December 1, 2000   

This Date's Issues:   4663 • 4664

Johnson's Russia List
#4664
1 December 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Elaine Monaghan, US, Russia keep arms talks warm for next president.
2. The Guardian (UK): The name's Putin, Vladimir Putin. As far as Russia's thirtysomething women are concerned, President Vladimir Putin is a wanted man. Ian Traynor on an unlikely sex object.
3. The Independent (UK): Patrick Cockburn, Russian troops raze Grozny's 'guerrilla' market.
4. Charlier Christophe: re 4662-Kay/EU Beware.
5. Chris Baldwin: The Internet Editor: The Russia Journal.
6. PRESS CONFERENCE WITH GLEB PAVLOVSKY, EFFECTIVE POLICY FOUNDATION DIRECTOR, November 29, 2000.]

******

#1
US, Russia keep arms talks warm for next president
By Elaine Monaghan

WASHINGTON, Nov 30 (Reuters) - The United States and Russia kept arms control
talks alive on Thursday, seeking to ensure continuity in one of the world's
most important foreign policy dialogues despite the delay in naming the next
U.S. president.

"People are very interested in keeping the momentum going, particularly on
the strategic dialogue on offense, defense and proliferation issues," a U.S.
official said.

"They want to make sure it's all teed up for the next people who come in," he
added.

He was speaking after Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, pivotal in
President Bill Clinton's Russia policy, held one of his last rounds of talks
with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov.

Their goal has been to agree upon the pace of arms cuts in the massive
nuclear arsenals built up during the Cold War without wrecking their defenses
or upsetting the balance on international arms treaties.

No breakthroughs are expected from their talks, which end on Friday, though
they may meet again before Clinton's administration closes shop on Jan. 20,
the official said.

Without the delay in naming the next U.S. president due to a bruising legal
battle over who won more votes in the state of Florida, Mamedov would have
known at least what political shade of counterpart he would be dealing with
after Jan. 20.

Analysts say their main sticking point will not go away. Talks have been
stymied over whether the United States should build a National Missile
Defense (NMD) to protect itself from missile attack from states considered
unpredictable, including North Korea, Iran and Iraq.

The Clinton administration would have liked to get further in arms talks with
Russia, convincing Moscow to agree to amend the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
(ABM) of 1972 so Washington could build the system, which uses missiles to
shoot down missiles.

The two U.S. presidential contenders have different positions on an NMD.
Democrat Al Gore has said he would examine a missile defense system to shield
U.S. territory while seeking agreement from partners like Russia.

Republican George W. Bush has said he would build a broader system, even if
it meant pulling out of the 1972 treaty.

Critics say the system could make the world more dangerous instead of safer,
arguing that amassing any missiles only encourages others to build more to
outflank the U.S. defense.

A key concern for the United States is whether Russia is doing enough to
prevent nuclear materials and technology it amassed during the Soviet years
from being spread from its territory.

The United States is also anxious to find out more about Moscow's intentions
toward Iran, a subject that came up at the discussions on Thursday, the
official said.

Moscow is due on Friday to pull out of a pact sealed in 1995 by Prime
Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and Vice President Gore under which Russia ended
conventional arms exports to Tehran at the end of 1999.

AMERICAN ON TRIAL IN MOSCOW

Apart from arms, they touched another sore spot -- the case of Edmond Pope, a
retired naval intelligence officer on trial in Moscow for allegedly obtaining
secret data on a torpedo.

The United States strongly denies that Pope was a spy and believes him when
he says he was just trying to do business.

Clinton has asked President Vladimir Putin to intervene because the
54-year-old suffers from bone cancer and faces up to 20 years in prison. His
entreaties have prompted no action.

Talbott and Mamedov, who also discussed China, North Korea and Afghanistan,
laid the ground for meetings between their respective defense and foreign
ministers at the North Atlantic Council in Brussels next month.

******

#2
The Guardian (UK)
30 November 2000
The name's Putin, Vladimir Putin
As far as Russia's thirtysomething women are concerned, President Vladimir
Putin is a wanted man. Ian Traynor on an unlikely sex object

Running at 70% in the opinion polls, with a supine parliament about to put
him beyond the reach of the law, and spraying foreign policy initiatives into
the vacuum left by America's political uncertainty, President Vladimir Putin
could be forgiven for feeling that fortune is smiling on him.

As he approaches the one-year mark in the Kremlin, Mr Putin's good fortune
was compounded this week when the president of Russia's judo federation,
Vladimir Shestakov, piped-up to comment that the black-belt president was in
such good shape at the age of 48 that he could still occupy a place in
Russia's Olympic team.

What's more, for thirtysomething women, VVP, as he is commonly known, is the
sexiest man in Russia.

According to a poll conducted by a Moscow newspaper this week, Mr Putin
outstrips the film stars, TV personalities, pop singers, and other
celebrities in his sex appeal. Sexy politicians are not exactly thick on the
ground in Russia.

If power and money are aphrodisiacs everywhere, the cruel geriatrics who ran
the Kremlin for much of the 20th century remained less than attractive to
Russian women.

Mikhail Gorbachev had charisma and a charming wife, but his appeal was
avuncular. Boris Yeltsin, too, acquired the appeal of the erratic, forgetful
grandfather.

But Vladimir Putin, according to the newspaper, is virtually unique among
Russian politicians in being seen as a sex object.

