November 29, 2000   

This Date's Issues:   4658 • 4659 • 4660

Johnson's Russia List
#4660
29 November 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Russia prosecutor seeks 20 yrs for US spy suspect.
2. Washington Post editorial: AIDS in Eastern Europe.
3. Itar-Tass: Ex-USSR president describes Putin as pragmatic politician.
4. Bloomberg: Russian Government Backs Corporate Governance Code, Paper Says.
5. Wall Street Journal: Alan Cullison, S&P Rates Top Russian Companies On Shareholder Treatment Patterns.
6. Itar-Tass: Over half merchandise on Russian market said to be fake.
7. Profil: Nina Lakomova, DO WE NEED OPPOSITION? (poll)
8. BBC Monitoring: Yabloko officials rule out disbanding their party.
9. gazeta.ru Central Bank vs. IMF and Russian PM.
10. John Semlak: Re: Black Athletes in Russia.
11. Moscow Times: Yulia Latynina, Easy Tips for Financing a Run for Office.
12. United Bureau for Information and Strategic Assessment web-site.
13. Reuters: N.Korea could cut military force-Russia's Sergeyev.
14. THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION PRISM: Aleksandr Tsipko, PUTIN REBUILDS
A UNITARY STATE IN RUSSIA .
15. Job: STUART RAMSAY TOMPKINS VISITING PROFESSORSHIP UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA, EDMONTON, CANADA.]
  
******

#1
Russia prosecutor seeks 20 yrs for US spy suspect
 
MOSCOW, Nov 29 (Reuters) - Russian prosecutors called on Wednesday for a
20-year prison sentence for U.S. businessman Edmond Pope at his closed-door
spy trial in Moscow, Pope's lawyer Pavel Astakhov told reporters.

The sentence would be the maximum allowable on the spy charges Pope faces.
Prosecutors also said they wanted Pope to be ordered to pay seven billion
roubles -- more than $250 million -- for "damage to Russia," Astakhov said.

Prosecutors declined to comment.

"He (the prosecutor) asked for a maximum sentence with an additional
payment of seven billion roubles, which means a 20-year sentence and a
seven billion rouble fine for damage to Russia," Astakhov said outside the
Moscow courtroom.

Pope, a former U.S. naval intelligence officer, has said he was researching
openly available military technology, but Russia says he bought secrets.
The grey-haired businessman could be seen through the courtroom door
sitting behind bars.

Astakhov said the prosecutors had even accused Pope of continuing to spy
while the trial was under way.

"(The prosecution said) Edmond Pope happened to be so treacherous that he
managed to carry out his spying while being held prisoner and being tried,
managing to take advantage of his detention," he said.

The case has become a thorn in Russian-U.S. relations.

U.S. President Bill Clinton has personally asked for Pope to be freed on
health grounds, but Russian President Vladimir Putin has said the judicial
process must run its course before he can consider a pardon or an early
release.

The 54-year-old businessman is in remission from a rare form of bone
cancer, but Russian doctors had insisted he was fit to stand trial.

The trial has twice been suspended after Pope suffered joint pains, a
complaint which fuelled concerns his cancer had returned.

Last week, the lead prosecutor on the trial was removed after Russian legal
authorities said he suffered a heart attack.

The defence had said the prosecutor who was replaced had a conflict of
interest because his son was involved in the initial investigation, and
requested a new trial.

Defence lawyers also tried and failed to have the presiding judge dismissed
for, they said, failing to satisfy most defence motions filed on Pope's
behalf.

Astakhov said last week he was hopeful for Pope after one of the
prosecution's key witnesses, Professor Anatoly Babkin, withdrew his
original testimony, which had incriminated Pope.

Babkin said in court that the testimony had been made under pressure from
the domestic security service, the FSB.

Pope was arrested in April this year by the FSB for allegedly buying secret
data on the Shkval torpedoes from Babkin, a professor at Moscow's elite
Bauman technical university.

******

#2
Washington Post
November 29, 2000
Editorial
AIDS in Eastern Europe

EACH YEAR the United Nations publishes new AIDS data, and each year these
grow more dispiriting. The report out this week says there were 5.3 million
new HIV infections in the past year alone, bringing the cumulative total to
58 million people; 22 million of those have died already, more than the
entire population of Texas. Africa, the worst affected continent, accounted
for nearly three-quarters of this year's new infections; in several African
countries, more than one in four adults are infected. But the newest source
of worry comes from Russia and Eastern Europe, where the number of reported
infections has gone from 420,000 to 700,000.

As a share of population, this number means that Eastern Europe is still
lightly affected. Ukraine, the worst hit country in the region, has a
reported infection rate of around one percent of the population. Russia,
where more people were infected this year than in all previous years of the
epidemic combined, still has an infection rate of just 0.2 percent. But
these rates won't stay low unless something is done soon to stop the
accelerating epidemic. By one estimate, Russia could face an infection rate
of 3 percent three or four years from now unless it makes prevention a top
priority.

The good news is that Russia, Ukraine and most of their neighbors are
starting to face the problem, and are talking to the World Bank about loans
to support prevention campaigns. The bad news is that good intentions are
muffled by popular resistance to action. For the moment, around nine out of
10 infections strike intravenous drug users, a group that attracts little
sympathy from the rest of the population; and people take refuge in the
fiction that the epidemic won't jump from drug users to the society at
large. As a result, there is too little support for spending money on AIDS
prevention. And public education efforts can be squeamish. In Ukraine, for
example, people have been told to avoid AIDS, but they have not been told
exactly how.

