October
2, 2000
This Date's Issues: 4552•
4553
•
Johnson's Russia List
#4553
2 October 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com
[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Russian Chechnya war reporter goes on trial.
(Babitsky)
2. Reuters: Russia signs up U.S. company to raise Kursk bodies.
3. Interfax: RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY SAYS RUSSIA HIGH ON USA'S LIST
OF POLITICAL PRIORITIES.
4. Interfax: 31% OF RUSSIANS THINK ALL ELIGIBLE MEN SHOULD BE DRAFTED
FOR ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE.
5. Reuters: Russia no longer going cap in hand to IMF-Deputy PM.
6. Christian Caryl: Poll question.
7. Abe Brumberg: re Lieven/4546.
8. Donald Barry: Re Blank, #4548.
9. Jamestown Foundation Monitor: NEMTSOV SAYS PUTIN KNEW WHAT LESIN
WAS UP TO.
10. Garfield Reynolds: Re: 4549-Ekman.
11. AFP: Russian minister calls for new media laws.
12. Reuters: Former communists sweep Mongolia local elections.
13. Carnegie Endowment and PIR Center Co-Sponsor First-Ever
International Non-Proliferation Conference To Be Held in Moscow.
14. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: 21ST CENTURY: BALANCE OF INTERESTS WITHIN THE
US-RUSSIA-GERMANY TRIANGLE. By Leonid SLUTSKY, deputy chairman of the
State Duma International Affairs Committee.]
******
#1
Russian Chechnya war reporter goes on trial
October 2, 2000
MAKHACHKALA, Russia (Reuters) - Russian journalist Andrei Babitsky, whose
reporting on the Chechen war angered the authorities, appeared in court in
southern Russia Monday accused of using a false passport.
Babitsky, whose case has prompted worries about press freedom in Russia,
denied any wrongdoing and said he had been forced to use the document as his
life had been in danger.
``I used the false passport in a case of extreme need,'' Babitsky said in
televised comments. The prosecution disputes the fact that Babitsky's life
was under threat.
At the hearing, Babitsky's lawyer and prosecutors questioned a policeman who
detained the journalist in Makhachkala, capital of the Dagestan region,
adjacent to Chechnya.
Babitsky, who had been reporting in Chechnya for the U.S.-funded Radio
Liberty, turned up in the city in February after disappearing for a month.
If convicted, Babitsky will not face jail but could be fined or sentenced to
community service. He would, in any case, be eligible for an amnesty
proclaimed for a wide variety of offenders by the Russian parliament last
May.
``We are not worried about Andrei Babitsky going to jail, but we do want him
cleared so that he can continue to work,'' Jeff Trimble, Director of
Broadcasting for Radio Liberty and its sister station Radio Free Europe, said
by telephone.
Trimble said Babitsky had waived his right to have the amnesty applied in
order to have the circumstances of his case put before the courts.
Babitsky went missing at the height of the Chechen war and was then shown in
a videotape purporting to show a swap for Russian prisoners of war which he
denied ever happened.
The report of the swap sparked an international outcry but Babitsky still
remained out of sight for around a month.
After his arrest in Dagestan, he was allowed to return to Moscow only after
President Vladimir Putin intervened.
Babitsky says he was in the hands of Russian forces all the time and was
never handed over to Chechen rebels. He says he made his way to Makhachkala
after escaping from his captors.
His lawyer said the charges had been trumped up as part of official efforts
to punish Babitsky for his reporting from behind Chechen lines.
``Our state is trying by every means to...stigmatise a man who for several
months was a permanent victim of fate,'' Babitsky's lawyer, Genri Reznik,
said in televised comments.
The presiding judge said he expected the trial to last about a week.
******
#2
Russia signs up U.S. company to raise Kursk bodies
October 2, 2000
By Konstantin Trifonov
ST PETERSBURG, Russia (Reuters) - Russia signed a deal with an American
company Monday to recover at least some of the bodies of the 118 sailors who
died when the submarine Kursk plunged to the bottom of the Arctic ocean in
August.
The deal with the Norwegian arm of the oil firm Halliburton Co was signed
after an offer by Norway's Stolt Offshore, involved in the original rescue
attempt, was rejected as too expensive.
The Rubin design bureau, which designed the nuclear-powered Kursk, signed a
contract with Halliburton to provide what is essentially logistical support
for an operation to be carried out by Russian deep-sea divers.
But the logistical and technical difficulties of the operation, which will
begin in just over two weeks, mean that perhaps as few as 30 or 35 bodies may
be recovered, at least until the entire vessel is raised next year.
``The contract stipulates that the work will be conducted in October-November
2000,'' said a joint press release distributed after the signing in St
Petersburg, where Rubin is based.
``The (Russian navy's) North Sea fleet will provide the necessary back-up at
the site of the Kursk disaster.''
President Vladimir Putin, slammed for inaction in the first days after the
Kursk sank on August 12, has promised relatives of the dead sailors that he
will raise the bodies from the bed of the Arctic Barents Sea, 108 metres (354
feet) down.
PUTIN CRITICIZED
Putin came in for unprecedented criticism after he stayed on holiday in
southern Russia when the crisis broke.
The authorities were also criticized for being too slow to request foreign
help when it became apparent that Russian rescuers could not get into the
submarine.
