminal case against State Fisheries Committee officials.

Prior to this, there were interventions in the grain market. At the end of
last year, Gordeyev became a passionate advocate of the idea of supporting
poverty-stricken peasants by allocating government money for the purchase of
grain. Truth be told, by this point the harvest had already been sold, and
the taxpayer's ruble was not going to support impoverished peasants, but
major grain buyers.

What can you say? The suspension of State Fisheries Committee head Yevgeny
Nazdratenko, in whose agency quota allocation procedures -- according to
those in the know -- differed in no way from the process of taking bribes,
might serve to restrain Gordeyev from the total commercialization of his

At the end of the day, vodka is Russia's second national currency after the
ruble, and if the Agriculture Ministry doubles the price of vodka it will
effectively be assuming the prerogatives of the Central Bank. The thing is,
adoption of the ministry's alcohol plan will either result in extra ruble
emission in favor of the Agriculture Ministry or the debasement of Russia's
national currency through a massive rise in moonshine production.

Yulia Latynina is author and host of "Yest Mneniye" on TVS.


Jamestown Foundation
Russia and Eurasia Review
Volume 2, Issue 5
March 4, 2003

by Elena Chinyaeva
Elena Chinyaeva holds a doctorate in modern history from Oxford University
and is a writer for Kommersant-Vlast, a leading Russian political weekly.

March 8 is still celebrated in Russia as "international women's day," with
men scurrying to buy flowers for their loved ones and organizations buying
presents for their female employees. Most Western observers think that
conditions for Russian women have substantially deteriorated since the
collapse of the Soviet system, but in reality the picture is more complex.
The transition has in fact brought opportunities as well as problems,
although men still jealously guard their grip on political power.

Once, during a department meeting at Moscow University where I was a
postgraduate student, the department head said on the issue of new
postgraduate admissions that: "We won't take any more females, and if so
only party members." To which a female professor, the department's longest
serving member, inquired: "What is it in a man that is an equivalent to a
female's party card?"

That was during the Soviet era, and a woman's misfortune of having to look
for an equivalent was only partially rewarded by acquiring a party card.
After all, there were plenty of men with party cards around and they did
not show any inclination to loosen their tight control over society.

Women, together with all other groups discriminated against under the
Tsars, were "freed" by the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, which declared them
equal and granted them all social and political rights. In reality,
however, the Soviet political system became male dominated, its legislative
organs developing into a rigid structure based on proportional
representation. Women were guaranteed proportional representation in the
soviets of all levels up to the Supreme Soviet, as were workers, peasants,
ethnic minorities and other groups. But these institutions were a
parliamentary facade with no real power.

The career of a Soviet woman depended on whether she had managed to gain
access to the party-controlled jobs--as part of the nomenklatura. That did
not happen very often, as the family was considered to be a woman's
principal social obligation. None of this is to say that a working woman
with a family had any privileges over male colleagues in terms of childcare
help. More often than not she would simply be denied promotions on the
pretext that--because of her children--she could not work hard enough and
hence was less valuable to her organization.

The Soviet Union ratified a 1979 UN convention on the liquidation of all
forms of discrimination against women. This was reflected in clause fifteen
of the Russian Constitution of 1993, which recognized the principle of
gender equality in the Russian Federation's legal system.

Though the official principle of equality remains in effect, there have
been some important changes in conditions for women in post-Soviet Russia.
There have been fewer formal declarations of equality, for example, and
proportional representation in legislatures was eliminated. Moreover, women
have emerged not only as a source of social and political power, but, most
importantly, as an indispensable economic factor.

When the old system collapsed and the usual social and economic safety nets
were dismantled, it came as a great shock to most Russian families. The men
often found consolation in drinking, while women had no choice but to find
a way to feed their families. Instead of lamenting forever the stability
that was lost, women started to take up those new opportunities that the
transition to a market economy had presented. One's success no longer
depended on party membership, but on one's wits, energy and persistence.
Leaving their traditional occupations, women ventured into small trade and
opened their own businesses. In the early 1990s, "shuttle traders" played
an important role in the emerging market economy. Former teachers and
engineers went to Turkey, Poland or Thailand to buy clothes and appliances
to sell in Russia. Women took an active part in these activities, which
later led to the appearance of regular shops and other small and
medium-sized businesses.

Women also took advantage of opportunities in newly established firms,
quickly climbing through the ranks to become managers. This was especially
true in accounting, advertising and public relations. However, although
women have become a visible presence among top managers, their success in
business is still very much limited by the glass ceiling. Among the
so-called oligarchs, the leaders of Russia's largest companies, there is
not a single woman. When President Vladimir Putin met with the members of
the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs on February 19, there
were no women among his twenty-five guests.

Women also enjoy only limited access to established channels of political
and social influence. State and political institutions are still tightly
controlled by men. Women make up more than 54 percent of the Russian
population, and the number of those holding fulltime jobs (about 45
percent) is on par with the developed countries. Yet their representation
in political bodies amounts to less than 10 percent.

With ten million more votes than men, the female electorate often
determines the outcome of elections at all levels. It is well known,
moreover, that more women than men supported Vladimir Putin during his last
presidential campaign, and they continue to do so. Putin repays this
support, never failing to emphasize that he would like to see a woman in
this or that position. It is said, for example, that the appointment of
Lyubov Slizka to the post of deputy chairwoman of the State Duma was
Putin's personal choice. Nevertheless, the trend lines for female
representation in legislative organs have been negative. The number of
women deputies in the State Duma has declined from 13.6 percent to 10.4
percent to 7.2 percent, while in the Federation Council there are six women
against 162 men. The government has but one high ranking woman--Valentina
Matvienko, vice premier for social matters.

In some Western countries one third or more of the parliamentary deputies
are women. This has been achieved in various ways, such as by establishing
a quota for women in party organs and party candidate lists, or by imposing
direct quotas in political institutions. Thus, the Swedish cabinet is half
female. In Russia, a presidential decree on June 30 1996, recommended that
the presidential administration introduce a minimum quota for women, as
well as create a system of female cadre training. The initiative was not
acted upon. This was not only because male officials resisted it, but also
because the idea of quotas for women--as well as special parties for
females--had little appeal for women themselves.