''He doesn't smoke, he doesn't drink, he's into sport, he loves his wife and
kids. What more do you want?'' Anna, 30, told the newspaper.

Others detailed their erotic fantasies about the former KGB colonel and
confessed that they dreamt of sleeping with the president.

Only last week, Mr Putin surprised the Russian and British press by quipping,
a propos of his get-together with Tony Blair in a Moscow pub, that in male
company Russian men talked about women.

According to Komsomolskaya Pravda, Russian women not only talk about, but
dream about VVP. If the image of the steely, creepy secret policeman is cause
for suspicion of Mr Putin in the west, it seems to be part of his appeal to
Russian women who buy the spin-doctored version of a less flamboyant,
Russian-style James Bond.

''I've been in love with intelligence agents since I was a child,'' confessed
Vika, 32. ''The KGB is so romantic - men in black suits, listening devices,
impassionate faces, epaulettes. The president has an iron hand inside a
velvet glove.

''Even when Putin is shaking someone's hand on television with a little smile
to show that he is human, I am frightened of him - in other words I want him.

"Danger and sex always go together... Putin is like a glass of 12-year-old
whisky.''

The top ten sex symbols listed for Russian women predictably include sports
stars, singers, actors, and TV personalities. Perhaps the bad news for Mr
Putin is that the only other politician who makes it to the top ten is the
lager lout of the Russian parliament, Vladimir Zhirinovsky.

He is the loudmouth, extremist clown of Russian politics, the opposite of Mr
Putin's sober and severe public image.

Writing in Komsomolskaya Pravda, Darya Aslamova reveals: ''I dream of Putin
at night. Black-and-white and handsome like the intelligence agent in the old
Soviet cinema.''

The nostalgia for the old days of Soviet superpower is a common thread in the
fantasies of Mr Putin. President Boris Yeltsin destroyed the Soviet Union and
communism.

President Vladimir Putin plays with that nostalgia, deliberately and probably
genuinely ambivalent about the so-called Soviet glory days, and constantly
pledges to restore a semblance of that past power.

''To be honest,'' Ms Aslamova goes on, ''I thought it was only me who was
licensed for the nocturnal rendezvous with Putin... So I was a bit jealous
when I asked my friends - all over 30 - and found out that they all had had
sex with the president in their dreams.''

The Kremlin spin doctors could not have done a better job in maintaining
those 70% ratings.

******

#3
The Independent (UK)
1 December 2000
Russian troops raze Grozny's 'guerrilla' market
By Patrick Cockburn in Moscow

"I was near the central market in Grozny when they destroyed it," says Ahmed
Abubakarov. "First I saw men in civilian clothes seal it off and let nobody
in or out. Then they brought in 90 armoured cars and trucks and smashed all
the market stalls and took the goods people were selling."

Sergei Yastrzhembsky, the Kremlin spokesman on Chechnya, admitted Russian
troops sacked Grozny market last weekend. It is the main source of food and
supplies in the Chechen capital.

He claimed guerrillas used the market, which employed thousands of people,
for hit-and-run attacks in which 18 Russian soldiers had been killed or
kidnapped in November alone.

Traders say the soldiers arrived on Sunday and told them to put their stocks
of food and clothes in the market storerooms where they would be safe. "But
when I had locked everything up they started to shoot the locks with machine
guns," said Musa Akhatov.

"Soldiers rushed inside and pilfered the shelves â?" sausages, butter and
cheese." Another market worker said soldiers took off their battledress to
put on stolen clothes.

Events such as the destruction of Grozny market, the centre of economic
activity in the city, explain the growing hostility of Chechen civilians
towards the Russian forces. Pavel Felgenhauer, a military analyst in Moscow,
says: "The critical change over the last year is the growing hatred of
ordinary Chechens towards the Russian troops. You can be robbed, raped or
shot at any any time â?" even if you are loyal to Russia."

He fears Russian behaviour may provoke a general uprising, as it did in 1996
during the first Chechen war, when guerrillas recaptured Grozny. Russian
forces retook the battered city on 6 February after a long siege. But they
have been unable to stop guerrilla attacks in the city and villages.
Small-scale ambushes, sniping and mines have exacted a daily toll on the
50,000 to 70,000 Russian force.

This week Bislan Gantamirov, Gorzny's pro-Russian mayor, also claimed local
Chechen police in the city, nominally under the command of the Russian
Interior Ministry, were in league with the guerrillas. "They collaborate with
the bandits, help them enter the city, move about and remove their wounded,"
he said.

Mr Gantamirov is a controversial figure. Last year he was released from
prison in Moscow where he was serving a sentence for siphoning off $6m
(£4.2m) intended for the reconstruction of Grozny when he was mayor during
the last Chechen war in 1994-96. But his view of the loyalty of eventhe
nominally pro-Russian Chechen police is probably accurate. He says that in
three districts "they work for the guerrillas not the Interior Ministry".
Russian troops unlawfully kill up to 15 Chechens a day in Grozny, he added.

As winter grips, the Russian forces in Chechnya are ill-equipped for a
prolonged guerrilla campaign. Mr Felgenhauer says troops use equipment and
ammunition from rapidly depleting old Soviet stocks. There is a shortage of
heavy artillery shells and new rotor blades for helicopters. The helicopters
are kept flying only by cannibalising others.