The statement said Russian volunteer divers would be the only ones to enter
the submarine, a very dangerous task given the darkness, the cold and the
damage to the vessel.
The Norwegians will run the operation, provide know-how and equipment and
help cut holes in the hull to allow direct access to the inside.
``If we manage to raise 20-30 percent of the crew, it will be a success,''
Igor Spassky, the head of Rubin, told reporters.
He said the three-week operation would start on October 18.
Spassky said Moscow would afterwards look for a foreign partner to help lift
the vessel.
Russia has said the Kursk sank due to explosions caused by a collision with
another vessel, probably foreign.
But several Western countries have dismissed this version, saying explosions
on board, probably caused by an accident with the vessel's own torpedoes,
caused the disaster.
The blasts on board have ripped open the front of the vessel, where most of
the crew were situated.
Rubin initially tried to do a deal with Norway's Stolt Offshore, whose divers
confirmed the crew were dead more than a week after the accident, but failed
to agree a price.
The cost of the deal with Halliburton, which was until recently run by U.S.
Republican vice-presidential hopeful Dick Cheney, was not disclosed.
******
#3
RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY SAYS RUSSIA HIGH ON USA'S LIST OF POLITICAL
PRIORITIES
Interfax
Moscow, 2nd October: The Russian Foreign Ministry has reaffirmed "Russia's
intention to develop equal and mutually beneficial cooperation with the
United States" in a statement obtained by Interfax on Monday [2nd October].
The statement commented on the recent hearings of US House of
Representatives' International Committee, where US Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright outlined the Clinton-Gore administration's stand on
Russia.
"The very fact the hearings are being held confirms Russia's important place
on the scale of American foreign political priorities," the statement says.
"Many of the views voiced by Madeleine Albright on the state and prospects of
Russian-American relations are close to our own outlook on the situation,"
the Foreign Ministry said.
The ministry also pointed out Albright's statement that foreign policy must
not yield to current factors of domestic politics.
"Bilateral relations have without a doubt reached a qualitatively new level
over recent years," the statement says. "A great deal of joint work has been
done to reduce the nuclear threat and amount of armaments and to develop
nonproliferation regimes. Cooperation is growing in the battle against new
challenges to security and stability," it continues.
"A solid foundation for Russian-American cooperation in the 21st century has
been laid. Thanks to that, the sides have managed to settle differences, some
of them crucial, and to preserve the positive vector of the Russian-American
dialogue," the statement says.
******
#4
31% OF RUSSIANS THINK ALL ELIGIBLE MEN SHOULD BE DRAFTED FOR ACTIVE
MILITARY SERVICE
MOSCOW. Oct 2 (Interfax) - Nearly a third of Russian citizens, 33%,
have said they think all Russian males eligible for active military
service should be drafted, according to a recent poll.
The data is the result of a survey taken by the Youth Institute's
research center on September 18-25. The 2,750 men and women polled in
ten typical Russian regions represent the main social, professional,
ethnic, religious and age strata in the country.
A total of 34% of those polled said that only those who wish to
join the armed forces should be drafted, while 26% said the draft should
be suspended until the armed forces are able to guarantee soldiers'
safety and protect them from hazing.
A total of 3% stated various other opinions and 6% were undecided.
The majority of Russians, 61%, favor the introduction of "an
alternative civilian service" and only 19% feel otherwise.
******
#5
Russia no longer going cap in hand to IMF-Deputy PM
By Artyom Danielyan
MOSCOW, Oct 2 (Reuters) - Russia no longer needs to take a begging bowl to
the International Monetary Fund but a resurgent economy does not exclude the
possibility of further loans, Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Kudrin said on
Monday.
Russian officials, long a familiar sight in the corridors of IMF and World
Bank meetings, spent most of last week's gathering in Prague briefing Western
counterparts on structural and fiscal reforms which they say are already past
the point of no return.
The long-suffering Russian economy has been given a new lease of life by a
steep rise in international oil prices -- a major export earner for Moscow
but a headache for many of the other participants from industrial countries.
In the space of two years, Russia has undergone a remarkable transformation
from bankruptcy to boom, from devaluation and default to diligent debt
servicing and burgeoning foreign exchange reserves.
"Nowadays Russia is considered as a country with a strong balance of payments
and which is able to service its debt obligations in the near future," Kudrin
told Reuters.
Russia, the IMF's biggest single borrower, has been able to service its IMF
debts without refinancing, thanks largely to the oil price rising to 10-year
highs of around $36 per barrel.
Russia owed $12.66 billion to the IMF as of July 2000.
The 1998 devaluation of the rouble, which made it tough for borrowers to meet
foreign debt obligations, has also helped domestic firms to compete with
importers and contributed to record post-Soviet growth.
This year's growth in gross domestic product is expected to be 5.5 percent,
up from 3.2 percent in 1999. The IMF forecasts Russian growth at seven
percent this year, but in 2001 the rise is seen slower at four percent.
Recovery notwithstanding, Kudrin said: "The possibility of (IMF) loans
remains an open issue."
The IMF suspended a $4.5 billion loan programme to Russia last year, saying
structural reforms had not been implemented.
