September 19, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4523  4524   4525 

Johnson's Russia List
#4524
19 September 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com


[Note from David Johnson:
1. Transitions Online: The Resounding Disappointment of Exposing 
the President. (Interview with Yevgenia Borisova of the Moscow 
Times)
2. Financial Times (UK): Russian moguls step up fight over Media 
Most.
3. gazeta.ru: Stepashin’s Financial Watchdog Gathers Strength.
(Audit Chamber)
4. Moscow Times: Soaring Fuel Prices Blamed on Government.
5. NG - Stsenarii: Analytical Report of the Centre of Political 
Technologies. HOT AUGUST: RESULTS AND CONSEQUENCES. Even despite the 
recent catastrophes, President Putin still has a margin of strength 
necessary for carrying on the reform policy.
6. Interfax: BORODIN VIEWS SWISS PROSECUTORS' CHARGES AGAINST 
HIM AS "POLITICAL ORDER FROM RUSSIA" 
7. Christian Science Monitor: Christopher Walker, Latvia's 
language tremors.
8. BBC MONITORING: RUSSIAN PAPER LOOKS AT IMPLICATIONS OF ARMED 
FORCES' CUTS IN 2001-2003.
9. Financial Times (UK) editorial: Russia's task.] 


*******


#1
Transitions Online
September 18, 2000
www.tol.cz


The Resounding Disappointment of Exposing the President 
by TOL 


In what has been referred to by many Russia-watchers as the most impressive
investigative journalism to come out of the country in a long time,
Yevgenia Borisova, a staff writer for The Moscow Times, exposed a dearth of
hard vidence that shows extensive. The fraud was so extensive, the paper
says, that it has become clear the Russian president Vladimir Putin would
have lost to Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov in the first round.
Though no one was surprised that elections were fraught with such grave,
and even comical, violations, Borisova's 9 September report was nonetheless
shocking. It included documented proof of everything from voters' ballots
for Zyuganov and other candidates being replaced with illegally duplicated
ballots for Putin to administrator's poorly orchestrated attempts to burn
Zyuganov ballots. But the journalistic investigation that should have
rocked the country has instead been picked up by only a few Western media
outlets and almost entirely dismissed by the Russian press. A few
low-profile Russian newspapers made half-hearted attempts to translate some
excerpts from Borisova's reports, but none have chosen to delve any deeper,
Russian citizens remain relatively unaware of the exposure. For its part,
the government has reacted by simply denying that the documents in The
Moscow Times' possession are real. During a visit to Prague last week,
Borisova took time out to talk to TOL about her six-month investigation. 


TOL: When you started to uncover the evidence that the presidential
elections had been falsified, what was your personal reaction—not just as a
journalist, but as a Russian citizen? 


Borisova: I was really shocked. When I was in [the Russian Caucausus
republic of] Dagestan [earlier this year] I was sitting in the Dagestani
Communist Party office interviewing people there about possible election
fraud.
Another guy walked in and saw me interviewing others and said "You should
listen to my story. I saw ballots being burned." I jumped in a car with
him, and we went to a government administration building. Just outside the
building was [the remnants of] a campfire. I thought he was probably
joking. I saw the ashes and sat down near the campfire. He probably didn't
think I would examine it further. But I started going through the ashes. I
was covered in black [soot]. There had been no rain [to wash away the
ashes], and some of the papers weren't completely burned. And it was clear
that they were ballots. I saw names of candidates on some, and [Communist
Party candidate] Zyuganov's name was marked off. That was really a shocking
experience. 


TOL: How loudly has this news resounded in Russia? You're shocked, but are
others? The rumors of such fraud have been thrown around since the elections. 


Borisova: I responded to the complaints of election observers. I spoke to
so many people who were really outraged. Many I interviewed, mostly local
election observers, said they were emotionally hurt that people's votes
were simply destroyed. The most offensive thing to me is that the Russian
media isn't following up on the story. They concentrate only on dismissing
it, not [investigating] it. Unfortunately, most Russian [citizens] haven't
even read it. If they did, something more might come out of it. 


