I find the report of interest from two points of view. First, it gives the perspective of a very well-informed observer on the condition of Russian science and technology in the early 1990s. Second, it is suggestive regarding the motives behind US financial support of science in post-Soviet Russia. (2)

The author states that Russia has "an enormous storehouse of SET information and an equally enormous rapidly decaying infrastructure for its dissemination, storage, and production." True, the storehouse contains somewhat less information than its vast size would suggest because there is massive duplication of effort: "One could visit several places and find out that they were all working on the same problem unaware or uninterested that others had the same goal." So the American visitor knows more about what is going on in Russian science than do the Russian scientists themselves!

Nevertheless, Russian scientists and engineers have developed novel technologies in a range of fields, for example:

* ultra-fine powders

* synthesis of refractory or hard materials

* free electron lasers

* configuration and equipment of the Buran space shuttle

* electromagnetic control of shock waves

* supersonic combustion

A great deal of valuable information is vanishing rapidly as a result of the departure of personnel combined with poor documentation. "The second generation of designers in the Russian aerospace industry have retired, and they have failed to document their lifelong experience." And "because of the obsession with secrecy many results were never put in archival form. When file cabinets are emptied into the trash, the information is gone forever. Some archived data is literally being dissolved in water because of leaking roofs or being eaten by hungry rats." (3)

Turning to American motives, let us start with this statement from the report's opening section. The author writes that he has attempted "to establish normal professional relationships [between Russian scientists, engineers, and technologists and] colleagues in the United States which would be of benefit to the US Air Force through the acquisition of knowledge and expertise at a fair price and which would offer Russian investigators some hope of recognition and perhaps provide stabilization of their current economic and political situation as well as encouragement for the future."

One wonders how a "fair price" is to be determined. A Russian scientist who is the sole known possessor of unique information is a monopolist, and as such can charge whatever he likes. Should the price be an estimate of what it cost to produce the information? If so, shouldn't most of the payment go to the Russian government as successor to the Soviet state that bore those costs rather than to individual scientists? Or an estimate of what it might cost the US to produce the information?

It is striking that there is no mention of the motive for supporting Russian science that dominates public discourse in the West -- that is, to prevent nuclear and other dangerous military technologies from ending up in the wrong hands.

So what American interests are served in supporting Russian science? "It is in the long term strategic interest of the United States to integrate Russia into the world capitalistic and democratic structure considering that it is probably cheaper to maintain peace at some level than it is to conduct war at any level."

However, the predominant theme is the unprecedented opportunity to acquire information of indirect or direct military value. And much of the information was evidently of very direct military value.

Here is an example to consider: "Some of this data is irreplaceable as it represents experiments, intentional or unintentional, that can never be run again -- radiation exposure, multimegaton thermonuclear devices, anthrax spore release, etc."

The data on "radiation exposure" may include:

* information collected by the Soviet military on the effects of radiation on people living near the nuclear testing site at Semipalatinsk (now Semei) in Kazakhstan, who were observed but not evacuated

* information on the effects of radiation on people living near the Mayak nuclear facility in the Urals (see item 4 in this issue) and/or near the nuclear facility in the Tomsk region of western Siberia (see issue No. 8 item 7)

The reference to multimegaton thermonuclear devices concerns the huge H-bomb tests carried out in the Arctic under Khrushchev before atmospheric nuclear testing was banned by international treaty. Anthrax spores were accidentally released from a germ warfare facility in Chelyabinsk in 1983.

Professor Kauffman points out that not only the US but several other powers are "searching out the golden nuggets" hidden in Russian SET. He makes specific mention of South Korea, the People's Republic of China, Germany, and France. "The French search for supersonic combustion technology is no doubt driven by the desire to improve upon the Exocet missile."

NOTES

(1) The report draws on contacts made by the author with numerous research, educational, industrial, and governmental institutions in Russia. Contacts included visits, conversations at embassy receptions, and receipt of proposals and descriptive information. Contact was also made with some institutions in Ukraine, Latvia, and Uzbekistan. However, the focus of the report is on Russia.