But the 2001 draft budget targets $4.795 billion in foreign loans, including
$1.75 billion from the IMF and $920 million in structural adjustment loans
from the World Bank.
Kudrin said repeatedly in Prague that he had received positive feedback on
the government's actions, although the main issues of concern were problems
posed for the West by the recent weakness of the euro currency and high oil
prices.
It remains to be seen whether the IMF's executive board will approve a new
programme for Russia, which the government hopes will lead to an agreement
with the Paris Club of country creditors on restructuring $42 billion of
Soviet-era debt.
An IMF mission is expected to visit Russia in early November, by which time
the Russian government hopes to push the 2001 draft budget through two
readings in the State Duma, the lower chamber of parliament.
GOOD OPPORTUNITY FOR LONG-TERM GROWTH
Economic analysts warned that Russia should not squander this opportunity for
sustainable growth. "Russia desperately needs deep institutional economic and
macroeconomic changes," the leader of the liberal Yabloko movement, prominent
economist Grigory Yavlinsky, told a news conference on Monday.
Erik Nielsen, Executive Director at Goldman Sachs, also said Russia had to
continue sound macroeconomic policies. "It can become a type of model country
that does things right," he said.
"In that sense to get there we need to see stronger and faster reforms on the
structural side in Russia and continued good macro policies. We think there
is a good chance of that."
"The single most important macroeconomic issue is how much inflation is
allowed to increase or, to put it another way, how much the authorities will
force down inflation in order to avoid real depreciation," Nielsen said.
The Russian government expects inflation in 2000 to fall to 18-20 percent
from 36.5 percent last year. It sees 2001 inflation at 12 percent.
(Additional reporting by Svetlana Kovalyova)
******
#6
Date: Mon, 2 Oct 2000
From: Christian Caryl <CCaryl@compuserve.com>
Subject: Poll question
Here's a question for JRL readers:
I remember a poll from a few years ago - I think it was some time in 1997
or 1998 - where a considerable portion of Russians said that they were
afraid of their own police more than they were of the mafia. Can anybody
help me out on this?
Any comparisons or related thoughts would be greatly appreciated.
******
#7
Date: Mon, 2 Oct 2000
From: abe brumberg <ABrumberg@compuserve.com>
Subject: re Lieven/4546
I am leaving in two hours for Poland, so I want to jot down a few words
regarding Anatole's piece on Chechnya.
I have been an admirer of Anatole's writings for a long time, both his
classic book on the Baltics and his volume on Chechnya, which I reviewed
favorably in the LATimes. In recent weeks, however, some of his comments
made me think that he had reversed himself and that he justified the
Russian wars (1 and 2) on Chechnya, and the barbaric destruction of Grozny.
So I am very glad that he has explained his position, with his customary
grasp of the relevant facts and moral passion. His assault on Western double
standards is absolutely on the mark. Like Steele, I have long detested
Western holier-than-thou attitudes, the hypocrisies involved in wretched
American policies in Guatamala, Nicaragua and Salvador, and cold war
assumptions: that Russian atrocities are by definition infinitely more
horrible than any cruleties committed by our "brave boys" (in Vietnam or
elsewhere); that leveling an "enemy city" is right while leveling cities
defended by "freedom fighters" (itself a meretricious term) is shocking,
etc.
Lieven's attempt to put the current situation in Chechnya in a historical
context is to be applauded, as is his fascinating discussion of why the
explosions in Moscow cannot be simply brushed aside as a Putin or oligarch
conspiracy. I still remain profoundly suspicious of Russian motives, but
welcome the facts Anatole provides. I am also glad he makes it clear that
the Russian invasion in 1994 was largely responsible for the current
horrors, and that Maskhadov is still preferab le to the fundamentalist
cutthroats, and that Russia must be criticized for not trying hard enough
to come to an agreement with him - all of which should be said and
recalled.
LOT airlines beckons - so let me concluce this expression of profound
pleasure at seeing Anatole perform as the responsible historian cum
journalist I have always found him to be. A. Brumberg
******
#8
Date: Mon, 02 Oct 2000
From: Donald Barry <ddb0@Lehigh.EDU>
Subject: Re Blank, #4548
I have read the continued exchanges among Ware, Blank, et al about
inspections of U.S. submarines with the growing impression that what is
now at issue is not the merits of the proposal but the egos of the
participants. But one particular phrase in Blank's #4548 contribution
seemed to me especially insightful as to the author's preconceptions:
"it is along-standing article of faith in Russian political culture not
to tell the truth when it can be construed as your fault and cost you
your job, etc." Russian political culture? Since when do Russians have a
monopoly on this trait. I've observed such practices in this country for
as long as I can remember. It must come close to being a universal
feature of behavior. Think, for instance, about the expression "cover
your ass" in corporate America and elsewhere. The quality of one's
argument is immediately made suspect by representing such a universal
inclination as being unique to Russian political culture.