******

#4
From: Charlier Christophe <CCharlier@lvfinance.com>
Subject: re 4662-Kay/EU Beware
Date: Fri, 1 Dec 2000

I was amazed by the November 30 Wall Street Journal Europe article
titled "EU Beware: Russia Wants To Divide the Alliance".

The article clearly demonstrates the contempt with which the United
States views Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations.  Any
effort by Russia to pursue its own national interests is viewed by US
commentators as purely an attempt to "to turn the U.N. into an
ineffective, political balancing act that aims to frustrate American
policy."  To use this as a justification for breaking the charters of
both NATO and the UN in Yugoslavia shows the unilateral decision-making
that Russia, China, and India are justifiably trying to counterbalance.

The article continues by describing Russia's attempts to create closer
ties with the European Uniion as an effort "to insert itself between the
U.S. and its allies."  How can Mr. Kay deny Russia's right to enhance
its relationship with its largest trade partner and neighbor?

I would be interested in hearing the views of the other DJL readers.

Christophe F. Charlier
Vice President
LV Finance

******

#5
From: Chris Baldwin <ChrisB@RussiaJournal.com>
Subject: The Internet Editor:  The Russia Journal
Date: Fri, 1 Dec 2000

Dear David,
This is a communique about our internet site and some other
news sites from Russia.

On www.russiajournal.com (or www.russiajournal.ru) we now
have round-the-clock news updates. Within the last month,
through our arrangements with over a dozen news and wire
services, we have taken the lead in provided news coverage on
a while range of issues from the region. The weekly magazine
is updated as usual on Saturdays.

I welcome comments and suggestions from JRL subscribers. I
should also like to thank the thousands of visitors we have
been receiving on the web site each day since we went live.

This week, after heroic efforts, we were also listed on
www.yahoo.com in regional press directory. (So now we know
that the "fastest" search engine on the web takes 18 months
to register a site if the application is not accompanied by a
cheque. Some friends tell us that they applied almost two
years ago to register their news sites and hav'nt been nonored
yet.

So, we remind your subscribers that there are some excellent
Russian portals and search engines like www.aport.ru,
www.yandex.ru and www.rambler.ru that will give you much
better results on Russian issues. www.rambler.ru is one of
the most advanced sites and comes complete with Moscow maps
and parking meter type rating on all Russian sites registered with
it.

There are plenty of Russian newspapers online but check out
www.gazeta.ru for latest news updates and www.vremya.ru for
excellent newscoverage and updates.

We have also put up a powerful clasifieds' site on
www.loot.ru, our weekly classifieds newspaper. Reader's would
be interested to know that we provide free and automatic
translation of classifieds on this site and it is now possible
to place Russian language ads at the push of a button. You
will soon be able to translate your clasifieds in six
languages and publish it simultaneously in almost all CIS and
Baltic countries.

******

#6
TITLE:  PRESS CONFERENCE WITH GLEB PAVLOVSKY, EFFECTIVE POLICY
        FOUNDATION DIRECTOR
        (ALEXANDER HOUSE, 12:07; NOVEMBER 29, 2000)
SOURCE: FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE

     Moderator: Good day, ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the
press conference by the National Information Service "Strana.Ru".
It is a press conference by Gleb Pavlovsky on the topic, "The
Regional Election Campaign and Amendment on the Third Term". I
would like to make two brief remarks. First, about the timing of
the press conference. Let me remind you that the State Duma today
considering the amendment to the federal law on the general
principles of organization of legislative, representative and
executive bodies of state power of the subjects of the Russian
Federation. The amendment deals with determining the terms of
office. Gleb Olegovich Pavlovsky will speak about it in more
detail.
     I would like just to add that we are planning to hold such
press conferences more often and not only with Gleb Olegovich. And
we would be glad to see you at our press conferences.
     And now I give the floor to Gleb Olegovich Pavlovsky.

