#2
The Guardian (UK)
25 October 2001
Controlling Kabul Political and strategic interests
divide world leaders over the future government of Afghanistan
By Simon Tisdall
A meeting in the Tajik capital of Dushanbe this week between Russia's President Vladimir Putin and the leader of Kabul's government-in-exile, Burhanuddin Rabbani, has further complicated attempts to forge a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan.
Putin was en route to Moscow from a meeting in Shanghai of Asian and Pacific nations, at which US President George Bush described him as a "stalwart partner" in the current American-led military action in Afghanistan. The two men were said to have agreed that a broad-based, multi-ethnic post-Taliban administration in Kabul was Afghanistan's best long-term hope. In the view of US secretary of state, Colin Powell, such a government could include moderate elements of the ruling Taliban.
But in Dushanbe, Putin described Rabbani, ousted from power in 1996, as the country's sole "legitimate" leader and condemned the Taliban in forthright terms. In a sense, Putin is technically correct. The United Nations still recognises the Tajik and Uzbek-dominated United Front/Northern Alliance, which Rabbani leads, as Afghanistan's rulers. Only three countries opened diplomatic relations with the Taliban when they took power - Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates - and all have now cut formal ties.
But Putin went further. "We consider that the Taliban has compromised itself through its cooperation with international terrorists," he said, in a reference to Osama bin Laden and his Afghan-based al-Qaida network. The Taliban, he said, should play no part in a future government.
That statement put Putin at odds with Powell and the Bush administration and effectively did something that even the US has so far eschewed - made the removal of the Taliban from power an official war aim.
This is obviously welcome news for the Northern Alliance, on whose anticipated success in capturing key northern cities such as Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat rests a considerable part of America's military strategy.
Putin's statements also coincided with a Russian decision to step up arms supplies to the Alliance. The weapons on offer include old Soviet T55 tanks, helicopters, ground missiles and Kalashnikovs - the Afghan personal weapon of choice.
But the Russian position has angered Pakistan. The military regime led by General Pervez Musharraf, and his predecessors, assiduously built up the Taliban as part of an overall effort by Islamabad to control its western neighbour. This policy was mirrored by similar attempts to extend Pakistani influence to the east, in Indian-controlled Kashmir.
Although Musharraf has been persuaded, more or less, to distance himself from the Taliban in return for US financial and other inducements, he still wants any future administration to be led and dominated by the southern Pashtun population, to which the Taliban belong. Pakistan has been promoting the claims of Afghanistan's exiled king, Zahir Shah, himself a Pashtun. Like Powell, it foresees a continuing role for some members of the Taliban.
But it is not trying totally to exclude its "enemies" in the Northern Alliance. This position is similar to that adopted by Britain and its foreign secretary, Jack Straw, who gave a speech in London this week urging an Afghan solution, created by and for Afghans, on the basis of a broad coalition representing all the main players and groups. But Putin's position, in contrast, is much less flexible.
There may be several reasons why the Russian leader has taken this stance. One is that, given his country's long-standing political and strategic interests in central Asia (large parts of which until recently formed part of the Soviet Union), Putin wants to ensure that the future government of Afghanistan is positively disposed towards Moscow and its satellites.
Another reason may be Putin's concern to retain Russia's primary control over the flow of oil from central Asia's large oilfields. In the past, US companies have shown interest in running pipelines through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Sea of Arabia. This would potentially rival Russian-controlled oil routes via the Caspian to the Black Sea.
Putin has also been pursuing improved relations with Iran and India in the 18 months since he took office. Both countries back the Northern Alliance - India, in particular, because of its long rivalry with Pakistan. Both Delhi and Tehran represent important export markets for Russian arms and weapons technology, including nuclear-related know-how in the case of Iran.
But the most persuasive reason may be found in the symbolism involved in Russian proxies finally "winning" control of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union fought a disastrous war of intervention in Afghanistan in the 1980s against the same Mojahedin forces (then backed by the US) that now help comprise the Northern Alliance.
If the Alliance does take power in Kabul, Putin will have achieved the objective that eluded all his Kremlin predecessors and the tsars before them: a pro-Moscow regime in Afghanistan whose legitimacy, ironically, would in effect be underwritten by the US and the west.
The spectre of Russian de facto control of Afghanistan (thereby threatening India) was one of the 19th century British Raj's great fears - and the reason why the British Empire fought unsuccessfully to subdue the country. Now, 150 years later, Britain and its US ally may unwittingly be facilitating that very outcome.
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