According to sociological polls, the majority of Russian women agree that
men have more opportunity to build successful careers--but this is accepted
as normal. Up to 85 percent of women reportedly regard a patriarchal model
of gender relations as an acceptable phenomenon, although few would want
the model applied to them personally. About one third of women would leave
work if their material situation allowed it, but approximately 60 percent
would continue to work regardless of such considerations.

The idea of a women's political movement is also unpopular among Russia's
female population. There are at least two reasons for this. One is that
public consciousness still associates women in politics with failed
personal lives. The other is that women are inclined to believe that a
"female party" would be relegated to the margins of political life. The
party "Women of Russia," which appeared in the 1993 Duma, failed to clear
the 5 percent barrier in subsequent elections. Russian women apparently did
not support the idea of political divisions made on the basis of gender.
Among women's public associations, the most influential to date is the
Union of Soldiers' Mothers. It has achieved a high political profile in
addressing problems related to the army and its operations in Chechnya.

Behavioral patterns have also been changing in Russia. Perhaps the most
visible to a casual observer is the number of women driving cars. In the
old days, cars were scarce and were driven mostly by men. However, such a
mundane practice as women driving cars has taken a few years to be accepted
as routine in Russia. (Alas, there has not been any positive change in the
attitudes of male drivers toward females behind the wheel on Russian roads.)

In general then, it can be said that, although Russian women have become
more active, socially and politically, they still lack the instruments
necessary to realize their potential power. Russian women are looking to
make progress in their own way, without necessarily adopting a Western
approach. For example, a rigid code of political correctness is not what
even most politically and economically active women in Russia would desire.
While aspiring to scale societal and business heights, they have tried to
avoid behaving in a bluntly declarative manner. Indeed, it is hard to
imagine a Russian woman taking offence at a man for opening a door or
offering a hand; rather, she would scold him for not doing so.

On the other hand, having tasted power and money, women are not opposed to
the idea of taking advantage of the situation--a theme exploited by the
writer Michael Crichton in his 1994 book, Disclosure. According to this
theory, the only reason why women are more frequent victims of sexual
harassment by superiors is that the majority of these superiors are still
men. Today, one can read in the classified sections of Russian newspapers:
"A female boss is looking for a reliable aide."

As the economic and social situation in Russia continues to improve, the
most important thing for women to have is not a strong feminist movement,
but a widening range of opportunities and options. Society should allow
women to build their lives as they want--as politician, businesswoman,
professional, or housewife.


March 5, 2003
An interview with political analyst Anatoly Golov
Author: Vladimir Ignatov
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]

Which of Russia's political forces can actually be described as
"real leftists"? The views of Anatoly Golov, St. Petersburg political
analyst and organizing committee member of the Civic Forum of Voters.
Question: Why are there differences in the political terminology
used in Russia and Europe?
Anatoly Golov: All the European democracies made the journey to a
balanced political model from "wild capitalism". We are moving toward
it from the side of barracks socialism. That is why our concepts of
"left-wing" and "right-wing" are different from those generally in use
worldwide. In Europe, for example, a kind of political "pendulum" has
developed: social attitudes swing to the right and to the left by
turn. The size of that swing is quite insignificant - sometimes only
2-3% of the vote. The left, as represented by the social democrat
forces, want society to pay more attention to social policy and do
more to help the weak. The right favors reducing the burden on the
strong and enterprising, so they can make more money and society can
develop. As a result, European leftists win elections under slogans of
social security; they increase taxes for the strong and social welfare
for the weak. But taxation pressure acts as a brake on the economy,
and living standards drop slightly. The right comes to power on this
wave; they cut taxes and social spending, and the economy becomes more
efficient. But then social tension rises, and the social "pendulum"
starts to swing to the left again...
Question: And why has "leftist" as a political term been usurped
by the Communists in Russia? Don't any other political forces uphold
the rights of pensioners and state sector workers? For instance, we
also have social democrats...
Anatoly Golov: Let's start with the fact that by international
standards, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) isn't
leftist at all. Actually, in Western terminology our Communists would
be called "conservatives". One way or another, they stand for
preserving the old, keeping that which used to be but is now gone. The
CPRF is rather like a Russian version of the British Tories, although
far less productive. CPRF leaders say: "We want to bring back the
past." But they never say how this might be achieved without bringing
back state planning, everyone living in equal poverty, and an
authoritarian regime. These are the kind of good intentions that pave
the road to hell.
Question: If the Communists aren't leftists, then where is the
left wing in Russia?
Anatoly Golov: In my view, of the European-style social democrat
parties in the Duma today, the one that is almost left-wing in the
manner of Tony Blair's Labour Party is Yabloko - which, oddly enough,
is considered a right-wing party here.
Now, as elections approach, there's a lot of party-building
happening on the left. A "new left" has appeared in Russia - real
leftist social democrats according to the international definition.
These include the united social democrats led by Mikhail Gorbachev,
and the Russia's Renaissance party led by Gennady Seleznev, and the
Party of Life led by Sergei Mironov.
Question: Do you think these "new left" parties can win some
votes from the Communists at the next elections?
Anatoly Golov: In my view, they can't win many votes as yet. Most
Russian voters are not sensitive to half-tones or nuances. They might
be described as politically color-blind, with poor perception of
colors. They don't see much difference between Zyuganov and Seleznev.
But Russians usually vote for leaders rather than political programs.
They listen to the leaders, and say "I believe" or "I don't believe".
Russian parties are groups of "comrades in faith". Many Communists -
especially old-style Communists, of course - believe Zyuganov by
Electoral laws are such that political parties don't usually
fight for "their own voters" or "other voters". There's no need to
persuade "their own voters" - the main thing is to get them to turn
out and vote. And winning over "other voters" is expensive in terms of
money and time. The real battle, once again, will be for "the swamp":
undecided voters. That's why it will be hard for the "new left" to
count on making inroads into the Communist electorate. Everything is
clear about the CPRF voters: 20-25% will duly turn out and vote
according to the lists for Zyuganov's party. But Seleznev might try to
win over those who vote for the Communists not because they agree with
their ideology, but as a form of protest voting. Still, there are
already too many parties competing for such voters...
And Gorbachev is about 15 years too late, I think. When he was
president, he had the chance to create a ruling social-democrat party
based on rational Communists, separating them from the stubbornly
orthodox Communist Party members. Perhaps we might have kept the
Soviet Union in place then, and developed along the lines of China.
But there was a lack of foresight and decisiveness at the time; and
now there is no longer the same ground for such an idea...
Question: What kind of concrete tasks should a normal leftist
party set itself in order to be in demand and fight for real
improvement in the lives of its socially unprotected voters?
Anatoly Golov: It seems to me that Russia's key social problem
now is "simple": decent wages for workers. Children and the elderly
are unprotected primarily because working men don't earn enough to
support their children and parents. Economic growth, job creation,
ensuring decent wages - those are the practical priorities for Russian
Question: Which Russian left-wing parties have these goals and
mechanisms for implementing them in their programs?
Anatoly Golov: That's the problem - at present, there is no
political force offering realistic mechanisms of creating social
prosperity; it's all at the level of slogans. In consequence, cautious
voters will vote for "a bird in the hand" - the pro-government party,
which at least promises stability: "perhaps things won't improve, but
they definitely won't get any worse".
(Translated by Andrei Ryabochkin)