One Western doctor who traveled recently in the Russian provinces found
herself confronted by total denial. She was told that the HIV virus had
come from Afghan heroin laboratories, which supposedly mixed the drug with
crushed bones containing the virus. She was told that Western research on
AIDS was bogus and that the real causes of AIDS remain unknown. In country
after country, the early stages of the AIDS epidemic have been attended by
this kind of defensive ignorance. The countries that failed to quickly
erase that ignorance are paying with millions of lives.

******

#3
Ex-USSR president describes Putin as pragmatic politician
ITAR-TASS

Tokyo, 28th November: Ex-USSR president Mikhail Gorbachev describes Vladimir
Putin as a "pragmatic politician of the new generation" whose actions suit
the principles of democracy.

Gorbachev told a news conference in Tokyo he supports the political course of
the Russian president as "there is a need for an active role of the state to
overcome the chaos he inherited".

Gorbachev believes Putin realistically assesses Russia's potential and is
aware of its need to cooperate with other countries. Gorbachev also
appreciates the president's ability to heed advice.

Gorbachev arrived in Tokyo in the capacity of president of the International
Green Cross, a non-governmental environmentalist organisation formed on his
initiative in 1993.

******

#4
Russian Government Backs Corporate Governance Code, Paper Says

Moscow, Nov. 29 (Bloomberg) -- The Russian government approved the main
principles of a draft law to regulate publicly traded companies and punish
them if they fail to respect the rights of minority investors, Kommersant
daily reported.

Russia's Federal Securities Commission, proposed the new code, which would
impose penalties such as excluding companies from leading securities
exchanges and levying large fines if they breach corporate governance
regulations, the paper said. Managers who breach its rules could be banned
from holding key posts at publicly traded companies, the paper said.

Securities Commission Chairman Igor Kostikov, who presented the code at the
government meeting, said the code will concentrate on improving rules on
shareholder meetings and the appointment of company boards to give
investors greater say in how companies are run, the paper said. Final draft
legislation will presented to the government in March, the paper said.

Russia's benchmark RTS stock index is down 5.8 percent this year, even as
the country's economy is expected to grow as much as 7 percent this year
amid rebounding industrial output.

******

#5
Wall Street Journal
November 29, 2000   
[for personal use only]
S&P Rates Top Russian Companies On Shareholder Treatment Patterns
By ALAN CULLISON
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

MOSCOW -- International rating agency Standard & Poor's Ratings Group has
waded into the scandal-ridden Russian stock market with a system to score
companies on their treatment of shareholders.

The attempt to improve corporate governance, which will be funded by the
firms being judged, has already raised some eyebrows. S&P has reviewed five
companies, and one of the largest, Russian oil company AO Sibneft, refused
to release its report, which criticized management for failing to say who
its shareholders are. "We've found the exercise useful, and we will take
action on two of the points that were outlined in the report," a company
spokesman said.

Russian securities laws are fuzzy and riddled with loopholes, allowing
companies to undertake dilutive share issues and asset transfers that are
outlawed in the West. Russia's main-market watchdog, the Federal Commission
on Securities, has proven toothless in halting egregious behavior. Often,
the only punishment a company gets for bad behavior is a poor rating from
Moscow-based brokerage firms, some of which soft-peddle their criticism
because they are seeking investment-banking deals.

Despite a strong economic rebound in Russia, the stock market has remained
in the doldrums this year, and is down 5.8% since January. Analysts blame a
world-wide emerging-markets malaise, but a poor record on corporate
governance is also depressing prices.

The one-time benchmark stock in the market, electricity giant Unified
Energy System RAO, plummeted earlier this year when management tried to
embark on a restructuring plan that would have sold most of its prized
subsidiaries. Investors remain deeply suspicious of major Russian oil
companies after a series of share issues and consolidations caused their
holdings to be massively diluted.

S&P plans to make its rating system international, but started in Russia
because "that is where the need seems to be the greatest," said Nick
Bradley, director of corporate governance services at S&P in London. The
service, he said, will expand to emerging markets in Asia and Latin America
where securities regulations are likewise fuzzy. The system is the first of
its kind offered by a major international ratings agency -- neither of
S&P's main competitors, Fitch IBCA and Moody's Investors Service Inc.,
offer the service.

S&P plans to assign a simple score from one to 10 for any company it
reviews, but held off releasing rankings of the first five Russian
companies until it has a broader market sampling. However, S&P released
draft reports on some of the companies. S&P said Rostelecom, Russia's
principal long-distance provider, showed better financial disclosure than
most companies, but that it would score higher if it released more
information about interconnection terms and prices in key areas, such as
Moscow and St. Petersburg. Mobile-telephone operator Vimpelcom likewise
appeared to win high marks for financial disclosure, though S&P's report
said that too much power seemed to be concentrated around the company's
65-year-old founder and leading shareholder, Dr. Dmitri Zimin.

Sibneft, an oil company in which well-connected Russian tycoon Roman
Abramovich holds a 40% stake, caught criticism from S&P for refusing to
divulge information about its shareholder structure. But the company won
some praise for its release of financial data and a corporate-governance
charter that assures the rights of minority shareholders.

A Sibneft spokesman said the company will release its draft report when
some other Russian oil companies also get scored by S&P. "We want to offer
investors and partners a chance to rate our corporate performance against
our peer group."

That may take time. S&P is scoring only companies that apply and are
willing to pay for it. The fees will vary, Mr. Bradley said, depending on
the complexity of the task. James Fenkner, equity strategist at Troika
Dialog brokerage firm in Moscow, said the scores could be a useful measure,
but that Russian companies will try to skew results by applying for a
review only when its to their advantage.