--
Donald Barry
Political Science
Lehigh University
302 Maginnes Hall
9 W. Packer Ave.
Bethlehem, PA 18015
Tel. 610-758-3338
FAX 610-758-6554
*****
#9
Jamestown Foundation Monitor
October 2, 2000
NEMTSOV SAYS PUTIN KNEW WHAT LESIN WAS UP TO. Boris Nemtsov, the head of
the Union of Right-Wing Forces' faction in the State Duma, said in an
interview yesterday with NTV television, the flagship channel of Vladimir
Gusinsky's Media-Most holding, that he was certain that President Vladimir
Putin was fully aware of Press Minister Mikhail Lesin's involvement in an
agreement signed July 10 by Gusinsky, Gazprom-Media chief Alfred Kokh and
Lesin himself. According to that agreement--which has become known as
"Appendix 6"--Gusinsky agreed to hand his media holding over to Gazprom,
its main creditor, in return for US$300 million cash, US$473 million in
debt forgiveness and a pledge by the state to end criminal prosecution of
Gusinsky and lift restrictions on his movements. While Nemtsov did not
present concrete proof for his assertion, he said that in a meeting he and
other parliamentary leaders had with Putin several weeks ago, the Russian
head of state was "absolutely up on" the Gusinsky-Gazprom battle and that
Putin had made it clear that the position of the press minister would
define the fate of Media-Most in general and NTV in particular. Putin,
through his spokesman, subsequently said that he was surprised and outraged
that Lesin had signed the document and said that he, as head of state,
should stay out of disputes between "economic actors." Prime Minister
Mikhail Kasyanov later reprimanded Lesin publicly, but no further action
was taken against the press minister (see the Monitor, September 21, 28-29).
Nemtsov also noted that the "information security doctrine" Putin recently
signed could be used to prevent foreign investors from buying stakes in
NTV. In Nemtsov's view, the doctrine would prevent foreign ownership of
media in Russia and gives preference to state media, meaning that NTV
could, in his words, be turned into a third state channel. On the other
hand, Nemtsov suggested that there is a disagreement inside the Kremlin
between "hawks" who believe that the Kremlin should interfere in media's
information policy and hiring decisions and those that believe it should
not. Nemtsov said it was up in the air which side Putin would favor (NTV,
October 1; see the Monitor, September 7, 15).
Meanwhile, Andrei Trapeznikov head of the press department for United
Energy Systems (UES), Russia's electricity monopoly, confirmed today that
the company had bought "more than a controlling share" in Ren-TV.
Trapeznikov said that UES, which is headed by Anatoly Chubais, was above
all interested in Ren-TV's network of regional television companies. Ren-TV
currently enjoys a 3.5-3.7 percent share of Russia's television viewing
audience (Russian agencies, October 2).
******
#10
Date: Mon, 2 Oct 2000
From: "GARFIELD REYNOLDS" <GREYNOLDS1@bloomberg.net>
Subject: Re: 4549-Ekman
Dear David, re Ekman's reply .... Peter, I didn't mean a series of your
comments; I meant the series of comments in the MT and elsewhere. I wasn't
sure if Peter's comment had hit jrl, i was too busy to scan all the recent
lists. As for NTV being dead economically, this is totally beside the
point ... if Media Most was making a million bucks a day, it would still have
problems with the government (probably it would be indicted for tax arrears).
And if the best rating tv station in Russia is economically dead, then the
same must apply to every television station in the land, which is of course
how the powers that be want it -- if you can't run a tv station as a business
in its own right, then you can only run one if you have either an oligarch on
your side or the government, preferably both. Gusinsky, (often misnamed as an
oligarch despite lacking the sort of broad political and business strength
required to be one) was trying to avoid this fate, but hasn't. It is also very
hard to know whether NTV/Media Most are economically dead. Unlike Gazprom and
the government, I have never heard of Media Most failing to pay its employees
on time. We do not know how much they owe -- because Media Most won't tell us
and it is impossible to trust either Gazprom or Putin when they say what
Gusinsky owes.
Cheers, Garfield Reynolds, journalist, Moscow.
*******
#11
Russian minister calls for new media laws
MOSCOW, Oct 2 (AFP) -
Russia's media minister said Monday that the country's media laws should be
updated, but dismissed reports that the Kremlin was cracking down on western
journalists working in the country.
"We have long been insisting on this (new media laws)," Interfax quoted
Mikhail Lesin as saying.
But he stressed that an information doctrine adopted by Russia's Security
Council would not ban the work of some agencies currently under fire for
their coverage of the war in Chechnya, such as the US-funded Radio Liberty.
"The goal is not to ban foreign stations in Russia, but to place them under
equal conditions with the Russian media, in particular as far as the payment
of a license is concerned," he said without clarifying further.
However the Interfax report said Lesin singled out Radio Liberty as one of
the media outlets whose legal status needed clarification.
Lesin's comments came as the network's hard-hitting radio reporter Andrei
Babitsky went on trial on charges of possessing a fake passport.
Babitsky has accused the authorities of using the document to wage a vendetta
against him because of his critical reports of Russia's yearlong crackdown in
Chechnya.
The Security Council last month adopted a new information doctrine designed
to make sure that the government's official line is presented in all media
outlets.
It was issued amid a furious battle for control over Russia's top private
media conglomerate Media-MOST, which has also presented critical coverage of
the Chechnya offensive.
*******
#12
Former communists sweep Mongolia local elections
ULAN BATOR, Oct 2 (Reuters) - Mongolia's former communist rulers won a
landslide victory in local elections, two months after they swept back to
power in parliamentary polls, election officials said on Monday.