Moscow Times
March 5, 2003
Ivanov: Russia Is Unlikely to Abstain
By Simon Saradzhyan
Staff Writer

Moscow upped the stakes in the diplomatic horse-trading over the Iraq
crisis Tuesday with Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov saying for the first time
that Russia is unlikely to abstain if the UN Security Council votes on
automatic use of force against the Saddam Hussein regime.

"Abstaining in this situation is not the policy we should follow," Ivanov
was quoted by Interfax as saying in London during a BBC interview. "Russia
is unlikely to abstain, Russia will take a particular position."

Ivanov's remarks went against the general consensus that Russia would
abstain to avoid falling out with Washington should the United States and
Britain force the Security Council to vote on their resolution authorizing
war with Iraq.

In the past both Ivanov and President Vladimir Putin have voiced opposition
to the use of force but have given no clear sign as to how Russia would vote.

In addition to Russia, the use of force against Iraq is opposed by France
and China. These three countries along with the United States and Britain
are permanent members of the Security Council and have the right to veto
any resolution.

Should none of the members exercise its veto, the United States and Britain
would still need nine of the 15 Security Council votes for their resolution
to pass.

It remains unclear whether Russia would vote for or against the resolution
put forward by the United States and Britain together with Spain. But
Ivanov's comments Tuesday are a clear sign that Russia is putting pressure
on the United States either to bypass the Security Council altogether or to
produce solid evidence that Iraq is not complying with UN resolutions, thus
allowing Moscow to reverse its opposition to the use of force.

Either development would allow Russia to save face, according to Ivan
Safranchuk of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information and
Alexander Pikayev of the Moscow Carnegie Center.

Moscow still runs the risk, however, that Washington and London may refuse
to withdraw the draft resolution. This would force Russia either to affirm
its opposition to the use of force and veto the resolution -- which would
endanger the nascent partnership with the United States -- or side with
Washington and lose face.

"Russia is gradually burning its bridges and this tactic is very risky as
it can produce maximum benefits, but it can also result in the greatest
losses," Safranchuk said.

However, should Moscow sense that there will be a showdown with Washington
at the Security Council, Putin can still weigh in and "correct" his foreign
minister, Safranchuk said.

Both Safranchuk and Yevgeny Volk of the Heritage Foundation noted that
Ivanov has a history of making strong uncompromising statements only to see
the Kremlin strike a deal later. One example was Ivanov's dire warnings
that Russia would not sign any new arms reduction treaties if the United
States walked away from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty only to see Putin
and U.S. President George Bush sign the Moscow Treaty.

"They have a long-standing tradition of working together in a good cop, bad
cop routine," Volk said.

Whether the United States goes to war against Iraq with or without a UN
resolution should not have a long-term negative impact on U.S.-Russian
relations, Safranchuk said.

As long as Russia did not try to act as a spoiler during the planned
military campaign, Putin would have a good chance of mending fences with
Bush at the G-8 summit in May.

A BBC translation of Ivanov's interview interpreted the minister's remarks
even more strongly. According to the BBC transcript, he said: "Russia will
not abstain."

Interfax, in its Russian-language report, said Ivanov had used the phrase
vryad li, meaning "unlikely to" or "would hardly."

Ivanov stayed closer to the Interfax version at a news conference after
talks with British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw.

"There are certain issues where it is desirable there should be no
abstentions among the Security Council members because these are serious
issues," Ivanov told reporters, The Associated Press reported. " The
permanent members of the Security Council have a special responsibility.
That's why I said the Iraq issue is an issue where it is unlikely one of us
would abstain."

Catherine Belton contributed to this report.


March 5, 2003
Igor Ivanov: cheery and direct
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov has told the BBC that Russia could yet
use its UN Security Council veto over Iraq.
He made the comments to BBC Talking Point live, answering questions sent in
by BBC News Online readers.
The BBC's Bridget Kendall interviewed Mr Ivanov, and here gives her
impression of the veteran Russian diplomat:

Igor Ivanov stepped out of his official limousine with a spring in his step
and a cheerful look on his face.

I introduced myself in Russian. He answered confidently in English.

Mistake number one: Contrary to my expectation, the Russian Foreign
Minister does in fact speak quite good English. He just does not like to be
interviewed in it.

No wonder, really, if you are weighing each nuanced hint you drop about a
possible Russian veto against assurances that Moscow's top priorities are
Security Council unity and continued cooperation with partners like Britain
and America.

Good humour

Mistake number two was to assume Mr Ivanov was as sombre and poker-faced as
he sometimes looks at international press conferences.

I had always thought of him as "bad cop" in a "good cop: bad cop" scenario.

He got to deliver gloomy warnings of Russian non-collaboration, while his
boss, President Vladimir Putin, got to eat barbecue with the US president
and look deep into his American eyes to convince him he was a guy to be

But as we made our way through the labyrinth of BBC's Television Centre in
London, I quickly concluded Mr Ivanov was anything but gloomy.

Embarrassingly, we had to wait ages for a lift. But Mr Ivanov's good humour
seemed boundless.

"Is that all for us?" he asked, as a BBC kitchen worker pushed past a large
trolley laden with water bottles.

As we all finally squeezed into the lift, he shouted jokingly to his
ambassador to London: "Out you get! You're too heavy! The doors won't close!"