Dr. Kauffman will be glad to provide copies of the report on request. His e-mail address is <cwkauff@umich.edu>

(2) The report also discusses how to improve the organization of US support. I do not summarize this part of the report.

(3) The Soviet "obsession with secrecy" turned out to be not so irrational after all, didn't it? It served its purpose.

----------------------------------------------

FOLLOW-UP INTERVIEW WITH PROFESSOR C. W. KAUFFMAN

SDS: Professor Kauffman, thank you for the interesting material you have sent me and for consenting to this follow-up interview. I'd like to clarify certain points in your 1994 report and get your assessment of further developments since that time.

First of all, who exactly was selling all this technology? I get the impression that it was individual scientists and engineers. Were they acting with or without government authorization?

CWK: The selling was going on at all levels, from the level of the individual scientist or engineer through the level of the enterprise or institute right up to the ministry level, including the ministry of defense. It was like a fire sale [a sale conducted by a bankrupt firm to dispose of its stocks -- SDS]. Everyone was in there buying. The South Koreans, for instance, were especially active across the board. Ethical standards were not high on either side.

SDS: I also get the impression that it was primarily military technology that was on sale. What about civilian technology?

CWK: Virtually all Soviet science and technology was military. There was little specifically civilian technology to speak of. On the other hand, almost all technology nowadays is dual-use.

For example, military transport planes can also be used to fight forest fires by "water bombing." The Russians have a couple of planes that are ideal for this purpose. Their amphibian Berev-200 can load ten tons of water from a nearby lake or river in under a minute, and then locate the fire through the smoke plume by means of infrared sensors. We have nothing like this. I would like to arrange a deal whereby the US would buy Russian fire-fighting planes and Russian air carriers would buy Boeing passenger planes in exchange.

My own field of explosion science also has important civilian applications. I participated in research under the aegis of the US National Academy of Science to prevent dust explosions in grain elevators and grain handling facilities. I discussed this work with colleagues at the Institute of Chemical Physics in Moscow as early as 1981.

SDS: Could you explain your reference to data from Soviet "experiments that can never be run again"?

CWK: Soviet technologists carried out incredible experiments that would never be permitted in the US because of the dangers involved. Take an example from my own area of specialization: Fuel Air Explosives (FAE), otherwise known as vacuum bombs. We used them in Vietnam, and the Russians have been using them in Chechnya. The Soviets carried out the largest ever FAE explosion, out in space. Unfortunately we did not obtain much information about it.

SDS: I just happened to come across an article about a Soviet experiment to simulate farming conditions after a nuclear war by irradiating wheat with radioactive cesium-137. This took place in eastern Georgia in the 1970s [The Washington Post National Weekly Edition, November 18-24, 2002, pp. 16-17]. And it appears that Chernobyl too was the result of some kind of experiment -- an unauthorized one in that particular instance.

In your report you talk about the ongoing loss of knowledge accumulated by Soviet science. That was in 1994. How much further has the process gone since then?

CWK: The loss of corporate memory has accelerated with the death of most of the leading figures from the old Soviet generation of scientists and designers. Khariton [the nuclear physicist] is dead. Tupolev [the aircraft designer] is dead; even his son is dead. Mil [the helicopter designer] is dead. They took a great deal of what they knew with them to the grave. But we can still learn quite a lot from representatives of the follow-on generation, and I have been doing what I can to set up contacts between them and American designers.

In the summer of 1994, I took a rather large delegation of people from NASA, the US Army, and various helicopter firms to discuss joint research and the purchase of Russian helicopter technology. We visited the Kamov and Mil Helicopter Design Bureaus, the Central Institute of Aviation Motors, and the Central Aero and Hydrodynamic Institute.