Preliminary results of Sunday's vote showed the Mongolian People's
Revolutionary Party (MPRP), which ruled for seven decades under Soviet
patronage, won 552 of the 695 seats up for grabs in the provincial and Ulan
Bator governments, the officials said.
Prime Minister Nambariin Enkhbayar, leader of the MPRP, hailed the victory as
a ringing endorsement of his new government's policies.
``These elections were a test...and the voters confirmed their support to the
MPRP,'' he told a news conference.
``People supported the MPRP policies and this is a step forward which makes
it possible for the MPRP government to carry out its new programme.''
The government has promised to improve social welfare, develop rural areas,
and protect domestic industry with 10 percent import taxes.
However, many failed to vote due to election fatigue after the July poll and
some confusion over new election procedures, said Enkhbayar.
About 61 percent of a total of 1.1 million registered voters came to the
polls, down from more than 80 percent in July.
In some areas, mainly Ulan Bator, polls may have to be repeated because voter
turnout did not meet the minimum limit of 50 percent, election officials
said.
The Democratic Forces coalition won 87 local government seats, while
independent candidates and small parties got 31 seats.
The MPRP ruled Mongolia for 75 years until it was booted out of power by the
Democratic Union Coalition in a 1996 election. But the former Communists won
a resounding 72 of 76 seats in the Great Hural, or parliament, last July.
*******
#13
Date: Mon, 02 Oct 2000
From: Julie Shaw <jshaw@ceip.org>
Subject: International Non-Proliferation Conference
For Immediate Release
October 2, 2000
Contact:
Julie Shaw, 202-939-2211
Natalia Kirpikova, Carnegie Moscow Center, 011-7095-935-8904
Carnegie Endowment and PIR Center Co-Sponsor First-Ever
International Non-Proliferation Conference
To Be Held in Moscow
Over 100 non-proliferation and security experts and government officials
will participate in the first international non-proliferation conference
ever convened in Moscow on October 6 and 7, 2000. The two-day conference is
jointly organized by the Carnegie Moscow Center and the Center for Policy
Studies in Russia (PIR), two leading, Moscow-based non-governmental
organizations on security and non-proliferation issues. The conference was
planned with the assistance of an advisory board consisting of the leaders
of every major non-proliferation organization in Russia, co-chaired by Duma
member Alexei Arbatov and Carnegie Senior Associate Joseph Cirincione. The
ground-breaking, two-day conference will feature discussions on:
* The future of Russia’s nuclear arsenal
* The spread of nuclear capabilities in East and South Asia, and the Middle
East
* Prospects for strategic nuclear reductions between Russia and the United
States
* U.S. assistance for Russian nuclear weapons elimination.
“This conference marks an important moment for the non-governmental
community in Russia,” said Jessica T. Mathews, president of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. “We are pleased to help showcase the
important work these groups are doing to broaden the discussion and
understanding of Russia’s stance on strategic nuclear issues and
non-proliferation.”
The conference includes international participants, with a majority from
Russia and the former Soviet states, including government officials,
internationally recognized experts and scholars, and members of the growing
NGO community. The conference will feature presentations and keynote
addresses by:
* Oleg Chernov, deputy secretary of the Russian Security Council
* Evgeny Adamov, Russian minister of atomic energy
* Fidel Castro Diaz-Balart, Cuban minister of atomic energy
* Abbas Maleki, formerly Iranian deputy minister of foreign affairs.
“Ten years ago, the entire Russian non-proliferation community could gather
in a single small room,” said Carnegie Scholar-in-Residence and conference
co-organizer Alexander Pikayev. “Now, even two days isn’t enough time to
hear from and speak with the whole community. Russia’s policy making
process is changing, and this conference gives us a chance to share
information and discuss future activities.”
“The promotion of non-proliferation values has become one of the most
urgent issues for the coming millennium, especially since during the last
five years, a regression in this area has taken place. Russia may make a
significant contribution to the cause of arms control and nuclear
non-proliferation, and this conference will obviously help it to do so,”
added PIR Director and conference co-organizer Vladimir Orlov.
Conference organizers will post summaries of keynote addresses,
presentations, and panel discussions to the Carnegie Non-Proliferation web
site at www.ceip.org/npp. The site will eventually contain full details
from the conference, including English and Russian transcripts,
presentations, biographies, and a list of attendees.
This event is being held through the generous support of the Carnegie
Corporation of New York, the W. Alton Jones Foundation, The John D. and
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, The John Merck Fund, and the
Ploughshares Fund.
About the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Founded in 1910, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a
private nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing cooperation among
nations and promoting active international engagement by the United States.
The Carnegie Endowment’s research projects are grouped in two areas, the
Global Policy Program and the Russian and Eurasian Program. The Carnegie
Endowment publishes Foreign Policy magazine and operates the Carnegie
Moscow Center to address compelling issues confronting post-communist
societies.
The Carnegie Moscow Center was founded in 1993 and was the first public
policy research center of its kind in the region. The staff of 35 is
Russian, except for an American director. The Center offers extensive
meetings and publications activities, including the quarterly policy
journal Pro et Contra. Visit www.ceip.org for more information as well as
www.carnegie.ru for more on the Carnegie Moscow Center.
