#17
Obshchaya Gazeta
No. 47
November 2001
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
THERE IS NO OTHER WAY
But Can the President Convince Russia's Elite and Society?
Vladimir PUTIN has reached deep into the West, surging far ahead of Russian public opinion and many members of its political elite. This opinion is being voiced by analysts ever more often, as they assess the results of the latest Putin-Bush summit. But is that so? Has Russia made any real moves toward forging a strategic alliance with the West? Does there exist any gap between Putin's aspirations and those of Russian bureaucrats? We asked all these questions to Sergei KARAGANOV, who chairs the presidium of the Foreign and Defense Policy Council.
Question: Many people were really surprised, after learning about the latest thaw in Russian-US relations. Has the situation changed? Or does this imply changes in the Russian leader's mentality?
Answer: In real life, Vladimir Putin began to consolidate Russian positions along each particular direction (where the required pre-requisites already exist) from the very outset. We have made certain headway in our relations with India, South Korea, China, Japan and the European Union. The President immediately took advantage of an opportunity to improve our relations with Washington. It would be really strange, if he acted otherwise because Russian-US relations were either bad or dangerously unstable over the last few years. It would be incorrect to say that Putin has moved westward. By all looks, several moves have been made, stipulating some really unimpressive concessions. However, a considerable part of Russian society views them as concessions alone. This can be explained by the fact that we still feel allergic toward former foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev and his policy of ceding everything in exchange for no gains whatsoever.
Question: Nevertheless, quite a few people keep talking about a gap between the presidential line and the Foreign Ministry's line.
Answer: It isn't the Foreign Ministry that matters. The President's concept has outrun our largely dilapidated political establishment. You see, Russian-US relations were previously perceived in the context of just two issues, e.g. NATO's eastward expansion and the ABM Treaty. However, this constitutes an aberration, of sorts. In real life, though, these problems don't rank among top-priority issues, accounting for 30 percent of the entire Russian policy and for 10 percent of the relevant US policy. There exist much more important issues, e.g. the proliferation of nuclear weapons, a newly resurgent Asia, as well as the consequences of the information revolution. These are the main current challenges, which must be dealt with accordingly. Meanwhile we keep talking about missiles and bases alone.
Question: In other words, the President has discarded insignificant issues, suggesting that we attach priority to more topical problems instead.
Answer: He has tried to rush ahead and to bring Russian-US relations in conformity with real-life problems of the future. At the same time, Putin intends to solve a purely Russian problem; to cut a long story short, the Cold War still remains to be ended. Russia and the United States have been regarding each other as semi-adversaries and semi-partners ever since the early 1990s. This half-hearted policy tends to mar all aspects of our relations. Putin has suggested that we stop hanging in limbo. This is a very difficult process, which is also being hindered by the West. Mind you, Western countries have a backward mentality; the substantial inertia of NATO institutions should also be mentioned here. Meanwhile the people of Russia don't completely understand the President's actions.
Question: Sergei Ivanov made a statement right after the September 11 terrorist attacks, noting that Russia won't allow the United States to use military bases of its CIS partners, e.g. Central Asian republics. This statement can only be explained by lack of understanding.
Answer: An open-minded assessment of the situation implies that the Russian empire's Asian territories had always gobbled up its resources. We didn't obtain any benefits in return. Right now, Moscow doesn't want to retain those republics, which are located along Russia's southern perimeter, within its sphere of influence, no matter what. On the contrary, Russia wants to protect them from the Afghan syndrome, perceiving this as its main goal. The Taliban, which used to spread terrorism all over the world, had directly threatened Russian security. As a matter of fact, that threat was second only to Chechnya. The United States has now decided to fight for our interests in a region, which spells nothing but trouble for Russia. Is it bad or good? Our own inadequate thinking presents a major problem of international politics.
Question: How can you explain the fact that Russian diplomats have fallen well behind the new foreign policy?
Answer: As I see it, our diplomatic establishment was not respected for 10 consecutive years, with the Russian foreign policy finding itself inside an ideological vacuum, of sorts. New, fresh, reasonable and cheap ideas, which could yield tremendous dividends, are lacking at this stage.
Question: They keep suggesting all sorts of up-to-date scenarios for the sake of filling this vacuum. The list of such scenarios includes yet another version of the Eurasian concept.
Answer: To my mind, the Eurasian concept is pure nonsense, stipulating some other national-development model for Russia that would match Asian development models. But the thing is that advanced Asian countries utilize European methods. They have opted for market economics, controllable-democracy methods and capitalism. On the other hand, some other countries have failed to accept such concepts; I'm talking about African countries and some Asian states, e.g. Afghanistan and Iraq. Anyone, who likes this model, should therefore formulate it correctly, referring to such a model as a Euro-African, rather than Euro-Asian, scenario.
Question: How can new Russian-Western relations be formalized?
Answer: This would eventually imply a de jure alliance involving Russia and the world's leading states. Among other things, Russia could join NATO; however, specific membership terms should stipulate NATO's transformation into an entirely new organization. In other words, NATO should also admit Japan or some other country. A revamped NATO can serve as a genuine foundation of 21st century security. Right now, NATO still remains an obsolete organization, which attaches priority to European developments, and which is concerned over its self-preservation, in the first place.
Question: What are Russian elites afraid of? What positions do they defend, while denouncing Putin's "concessions"?
Answer: In my opinion, one can talk about lack of understanding and mercenary interests alike. We are becoming part and parcel of the international division of labor and international competition. Some of our economic structures understand only too well that they won't survive inside this new global system, also failing to withstand fair competition. They find it more profitable to live in conditions of state protectionism and behind closed borders. All these groups now side with the so-called Eurasian school.
Question: Will Russian authorities keep moving westward? And will the alliance being mentioned by you become a reality? What are the chances for all this?
Answer: The problem doesn't lie in Putin himself. Society, which keeps dragging us back, and which is not ready for domestic reforms and for specific foreign-policy changes, presents a problem. Consequently, everything depends on the establishment's ability to explain its intentions with the utmost clarity and to display will-power. Putin has so far failed to explain his foreign-policy goals. Nor has he explained his domestic-policy goals. People believe Putin, sensing that he stands for Russia, and that he opposes all aspects of Yeltsin's policy. However, Putin's popularity won't last long that way. The President should publish a clear-cut program, which might well suit 50 percent, rather than 70 percent of our society. However, Putin would then be backed by those 50 percent.
Transcript by Maxim GLIKIN.
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