I am currently trying to organize a similar trip for aircraft designers. That is an area with great potential for collaboration. The Russians have produced very unusual aircraft models. I mentioned their fire fighting planes. Another type of aircraft they have developed is what they call ekranoplanes. (1) These are planes that fly low over water, wetlands, ice or snow. They take advantage of the additional lift provided by the cushion of dense air trapped between the plane's large wings and the surface, thereby saving on fuel and increasing range. They have military applications -- antisubmarine warfare, coastal defense, amphibious assault -- but are ideal too for sealift and for search and rescue. We have nothing like them, and in general the Russians are far ahead of us in air-cushion vehicle technology. Then there are planes with innovative features like skis, mudguards, debris screens, gear pods, and six-wheel gear.

Most worrisome for the future is that the follow-on generation of Russian designers seems to be the last generation. Young people are no longer going into science and technology. Business is more attractive. One Russian colleague told me that the average age of scientists in her institute is now 55.

SDS: Looking back at the whole of the period since the Soviet Union started to open up in the late 1980s, how would you assess the achievements of US-Soviet and then US-Russian cooperation in science and technology?

CWK: Something has been achieved. The Soros program has been an unqualified success. So was the USAID student exchange program of 1992-96, over half of whose graduates ended up at joint enterprises. About one fifth of the participants in the Special American Business Intern Training were scientists. Ford, who now produce automobiles in St. Petersburg, bring over twenty Russian scientists each year.

I should mention the successful program initiated by James Billington, a respected scholar of Russia and librarian for the US Congress, under which young Russians expected to become the leaders of tomorrow are brought to the US for one year of study.

The International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) has helped some Russian scientists set up and develop science-based business enterprises. (2) The Civilian Research and Development Foundation (CRDF) also achieved something, though it was constrained by limited funding: it received perhaps ten proposals for each grant it was able to make.

Quite a lot has been done in the area of aircraft and helicopter technology, although the only firm that has established close and enduring ties with Russia is Boeing, which employs 400 Russian aeronautical scientists and engineers at its Moscow branch even though it doesn't actually manufacture aircraft in Russia. The European Office of Aerospace Research and Development [an agency of the US Air Force] has a small continuing program.

But overall I would say we have failed. There are pockets of success, but nothing like what could and should have been. In the mid-1990s we had the opportunity of the century, and we missed it. From 1996 on the Russians became more conservative: they no longer wanted so much technology leaving the country. By the late 1990s it was too late.

SDS: Why do you think the opportunity was missed?

CWK: My colleagues and I interacted quite a bit with the Clinton Administration, and it seemed to me that they lacked vision. They poured the lion's share of the resources available for Russia down the rat hole of the Harvard Institute for International Development, which was allowed unsupervised control of enormous amounts of federal money.

Science and technology had much lower priority. I proposed to the Clinton Administration a couple of projects to establish internet linkages between scientists and technologists in the US and in Russia and the former Soviet Union. One project, called "the Global Village," would have linked US industry with scientists and technologists in Russia and Central Asia. (At that time, by the way, government people were quite unable to appreciate the importance of the Central Asian countries.) The other project was called "Viewnet," which stood for Virtual Interactive East-West Network for Science and Technology. Both proposals were rejected.

A large part of the explanation is that there were many people who didn't want technological cooperation to succeed because they saw Russia only as a competitor, not as a potential partner.

SDS: How does that compare with the approach to scientific and technological cooperation of the Bush Administration?

CWK: I have had no interactions with the Bush Administration, but I would be glad to explore these matters with them. Who knows? Perhaps something could be achieved. I would not like to prejudge the outcome.

NOTES

(1) In the West these planes are usually known as WIG (wing in the ground effect) planes. They have also been dubbed "Caspian Sea Monsters." For further information, see http://aeroweb.lucia.it/~agretch/RAFAQ/WIG.html

(2) The work of the ISTC has been described by Maria Douglas and Peter Falatyn in the RAS: see No. 10, item 1.

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