About PIR: Center for Policy Studies in Russia
PIR is the acronym for the Russian words Policy Studies in Russia. The PIR
Center is a non-profit, independent, Moscow-based research and public
education organization, which was founded in April 1994. Although its name
and flexible structure permit it to conduct research on a wide range of
issues related to Russian foreign and domestic policy, the Center is
currently focused on international security, arms control, and
nonproliferation issues that are directly related to Russia’s internal
situation. It is one of the leading Russian non-governmental organizations
working in this area. Its Yaderny Kontrol journal is widely known in Russia
and abroad and is disseminated among the Russian and foreign academic and
decision-making community. For more information, visit www.pircenter.org.
******
#14
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
September 26, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
21ST CENTURY: BALANCE OF INTERESTS WITHIN THE US-RUSSIA-GERMANY TRIANGLE
By Leonid SLUTSKY, deputy chairman of the State Duma
International Affairs Committee
Since Middle Ages and the era of great geographic
discoveries, when the development of world history noticeably
accelerated, no century has repeated its predecessor in terms
of the line-up of global forces. Not only the outline of
national borders changed. Armed and commercial clashes for
regional and world leadership led to the re-distribution of the
zones of influence, the grandeur of some powers and the decline
of others.
What is more, the very type of the world order changed. There
is no doubt that the 21st century will not be an exception in
this respect, for the main global trend now is the deviation
from ideological confrontation which was typical of
practically the whole of the 20th century.
This inevitably entails serious changes in the system of
world foreign policy coordinates: the geopolitical combination
of the 21st century will differ greatly from the habitual
picture of confrontation between the two nuclear superpowers.
It is also clear that the new model of the world is taking
shape in an unstable and not quite clear situation connected
with the disintegration of the USSR. The main question is who
and how will use the new line-up of world forces.
Along with completing the shaping of our foreign policy
doctrine, and upholding our current international interests
Russia is faced with the task to comprehend the future world
order and determine its new role in this quickly changing world.
A new stage of re-division of the world began after the
fall of the USSR. Old historic grievances surfaced and
revenge-seeking sentiments revived. It is becoming increasingly
clear with every passing year that the century-old geopolitical
interests of the great powers only lay dormant under the burden
of the clash of ideas in the 20th century and are now
awakening. It suddenly became clear that the balanced
NATO-Warsaw Pact "linkage" was only a temporary bastion of
mutual deterrent. When this bastion fell, familiar traditional
pictures and contours of the European geopolitical "games" of
the times of Bismarck and Metternich began showing themselves
gradually but inexorably like a film soaked in a developer.
They are poorly visible yet and by far not all the
diplomatic community is ready to admit them. What is more, they
manifest themselves in a new, changed image, and the changes
are connected with the modern processes of globalization, in
which the US is involved.
However, a deep analysis reveals a very interesting
picture.
Frictions between expanding NATO and Russia, which does not
approve of the latter's coming closer to its borders, have
moved to the foreground of European politics and attracted
enhanced attention. But somewhere in the background another
process, which is far more important in a long-term geological
context and which bears on relations between the two largest
Western powers - the US and Germany - is developing rather
inconspicuously thus far.
To call things their proper names, there is the ground to
say that it is not the debates over NATO enlargement but the
inevitable dispute for global leadership between the US and
Germany, which will determine the world order in the 21st
century. I think it is necessary to realize these very
important strategic peculiarities of modern geopolitics in
order to more fully and precisely determine the role and place
of Russia in a mid- and long-term perspective of world
development.
ABM and a "Soft Force"
The realization of the fact that the specter of rivalry
between the US and Germany will sooner or later appear on the
horizon of world history logically stemmed from the events
connected with the unification of two German states. Like the
jinni let out of the bottle, this specter emerged from the
ruins of the Berlin Wall. After eventually digesting the former
German Democratic Republic economically, Greater Germany would
objectively turn into one of the most powerful nations capable
of casting a challenge to the overseas world leader.
After the collapse of communism and the USSR, this
argument was buttressed up by a no less unbiased conclusion:
the American "nuclear umbrella" over Europe would gradually
lose its significance and continental sentiments would
inevitably grow stronger in NATO, in which the US prevails. As
years (or decades?) go, this military-economic organization
will inevitably drift in the "economic direction." This will
happen not because of pressure on the part of Russia but
because it is in the interests of its European member
countries. It is clear that the influence of the US is also to
grow weaker in NATO.
These two general conclusions in a way create the
foundation for understanding global processes as a result of
which the world order of the 21st century will soon begin to be
shaped. However, it is sufficiently clear even now that
rivalry between the US and Germany has already begun. This is
not surprising at all. As soon as the unity of the West in the
face of communist menace lost its importance, the century-old
national interests of the leading world powers came to the
fore. As I have already said, differences between American and
European, in particular, German, interests, will be the main
characteristic feature of the coming 21st century, as distinct
from the latter part of the 20th century, which was
characterized by confrontation between the US and the USSR.
As a matter of fact, these differences manifested
themselves for the first time in the years when the
disintegration of Yugoslavia began. It is common knowledge that
Yugoslavia was regarded by the USA as a major strategic point,
a country to be finally uprooted from the socialist camp and
eventually integrated into NATO. That is why Washington's plans
did not stipulate Yugoslavia's disintegration and at the first
stage of the dramatic events, which began in the Balkans, the
US tried to preserve the integrity of that federative state in
order to draw it into its zone of influence.