"As soon as they start behaving badly, they'll just stop paying S&P," Mr.
Fenkner said.

A Russia-based market watchdog group, the Institute of Corporate Law and
Corporate Governance, launched its own rating system for Russian companies
earlier this year, and began assigning rankings whether the companies asked
for them or not. The effort was sponsored by the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, and advised by the World Bank.

Unlike S&P, the society doesn't rely on special data or conversations with
management, and relies on information revealed to typical shareholders. "We
approach this like simple shareholders," said Dmitry Vasiliev, executive
director of the institute. "We think it's important to rate everyone equally."

Mr. Bradley thinks the S&P system can be successful only if investors show
companies that it is important. If the scoring system becomes a benchmark
for the Russian market, companies will feel pressured to apply for a score
whether they want one or not. "We're only three weeks old now, but we're
hoping that sort of model takes shape," he said.
 
******

#6
Over half merchandise on Russian market said to be fake
ITAR-TASS

Moscow, 28th November: Sixty per cent of the merchandise on the Russian
market is fake, deputy head of the Economic Development Ministry's department
for supervision over trade Nadezhda Nazina said at a news conference in
Moscow on Tuesday [28th November].

At present they mostly fake clothing, footwear and household chemicals, in
contrast to large-scale falsification of foods in the first half of the
1990s, she said.

Russia's first hot line for people, who happen to buy fake goods, became
available on 10th November. Up to 30 calls come daily. Ninety-five per cent
of fake commodities are sold on marketplaces and stands, while 5 per cent are
sold in shops.

******

#7
Profil
No. 45
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
DO WE NEED OPPOSITION?
By Nina LAKOMOVA
    
     Russian politicians have outdone one another in expressing
support for Russian President Vladimir Putin over the past few
months. A distinct opposition to Putin is expressed by Boris
Berezovsky, a few governors and Boris Nemtsov. The Right Forces
Union strongly opposes the federal authorities on many basic
issues, Nemtsov said at a meeting of the Union's Duma faction.
     The Russian Public Opinion Center (VTsIOM) conducted an
express poll entitled "Putin and Opposition" among 1,600
citizens living in 83 Russian cities and towns. Over half, 52%
of the respondents positively answered the question of whether
there was an opposition to Putin and his government in Russia
(Table 2).
     The situation with the Communist Party is clear. They have
been in opposition since they emerged in the State Duma during
the Yeltsin era. They formally stayed in opposition although
Putin's obvious retreat from Yeltsin's positions permits the
Communist Party to transfer to the so-called constructive
opposition. It would challenge the authorities and cooperate
with them without going against the Communist ideology.
     Oligarchs' opposition is a recent phenomenon. They are
being ousted from big politics. They realized that they would
not be "wheeling and dealing" as they used to in the Yeltsin
era. Some oligarchs, for instance, Berezovsky, moved to a more
radical opposition than the Communist Party.
     Every member on the so-called opposition list is in
conflict with Putin. Yeltsin's former circle wants to retain
strategic decision-making functions. Governors are dissatisfied
because they were deprived of their right to participate in
sessions of the upper parliamentary chamber and their local
powers were limited. The Yabloko is discontent over a retreat
from the civilian society principles.
     An answer to the question "why opposition to Vladimir
Putin is needed in Russia" coincides with a classic definition
of opposition (Table 1). A total of 19% of those polled said
that opposition is necessary for maintaining dialogue between
those in power and society. This group of respondents sees
opposition the way it should be, i.e., a democratic means of
interaction between society and the authorities.
     However, authorities prefer to view opposition as an
instrument for attaining their objectives while observing
democratic procedures. This requires a constructive opposition
willing to reach agreements. The government does not want
opposition to put spokes in its wheel.
     Those respondents who do not see a need for opposition
indirectly back this view. They reaffirm the authorities'
position saying that efforts and time should not be wasted on
rows and debates.
    
              Table 1
Why does Russia need opposition to Putin and his government?
(Percentage from the total number of respondents, several answers are possible)
---------------------------------------------------------------
To control authorities and keep them from going too far             48%
Opposition does not let Putin efficiently resolve our problems     49%
To allow society choose between government and opposition programs                                                                                  30%
Resources must not be wasted on arguments and rows              33%
To maintain dialogue of the authorities and society                     19%
Putin's policy meets the interests of most people                          9%
----------------------------------------------------------------

           Table 2
        Who is in opposition to Putin and his government?
        (Percentage from the total number of respondents, several answers are possible)
---------------------------------------------------------------
        Opposition                                                   %
-------------------------------------------------------------
Communists and other leftist forces                      48
Oligarchs (Gusinsky, Berezovsky and others)       18
Corrupted officials seeking to retain power,
those who want to come in power                        11
Grigory Yavlinsky's Yabloko                                10
Governors                                                              6
People concerned over Russia's future                     3
Yeltsin's former circle                                              3
--------------------------------------------------------------

******

#8
BBC Monitoring
Russia: Yabloko officials rule out disbanding their party
Source: NTV International, Moscow, in Russian 1600 gmt 28 Nov 00

[Presenter] The Yaroslavl branch of the Yabloko association has proposed that
Yabloko should disband itself. This is how the proposal was announced to
journalists after a meeting of the local branch.

[Mizulina, a State Duma deputy, the Yabloko faction] We propose that the
central council should consider convening a Yabloko congress in January to
discuss the disbandment of the party and the formation of a new political
democratic party together with the Union of Right Forces ...