TOL: Why do you think Russian newspapers haven't picked up on the story,
other than to poorly translate some excerpts and dismiss them? 


Borisova: Major Russian national newspapers should have reported or
published this story themselves. The biggest interest absolutely must come
from the Russians, not from Western institutions. I cannot speculate on why
[the Russian papers] haven't done this. Maybe it's just envy. 


TOL: What's the next step? What will happen now that this is out in the open?


Borisova: I like digging. I like investigating. I used to be a scientist
myself. But I think others should follow this now. I've laid the
groundwork. What will come of this? I don't know. What has disappointed me
is that most of the good evidence has been destroyed, like they tried to do
by burning the ballots. So far, prosecutors have denied that the signatures
on the [almost] destroyed ballots are real. But a thorough investigation
could easily prove these documents are not forgeries. I've collected enough
very convincing evidence. It's enough, but it hasn't resulted in any real
attention from law enforcement bodies. It's up to the prosecutors, and I
don't see that there's any will to pursue a thorough investigation [based
on this evidence.] 


TOL: Where is that evidence now? 


Borisova: Oh, the ashes are still around. I keep them in box, and they're
very clear and readable. I also have other copies of ballots that were not
turned in. Perhaps I should have [made arrangements to hide them]. 


TOL: What about the OSCE election observers. What do think about their work
in light of the evidence you've uncovered? 


Borisova: I think they did a shitty job. Most of them didn't speak a work
of Russian. It was as if they walked into [the polling stations] and said
"Look, there's a [voting] cabin, there's a box, there's a table. Okay,
everything's fine." But also, there were 95,000 polling stations and only
about 300 [OSCE] observers. Another factor is that when the OSCE released
its initial report immediately after the elections, it declared they were
free and fair. That's what everybody paid attention to. But later, when
they released their full, extensive report that listed the numerous
violations, nobody read it. 


TOL: Are you in any way scared, or afraid for your safety upon returning to
Moscow? 


Borisova: You only die once. What I'm really worried about is the safety of
the people I quoted in the story. They all gave their consent for me to use
their names, but their safety is a concern for me. 


TOL: So, based on your evidence, is Putin illegitimately holding the office
of president? 


Borisova: That's the thing ... the election could have been legitimate.
Most of my colleagues agree that Putin would have won in a second round of
voting. There was no need for this type of fraud. I think people [mostly in
the regions] were trying to show their loyalty in this way. 


TOL: Does it make you lose faith in Russia? 


Borisova: Absolutely. 


Tracy Did you have faith before? 


Borisova: Not much. 


******


#2
Financial Times (UK)
19 September 2000
Russian moguls step up fight over Media Most
By Andrew Jack, Arkady Ostrovsky, and John Thornhill


One former ambassador to Moscow had two golden rules when following the
murky world of post-Soviet politics: never throw away a business card and
never forget a feud. His advice would have been particularly useful in
trying to unravel the current dispute over Media Most, Russia's biggest
commercial media group. 


Alfred Kokh, the managing director of Gazprom's media business, is
currently locked in a bitter dispute with Vladimir Gusinsky, the founder of
the Media Most group, which includes the NTV television channel and several
leading newspapers and magazines. Their animosity stretches back years. 


In 1997 Mr Kokh, the then privatisation minister, was hounded out of office
after he was embroiled in a corruption scandal partly fanned by Mr
Gusinsky, who had lost the auction for the Svyazinvest telecommunications
company. Mr Kokh spent the next two years fighting to stay out of jail. 


But the charges against Mr Kokh were eventually dropped and he swung back
through the revolving door of Russian politics to emerge as the head of
Gazprom Media, which runs the Trud and Rabochaya Tribuna newspapers as well
as shareholdings in several television stations. In this post, Mr Kokh has
also taken control of Gazprom's substantial interests in Media Most. 