Germany had a different standpoint in principle. Without
asking advice from its overseas partner, it was the first to
support the striving of Slovenia and Croatia to break away from
Yugoslavia. These two republics had always been historically
regarded as a sphere of Germany's special interests. So,
scarcely had a suitable situation been created when Bonn
hurried to bring European history back into the old and tested
tracks disregarding the opinion of its older overseas partner.
This noteworthy episode from recent history has almost not
been noticed. However, inherent in it is the entire "genetic
code" of the future geopolitical conflict between the US and
Germany, which will develop in accordance with the new scenario
of the 21st century. Many eminent analysts think that under
this scenario military confrontation will be replaced by
rivalry in so-called zones of economic cooperation. To put it
differently, nuclear and military supremacy in general, for
which Europe will never be able to compete with the USA, will
stop being the main factor of global competition in the
foreseeable future, yielding to a "soft force," that is,
economic might. It is in terms of economic might that Europe as
a whole and Germany in particular objectively become the rivals
of the USA.
If we look back into recent history from this standpoint,
we can notice some facts which clearly show that
inconspicuously and without making it public Germany has
already started the fulfillment of its long-term plans. History
has given it pretty good chances for this. The first was the
situation which developed following the liquidation of the
COMECON as a result of which Eastern Europe, which had long
been regarded as a sphere of Germany's special interests,
remained on its own after it had weakened ties with Moscow.
Politically, it was immediately "picked up" by the USA, which
set forth the task of drawing East European nations into NATO.
This clearly visible process has been developing quite
successfully for America, giving it ground to claim the new
victories of its diplomacy.
The question is whether these victories may turn out to be
Pyrrhic victories. Under the cover of political noise, which
accompanies NATO eastward enlargement, Germany is gradually but
firmly promoting economic expansion into East European
countries without making any program statements. It is well
known that it has seriously strengthened its positions in the
Czech republic.
Even 'Skoda,' the pride of Czech industry, has now become a
piece of German property. German investments are growing in
Hungary. In West Poland Germans continue to buy land often
through front men, as Warsaw-based papers write.
A legitimate question arises: What is really behind the
desire to get these countries admitted into NATO on a priority
basis? Washington's military-political plans or Berlin's
economic strategy? When NATO starts shifting towards
transformation, weakening its military components and bringing
to the fore the economic ones, the influence of Germany on
Eastern Europe will sharply grow, allowing Germans to occupy
the leading positions in the alliance. Isn't it the case of
America being in a way a cat's-paw of the future Greater
Germany?
There are other, no less important regions for influence
in which America and Germany are to fight. Given certain
political circumstances, a serious German economic expansion in
Ukraine cannot be excluded. Thus far, Americans have had the
strongest influence on Kiev. This is born out by a chain of
military exercises and Kiev's flirting with NATO. But this
influence is of a military-political character, while the
economic aspect has not been developed yet. However, in its
time Ukraine was one of the elements of Germany's strategy.
Will Berlin attempt to regain what it has lost in Eastern
Europe, as is the case with Slovenia and Croatia?
And still, the geostrategic interests of the USA and
Germany intersect particularly in Russia, because due to its
scope and - no matter what might be said - great-power role,
our country will exercise considerable influence on the outcome
of future competition for global leadership.
The US and Germany have different positions in Russia. The
US is beyond competition in terms of political influence. As a
matter of fact, it is relations with the USA that have been
thus far determining in Russia's relations with the West as a
whole.
Germany, which actually follows in the wake of American policy,
has long since started its own game in the economic field.
Suffice it to mention some generally known facts. Germany is
Russia's main trade and economic partner and German credits and
investments constitute the largest proportion in corresponding
statistics. Add to this the objective "dollar barrier"
manifested in the high cost of overseas flights, compared with
Germany's geographic closeness. Such a subjective and sensitive
factor as the growing anti-Americanism of ordinary Russians
must not be disregarded, either.
Finally, there is no ignoring the fact that since the
years of Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika a pro-American and
pro-German parties have formed in the Russian political
Establishment. What is more, lately, the pro-American party has
clearly retreated into the background: it has been almost
ousted from Russia's political Olympus. At the same time,
latent pro-German sentiments have grown stronger for
understandable circumstances, especially after Vladimir Putin,
who knows Germany very well and speaks German fluently, settled
in the Kremlin. If these very well known facts are supplemented
by concrete examples of the infiltration of German capital into
the Russian economy, a natural conclusion will be that Berlin
has been behaving in a more prudent and far-sighted manner than
Washington. It is obvious that Germany is preparing ground for
serious economic presence in Russia scheduled for a period when
the processes connected with the complete integration of East
Germany into the German economic complex will be finalised.
"The Russian task" for its part is one of the components
of the great German task, because of which, as history teaches,
the first American President-globalist, Woodrow Wilson, used to
have nightmares, namely, the task of Germanization of Europe
and creation of a Greater Germany. In order to prevent this,
Wilson put into effect the Versailles plan for the division of
Europe. A hundred years later Wilson's nightmares begin to
return.
