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#13
Tribuna
December 21, 2001
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ISN'T TELLING THE WHOLE TRUTH
Possible consequences of the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty
Author: Vladimir Kuklev
Source: Tribuna, December 21, 2001, p. 6
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]

MAJOR-GENERAL VLADIMIR KUKLEV LOOKS AT HOW THE US WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABM TREATY OF 1972 IS LIKELY TO AFFECT RUSSIA. THE UNITED STATES IS ASPIRING TO UNILATERAL NUCLEAR RESTRICTION, WHEN THE US WOULD BE ABLE TO RESTRICT ANY OTHER STATE, BUT NO OTHER STATE WOULD BE ABLE TO RESTRICT THE UNITED STATES.

George Bush has announced that the United States is pulling out of the ABM Treaty of 1972. What will be the consequences for Russia?

The mutual nuclear restriction (or mutually assured destruction) between the USSR and the United States envisaged in the treaty maintained stability in relations between the two states, and had a positive influence on the global situation. This provided favorable opportunities for developing the process of limitation and decrease in other weapons of mass destruction, non-proliferation of them in the world, securing the atmosphere of trust in relations between states.

The decision of the United States to withdraw from the treaty means a conceptual change in its nuclear strategy. The United States is rejecting the idea of mutual nuclear restriction and aspire to unilateral nuclear restriction, or a situation when the US would be able to restrict any other state, but no state would be able to restrict the United States. And this is strategic domination in the world, which Russia has long been fighting against, favoring the ABM Treaty.

The American supporters of creating a missile defense assert that present relations between Russia and the United States have outgrown the level of mutual restriction, and it is necessary to look for new frames of strategic relations between the two countries.

Firstly, the president of the United States did not tell the whole truth. In fact, the United States does not deny the doctrine of restriction as it is. Representatives of present US administration speak about the necessity to strengthen restriction, with more stress on defense. The United States now wants only to make this restriction one-sided.

Will it be in the interests of Russia? I doubt it. The US national missile defense will lessen the value of our strategic potential, and question our security, at least from the side of the United States. Of course, at present there is no direct threat from the United States, however, political situation is changing more rapidly than defense abilities of countries. And the events of recent years show that military forces are more often used in the United States as a universal and most convincing argument in settling all questions. And it would be a crime to abandon the last what we have - ability to maintain strategic nuclear restriction in respect to any country. While we maintain it, we can continue talking to the United States as equals in the sphere of security, at least.

Secondly, on what foundation is the establishment of this "mutual cooperation" based, what should replace the mutual nuclear restriction? There is no definite answer to this question yet, there is only talk about some "partnership", which should be agreed on as soon as possible. At the same time, the experience of the closest allies of the United States in NATO proves that there is no equality in it. Especially since Russian-American relations have not yet reached the level, when we could forget about our own security.

Thirdly, if we are going to be partners with the United States on some basis, different from mutual nuclear reastriction, what shall we do with the military doctrine of the Russian Federation, in particular with its major point about the role of strategic nuclear restriction in securing defensive capacity of the country? And of this position keeps its importance, then it is necessary to admit discrepancies between the approaches of Russia and the United States toward the essence of our future relations. And in its turn, it shows the necessity of minute elaboration of each step and danger of haste in forming a new relationship with the United States.

Fourthly, even if we admit that it is necessary to replace mutual nuclear restriction with something else, it would make sense first to agree on these new relations, fix them and then start destroying the old ones. However, the US administration decided otherwise, and our obvious concernment about working out new frames as soon as possible helps them, because it comforts Russian and the world public opinion, worried about dangerous actions of the United States.

There is another question: how much do we need those new frames? Is not it high time for us to get rid of that old habit to place the relations with the United States in the center of our foreign policies? We do not consider changing our relkationships with other states. Besides, this would correspond to the idea of building a multi-polar world. even officials of the United States declare that relations with Russia are no longer a priority in foreign policy.

(Translated by Daria Brunova)

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