     Pavlovsky: I hope that you have all received the somewhat
mysterious sheets of paper. I will try to explain something. Today
the amendments that create certain legal possibilities for the
reelection of a number of governors, heads of regional
administrations. They are known as the "third term amendments". I
won't go into the legal niceties of the issue not being an expert.
But they introduce more certainty in the current vague situation
which lends itself to diametrically opposite interpretations as to
whether or not governors can be elected for a third term. This
applies, I repeat, only to some governors and heads of republics.
     This is one reason for holding this press conference. Another
reason is the reports in the media recently claiming that the
Effective Policy Foundation is waging election campaigns in this or
that region. This campaign has outgrown the stage of normal
"background noise" to become what we think is a dangerous factor
because various incumbent candidates manipulate this in their
election campaigns, sometimes against their rivals by linking us
with them and sometimes in their favor by linking themselves to us.
     The table here contains only part of the false data on what
the Effective Policy Foundation is doing. The table enumerates the
activities in which the Effective Policy Foundation does not
engage. And I would urge you to treat these and other data and
rumors as untrue. However, they sometimes are prompted by some real
facts. The Effective Policy Foundation is not waging any election
campaigns in any regions of the Russian Federation and it is not
creating or destroying any political parties in the Russian
Federation. And it is not planning to do so.
     And now about what we actually do. I will first say it and
then explain. The Effective Policy Foundation has a presence in
some regions, including all the regions affected by the third term
amendment. It does two main things. It takes part in the
negotiating process to form the new Federation Council and I will
explain to you shortly why we are doing it. And secondly, we are
engaged in what we in our Foundation call the restoration of
democratic standards in the regions. I mean above all the formation
of real and practical foundations for an opposition to the
executive authorities in the regions. Not within the executive
branch, but a democratically elected opposition to democratically
elected authorities of the region.
     To this end the Foundation conducts consultations in the
regions and between regions and stages direct political actions, in
other words, it mounts campaigns, but these campaigns are in the
two areas I have just mentioned and they are not campaigns of
candidates. Now I will explain the background.
     Let me start with the "third term". If you look at the chart
you will see that this problem like many other problems has been
the subject of myths and has been blown up. One school of thought
holds that the third term is a kind of compensation paid to the old
Federation Council for agreeing to the federal reform. This is not
true. Similarly, it is untrue that the third term makes it possible
to preserve the system of "privatization of power" in the regions
indefinitely. This is untrue.
     The third term -- and let me remind you that we are talking
not about the Federation Council in general, but we are talking
about the transitional Federation Council whose term runs out at
the end of next year. So, we are talking about a transitional,
mixed Federation Council in which representatives of the old body
of senators coexist with the new senators who are appointed by the
heads of local administrations and local legislatures. That changes
the composition and the character of the corporation. If you
include in the corporation a person incorporated on a new basis,
the whole corporation changes although initially the new members
are in the minority.
     As we see by the end of the year six persons will be elected.
True, they are very important personalities. Such names as Stroyev,
Shaimiyev, Nikolayev, Spiridonov, and Fyodorov are household names
and in a sense they formed the nucleus of the old elite closely
connected with the concept of republics within the Russian
Federation. This is quite a confused story with Mr. Uvodkin (sp.?).
His third term is a result of confusion in our legislation in the
first half of the 1990s. Strictly speaking, one can argue what term
it is exactly going to be.
     But I want to say that in the event of a vote in the
Federation Council of the new composition these people, even if
they all are going to serve a third term, if they all win their
elections, the former and the latter being open to doubt, will not
exert any noticeable influence. Their share of the new Federation
Council will be 3.4 percent. But, I repeat, these are important and
respected people.
     Now about the composition in why they are going to vote. This
is a much more important question. What is the new Federation
Council? This, again, is being underestimated. The process of
introducing new senators into the Federation Council has begun. It
is giving rise to debate and friction. This is quite natural. But
it is taking place, it is picking up speed. As you see, all these
are approximate figures. You see, some governors are resisting, are
putting off the appointment of their replacements. This is
understandable. Other governors have already made these
appointments. But so far this involves only five persons.
     But let us take the dynamics. The figures given here are
connected with real expectations. I mean they reflect the extent to
which the various candidates have been cleared in the regions. We
are monitoring this. In our point of view, already by April next
year... I remind you again that this concerns not only governors
but also the legislatures. Well, by April next year we will have a
controlling third of the Federation Council... I emphasize that a
third of the composition of the Federation Council is not yet a
controlling interest but quite a controlling one. Together with
those on whom they can exert an influence they will account for
about a half of the new composition of the Federation Council. Such
is our estimate.
     In other words, already by spring we will have an actually new
institute. That is why we are speaking about conversion, about the
political conversion of the Federation Council.
     What is the novelty? Let us call a spade a spade. The
Constitution was not observed in the regions. To be more precise,
the Constitution was observed only in its procedural part. It
described how elections in the regions should be held. But it did
not outline the guarantees of local voters against a privatization
of power in the regions, against the establishment of control by
the local administration over the local political life. As we know,
in some instances this control was almost total. Matters differed
from zone to zone.
     I would say that different political regimes had formed in
different regions. To support this point I will give you the
example of such regions as ... we are speaking about the third
term... yes, Yakutia and Tatarstan. In both instances we are
speaking about republics within the Russian Federation. In both
cases we are discussing the possible third term of the incumbent
and respected president.
     But the election situation differs in these regions. You see,
whereas Yakutia used the model of shouldering out possible
successors... Sorry, Tatarstan employed the model of shouldering
out the incumbent president's possible successors. They usually