The reason for this is that the pace of recent political events clearly shows
that Yabloko, as a rather influential party, will be able to continue to
exist only if it unites with other democratic forces. And the Union of Right
Forces is a political force which can give Yabloko this chance of continuing
its existence.

[Correspondent] Mizulina believes that if things are left as they are now,
the party will split into three groups: the right-wingers, social-democrats
and staunch Yabloko supporters.

[Mizulina] This proposal has not been coordinated in any way. I do not know
how [Boris] Nemtsov or members of the Union of Right forces may react to it.
And I do not know how the Yabloko people may react to it. I believe it may be
quite sensitive. Believe me, it is not easy for us either to talk about it,
but I know that if we do this together, if we do this jointly, the whole
process will be less painful.

[Correspondent] Yabloko colleagues were quick to respond. The deputy head of
the faction categorically stated that Mizulina's proposal is extravagant and
there will be no self-disbandment.

[Sergey Ivanenko, deputy chairman of the Yabloko faction in the Duma] The
disbandment of Yabloko is out of the question. We are currently working on
strengthening our organization, including its structure and its membership
which we are currently increasing and which will reach the figure to be
stated in documents. What's more, we are interested in the Union of Right
being strong. We believe our coalition can only win and we will significantly
increase our influence.

[Correspondent] It seems the Union of Right Forces found Mizulina's proposal
quite flattering. It publicly showed maximum political correctness towards
their potential partners and made it understood that it will approach the
Yaroslavl proposal with caution.

[Boris Nemtsov, the leader of the Union of Right Forces faction in the Duma ]
I think that the merger should not be forced. This process should be
consistent but quite dynamic at the same time. Our views coincide on all key
points and this is much more important than any apparatus intrigues as to who
should disband or who should merge with whom ...

*****

#9
gazeta.ru
November 28, 2000
Central Bank vs. IMF and Russian PM
 
President Putin continues to support Central Bank Chief Gerashchenko's
policies despite opposition from the PM, the IMF and the Duma finance
specialists. As a result, the future of the draft laws to appease to the
IMF now looks uncertain.
 
On Monday the State Duma's Banking Committee was due to further discuss
three bills elaborated by the government upon at the request of the IMF,
concerning the Central Bank's legal status and powers. However, no
significant progress was made, mostly due to the Central Bank Chief Viktor
Gerashchenko's strengthened position following his meeting with the
president Vladimir Putin.

On Monday the lower house's Banking Committee failed to review any of three
draft bills, submitted by the cabinet. The parliamentarians resolved not to
take any risks and postponed debate on the bills until next Friday, when
finance minister Alexei Kudrin will attend.

The controversial package of three draft bills includes proposals for
amendments to three laws: the Law on Insolvency (Bankruptcy) of Credit
Organizations, the Law on the Central Bank and the Law on Banks and Banking.

The drafts, submitted to the Duma by the cabinet at the end of last year at
the request of the International Monetary Fund, were approved by the lower
house after the first reading in March 2000. However, all bills require
three readings in the lower house

The International Monetary Fund has repeatedly insisted that Russia reform
its national banking system, which would involve a revision of the Central
Bank's legal status.

The IMF insists that the Central Bank should be deprived of its authority
to grant commercial banking licenses and should relinquish all stakes in
commercial banks.

The Fund is adamant that the Central Bank's activities should be limited to
banking control. Unsurprisingly, the Central Bank's chairman, Viktor
Gerashchenko is not at all happy at the prospect.

After lengthy and complicated bargaining with the cabinet, the Central Bank
managed to include its own amendments to the draft bill pertaining to the
CB's status. Those amendments were drawn up with the government.

After it became clear that no progress had been made at the November talks
with the IMF, the chairman of the Duma Banking Committee Alexander Shokhin
declared that his committee might advise the deputies to reject the
proposed amendments to the banking laws and to exercise the right to revoke
their approval after the first reading.

Shokhin made the announcement last Thursday and on Friday Viktor
Gerashchenko met with president Vladimir Putin. After his audience with the
head of state, the CB chief confidently announced that he has nothing to be
afraid of and that nothing threatens him.

Gerashchenko went on to say that the IMF experts' advice "may sometimes be
useful" and therefore, cooperation with the Fund will continue. In other
words, according to Gerashchenko, the main reason for Russia's cooperation
with the IMF is not that Russia badly needs reforms, which require foreign
financing, but that the advice rendered by the Fund's specialists may
sometimes be very valuable.

Nevertheless, Gerashchenko predicts that next year Russia will not be
granted any loans. Thus, one may say, Gerashchenko has regained the role of
Russia's key economic strategist. He predicts the inflation rate will
remain at 20% level, the ruble dollar rate will fall slightly and that hard
currency reserves could reach $30 billion.

The IMF specialists are deeply disapproving of the Central Bank's governing
role in the Russian economy. The Central Bank issues money to purchase
currency and carries out commercial operations on the securities market.
Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov is also opposed to Gerashchenko's colossal
influence over the Russian economy.

Thus, the failure of negotiations between the IMF and the Russian
government and Kasyanov's failed attempts to weaken the Central Bank's grip
upon the Russian economy suggest that Viktor Gerashchenko's political
standing is as solid as ever.

For the Russian economy that means the ruble rate will remain stable,
regardless of Kasyanov's and Gref's insistence that the national currency
policy needs to be reviewed.