While Mr Gusinsky thinks he can still rescue his business, Mr Kokh is
already plotting its endgame. "There is nothing personal in business," Mr
Kokh insists, in an interview. "I just want our company's money back." 


Gazprom, which already owns 16 per cent of Media Most and is one of its
biggest creditors, thinks it is only a matter of time before it assumes
full control of the financially troubled media group. 


Indeed, it thought it had struck a deal with Mr Gusinsky in July to buy out
the company's remaining equity for Dollars 300m. 


The giant gas company has instructed Deutsche Bank, the international
investment bank, to seek buyers for Media Most, with the stated view of
preserving its financial strength and its editorial independence. 


The obvious purchasers would appear to be the big multinational media
groups, such as Bertelsmann, Time Warner and News Corporation. All these
companies may be tempted by Russia's most attractive media company -
although they will be well aware of the dangers of investing in the
politically fraught world of Moscow's media industry. 


Media Most suggests that Mr Kokh is merely the Kremlin's hatchet man, who
has been employed to chop down Mr Gusinsky and damage press freedom. 


Yevgeny Kisilyov, the head of the NTV television channel, had earlier
accused the Kremlin of interfering in the debt negotiations between Gazprom
and Media Most. In an interview with the FT, Mr Kisilyov said: "The
negotiations with Gazprom were going on since late spring of 1999, but the
Kremlin unleashed a propaganda campaign (against NTV) and started to create
an image of a forthcoming bankruptcy of Media Most. Finally, in the spring
of 2000, (the Kremlin) ruined the deal with Gazprom." 


He said both sides agreed not to comment on the talks. "It was a direct
political pressure on (Rem) Vyakhirev (the head of Gazprom) and other top
managers of Gazprom who were advised not to finish off the deal." 


The epic personal struggle between Mr Kokh and Mr Gusinsky looks set to run
for some time to come. As late as last night Mr Gusinsky, speaking on
Russian radio from abroad, said that he had only signed an agreement for
the sale of his group to Gazprom in July under pressure coming shortly
after his release from a Moscow jail. 


He said he had been advised by his lawyers that the agreement was not valid
as a result of this pressure and accused the Russian government of trying
to gain control of his group as part of a political attack on freedom of
the press. 
******


#3
gazeta.ru
September 19, 2000
Stepashin’s Financial Watchdog Gathers Strength
Sergey Stepashin, the head of the Audit Chamber is continuing to press for
broader jurisdiction for the financial watchdog. The Chamber’s newly formed
advisory board is Stepashin’s latest achievement in his quest to strengthen
the Chamber’s powers. He is now calling for powers to prosecute. 
Since being appointed to the post, the former Interior Minister and Prime
Minister prior to Putin Sergey Stepashin, has endeavored to strengthen his
agency and in fact, turn it into a new power structure. 


Stepashin began by signing a cooperation agreement with the Federal
Security Service (FSB) earlier this year. The Chief Auditor has
persistently sought for cooperation with the Interior Ministry, the
Prosecutor General’s Office and Tax Police. Stepashin’s initiatives have
received the president’s seal of approval. 


According to the Constitution as it stands, the Audit Chamber is a
controlling organ formed by the Federal Assembly. The lower house appoints
and dismisses the Chairman of the Audit Chamber and half of the chamber’s
staff of auditors. 


Recently Sergey Stepashin won presidential approval for the creation of
regional auditing departments. Last week on Stepashin orders, an expert
advisory board was established under the auspices of the Chamber. 


There are 64 members on that expert advisory board. At the board’s opening
session Stepashin announced that the board’s members are “prominent and
experienced economists, lawyers, budget procedure experts, representatives
of the judiciary and law enforcement organs.” 


The list includes the names of Sergey Glazyev, Alexander Zhukov, Mikhail
Proussak, Alexander Shokhin. 