left for Moscow. In Yakutia, on the other hand, they used the model
of eroding possible local successors. They remained in the republic
but were under the control of the local executive.
     What are the consequences of this? On the eve of elections
Tatarstan is conducting a dialogue with its emigres in Moscow. The
main aspirants for the top post in Tatarstan are in Moscow. I could
name, I believe, Altynbayev, Gazizullin. In Yakutia the process can
be described as one of negotiations within the republic. The local
elites are trying to come to terms on the forthcoming elections, on
candidates to be named by the President of Yakutia and possible
candidates in opposition to them.
     In other words, there are big differences between these
regimes and suggest different models of solution. What is in the
center of all these themes? We see there a totally different model
of change of power on the regional level.
     As the Putin factor appeared, as the new federal context came
into being, a change took place in Moscow's role in regional
elections. In the past Moscow concentrated entirely on the so
called Kremlin candidate. We all remember this very well. Sometimes
the Kremlin candidate was elected, sometimes the Kremlin candidate
lost. The sides conducted a head count. But in principle those were
"winner takes all" situations. The winner got total control over
the region.
     Today we have new legislation. I mean not only the already
carried out federal reforms, not only the currently considered law
that amends the right to run for a third term, that specifies this
right, but also the new package of legislation on parties. All this
changes in principle the nature of election campaigns in the
regions. That is why the interests of the federal authorities are
now rather in the zone of the negotiating process. In the following
nominations. Firstly, talks on the nomination of new senators to
serve in the Federation Council. This is a negotiating process, as
you understand. In reality, it depends very little on the
elections. It does not fully depend on their outcome. A candidate
is one thing. The candidature of this candidate to serve as senator
is another thing. There is a difference between these positions.
     That is why the decisive role in the second instance is played
not by elections but by negotiations. And these negotiations, I
believe, abolish the "winner takes all" principle. Now the winner
gets his elected post and in addition to this a certain system of
accords within the local political elites which is linked with the
federal space. In other words, matters cannot be limited to the
secret arrangements made by local groups. You see, all these
accords have to deal with the senators in the Federation Council
and thereby with the interests of the federal center.
     In other words, the chief executive, the legislature in which
federal party factions will appear after the new series of laws on
parties is adopted, which is very important. I would like to draw
your attention to this revolutionary change. For the first time
Russian parties reach down to the grassroots level. The federal
parties will have local factions in the local legislatures
corresponding to the factional structure of the State Duma, and, we
believe the factional structure of the new Federation Council.
These new laws effectively strike the bottom from under local dwarf
parties.
     And note that the proportions of these factions will differ
widely. Factions in the regions will mainly concentrate around two
centers as we understand it, around the local head of
administration and around the main opposition figure whom he will
no longer be able to crush and who will be his main rival in the
local elections. So, we will have a kind of two-party system, with
at least two centers of political life in the region which in
principle rules out any monopoly of power at the regional level.
That marks a fundamental change in the political life of the
Russian Federation that rules out the establishment of a
totalitarian political regime in a region. And we know that some
regimes are very close to being totalitarian even now.
     And finally, it injects new dynamism in party life throughout
the Russian Federation. The recent incident involving Yabloko, the
initiative of its Yaroslavl branch marks movement in that direction
because consolidation of party wings is beginning. It is still hard
to say which parties will remain and on what basis and what their
strength will be. But they are beginning to consolidate before
launching an onslaught on the regions. I mean the federal parties
are beginning to restructure themselves before moving into the
regions. That movement is to start literally tomorrow. It is in
fact already beginning because the parties must decide whom they
would like to have as their representatives at the Federation
Council. This is already raised at the level of agreements on the
appointment of new senators.
     You understand that the parties which have no chance of
winning the gubernatorial elections have a chance to send their
representative from the region to the Federation Council, which is
a very interesting circumstance. To be sure, the proportions will
be different and the factions of Unity and the CPRF will probably
be formed more quickly than other factions. But the democrats,
especially if they unite into one party under some framework
agreement, the right-wing parties, the right-wing-liberal parties
will have a new chance in the Federation Council simply by virtue
of their composition. They possess a very interesting human
resource potential.
     I would like to finish with this subject now and speak briefly
about the story that was top of the news yesterday. Because my
interview is part of yesterday's information operation behind which
stands the second attempt to oppose Putin's course. I would just
indicate to you what this second echelon is about. I spoke about it
in my interview. In my view not being able to challenge Putin on
behalf of the old forces, the old political elite which is still
basically the old elite of governors or the old Yeltsin guard,
above all, the regional guard, is trying inside the executive
branch to start behind the scenes factional struggle while pledging
adherence to the federation reform and to the political changes
that occurred last year.
     I will name just three figures because all of them appeared
yesterday. I have, perhaps, already mentioned such highly regarded
politicians as Federation Council members Titov, Igumnov and Prusak
simply because each of them yesterday promoted a position which
boils down to strengthening the State Council with a view, perhaps,
of eventually giving it control of all the other branches of power.
     I would urge you to refrain from paranoic conspiratorial
thinking because I have already heard it said that Berezovsky is
behind all this. It is very hard to understand who stands behind
whom in this country today. I think the logic of political struggle
tends to bring the old regime factions together and resistance to
reforms will naturally increase, this is inevitable, and their
interests will become integrated. Therefore, I don't see any great
difference between the old opposition of governors, the so-called
the opposition of oligarchs which relied on television channels
appealing to Constitution and to common law, and the new opposition
which is basing its claims on calls for reform of the Constitution,
Putin and a stronger State Council.
     The logic is the same in both cases, to set a barrier in the
way of transformations. That is all. If you have questions, I am
ready to take them.