Thus for the foreseeable future, the national banking system is unlikely to
undergo any significant changes. The government is unlikely to successfully
persuade the Duma deputies to resist the approaches of the Central Bank's
lobbyists.

In other words, Kudrin's meeting with the Duma deputies on Friday is sure
to be a tough test for the finance minister.

But who knows, maybe he or Mikhail Kasyanov will manage to meet the
president beforehand and persuade him that the chief banker is wrong.And in
the current political climate, Putin's opinion is of paramount importance
to the Duma.

Andrey Stepanov, Anton Baranov
 
*******

#10
Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2000
From: "John Semlak" <jsnz@online.ru>
Subject: Re:Black Athletes in Russia

I'm wondering if anybody has written on the possible effects of various
Black athletes, particularly those who have played a spectacular role in the
recent successes of Spartak, on Russian attitudes towards people of African
descent.

Spartak now lines up three Blacks in its starting line-up--two Brazilians
and one of Cameroonian origins who now has a Russian passport.  Those three
players are definitely a primary factor in Spartak's success this year.  In
Spartak's most recent victory over London's Arsenal, Marcao, one of the
Brazilians, scored two of Spartak's 4 goals.  Another was added by Luis
Robson, also from Brazil.  Three of the goals resulted from passes by
Jerry-Christian Tchuisse, the Cameroonian.

In America, the impact of important Black athletes such as Jackie Robinson
or Muhammad Ali on people's attitudes often receives serious journalistic or
academic treatment.  In English language press, a lot is written about the
high level of racism towards Blacks in Russia.  But I've never seen anyone
write on the effects of local Black icons, such as Spartak's Marcao, on
Russian attitudes.

******

#11
Moscow Times
November 29, 2000
INSIDE RUSSIA: Easy Tips for Financing a Run for Office
By Yulia Latynina

Russia is a continuous stream of gubernatorial elections. Against the
background of what is happening lately in the United States, these elections
clearly demonstrate the advantages of the Russian electoral system, in which
one can usually determine the winner by the day of the voting and f often f
quite a bit earlier than that.

According to campaign experts, a candidate for governor in Russia must spend,
on average, about $1 per vote. Officially, of course, they are not allowed to
spend nearly this much. Although the rules vary from region to region, on
average candidates are allowed to spend about 300,000 to 400,000 rubles
($10,770 to $14,360) running for office.

It is perfectly obvious that this amount is adequate only to mount a campaign
in one or two villages. Therefore, in addition to official money, there is
"black money" as well. Black money consists of both "voluntary" and
"involuntary" campaign contributions. Voluntary contributions are made by an
entrepreneur who wants the future governor to hand someone else's property
over to him. Involuntary contributions are made to prevent the future
governor from giving an entrepreneur's property to someone else.

As a result, the election of a new governor is inevitably accompanied by the
local redistribution of property. For instance, when Yury Tyazhlov was
governor of the Moscow region, the government did its banking with Guta Bank.
As soon as Boris Gromov became governor, police armed with machine guns
appeared at the bank to close the accounts and transfer them to another bank.

In recent months, President Vladimir Putin has taken decisive measures to
break these improper ties between the governors and big money. Andthe
governors have begun to feel the heat.

Take, for instance, the remarkable case of Perm. There, incumbent Governor
Gennady Igumnov flipped back and forth on the question of whether he would
run for another term. He apparently felt that the Kremlin was dissatisfied
with him when, just before the election, a criminal case was filed against
his daughter. One influential political consultant told me that Igumnov tried
for days to call Kremlin Chief of Staff Alexander Voloshin, but Voloshin
refused to take his calls.

In the end, Igumnov bravely called a press conference and announced that he
would not seek another term. Within an hour, Voloshin called and shortly
thereafter, Igumnov announced that he would run after all.

According to other experts with whom I have spoken, a new means of financing
gubernatorial campaigns has emerged in connection with Moscow's drive to
reassert control over the regions. The Kremlin administration now has a
special office of regional affairs. This office, they say, will call a
governor and say: "We'll support you if you hire such-and-such a PR company."
The happy governor lets everyone know that he has the support of the Kremlin,
and the donations start flowing into the PR company running the campaign. The
PR company somehow manages to express its gratitude to the proper bureaucrats
in the Kremlin.

Putin's bid to control the regions has lifted Russian democracy to a new
level. I doubt the United States will ever be able to catch up with us now.

Yulia Latynina is the creator and host of "The Ruble Zone" on NTV television.

******

#12
Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2000
From: "VK" <politvector@vipmail.ru>
Subject: A new source for current Russian and FSU politics

Gentlemen,

We'd like to inform you that in November 2000,  a new Web resource on
political information on Russia and FSU had been inaugurated.

This is the Web-site of the UBISA, which stands for United Bureau for
Information
and Strategic Assessment. The head of the UBISA is a well-known figure on the
Russian military-political scene - Colonel-General Fyodor I. Ladygin - until
a few years ago he was in charge of the powerful Chief Intelligence
Directorate with Russia's General Staff.

So for you can get acquainted with the interview of  Colonel-General Fyodor
I. Ladygin where he expresses his opinion on the current situation in Russia,
both on political and military political issues.

UBISA is providing services to all concerned on the issues of  description and
analysis of the general issues of national security, military construction,
of geopolitics and geostrategic situation in the world and in its regions.