It is worth recalling in this context a long forgotten
historic fact. Who can clearly answer today what strategic
goals Americans officially made the foundation of the North
Atlantic alliance fifty years ago? In the meantime, there were
two goals.
All remember the first one - to throw back communism. But the
second goal was to deter Germany (Sic!). Woodrow Wilson's
precepts were honored in the USA in the post-World War Two
years.
Having failed to ensure a new division of Europe under the
Versailles pattern because of the strengthening of the USSR,
America was preoccupied with the task of preventing the revival
of its old geopolitical rival, Greater Germany, in the future.
Who, except specialists, remembers this second strategic
aim for the creation of NATO? And precisely the fact that it
has almost been forgotten conclusively confirms that along with
the change of the paradigm of development in the world - from
nuclear-military to purely economic - the change of the leader
is coming, and this will be an uneasy process.
Judging by everything, Americans have not fully realized
the challenge that threatens them and how far Germany has
already moved forward (without officially proclaiming this) to
the establishment of a new world order suitable to it. This is
probably why the US continues by inertia to press the military
pedals, risking to be mired in the problems of building an
anti-missile defense system, despite the fact this will only
lead to the continued loss of momentum in the forthcoming clash
for global leadership, the success of which will be determined
by the "soft force."
In this collision Russia is by no means assigned the role
of an onlooker on the sidelines. Quite the contrary, the
process of changing the line-up of world forces and forming the
model of the world for the 21st century gives our country a
good chance not only to participate in it but also to make its
participation determining in many respects. The task is to
search and find Russia's new place in the world. To accomplish
this, Moscow should not lose any time and comprehend the global
realities of the new century along with handling its current
foreign policy tasks in order to apprehend events and use in
full measure its geopolitical advantages.
Factor of Stability
A few years ago Russian politicians loved to talk of
differences between American and European interests. Though
this subject is practically not discussed today, the objective
base for such a conclusion not only remains but it has received
new confirmations. Without going into the details of this
problem, it is, nonetheless, worth recalling that a latent
clash between European and American interests was clearly
manifested during the assertion of the euro, which is to
compete with the dollar, the gradual formation of purely
European, non-NATO military contingents and other rather
important peculiarities. After a series of latest upheavals for
high/tech companies at the New York Stock Exchange predictions
of a financial-economic crisis in the USA and even the possible
loss by the dollar of its role as the world currency have been
made more frequently.
The core of the matter is not to what degree and when such
forecasts will come true. The problem is that the growth of
economic (and consequently, foreign policy) rivalry between the
USA and Germany, which plays a special role in Europe, is of an
objective character and it will sooner or later manifest itself
as a rusty spring from the sofa of Woodrow Wilson's times.
That is why Moscow should realize in good time all that
Washington is unable to realize yet, namely, that it is in US
geopolitical interests that Russia should play an independent
economic and political role, thereby balancing the swift growth
of Germany's might. If a weakened Russia is drawn into the
sphere of German economic influence, this will have a fatal
effect on America's leadership in the world. However, objective
logic also prompts another conclusion: if Russia is drawn into
the sphere of American influence, this will do an irreparable
damage to Germany's global interests.
So, given a prudent use of Gorchakov's diplomacy methods
(Prince Alexander Gorchakov was a prominent Russian statesman
in the 19th century), in the 21st century Russia can play an
extremely responsible and independent role of the stabilizer of
global political and economic processes. Its balanced
integration into the system of global economic ties will be of
major importance. The fate of Russia with its huge area and
rich national resources exercises substantial influence on the
entire line-up of forces in the world. Thus, if the USA is
ousted from the power lines of the new economic field, which is
developing in the territory of what used to be the USSR, this
can lead to its becoming a second-rate nation politically. The
same can be said about Germany.
This concept is actually built into the basic element of
our foreign policy doctrine - the creation of a multi-polar
world system. However, the problem is that we have not realized
in full measure what an important role in reaching this goal
can be played by Gorchakov-style political manoeuvring, that
is, by taking into consideration differences between the
interests of the USA and Germany.
The above said does not diminish the importance of our
eastern policy, which is also aimed at facilitating the
creation of a multi-polar world. But diplomatic gambling on
future objective and inevitable US-German contradictions can
and should become the trump card of our foreign policy. It will
be neither an anti-American nor an anti-German card, because in
the final count it will be able to facilitate the establishment
of a geopolitical balance - the most stable type of the world
order.
Of importance is the fact that so-called middle European
countries are also ready to welcome the creation of a balanced
model of the world, and we can count on their support in this
respect. With the supremacy of the "soft force," the monopoly
of one superpower is to the disadvantage of these countries.
What is more, they want to be present on the vast Russian
market and are not interested in any lop-sided economic
orientation of our country. This factor allows to make more
flexible and diverse those components of our foreign policy,
which facilitate the establishment of a geopolitical balance of
interests and which, if taken together, are called Russia's
"traditional Gorchakov-style diplomacy." It is also necessary
to take into consideration that the main geopolitical rivals
have already started using Russia as an economic "battlefield."
It is only natural that some serious analysts have shrewdly
seen our August 1998 default as the reflection of a clash
between the euro and the dollar.
******
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