The establishment of the new organ within the Audit Chamber is Sergey
Stepashin’s second step towards strengthening the Audit Chamber’s political
weight. The first step was Putin’s approval of Stepashin’s plan to set up
regional departments of the Chamber. 


“The President introduced an amendment regarding the jurisdiction of the
Audit Chamber’s departments. But they (those departments) by no means would
replace the existing regional auditing organs. Our departments are (the
means of) federal control,” Stepashin said at the board’s first session. 


The Chief Auditor is eager to see his agency endowed with the right to
initiate court proceedings. 


Under present regulations the Audit Chamber is only authorized to collect
documents and to conduct research, after which the auditors pass their
results to the prosecutor’s office and cannot in anyway influence the
subsequent investigation. 


In order to achieve his goals the Chief of the Audit Chamber obviously
needs to maintain the president’s interest in his cause. It seems that so
far Stepashin is succeeding. He says that Vladimir Putin has coordinated a
schedule for the two to hold regular meetings. 


At those meetings Stepashin will report the results of the completed checks
to the president. 


At their first session the council members drew up a list of top priority
“clients”, whose financial activities will be subject to close
investigation by the auditors in the near future. 


Among those are the power grid monopoly RAO UES (Unified Energy Systems) of
Russia and the nation’s largest gas company Gazprom. 


“Our check up of the legality of the shares sales is complete. The
documentation is now in the Prosecutor General’s Office. The RAO
(management) is sticking to its own position, while we adhere to ours. But
we have mutually concluded that our legislative system is not perfect.
Alas, many laws conflict with each other,” said Stepashin. 


As for Gazprom, the Auditors have completed a probe into the transfer of
35% of the government’s packet of the company’s shares into the personal
trust of Rem Vyakhirev, the gas giant chief executive. 


Stepashin’s newly established board is also planning a probe into the gold
and diamond industries which back in the Soviet era used to fill the
nation’s budget with huge revenues. The revenues from those industries have
fallen substantially since the collapse of the Soviet Union. 


The members of the board also harshly criticized the principles of budget
formation and insist that budget legislation be revised. 


******


#4
Moscow Times
September 19, 2000 
Soaring Fuel Prices Blamed on Government 


A fuel industry official is blaming surging gasoline prices on the absence of 
a state strategy on the fuel market, and an analyst said Monday that prices 
will stabilize only next spring. 


"We have been ringing all the bells about the problems on the fuel market þ 
but the authorities refuse to take the need for seasonal adjustment into 
consideration when they issue exports quotas," Sergei Borisov, president of 
the Russian Fuel Association, said Monday in a telephone interview. 


In the last three months, gasoline prices have skyrocketed by 25 percent from 
about 6 rubles per liter of 92-octane, the most popular brand, to about 8 
rubles (29 cents) per liter, he said. 


Vladimir Nosov, oil analyst with Chase Flemings UCB, said fuel prices are 
likely to reach about 10 rubles at the beginning of next year, after the 
introduction of a new tax on fuel, and may finally level at about 9.5 rubles 
per liter only next spring. 


Both experts said the world oil crisis and fuel shortages had little 
influence on the domestic market. 


Borisov said only four out of 21 regions that on Monday reported to the 
association had no fuel shortages, while most regions had part of their 
gasoline stations closed or cars waiting long hours in lines for fuel. 


"What we have now is called 'a shoemaker left without shoes' f look, [Western 
Siberian oil cities] Surgut and Tyumen are short of fuel," he said. 


He said more oil needs to be kept in the country for the April sowing season, 
the August harvest and in September, when people returning from vacations use 
their vehicles more. 


Borisov called for a state strategy on the distribution of oil and petroleum 
products to be created with the participation of all market players. 