Welcome to our Web-site: www.politvector.ru/eng

Our contact information is:
2 Luchnikov Per.
Moscow, 101000, Russian Federation
Phone: +7 (095) 206-8593
Fax: +7 (095) 206-8479
e-mail: info@politvector.ru

******

#13
N.Korea could cut military force-Russia's Sergeyev
By Teruaki Ueno
 
TOKYO, Nov 29 (Reuters) - Russian Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev said on
Wednesday that North Korea could afford to cut its 1.2 million-strong
military given signs of a reduction in tension in the divided Korean
peninsula.

Sergeyev made the remarks in a meeting in Tokyo with Japanese Foreign
Minister Yohei Kono.

"It is highly possible that North Korea could reduce its military,"
Sergeyev was quoted by a Japanese official as telling Kono. "There are
signs of easing tensions in the Korean peninsula."

He urged Japan and other Asian neighbours to hold talks with North Korea to
try to bring peace and stability to the heavily militarised peninsula.
Sergeyev was speaking on the second day of a three-day visit.

Kono told Sergeyev that military tensions seem to have eased between the
North and South since the historic summit in June, when the two nations
agreed to work for reconciliation and eventual reunification.

DIPLOMATIC DRIVE

In a sign of warming ties, military officials from North and South Korea
pledged on Tuesday to cooperate on building road and railway links across
their heavily militarised border.

The two countries remain technically at war since their 1950-53 conflict
ended in an armed truce rather than a peace accord.

In Singapore on Monday, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung said North
Korean leader Kim Jong-il had dropped Pyongyang's long-held insistence on a
withdrawal of U.S. troops from the South when the two met in Pyongyang in
June.

The communist North has recently launched a diplomatic initiative to end
its Cold War isolation in a move analysts believe is aimed at securing
badly needed economic aid.

Russian President Vladimir Putin visited North Korea in July, heralding
Moscow's attempts to revive ties with Pyongyang which ended during the
Soviet era.

His visit brought the first news of a possible deal in which North Korea
would end its long-range missile programme in return for Western assistance
in launching its satellites.

Russia has said it expects the North Korean leader to visit Moscow next year.

REDUCTION OF RUSSIAN FORCES

In Wednesday's meeting, Sergeyev reiterated that Russia plans to slash its
forces in its Far East and Siberia regions by 20 percent.

But he said Moscow had no plans to reduce its military presence in central
Asia because of security concerns due mainly to the Muslim fundamentalist
Taliban group.

"We must concentrate our military in central Asia because of military
instability caused by the Taliban and others," Sergeyev was quoted as saying.

Earlier on Wednesday, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori told Sergeyev he
would try to visit Russia at an early date.

Mori met Putin this month on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation summit meeting in Brunei, and they agreed to meet again in the
Russian city of Irkutsk near Lake Baikal possibly by the end of this year
to try to make progress on a World War Two peace treaty.

But a senior Russian Foreign Ministry official told Japanese public
broadcaster NHK on Wednesday that Mori's visit to Russia would not take
place until the first quarter of next year.

Putin's predecessor Boris Yeltsin and then-Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto
vowed in 1997 to work towards clinching a treaty by the end of 2000.

A dispute over four small islands that Japan wants returned has impeded the
signing of a treaty for more than half a century. Soviet troops seized the
islands at the end of the war.

******

#14
THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION
PRISM
A MONTHLY ON THE POST-SOVIET STATES
NOVEMBER 2000   Volume VI, Issue 11    Part 1

PUTIN REBUILDS A UNITARY STATE IN RUSSIA
By Aleksandr Tsipko
Aleksandr Tsipko is senior associate at the Russian Academy of Sciences'
Institute for International Economic and Political Research and a columnist
for Literaturnaya gazeta.

Provincial Russians cannot as yet see the results of Putin's restructuring
of the power hierarchy. For them--ordinary Russians--the governor is still
the highest authority, just as in the Yeltsin era. The head of the local
administration still decides where to build new hospitals, schools and
roads, where to supply gas, which federal projects to implement and which
to shelve.

The governor may reward some district with his attention and punish others
with his indifference. For the residents of the national
republics--particularly the Muslim ones--until recently the power of the
local president seemed boundless. By the early 1990s enclaves of Central
Asian-type authoritarianism had already been established in Tatarstan,
Bashkortostan and Kabardin-Balkaria. In these republics the national
president controlled, and to a great extent still controls, almost
everything--key appointments, the work of the law enforcement bodies, and
all financial and media resources. As a rule, those candidates who have the
support of the local president are elected to the Russian parliament from
the national republics.

Yeltsin--who needed the support of the leaders of the national republics
both in his battle with the KPRF and during the 1996 election campaign--did
absolutely nothing to curb the absolute power of the local presidents.
Moreover, special 1992 treaties on the division of powers between the
federal center and the national republics--between Moscow and Tatarstan,
for example--established their sovereignty within the Russian Federation.
There were similar declarations of sovereignty in the constitutions of
Bashkortostan, Yakutia and even Tuva. All this prompted many experts to
speak of the contractual nature of our state: We are de facto not a
federation so much as a confederation.

But the regional elite has now begun to sense what ordinary people in the
provinces cannot yet see in their daily struggle for survival. In fact,
Putin's reform of the Federation Council is in many ways similar to Peter
the Great's battles with the traditional freedoms of the boyars. In a
structural sense we have progressed from a confederation of lands and
peoples not just to federation, but also in many respects to a traditional
Russian unitary state. The changes are mainly psychological.

Our regional leaders looked down on Yeltsin during his last years in office.
Putin, however, has in a very short time become a leader to be reckoned
with. The vast majority of regional heads have come to terms with the fact
that the balance of power has not shifted in their favor, and that the
power in Russia lies mainly in the hands of the Kremlin.