And when I suggested make up for the TV cameras, he musingly replied: "I
wonder what the British Foreign Secretary will make of me if I turn up with
powder on my nose."

Direct answers

My third mistake was to worry he would be evasive and long-winded.

That was to happen later, at his press conference with Jack Straw, a master
performance on both their parts of delicacy and diplomatic obfuscation.

But for the BBC's world audience, he was prepared to be considerably more

"How long do you want my answers?" he asked quietly before we began. No
wonder he was clear cut.

Perhaps Igor Ivanov was determined to do his best - not just to turn the
spotlight on Russia in the midst of this crisis, but also on himself a little

As the interview wore on, I realised this hour-long exposure to the world's
questions was taking place because Russia is feeling supremely confident at
this moment. And as the poker game which is the battle for votes in the UN
Security Council reaches its climax, what better way to make your case to
the international community than take to the international airwaves?

Anyway, with no obvious sign that the US, Britain, and Spain are winning
any more allies beyond Bulgaria to support their second resolution, Russia
can afford to relax a little.

After all, if the Americans fail to win over nine voices out of the
Security Council's 15 to vote in favour of a resolution to pave the way for
war, then Moscow, like France, can brandish its veto threat without fear.

There will be little chance during this Iraq crisis that it will have to
use it.

Well connected

"I don't think they'll get nine votes," he said after the interview was
over, as he took off his microphone.

"I don't think even Pakistan will support the US," he added.

He should know, I suppose.

This is a foreign minister who has telephoned seven out of the 10 rotating
members of the Security Council in the past few days.

Though of course it is always quite possible they say one thing to Mr
Ivanov, and quite another when America's big guns - Colin Powell or
Condoleezza Rice - come on the line.

But however the votes finally stack up, my impression was that Russia is
already resigned to the prospect that the US - and presumably Britain -
will go to war without a UN resolution.

In that case, Mr Ivanov's message was that Russia and others will remain
critical of the use of force, but won't stop working with Washington and
London, or trying to bring the debate and the centre of power back to the
Security Council.

Nor was there an inkling in any of his answers, on camera or off, that
Moscow is considering coming round to the US view if it can do a deal on
its oil interests in Iraq and secure a promise to be paid back the billions
of dollars Iraq still owes it.

If it does turn out that Russia is prepared to be won over after all in the
name of economic self interest, then Mr Ivanov did a good job of persuading
us to the contrary.

It was overall a good performance. Perhaps Igor Ivanov was determined to do
his best - not just to turn the spotlight on Russia in the midst of this
crisis, but also on himself a little.

There are always rumours bubbling below the surface in Moscow of possible
reshuffle plots. Mr Ivanov is sometimes seen, in the words of one Russian
official, to be "a touch old-fashioned", a career diplomat who has been in
the business a long time, since way back in another, Soviet, era.

What could be more 21st Century than to dip his toe into the Internet and
show that he too - like Mr Putin - can handle it?


[interview concluded/first part in JRL 7089]
March 4, 2003
Ask Russian foreign minister
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov told the BBC's Talking Point that Russia
has not ruled out the use of its veto in the UN Security Council to prevent a
war in Iraq.

Bridget Kendall:
Somu, USA If your country were ever to veto the second UN resolution would
that reflect public opinion in Russia and would this be a turning point in
Russian foreign policy?

Igor Ivanov:
I could emphasise two sides to this question. First in Russia the vast
majority of people are against a war in Iraq. I recently met all the
political factions in the state parliament, in the state Duma, and
everybody subscribed to putting this policy against a war in Iraq.

On the other hand, it's also very important that there's no anti-American
feeling in Russia. There were no rallies with anti-American slogans. This
is why I think that no matter how the situation in Iraq develops, we must
concede that if there is a war, if the USA unilaterally begins a war
against Iraq, of course this would influence the Russian public opinion.
There would be discontent in our country and the public opinion will not be

However, our strategic interests are in developing these relations and I
hope that through joint efforts we will manage to overcome the difficulties
which we are facing.

Bridget Kendall:
So you're saying that whether Russia were to use a veto or to abstain in a
second resolution, you think public opinion would support you?

Igor Ivanov:
I have already said that for Russia in such a serious question like a
crisis around Iraq, to abstain is not a position which we can pursue.
Because for Russia it is not indifferent to how this problem is solved and
how the situation will develop further. It is most likely that Russia is
not likely to abstain - Russia will take one position or another.

I have already said that the right of veto exists and every permanent
member has got such a right. Russia has this right and if the situation
requires this, Russia will of course use its right of veto as an extreme
measure in order to avoid the worst development of the situation.

Bridget Kendall:
Paul, Brazil Is Russia's stance based on the business that Russia has
conducted with Saddam Hussein in the past on oil interests and on the money
Iraq owes them?

Igor Ivanov:
Russia has got economic interests in Iraq. Indeed, for many tens of years
we have been cooperating with Iraq in the economic field. However, our
position on the Iraq settlement is determined not by our economic interests
there. And of course we would like to defend them but first of all by the
interest of international security and stability. And our economic interest
in this case, they're not defining, they're not in the first place -
politics are in the first place and our interests of preserving peace and
security in that region.

Bridget Kendall:
Yuri, Russia from BBCRussia.com who asks: Would Moscow offer Saddam Hussein
asylum in Russia in order to stop the war?

Igor Ivanov:
On this factor, there are speculations and I would like to make an official
statement that Russia has not offered asylum, is not offering asylum and
will not offer such options neither to Hussein or leaders of any other
states because we believe that this would be interference with the internal
affairs of the state to which such an offer would be made.

You know that sometimes people say - some protagonists of the military
action against Iraq - they say that, look at the moment nobody is already
talking about disarmament, that Iraq should be disarmed - there's more talk
that the regime in Iraq should be changed. And second that democracy should
be established in Iraq which would then begin the democratisation process
of the whole Arab world. This goes beyond any UN Security Council
resolutions which were taken before.

A question arises who gave anybody rights to establish a democratic regime
in other countries even if they would be called democratic regimes. In the
time of the Soviet Union we had the experience when we tried to establish
regimes loyal to our country and as you know this sad experience ended in
quite a sad way. That's why we wouldn't - instead the aspect of revolution
would be replaced by the aspect of democracy because the people on which
such experiments would be placed, such people would pay a very high price
for that.

