#3
From: "Stanislav Menshikov" <menschivok@globalxs.nl>
Subject: DO PUTIN AND BUSH UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER?
Date: Thu, 25 Oct 2001
"MOSCOW TRIBUNE",
26 October 2001
DO PUTIN AND BUSH UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER?
Strategic Priorities Not Clear
By Stanislav Menshikov
Big Power Summits are usually risky. They arouse inflated expectations, but rarely produce tangible results. One wonders whether they are really worth the effort and cost. Shanghai was no exception as far as its economic objective was concerned. It was also a disappointment from the more important political standpoint.
If George W. Bush was seeking another international acclamation of his war in Afghanistan, he failed to get it. Having tea with the Chinese president may have somewhat improved the cold atmosphere that reigned between the two countries in recent months but changed nothing in their substance. And if meeting Vladimir Putin was the main purpose of the trip, their encounter in the "Chinese New York" was far from successful.
The US president's intentions were rather murky from the start. In his own words he was going to convince "friend Vladimir" to withdraw together from the 1972 ABM Treaty. In the words of his aides he was going to present his friend with the ultimatum of the US pending unilateral withdrawal from the pact. He did nether of these things. Something prevented it from happening. What?
Apparently, once they started talking, it became clear that their concepts of building up a strategic partnership were entirely different. Bush's "talking points" were based on Russia's integration into the Western system, meaning unequivocal acceptance of US "leadership" and its view on ABM and nuclear weapons. But Putin was more interested in the immediate issues as to how to win in Afghanistan today and rehabilitate it to stability and security in the future.
For America Afghanistan remains another distant bombing target and a card to play in the geopolitical game. For Russia it is a neighbouring state with historically common security interests. And even if Bush and Putin managed to sign a declaration vowing to work for stabilising future Afghanistan jointly and in collaboration with the UN, it is doubtful that they speak the same language. If this was not so, Putin would not have had to spend the very next night talking to Mr. Rabbani whom Mr. Bush hardly recognises as legitimate president of Afghanistan and announcing to the wide world that Russia opposes any Talib involvement in the future Kabul government. As anybody knows, CIA agents and US diplomats are busy in securing "moderate Talib" participation in that same government.
Also, at the press briefing in Shanghai Putin mentioned Iraq as one of the issues he raised with Mr. Bush. He did not elaborate, but Moscow's concerns as to US intentions versus Baghdad are obvious. However, the US president flatly ignored the subject. Again, the "strategic partners" were on different wavelengths.
There talk in the media about "progress" in Shanghai on the ABM Treaty. But the remarks of the two leaders at the briefing showed that they are far apart. Bush called the treaty "dangerous", while Putin mockingly challenged his friend to explain how terrorists could get hold of an ICBM. The expectation now is that the Big Two will make a breakthrough in Crawford in November despite complete lack of progress between military experts. But why all the hurry? Is it that Saddam or some other rogue leader is about to snatch an ICBM before Thanksgiving? Or is it that US companies producing hardware for the NMD tests are scared of losing market capitalisation if tests are delayed? Russian leaders and experts are at a loss to understand why the US need NMD so urgently. No serious reasons have so far been given except the point that "we are no longer enemies". But serious policy and military decisions cannot be based on assurances of love and friendship. Even loving pairs nowadays prefer formal pre-nuptial arrangements. Just in case.
One explanation is the US view that Russia has no alternative but to swallow whatever Washington suggests. That view has obviously not changed after 11 September despite Moscow's support for the American war on terror. Either that support is considered too small and not essential or its price is being intentionally kept low. For instance, wouldn't US promises to chaperon Russia into the WTO be quite enough? If that explanation is true than all the talk about a new strategic partnership is meaningless.
Our guess is that the solution will be provided by the course of events in Afghanistan. If the US fails to win the war before winter, as it expects, then the value of the Russian factor in the strategic equation will tend to increase. Washington will need more help, not less. But, as Moscow public opinion feels, it is Mr. Putin who is so far conceding to Mr. Bush much more than he is getting in exchange. On that basis the Russian president is described by some as having been infected by the "Gorbachev syndrome". Even if that is an exaggeration, Kremlin cannot ignore it. Neither can George W. Bush. The less he "gives" to Moscow from now on the less he will get back. And that could substantially work against his political future. Losers in wars are never popular.
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