     Q: You have spoken of the key role of the new structure of
local parliaments that will appear after the new law. I understand
that you had in mind the proposal of the Central Election
Commission to grant the federal parties the exclusive right to hold
seats in the local parliaments, yes? That is, to strip the local
parties of any rights to take part in elections? At the recent
Central Election Commission hearings it was said that the parties
can take part in elections, local elections today. But in the
recent hearings at the Duma all the factions opposed this proposal.
And just recently one had the impression that this idea was not
assured of support. My question is, although you consider it to be
important, how confident are you that the proposal will be adopted?

     Pavlovsky: I did not claim that such an express amendment
exists. That this principle will be retained in the new package of
legislation on parties.
     But I believe that in any variant, even if it is not preserved
in this form, in the event of a strengthening of the general
federal component, the federal factor, regional parties will
inevitably lose ground in elections. For instance, because they
will have actually no chances of establishing their representation
in the Federation Council. They will have the possibility to take
part in negotiations. But as you realize this will be a rather
marginal participation in negotiations. They will be able to
threaten, to blackmail, they may try to put pressure but they will
hardly be able to count on getting a place in our Federation
Council, like the Lombard League in Italy.
     That is why I think that in any case ... already now the
negotiating process on the forming of the Federation Council shows
that regional parties have a zero participation in it. I simply
proceed from this fact. It will be possible to do without bans. In
our country we always overestimate the role of bans. You see, bans
can be sidestepped. It is difficult to sidestep a force majeure. In
the past an incumbent governor could be a force majeure. Today this
re-establishment of the federal rules of the game is becoming a
force majeure. The moment they begin to act on the local level a
separation is inevitable: federal parties become an elite in the
regional legislature. This is what I had in mind.

     Q: Gleb Olegovich, could you, please, comment on the recent
statement by Boris Berezovsky that Vladimir Putin's election
campaign was financed also by the Swiss branch of Aeroflot? And my
second question. Could you comment on the rumors that Berezovsky is
taking part in the gubernatorial election campaign in Irkutsk
region?

     Pavlovsky: Frankly, your first question has nothing to do with
the theme of our press conference. But as I know from publications
in your newspaper, the accounts of those firms were blocked already
last summer. That is why I do not quite understand how financing
was done. The accounts were blocked not by the Kremlin, of course,
but by the Swiss judiciary.
     Your second question. You are dealing with a specter. I do not
want to join the Russian army of paranoiacs who are trying to catch
the specter of Berezovsky on the expanses of the Russian
Federation. The interests of Berezovsky, no doubt, are closely
connected with the search for a new, as he puts it, configuration
of the opposition. But by opposition he actually means destruction,
the possibility of suddenly blocking various actions of the forces
that he does not favor.
     I think that he is making such attempts in various places,
including in Irkutsk region. But I think that today this is not a
force majeure circumstance for any elections in Russia. But I think
that his efforts are more felt on the level of the capital city for
the simple reason that this capital level is more susceptible to
the resources of Boris Abramovich Berezovsky.

     Q: NHK. Gleb Olegovich, you mentioned some attempts of
opposition to Putin by the so-called Yeltsin Old Guard. Is a New
Guard being formed now? What are the distinctive features of the
new elite and has it really become established?

     Pavlovsky: The process of forming the elite, the new elite, is
taking place. As you realize, this cannot be done in accordance
with some plan or in fulfillment of some directive. This process
takes place by way of the forming of vacuum in some sectors, that
is, the discreditation of some politicians. Discreditation creates
a vacuum of influence, in some instances a vacuum of power. New
groups surge into this vacuum, they compete to take over this
place. That is all.

     Q: But what are these groups and how do they differ from the
old ones?

     Pavlovsky: They definitely differ form the old ones. Not in
the sense that mother gave birth to all of them last year. As to
distinctions ... generally, they have only one thing in common --
in the past they were denied access to the zones which they are
reaching today. I will give you a widespread example. I mean the
appearance of generals. Everybody is saying "Look, the generals are
becoming part of the ruling establishment." This reminds me of the
Soviet times when people would ask "Look, why are Jews eager to
become defense lawyers?" The answer is very simple. Because they
were not allowed to serve as judges.
     So, if a group is isolated for a lengthy period of time from
a possibility to move somewhere, and this group for some of its
features, be it professionalism, moral outlook, political outlook,
anything, enjoy the trust of the population, this group begins to
move where it can the moment it gets a possibility to do this.
     In terms of mass trust the army today is almost beyond
competition, if I am not wrong, it is competing only with Church
and the Academy of Sciences. And so it is advancing into the field
of government. This is not a process that can be controlled.
     Let us now take the example of the new industrial groups. In
the past financial capital, which gradually became an export and
raw materials capital, had its advantages but now it is the
industrialists who are moving to the fore, medium-scale business
that is moving to the fore. This is very obvious in regional
elections.
     So, in many instances when the incumbent governor is
challenged, it is usually the local business elite that is behind
this challenge.

     Q: But what exactly makes possible the advancement of the
groups that you mentioned, for instance, the military?

     Pavlovsky: I think this is a subject for a separate
discussion.

     Q: Natsionalnaya Gazeta. You spoke about  the big importance
of the future law on parties that is now being discussed in
society. Have you anything to do with the idea to adopt such a law?
My second question. If the law is adopted in its present form, huge
contingents will find themselves outside of full-blooded political
life because the surviving parties will be of no interest to them,
are not respected by them. And in this case the behavior of these
contingents will become unpredictable. What can you say on this
score?

     Pavlovsky: Thank you, I understand your question. As you know,
any political decision has its price. There exist two models. I
mean your first question, I am referring to your question if I had
anything to do with the appearance of this draft law on parties
that is now being discussed. This idea came into being early in the
1990s. I think that in principle this is a correct idea. It would
have been very good if it were implemented already early in the
1990s when this model was developed and which I consider to be
correct. It would have been better if it had been implemented in
the early 1990s. Then there would be greater opportunities for the
broadening of the composition and the party composition, including
in the State Duma, would now have been different.
     But we have to move forward from where we are. The ease with
which parties can be formed results in the weak party structure on
the territory of the Russian Federation. We can no longer tolerate
the situation when under the guise of a multi-party system we have
in fact a system of authoritarian regimes at the local level and on
the other hand, a small club of parties in the capital. And one has
to accept this option... As far as I understand, the consensus
among the elites is leaning towards a different, the so-called,
zero option. To draw a line under the current elite of the federal
parties, that is, those who were able to contest the federal
elections. This does not shut the door for others. Naturally,
factions will arise and splits will develop and internal party life
will continue. I think it has already begun and it is picking up.
On the other hand, as you have rightly said, the group of federal
parties will come under pressure. And they will either incorporate
these groups and change their platform and ideology or eventually
new federal structures will emerge. I don't see it as a tragedy.