******


#5
NG - Stsenarii
No. 8
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
Analytical Report of the Centre of Political Technologies 
HOT AUGUST: RESULTS AND CONSEQUENCES
Even despite the recent catastrophes, President Putin 
still has a margin of strength necessary for carrying on the 
reform policy

Igor BUNIN, Director General of the Centre of Political 
Technologies, Boris MAKARENKO, Deputy Director General of the 
Centre, and Andrei BOGOSLOVSKY, head of the Centre's department 
of sociological studies 

The dynamics of political life in Russia is becoming more 
and more dependent on the progress of "the Putin Project," that 
is, an ambitious programme of reforms advanced by the new 
president. Having successfully overcome a number of political 
hurdles without having to fight a serious and structured 
opposition, the Putin Project was shaken by a series of 
catastrophes - the explosion in the underground crossing in 
Pushkin Square, the sinking of the Kursk submarine, and the 
fire in the Ostankino TV tower. So, "the hot August" brought to 
the fore the question about how the elite and the general 
public will regard these bad omens. Will they withdraw their 
loyalty for and support of the national leadership? 
Consequently, the authorities need to react to and to take 
measures to cushion the possible effects of these catastrophes 
on their political line. 

"Revolution from Above" Putin's Way

The Putin Project, which was most fully put forth in the 
presidential address to the Federal Assembly, is a plan of 
turning Russia into a country with an effective market economy 
and a strong state. The main definitions of the Putin Project 
are:
- it is a modernisation project as it is spearheaded at 
renewing different facets of social life, namely a liberal 
economic reform and the creation of a new, more effective 
mechanism of running the country with the help of a highly-paid 
state bureaucracy;
- it is an etatist project as it stipulates the priority 
of the interests of the state over the interests of the 
individual;
- it is a standardisation project as it provides for the 
establishment of transparent and equal rules of the game in 
society, which entail respect for the acting legislation by all 
groups of population;
- it is a pro-Western project as its main guideline is the 
industrialised Western countries, or rather the etatist element 
of their life (the existence of strong and respected army and 
special services, which are not rejected by society, an 
independent foreign policy, and the maintenance of formal 
democratic institutions, such as the parliament, political 
parties, etc.);
- it is a technocratic project as the planned reforms are 
to rely on groups of "new bureaucracy" (liberal-minded) and the 
staff of special services, rather than a broad political 
coalition. The bulk of the population supports Putin but is not 
taking an active part in the implementation of his project. 
This is another Russian "revolution from the above," carried 
out by the hands of "enlightened administrators." The Putin 
Project was not born unexpectedly; it was engendered by 
objective social needs. The stagnating regime of Boris Yeltsin 
was consistently losing allies in the elite and in the 
electorate alike. The striving for change became socially 
significant again, just as it happened in the mid-1980s. It is 
another matter that perestroika was waged under the slogans of 
freedom, while the current leaders are appealing to order 
(which fits in with the public demand). Consequently, we can 
speak, just as deputy chief of the presidential staff Vladislav 
Surkov did, about a period of reaction, although Surkov himself 
warned against confusing it with restoration. 
Before the Putin Project was launched, the advocates of a 
communist revenge were herded into a kind of an election ghetto 
(roughly 30% of the electorate), whose boundaries kept them 
from taking over executive power in the country. The positions 
of the communists have further weakened since then. 
Other possible opponents of Putin (oligarchs and 
governors) proved to be politically non-entities at the federal 
level and hence cannot seriously threaten the president (which 
does not exclude the possibility of the appearance of such 
threat in the future, though, if Putin's regime becomes 
weakened). The economic situation in the country is relatively 
stable and oil prices will remain high in the near future. 
Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin did not have such 
favourable conditions for reforms.
However, it soon transpired that the future of the Putin 
Project depends on the sum total of factors and can be 
influenced by things that cannot be predicted (unlike the level 
of opposition activity, the exchange rate of the rouble, or the 
aforementioned oil prices). 
In this context, the analysis of the reaction of the 
authorities, the elite and society to the consequences of 
catastrophes could help outline the prospects of the Putin 
Project. 