Indirect evidence of the growing strength of the center is the astonishing
acquiescence and servility of those who until recently were known as
"barons" or "khans." The governors themselves voted for the changes in the
principles by which the Federation Council is formed, as a result of which
they lost the senatorial powers they had enjoyed under the constitution.
Without any noticeable resistance they voted for a tax code which
transferred a significant part of the consolidated budget from the regions
to Moscow. They thus lost a considerable chunk of their old economic might.

Governors have voluntarily abandoned their positions and relinquished their
privileges probably because they are afraid of Putin. They sense that a new
leader has arrived who is not to be taken lightly. Politics in Russia
continues to be governed by fear, though in each era the fears are
different. Informed experts say that many of the governors are so
accommodating for the simple reason that they fear ending up in prison and
losing the huge fortunes they have for the most part amassed illegally,
particularly in the process of privatization. Incidentally, the president
of Bashkortostan feels able to oppose Putin's administrative reforms
because in his words he is "no thief and no oligarch." But few are as
courageous as Murtaz Rakhimov.

Putin is briskly exploiting the confusion and fears of the governors to
strip them, step by step, of the guarantees for their personal security
which Yeltsin granted them. He has already disavowed the numerous treaties
on the "division of powers" the previous president signed with the regions
in 1992.

His main reason for divesting the governors of their senatorial powers was
to remove their immunity as deputies. As a result of his administrative
reforms, the governors are now under the heel of seven governor-generals
who have shared out power over Russia's regions among themselves. These
seven are the "tsar's eyes" now monitoring, with prejudice and from a short
range, the activity of the heads of local administrations. The president's
representatives in the regions are taking a very active part in organizing
and preparing for the gubernatorial elections which are due to take place
in more than thirty regions in late 2000 and early 2001.

By special presidential decree, the governor-generals have been granted the
right to independently select and effectively appoint the heads of the
oblast and republic branches of state radio and television. Previously,
according to the constitution, the heads of local state radio and
television were appointed by Moscow only by agreement with the governors.
Thus on the eve of the elections Moscow is trying to distance those
governors standing for reelection from an extremely important media
resource. The governor-generals have concentrated in their own hands
control over the work of the regional prosecutor's offices, and are
generally determined to completely nullify the influence of regional
leaders over the activities of the federal law enforcement bodies in the
provinces.

The Rutskoi saga showed that it is difficult for a governor to survive if
he is constantly at loggerheads with the bosses of the local power
structures, particularly the police. If Rutskoi had been popular with the
regional power bosses, it is unlikely that the oblast judge would have
deprived him of the opportunity to stand for reelection as governor. But
experts believe that in that case the president's administration would have
found another way of removing gubernatorial powers from Rutskoi, who is
such an annoyance to Putin. Unfortunately, unitarism in Russia is being
restored using Russian methods--clumsily, with little regard for public
opinion.

The influence of the president's regional envoys on political life in the
regions is visibly increasing. This is also an indication of the growth of
unitary tendencies in Russia. For example, within a short time the
president's envoy in the Urals federal okrug, Latyshev, replaced the head
of the customs department without the agreement of Sverdlovsk Governor
Rossel, and is planning to replace the prosecutor. This elicited a protest
from Rossel, who at a recent meeting of the Bolshoi Ural association
described this "show of muscle" by the governor-general as intolerable. Of
course, alongside the other submissive governors, Rossel stands out as a
rebel, but it is notable that he does not blame Putin for all this--only
his envoy. The fact that such a well-known politician as Rossel is getting
nervous is a sure sign that the governors are losing their grip on power.

The time is approaching when Moscow will be able to dismiss governors if
their decrees and edicts do not comply with federal legislation: This will
become possible from March 2001 onwards.

Alongside the attack on the political and media resources which contributed
to the absolute power the governors used to enjoy, there is also a policy
to undermine to economic base of the regional sovereignties. According to
the new tax code, the governors now have direct control of slightly more
than 30 percent of the consolidated budget. This figure used to be 60-70
percent. Overall Moscow is strengthening its economic position in the
regions by redistributing the wealth of the few donor regions to the many
regions which are unprofitable and which survive only on state subsidies.
Recently regional leaders lost the right to secure independent foreign
loans for their investment projects. At the same time, Putin intends to
strip the governors of the right to control federal property in the
regions, which until now has only been generating revenue for the local
budget. It is not difficult to do this, because the Russian constitution
does not allow for "regional" property alongside federal and municipal
property. All this gives Putin the right, for example, to bring Tatarneft
under federal control, which until now has provided Shaimiev's powerful
political base. Shaimiev will not be Shaimiev without Tatarneft. At the
same time, the Russian business sharks with Kremlin ties are swallowing up
small regional corporations. For example, Sibneft and Siberian Aluminum,
which belong to the Kremlin oligarch Abramovich, have got a grip on all the
large and profitable metallurgical enterprises in Kemerovo Oblast.

As is now clear, Russia always has been and remains a unitary state.
Here, it is probably impossible on principle to establish equal relations
between Moscow and the regions; here the country's ruler is always right.
This was not evident under Yeltsin simply because he did not use his
administrative resources to their full capacity, which is part of the
nature of power in Russia and which is enshrined in the autocratic
constitution of 1993.

This is why it was not difficult for Putin to put the governors in their
place when he needed to, and remind them that they are merely the
transmission belt between Moscow and the people, and that their task is not
to play big politics, but to run the local economy.