     Q: You have referred to what you called the second echelon of
opposition to Putin. You sound as if opposition at the federal
level is almost a cuss word or is it the wrong kind of opposition?

     Pavlovsky: That's not what I meant. You see, in Moscow the
opposition is the so-called Moscow opposition which is a tautology
that the members of the political process in Russia understand. In
Moscow opposition is the opposition located in Moscow. And in
general opposition is the institutional possibility for the actions
of other political forces which oppose the executive power
throughout the territory of Russia. The Moscow parties in their
present state are unable to do that.
     So, what are we to do? To wait? Should we wait for the Moscow
parties to establish a presence throughout Russia and will they be
able to create powerful opposition locally? This is unlikely
because as the previous questioner rightly pointed out, other
leaders appear at the local level, alternative leaders and in some
cases they are would-be successors to the heads of the incumbent
administrations. The local opposition rallies around them.
     The Effective Policy Foundation is working and intends to work
still harder with the local regional opposition, supporting them,
strengthening them, helping them to forge into regional ties, to
protect themselves from the local executive branch, helping them to
exchange information and thus to become integrated in the federal
constitutional context. At a certain point in time these two
opposition will merge, that is, what is called opposition in Moscow
and what is called opposition in the region will form common
federal parties.
     But at present there is a gap. Today the opposition in every
region name not the Moscow party but the person who challenged the
incumbent governor.

     Q: Talking about the strengthening of parties in concrete
regions by analogy with the Duma parties you said that one
coalition may be formed around the incumbent governor and the other
around the opposition. Don't you think that the result, on the
contrary, will be the weakening of some parties? Because naturally
there will be a party that supports the incumbent administration
and several desperate parties.

     Pavlovsky: I made a point of saying that this process has
nothing to do with whether or not there will be local regional
parties. I said that there will inevitably emerge two centers to
which political groups will gravitate both at the local level and
in the capital: one will support the incumbent administration and
the other will gravitate towards one, but more likely not one but
two or three main contenders for victory in the next elections.
This is what I have in mind.
     But we are not going to determine who will be the members of
these coalitions.
     Today in many regions even the communists and the democrats
are seen in some regions as a single integrated opposition. Why?
For the simple reason that there is a regime in a republic that
prevents a real multiparty system from emerging. They are all
uniting in order to change the situation jointly. We are witnessing
the beginning of a peaceful democratic transformation of power in
the regions in the Russian Federation. This has only become
possible because a new federal factor has emerged in the person of
Putin and his policy.

     Q: Do you think that within the new political system being
created in Russia, the role of the Orthodox Church may increase and
groups affiliated with it may emerge?

     Pavlovsky: I get you. The answer is simple. It may happen and
it is desirable. But because everything connected with the Russian
Orthodox Church all this has traditionally been very unhurried,
very slow and conservative, which may be good in terms of Church
life, but it weakens the positions of the Church as a participant
in the broad political process. The Church should not be a subject
in the electoral process, a subject of the political process in the
narrow sense of the word. But it is a fact that the Church is only
beginning to realistically assess its social and political mission.
You cannot prod on this process from outside.

     Q: I have a question about your remarks yesterday. Who is
behind the -- (inaudible) -- opposition, what circles? Who could it
have been?

     Pavlovsky: Who stands behind yesterday's action? Well, I have
said that a politician has another politician who stands behind
him. And behind that politician stands yet another one. I don't
think it is all that interesting. It was important for the old
order when the protagonists had behind their backs certain
financial groups, groups of companies which developed natural
resources or factions within the administration.
     They have not vanished. They exist. But they are just players
like all others. The system of shadow policy is abolished. To put
it crudely, very crudely, he who finances various political
operations understands today that he may be achieving his tactical
aims, fulfilling some tactical task but he may not count on the
full loyalty of the political group or individual politician
subsidized by him. Here, so to say, the political context becomes
ever stronger than the shadow groups. There is a weakening of
direct links with lobbying. In my opinion, lobbying acquires a more
civilized form. And once again, the winner does not take all.

     Q: Kommersant-Daily. What do you personally think about the
problem of the third term? Don't you think some governors should be
allowed to serve a third term?

     Pavlovsky: What do you mean by denying permission? And why? My
point of view, and I have expressed it on many occasions, is that
the very problem of the third term has been created with the
purpose of giving the federal authorities battle on a court that is
senseless for them and disadvantageous to them. By consenting to
the third term, the authors of this gimmick believed, the federal
authorities would actually give support to those who would want to
serve a third term. My answer is that anybody who is going to
aspire for a third term should know (a) that he may lose and (b) he
is most likely to lose especially if he fails to fit the new
political, the new real context, the federal context.
     The Kremlin is not the federal context. The Kremlin is only
one of the participants in this context. If you want to serve for
a third term, go ahead, come to terms with the opposition, create
a sufficiently serious base in the form of the consensus of elites,
including with those which were suppressed in the past and kept out
of negotiated arrangements.
     Therefore for the federal authorities the third term is not a
court in which it would be interested to engage in a conflict.
Where it to give battle on this court, it would compromise its
legitimacy. Because in that case it would display bias in front of
the eyes of the entire country. Why should it engage in this? Why
should Putin whose power is tangible enough play any games on such
unconstitutional fields? The process should be allowed to pursue
its legitimate course.