Bridget Kendall:
While we've been talking Felix Ogagov, who's based here in Britain but I
think he's from Russia. Who says: Does the Russian anti-war stand on Iraq
indicate a change towards a liberalism in handling other military
confrontations including the internal conflict in Chechnya?

We also had an e-mail earlier from Freda Saul, USA who had a similar
question: Russia's biggest problem now seems to be the Chechen war against
you. That being the case, why would you want to oppose a war against Iraq,
which also has allegedly connections to many terrorist organizations?

Igor Ivanov:
In Chechnya, we're not talking about a war but about a political settlement
of an internal problem - there's no war in Chechnya. What's happening in
Chechnya is the fight against international terrorism and in parallel
there's a process of political settlement.

On the 23rd March there will be a referendum in Chechnya on a new
constitution then there will be presidential and parliamentary elections.
And we're convinced that this process and the process of the political
settlements will become stronger in future.

At the same time Russia is an active participant in the international
terror coalition and we will cooperate actively with other countries
against international terrorism. We believe that terrorism has no
justification. Terrorism is not linked to any religion or any nation. They
are criminals against whom people must fight and Russia will always side
with those who fight against international terrorism.

Iraq is a different matter all together. The solution of the problem of
Iraq is based on the UN Security Council resolution. Therefore we must
comply with these resolutions. In Iraq what is at issue is that we must
complete the process of the disarmament process. We are insisting that this
has to be done but through political means.

Bridget Kendall:
George, USA What is Russia's position on North Korea's compliance on the
nuclear program and what consequences should they face if they continue to
violate these nuclear programme agreements?

Igor Ivanov:
There are several aspects to this issue. First Russia is for the
non-nuclear status of the Korean Peninsula. Secondly, Russia is for strict
compliance of the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Third, Russia believes that all the nuclear programmes in North Korea must
be under the control of the international atomic energy agency. The
interest of the security of Korea must be respected here. Therefore,
putting forward demands in connection with the control over nuclear
programmes, we must also solve the problem of security of North Korea. This
is why we believe that direct dialogue is necessary between North Korea and
the USA. As for Russia - together with China, South Korea and Japan -
Russia is prepared to help such a dialogue.

Bridget Kendall:
Mesfin, Ethiopia Do you think Russia will become a world superpower once
again? If so when?

Igor Ivanov:
Russia speaks for a multiple world in which all the states, small and big
would have equal rights and in which the interests of every state would be
respected equally. For that it is necessary to strengthen the UN, to ensure
respect for the UN Charter and international law. If we manage to create
such a multiple, democratic secure world order in that case a super state
as a concept would cease to exist.

Bridget Kendall:
One final question foreign minister. Coming back to the Iraq crisis, what
do you think will happen in view of this threat this week and in the coming
week? Do you think that there will be a vote at the United Nations and that
Russia will be forced to use its veto or do you think that diplomacy will
extend longer than that?

Igor Ivanov:
I can tell you what I will do. I will continue to work 24 hours a day in
order to look for a political way out of this crisis, both at the UN
Security Council outside its bilateral levels and multilateral levels. I'm
convinced that my colleagues will also do that.

On the 7th of this month, we will have a meeting of the Security Council at
which we will listen to new reports from Hans Blix and Mr ElBaradei, the
head of the international atomic energy agency and on the basis of their
reports, we will put forward further actions. I think that Russia will be
supported by many other members of the council. We will demand that
international inspectors will continue their work in Iraq on the basis of a
specific plan and specific dates.

I find it hard to say what Washington or London will do. Maybe while I'm
holding talks, my colleague, Mr Straw, will tell you during our talks here.

Bridget Kendall:
Do you think that Russia and others could stop the US and Britain from
bringing that resolution to a vote?

Igor Ivanov:
It seems to me that a vote on the draft resolution submitted by the USA,
London and Spain would not benefit the search for a political solution to
the Iraqi problem. I will be honest with you, I believe that it would be
expedient not to put this question to a vote. I'm not the author of this
draft - at the end of the day it is up to the authors of this draft whether
it is submitted to a vote or not.

Bridget Kendall:
That's all we have time for today. My thanks of course to our guest, the
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, and to everyone who's taken part in
today's programme with your e-mails. Don't forget that you can still keep
sending your e-mails to talkingpoint@bbc.co.uk. And you can visit our
website at bbcnews.com/talkingpoint, where you can watch or listen to this

On Sunday, my colleague, Robin Lustig, will be here with the usual Talking
Point at 1400 GMT. But for now from me, Bridget Kendall and the rest of the
team, goodbye and of course to the Russian Foreign Minister, thanks again.


NG Dipkuryer
No. 4
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
State Duma deputy Andrei KOKOSHIN has returned from the
USA, where he met with prominent politicians, experts and
The main subject of their discussions was Iraq. He talks with
Alexei USOV about their view of the solution to the Iraqi
problem and his impressions of meetings with them.

Question: Have the appearance of strong opposition in some
European countries, Russia and China and the growing anti-war
movement in the USA influenced the war plans of the US
Answer: To my mind, the US administration has made this
issue nearly central in the fight against terrorism and on the
internal political agenda. It is now demonstrating readiness to
act despite maximum risks. It has created and nearly fully
deployed the military force for the war.
So, the probability of the military operation remains very
high even despite the unwillingness of many Americans to launch
the war without the UN sanction and unconditional approval of
all NATO allies. At the same time, Washington has been hinting
to the possible use of nuclear weapons in a critical situation,
if the other side resorts to chemical or bacteriological

Question: What conditions other than weather determine the
date for the beginning of the war, which rumour has set for
Answer: If the USA does not begin the war in the next few
weeks, it will have to put off the possible military solution
until late autumn. This will create a fundamentally different
political situation around this action.

Question: What do you think about the long-term US plans
concerning Iraq?
Answer: It would be too materialistic to reduce the "great
plan" of the advocates of destroying the current Iraqi regime
to a desire to resume control of the world's largest oil
For many years the brain trusts of the USA, whose produce is
being widely used by the current administration, have been
working on a model for creating an "exemplary" (by regional
standards) Middle Eastern democracy in Iraq. This model is seen
as the alternative to both the Islamic and secular regimes of
the region, which many people in Washington believe have
exhausted their potential and become exceptionally vulnerable
to Islamic fundamentalists.