Many experts believe that Putin supported the revolt of the Kursk Oblast
elite against their governor, General Rutskoi, in order to bring into line
once and for all those regional leaders who were still opposed to him. This
was a particularly bad sign for the governors of the Russian regions. It is
no coincidence that immediately after Rutskoi was prevented from
participating in the elections for governor, the Federation Council
abandoned its original intention to file a suit with the Constitutional
Court claiming that Putin's reforms were illegal. Even the most influential
and critical regional leaders were keen to become the "president's men" and
to be on friendly terms with his representatives in the regions. Sverdlovsk
Oblast Governor Eduard Rossel, who just two weeks earlier had spoken out
against Moscow's budget policy and what he saw as the excessive powers of
the president's envoys, recently stated publicly that there was no longer
any conflict between him and the president's envoy Peter Latyshev. Rossel
put down all previous disagreements to "misunderstandings."

Incidentally, many influential governors now say that they have long been
psychologically prepared for such a turn of events, and for the restoration
of strong centralized power in Russia. The governors, most of whom emerged
from the old Soviet party and economic nomenklatura, quickly reverted to
familiar rules and toned down their aspirations to power.

There are some grounds for saying that Putin too is prepared to agree to
some sort of compromise in the current battle for power with the governors.
He is at least prepared to cooperate with those who accept the new rules of
play. Harsh measures will only be taken--if they are taken at all--against
those who continue to sabotage the Kremlin's decisions designed to limit
the rights and powers of the regions. For example, immediately after
Rossel's move, Putin's Urals representative General Latyshev arranged a
special meeting with major businessmen and suggested that they should rely
not on the governors but on the head of state's envoys.

However, those sanctions which may be taken against the heads of the
Russian regions are unlikely to be adopted with regard to the heads of the
national republics. It is notable that Putin is showing caution in respect
of the leaders of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, who have still not entirely
resigned themselves to Moscow's attack on their old powers. It is not
profitable for Putin to go to war with the leaders of the national
republics and thus provoke separatist sentiments.

Putin will probably have to tone down his unitarist drive with regard to
the leaders of the national republics. They have always enjoyed special
rights and special privileges, both under the czar and particularly in the
Soviet Union. Today, too, the presidents of the national republics will be
more equal than others, and will have more rights than the governors of the
Russian regions. The very fact that Russia is a multiethnic state
establishes the limits of unitarism.

Significantly, the attempt by some Duma deputies to put pressure on
Tatarstan and push through parliament the text of an appeal to its leaders
to stop violating the constitution and laws of the Russian Federation ended
in failure. A majority in the Duma rejected the proposal as political
provocation. Putin's concessions to the governors include his decree on the
creation of the State Council, which grants regional heads the right
periodically to meet face to face with the head of state and discuss
strategies for the country's development.

Putin's revolution from above will probably soon come to an end, and he
will be satisfied with what he has already managed to do to strengthen the
power hierarchy. This is not the time for revolutionary disruption. In the
end, Putin is only seeking a compromise between the interests of the
Kremlin and the interests of the regional leaders, but one that is more
advantageous for Moscow. The economic, moral and political conditions for
restoring the authoritarian model for running the regions which existed
under Stalin, for example, are not there. The closer May 2004 comes--that
is, the date when Putin will stand for election for a second term--the more
often he will have to make compromises with the regional leaders, who still
control the voting machine in the provinces.

*******

#15
Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2000
From: David Marples <david_marples@yahoo.com>
Subject: Canada: STUART RAMSAY TOMPKINS VISITING PROFESSORSHIP

STUART RAMSAY TOMPKINS VISITING PROFESSORSHIP
UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA, EDMONTON, CANADA

Applications are invited from citizens of Russia and
the NIS for the position of Stuart Ramsay Tompkins
Visiting Professor at the University of Alberta,
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. This is a 9 month
appointment (15 August to 15 May) to be held jointly
in the Departments of History and Classics, and Modern
Languages and Cultural Studies (MLCS, home department
for the appointee). The successful candidate will
teach a total of four courses during the year, two for
each department, and give a number of  public lectures
throughout the year.

The successful candidate should hold a doctorate or a
candidate's degree in Russian/East European history.
Preference will be given to scholars in early or
mid-career. The candidate should be prepared to teach
courses in a wide range of Russian history, politics
and culture with an emphasis on the contemporary
period. Scholars who are qualified to also teach the
history, politics and cultures of the former member
states of the USSR and other countries in Eastern
Europe are encouraged to apply.

Since all teaching and communication will be in
English, it is imperative that candidates possess near
native fluency in spoken and written English. This is
a precondition to employment.

Return air fare will be covered by the Stuart Ramsay
Tompkins endowment. Compensation is $40,000 Cdn
(US$26,700) plus benefits.

Qualified individuals are invited to submit a letter
of application, a complete CV, and sample
publications. They should include the names and
contact coordinates of three individuals qualified to
act as referees. E-mail submissions are accepted.

Applications should be submitted to: Tompkins
Professorship Committee, Department of Modern
Languages and Cultural Studies, University of Alberta,
Arts 200, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada T6G 2E6. E-mail
inquiries can be addressed to the MLCS Departmental
Secretary, Dolores Wohland at
dolores.wohland@ualberta.ca. Telephone: (780) 492-1997
  Fax: (780) 492-9106.

Closing date for this competition is January 31, 2001.

David R. Marples
Professor of History
Department of History and Classics
University of Alberta
Edmonton, CANADA T6G 2H4
Tel. (780) 492-0851    Fax (780) 492-9125
Cell/voice mail (780) 905-8859

******


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