     Q: (off mike) ... Is the Berezovsky-Gusinsky problem an
attempt to camouflage friction inside the executive branch?

     Pavlovsky: There always is friction inside the executive
branch. As is known, there are groups and factions. We know from
the history of world politics that there has never existed a single
executive branch, even the most draconian one, in which there would
not be several competing groups. This is commonplace. It should be
taken into account but it should not be turned into a general
explanation of everything that is happening in the world.
     There are different views on any political problem. If the
executive branch is capable within the framework of its system, and
as I understand you are asking about the top of the executive
branch, if it is capable of collectively discussing and solving
problems, of arriving at some concurrent views, then everything is
in order. But does the existence of different views mean that open
conflicts are possible because of this in the future? Perhaps. But
these conflicts will not have the capability of turning into, say,
a central political problem. A struggle of different factions in
the administration through the press and with the involvement of
the main federal politicians from all sides is impossible under
Putin. Such things would simply be stopped one way or another.

     Q: VID. Gleb Olegovich, you singled out two levels of the
problem: the federal level of the problem of the third term
involving only six senators. This is the quantitative aspect. But
if we look at the qualitative aspect, we will see that each of them
is a very powerful lobbyist capable of giving leadership to the
senators in respect of vitally important problems. There is also
the regional level. You gave the example of Yakutia and Tatarstan
where the opposition is sidelined and virtually authoritarian
structures are being formed. The leaders of these two regions and
in the next two years the leaders of almost 20 other regions will
seek their third elections. Does this not mean that democratic
freedoms are not guaranteed in some parts of Russia? Doesn't this
mean that for them these guarantees will appear only five years
later?

     Pavlovsky: All that I said relates to a diametrically opposite
scenario. You are right in the sense that the opposition is partly
suppressed. To a certain extent, and this is important, there is an
imitation of opposition. In a number of regions, including regions
where a third term is going to be sought, there is an imitation of
opposition, including an imitation of national opposition which is
actually fully controlled by the local executive. This is an open
secret. You can take the example of yesterday's statement by the
Tatar Public Center which was timed to coincide with the
intensification of activities of the State Council. Just relate
these two facts. There is the so-called national opposition which
in reality is not a national but an ethnocratic one which proceed
basically from ideological doctrines banned by the Constitution of
Russia, the doctrine of the ethnic advantages of one group of the
population over another group. This is a prohibited doctrine in our
country.
     I describe these oppositions as subsidized oppositions. From
my point of view, they do not pose a serious problem. A problem, in
fact, is created precisely by the absence of a genuine opposition.
And the federal factor, federal intervention, if you want, of
course, not in the juridical sense, intervention of the new federal
situation in the regional elections in regions where third terms
are sought is very simple: the local executive knows that the use
of unconstitutional means, even of simple administrative means,
will have very serious consequences. The third term is not a
forgiveness for everything that happens during the elections, or
for what has happened during the two previous terms.
     That is why I believe that elections precisely in such regions
will produce bigger surprises than in many other regions.

     Q: Reuters. Could you explain the things that are happening in
Kursk region? The disqualification of Rutskoi appeared to be a good
thing for the Kremlin. But in reality a man who makes questionable
statements and who can become a headache was elected. Can similar
setbacks for the Kremlin happen in other parts of Russia?

     Pavlovsky: This is possible. You are actually asking if people
whose views and positions are disapproved of by the federal
authorities may be elected? Of course, this is possible. But this
is exactly what the democratic process is about. A person's views
and ideas cannot serve as a criterion for obstructing his
participation in the political process.
     As to things done in the interests or not in the interests of
the Kremlin, well, Rutskoi was disqualified by a court of law. The
intensification of courts as the juridical branch of government in
Russia is a precious factor, this is something that we should
welcome and strengthen. The judiciary, and here my opinion,
evidently, differs from the opinion of our President... recently he
praised the judiciary but my position is that the judiciary in the
Russian Federation is not functioning. Today Russia is a country
without a functioning judiciary as a branch of government. We have
courts but we do not have court power, we do not have courts as an
instrument of power. That is why, I say, one of the main tasks in
the near future is to restore the dignity of the court and the
power of the court.

     Q: Did I understand you correctly that political forces of the
federal level are actively influencing the process of nominating
representatives of governors to serve in the Federation Council? If
this is so, what resource of influence is being used in this
negotiating process?

     Pavlovsky: Yes, they are and, yes, they are using a resource
of influence. This  resource is information. Not only the federal
authorities, not only the executive branch, but also, by the way,
the elite of the legislative branch is most actively participating
in this process. I mean the State Duma factions, the committee
heads and so on. They are taking part in this process and are fully
informed about it. And they have access to information. You see,
all the talks are confidential ones. The important thing is for all
the main interested parties  to be able to have information on the
course of the talks. In this sense information is a resource.
     But I will not speak about the factor of the strengthening of
the federal authorities. I have spoken about this already.

     Moderator: Any more questions? Thank you. Our press conference
is over.


******

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