Question: Can Russia influence the post-war system of Iraq
in view of the fresh information about contacts between Russian
businessmen and the leaders of the Iraqi Kurdistan?
Answer: The overwhelming majority of experts agree that
Russia's possibilities of influencing the political situation
in Iraq after the US military action would be limited, if not
Russia simply has very little resources for doing this. And the
same is true of such states as China, which has been trying to
strengthen its positions in oil producing countries in the past
few years, and France, which has traditionally strong positions
in Iraq.

Question: And what can be Russia's economic positions in
post-Saddam Iraq?
Answer: We cannot expect them to become better than they
are now. For several months now the international expert
community has been aware of a scenario under which oil
production in Iraq under the new regime will be controlled by
four American and Anglo-American oil giants. As one prominent
Western leader said, "the winner gets it all." Under this
scenario, Russian, French and Chinese companies will not be
directly involved in the development of the richest Iraqi oil
fields. The firms from other countries (with the exception of
the USA and Britain), including Russia, will take part in oil
development in Iraq only as operators and not as co-owners or
strategic partners.

Question: What can be the consequences of the probable
Iraqi war for the Middle East as a whole? And what state can
become the target of a subsequent military action?
Answer: Washington hopes that a quick victory over
Saddam's regime would have an intimidating effect on the
extremist forces in the region and beyond and would further
limit the base of such organisations. On the other hand, the
Iraqi war may provoke an outburst of anti-American and
extremist sentiments in the Arab world, expanding the base of
radical political organisations that use terrorist methods.
I think we can expect Islamic extremists to try to seize
power in a number of Middle Eastern states before the USA is
ready to act against other countries after the end of the
operation in Iraq.

Question: What countries can become the victims of Islamic
Answer: Egypt, the largest state with the most powerful
military organisation of the Arab world may become the
potential victim of Islamic extremism. The situation in Saudi
Arabia, where the government is preparing for unprecedented
reforms, is very complicated. It should be said that the Saudi
authorities plan to carry out the reforms in a way that would
preclude rumours about US pressure.
The situation in Saudi Arabia, the largest oil exporting
country and the leading OPEC member, is of a direct strategic
interest to Russia, which few members of the Russian "political
class" and the business elite understand.
Neither should we forget about Pakistan, whose leaders
have made a difficult decision of joining the US-led
counter-terrorist coalition despite a very complicated internal
political situation.

Question: Can the US military operation in Iraq provoke
the appearance of more nuclear states?
Answer: To my mind, there is a large probability of the
appearance of a nuclear and missile programme in Iran. If that
country becomes a nuclear missile power, this may pose a direct
threat to Russia in case of the deterioration of relations with
One can say confidently that the current US actions will
result in the appearance of nuclear missiles in North Korea,
which will be a powerful impetus for South Korea and Japan to
acquire the nuclear status. Technologically, Japan can become a
nuclear state with its own modern intercontinental ballistic
missile within a matter of months. The nuclear taboo was lifted
from the Japanese political elite last year. Unlike North Korea
or Iran, Japan, if it becomes a nuclear power, will immediately
change the global "nuclear formula."
The way of ensuring strategic stability in the new nuclear
structures, such as the nuclear hexagon of China, India,
Pakistan, Russia, Iran and Israel, which will be created if
Iran becomes a nuclear power, has not been elaborated even at
the conceptual stage.
All of the once and still effective parameters of
strategic stability were created for the binary situation of
US-Soviet relations, when the other nuclear powers played a
clearly marginal role. If the USA launches the war on Iraq in
violation of the UN Security Council decision, this will
deliver a powerful blow at the international legal system and
the role of the UN and its Security Council, which are
currently the most legitimate international institutions.
So, there are grounds for Russia to press for a political
solution to the problem of mass destruction weapons in Iraq in
strict compliance with the norms of international law and by
employing the UN Security Council. President Vladimir Putin and
the Russian Foreign Ministry are acting in this area fully in
compliance with the interests of Russia's national security. In
point of fact, their efforts also meet the interests of the


Washington Post
March 5, 2003
A Crippling Legacy...
By Masha Lipman
Masha Lipman, a Russian journalist, writes a monthly column for The Post.

MOSCOW -- Fifty years ago today Russia was delivered from the long
nightmare of Joseph Stalin. The man who murdered his compatriots by the
millions, who for three decades immersed his country in bloody terror, was
finally gone.

It was the end of a reign under which every man and woman knew that he or
she could at any time of the day or night be arrested, tortured and killed
or sent to a concentration camp. Swept by deadly fear, Soviet people
worshiped their ruler. They sacrificed neighbors, wives, husbands, mothers
and fathers to Stalin. Denouncing your colleagues and relatives to the
authorities in the hope of extending your own life a little longer became
routine practice. "You die today, so I will live till tomorrow" was the
motto of Stalin's subjects.

Stalin's totalitarian police state is long dead, but his crushing legacy
endures. Deep mutual mistrust between the state and the people; the
constant desire on the part of the state to expand its control; the
people's efforts both to deceive the state and rely on it -- all these
historical Russian ills spread and worsened under Stalin. Russia's stalled
development -- economic, technological and social -- is part of the tragic
aftermath of his rule.

Even today, more than a decade after the collapse of communism, there is no
national consensus as to what Stalin did to Russia and how he ought to be
remembered. Nikita Khrushchev's radical de-Stalinization campaign was
followed by a moderate reverse action on the part of his rivals. The
Communist elite that toppled Khrushchev sought to restore Stalin's
authority and to keep him as an emblem of greatness, but leaders in the
Brezhnev era did not intend to restore the practices of mass terror: None
of them could be sure he would not end up as its victim. They loved Stalin,
but unlike him they were "vegetarians," as they were commonly nicknamed in
Soviet intellectual circles.

Under Leonid Brezhnev's regime, there was no mention of Khrushchev's
accusations against Stalin. Other than in his role as mastermind of the
Soviet victory in World War II, Stalin was basically excluded from official
history as it was told in museums and history books. Nor was he a subject
of historical research. His crimes went uninvestigated, and their aftermath
was never discussed in public.

This oblivion ended abruptly in the perestroika years. When censorship was
eased and then removed, personal histories, memoirs, books and documents
flooded Russia. Suddenly it turned out that hardly a family in the Soviet
Union had not been harmed by Stalin's atrocious regime. But the excitement
of disclosure soon waned. Buffeted by swift economic change and its ensuing
hardship, Russians soon tired of revisiting their dark past and its
foremost figure.

Today one is free to undertake archival explorations. Public organizations
may carry out historic research unimpaired. The most prominent among them,
the Memorial Society, has done tremendous work to collect and analyze the
evidence of Stalin's crimes. School history books, though not all of them,
tell the truth about Stalin's terror. A commission in charge of
rehabilitating his victims continues its works under the government
auspices, and survivors are paid compensation, however paltry. But neither
the government nor the public shows much interest in this activity.

According to a national poll conducted in late February in St. Petersburg,
45 percent believe Stalin played a generally positive role in Russia's
life, 38 percent believe his role was generally negative and 17 percent are
undecided. Today's Russian Communists, who still have the most numerous
constituency of all the country's political parties, never fully distanced
themselves from Stalin, and at their rallies one is sure to see a certain
number of Stalinist slogans and Stalin portraits. Under President Vladimir
Putin's tenure, people seem to have lost sight of the reason post-communist
reforms have been so difficult: because of the decades of terror and
oppression that went before. Putin is seen as a conciliator who has
restored the continuity of Russian history and ensured the yearned-for
stability. The majority of Russians today eagerly embrace both czarist and
Communist Russia. A common view holds that the years of Stalin's terror are
but a controversial period in the country's checkered history. To this day,
Russian society instinctively seeks to hide from the risks of initiative
and individual responsibility and curl up in the stifling embrace of the

Meanwhile, 50 years after Stalin's death, his victims have no national
memorial. In Moscow alone there are two sites where mass killings were
carried out in the 1930s on Stalin's orders, but no memorials to the
thousands who died there. In one of them, less than 20 miles south of
Moscow, the remains of at least 6,000 people lie hidden from the public
eye, in a place overgrown with tall weeds. Another, called Butovo, is just
outside the city. When I went there last summer, I missed the sign and
stopped to ask a policemen and several others. All just shrugged. Imagine
losing your way on the road to Dachau and realizing nobody had the
slightest idea what you were talking about.

Once on the Butovo site you see no tourists. The space is vast, with the
unevenness of the ground hinting at what lies beneath. The place has been
handed over to the Russian Orthodox Church, but the church takes a
selective approach: Only clergymen are commemorated in a place where more
than 20,000 people were shot and buried in 1937-38. There are no other
names anywhere.


Washington Post
March 5, 2003
...A Lesson For the West
By Anne Applebaum

Fifty years ago today, Stalin died. Or rather, 50 years ago today, Stalin's
henchman announced that Stalin had died. It is possible that he had died a
day or two earlier, but the true circumstances of his death are so mired in
conspiracy theory that even now, 15 years after glasnost, nothing about his
demise -- not the time, not the circumstances, not the medical causes -- is

But then, 15 years after glasnost and more than a decade after the collapse
of the Soviet Union, very little about Stalin and his reign is as clear as
might have been expected. Often, these days, it is observed that Russia --
a country with a tradition of grandiose war memorials -- has no national
monument to the victims of Stalin's concentration camps and execution
squads, only a few scattered local memorials. But how well do we in the
West remember what happened in Communist Europe? Few of us have much sense
of the depth of the tragedy, of the numbers: the 18 million people who
passed through the camps, the 6 million or 7 million who died in Stalin's
artificial famine, the millions more who were shot in forests or died in
exile, or died in orphanages after their parents' arrest. Few, still, see
much harm in a Lenin T-shirt or a hammer-and-sickle poster. Few are much
troubled by the presence, in our universities, of people who tried (until
archives made it impossible) to play down the viciousness of Stalin's rule.
It isn't an absence of memory exactly, just an absence of strong feelings
about what happened.

Up to a point, there are good reasons for this: While it was happening, we
had no photographs, no documents and few memoirs. Perhaps because the
movements shared some philosophers (Marx, Engels) and some language (the
proletariat, the world revolution) a part of the Western left dismissed the
significance of Soviet camps, from the 1930s onward. On the right, Sen.
Joseph McCarthy's overzealous pursuit of communists in American public life
ultimately tarnished the anti-communist cause. Our attitudes are also a
byproduct of our idealization of the Second World War. No one wants to
hear, now, that we defeated one mass murderer with the help of another.

Although these are outdated explanations -- the left and the right argue
about other things these days -- they still have an impact. Recently Gore
Vidal described the Cold War as "40 years of mindless wars which created a
debt of $5 trillion." Is that what it was -- or was it a sometimes
ill-fought, sometimes wasteful, sometimes embarrassing but nevertheless
necessary battle against a totalitarian regime that murdered millions of
people? Not long ago, a British journalist, writing in a conservative
magazine, described the Cold War as "the most unnecessary conflict of all
time." Is that the case -- or did our frequently clumsy interventions
around the world prevent the Stalinist system from spreading, at least to a
few places?

The answers to these questions matter at a time when the West is once again
fighting an ideological enemy, in the form of radical Islam. If we
remembered, truly remembered, why the Cold War was fought and how it was
won, for example, we would know that it is unacceptable to alter our
liberal democracy in order to fight the war on terrorism either at home or
abroad. This week, I heard a university professor tell a television
interviewer that he thought the use of torture in the interrogation of
Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the al Qaeda leader, was acceptable, as long as it
is done abroad, and as long as it is not used on U.S. citizens. Elsewhere,
Sen. Jay Rockefeller said, "We don't sanction torture," but there are
"psychological and other ways we can get what we need" out of him --
whatever that means. Comments such as these have sparked, once again, a
mini-storm about whether Americans should be allowed to use torture or not.

Properly understood, the history of the Cold War should lead us directly to
the answer: We fought Stalin's system because it was inhuman, not just
because it was powerful. Our weapons helped us to win, but our victory, in
the end, had far more to do with the moral and material success of Western
society and the bankruptcy of communism. On the anniversary of Stalin's
death, it is worth remembering that radical Islam will also come to a
swifter end if we abide by our own rules of decency at home, and apply them
to others as well.


The Guardian (UK)
March 5, 2003
Stalin's reputation as a ruthless master of deception remains intact
Fifty years after Stalin's death, one of the first western historians to
document the violence perpetrated by the brutal leader describes how his
demise saved citizens of the Soviet Union from greater suffering
By Robert Conquest

It is lucky for many - for the world - that Stalin did not live as long as
Mao. His death in Moscow 50 years ago, in circumstances that are still
dubious, proved a direct and immediate benefit to large numbers of people.
In the prisons, for example, the large group of physicians arrested in the
"doctors' plot" and charged with conspiring to assassinate the Soviet
leadership had confessed and faced execution. Their "trial" was due in a
couple of weeks. The men were freed almost immediately after Stalin's death.

Other prospective victims who were saved by his death came from the
political leadership, his old colleagues and comrades: Vyacheslav Molotov,
whose wife, formerly Stalin's wife's best friend, was in jail, Anastas
Mikoyan and others, all suspected of espionage for the US or Britain (or in
Mrs Molotov's case, the Jews).

Stalin's last year, 1952, had been particularly brutal and even now the
appearance of new material is shedding further light on the extremes of his
regime. Stalin's officials oversaw the secret trial of the Jewish
Antifascist Committee, the full text of which again only emerged in the
1990s. Execution of suspects followed months of torture, with one key
suspect testifying that he had been severely beaten 80 odd times in the

It is only by chance that evidence of many of these violent acts survives.
One of the most "Stalinist" acts of the period had been the murder of the
leading Jewish actor and producer Solomon Mikhoels. Here again, the full
story only came out in the mid-90s. The killing was done by a secret police
team from Moscow, headed by the deputy minister, Sergei Ogoltsov.

The actor was crushed under a Studebaker, then his body was left in a side
street and his death attributed to a car accident. Mikhoels was buried with
honours. We have the details because, on Stalin's death, police chief
Lavrenti Beria arrested the perpetrators, though they were later released
and the case was hushed up.

But we now at last have their confessions, which include the detail that
they were instructed to "put nothing on paper", one of them adding that
this was always the rule in such cases. Which means, of course, that there
must be much information about the regime's actions that will never be
"documented". We have learned much in recent years, but much will remain
beyond our grasp forever.

What of the mind behind all this? In his private life, if you can call it
that, Stalin wanted adulation, was extremely touchy, but at the same time
wished to appear the hearty comrade. All this informed the long, dreary
soirees described by his daughter, with colleagues in constant fear. But in
contrast, he is often described by foreigners as having charm - a word used
by the Nazi negotiators in 1939, though HG Wells said much the same, and
even Churchill felt it occasionally.

From the start, Stalin was noted for an extraordinary capacity to enforce
his will, as is also said of Hitler. This is a characteristic little
studied, and doubtless hard to analyse. The Old Bolshevik Fyodor
Raskolnikov, rehabilitated under Khrushchev, and de-rehabilitated by his
successors, saw Stalin as lacking "farsightedness".

The purge of the great majority of experienced red army officers was a huge
negative, as was, in another sphere, the execution of many of the engineers
newly trained to run the state-driven economy, the former for treason, the
latter for sabotage. As a consequence, both army and industry had been
gravely weakened by the second world war and this nearly produced disaster
when Hitler invaded.

Historians have written that Stalin was a "consummate actor". When
post-Soviet Russian historians saw that Stalin had deceived Roosevelt in
crucial world war two negotiations, academics pointed out that this was
perhaps not very surprising, since he had even managed to deceive Alexei
Rykov, Lenin's successor as head of the Soviet government, who had served
with him on the politburo in daily, close contact for over a decade - only
to be shot later.

In fact, if we look back at Stalin, we see not only terror and
ruthlessness, but - even more - deception. Not only in such things as the
faked public trials, the disappearance of leading figures, of writers, of
physicists, even of astronomers, but in the invention of a factually
non-existent society. The British socialists Sydney and Beatrice Webb were
taken in by the not very sophisticated trick of having meaningless
elections, trade unions, economic claims and so on.

One major attribute of Stalinism was stupefaction or stultification. His
subjects, or dupes, had to act as if they believed what the Kremlin was
telling them in the press, on the radio. Anna Akhmatova, the poet, said
that no one could understand the Soviet system who had not been subjected
to the continuous roar of the Soviet radios at street corners and
elsewhere. And, with all that, the effective banning of non-Stalinist
thought, or its expression.


Even the wise physicist Andrei Sakharov, one of the finest minds of the
generation, said later that he was deeply affected by Stalin's death; it
took him years to break out of what he described as a "type of hypnosis"
that had blinded him and so much of the population to the reality of
Stalin's regime.

As one Russian scholar later remarked, "we wiped out the best and brightest
in our country and, as a result, sapped ourselves of intelligence and

Any comparison of post-Nazi Germany with post-Stalinist Russia throws up
the obvious difference that one regime was totally destroyed and its ideas
totally discredited. There was no formal process of de-Stalinisation in
Russia; the disorganised breakdown of the Soviets left a detritus of both
ideas and interests, which took decades to disintegrate.

Stalin's heritage today? He remains respected by a swath of what may
legitimately be called reactionaries in Russia: nationalists - chauvinists.
This might have surprised him, because Stalin was not Russian and did not
even begin to learn the language until he was eight or nine. Those who
remain devoted to Stalin often combine Stalinism with religion. How Stalin,
the rebellious young theology student who went on to blow up the Cathedral
of the Christ the Saviour, would have jeered.

From Soso to Koba to Stalin

Born December 21 1879 to cobbler Vissarion Djugashvili and wife Catherine.
Grew up in Gori in Georgia. Father died when he was 11. His hard childhood
was not helped by two of his toes growing together and smallpox scars on
his face

Names: His mother called him"Soso". In his early years he got the name
"Koba" after a literary outlaw. When he was 34, he changed his name from
Djugashvili to Stalin, meaning "man of steel"

First job: After studying theology, he fell in and out of work. He was
exiled twice to Siberia in 1902 and 1913, and even robbed trains as he
supported the revolutionary cause. Got his first real job on the newspaper
Pravda in St Petersburg before the 1917 revolution

First rose to fame In 1917 helped Lenin direct a meeting of Bolsheviks who
approved armed uprising. Became Communist general secretary in 1922

Worst legacy: Killed millions across Russia. Hundreds of thousands of
scientists, artists, priests and intellectuals perished in the Gulag

Better legacy: Transformed Russian industry, enabling Russia to resist the
Nazi advance