End of the Triumphal March

The storm of emotional reactions to the catastrophes and 
the actions of the authorities should have engendered major 
changes in the sentiments of society. However, sociological 
polls show that the level of trust for the authorities and the 
general attitude to them changed only slightly. A closer look 
reveals significant nuances, though, which can play their part 
not today, but at subsequent stages of the Putin Project. 
The polls held by the Centre of Political Technologies in 
the wake of the catastrophes revealed a considerable fall in 
social optimism. The catastrophes cut short Putin's "triumphal 
march" and ended the romantic period of the president's first 
100 days. Even convinced supporters of Putin are coming to 
think that his possibilities are limited and there will be no 
miracle. A month ago, the future of "Putin's state" was not 
clear to the people, yet most of them were optimistic, while 
today it is regarded as a kind of "a bad-luck island." The 
fall in social optimism and the "shrinking" of Putin's image 
are objectively reducing the margin of strength of the public 
policy steered by the president and his team. However, this 
process (provided it begins) will be drawn out in time and will 
hardly affect the core of the president's supporters. So, the 
margin of strength is still sufficient for carrying on a reform 
policy. 

Putin's Supporters: "Hard" and "Soft" 

Mind you, this information is important for the medium 
term of the authorities' policy. On a short-term plane, this 
reaction of society testifies to the inertia development of 
previous trends in the attitude to the authorities, rather than 
to a change in these trends. The most important element of them 
is the central, determinant role of the president in all 
evaluations of political events. This "monopolisation of 
politics" by the head of the state was characteristic of Yeltin 
in his early period, but the president ceased to be the only 
"axis" of political life during the first Chechen campaign. 
The study carried out by the Centre of Political 
Technologies on the basis of focus groups in Moscow on August 
24 and 25 (after the Kursk catastrophe but before the Ostankino 
fire) revealed four clearly defined groups in the reform 
spectrum of the Russian electorate (those who voted for OVR, 
Unity, SPS and Yabloko at the latest parliamentary elections). 
Those respondents who voted for the centrist parties have a 
positive attitude to the president, while the supporters of the 
right-wing parties regard him negatively. 
It turned out that the attitude to Putin that developed in 
the electorate during the Duma and the presidential elections 
is closely related to (moreover, it largely determines) their 
interpretation of the developments around the Kursk and other 
actions of the federal authorities. 
It is indicative that hardly anyone accused anyone 
personally of the events (the Kursk catastrophe and the 
explosion in the underground passage). Most respondents blame 
them on "the system." 
Those who have a negative attitude to the president regard 
him as a part of "the system." Consequently, they think that 
Putin is guilty of what happened, but no more guilty than his 
predecessors. 
Those who have a positive attitude to Putin regard him as 
a man "outside the system," who has come to change it but did 
not have enough time to do this. Consequently, they think that 
Putin has no relation to the tragic events. 
And lastly, the maximally loyal group explain these events 
by "a tragic coincidence: nobody is to blame. Submarines have 
accidents everywhere, and it is far from always that their 
crews can be saved."
In other words, there are two basic types of Putin's 
supporters. 
The first type can be described as "hard pro-Putin." These 
people have a positive view of Putin's actions during the Kursk 
catastrophe. It is a paradox but some "hard" Putin supporters 
do not admit the fact that Putin was on vacation at the time: 
"How do you know why he had not come? Who said he was on a 
vacation?" They believe that the president was busy tackling 
more important problems during the Kursk catastrophe, and they 
do not even want to know exactly what these more important 
problems can be. 
From the viewpoint of "hard" Putin supporters, the crew of 
the submarine died in the first few minutes of the catastrophe 
and the rescue operation was mounted to appease public opinion.
It is indicative that this engendered a positive reaction on 
their part: "One cannot tell such things to the people 
outright." The "hard" Putin supporters have a rather tranquil 
attitude to the death of the crew: "It is a risk they always 
had to take.
They knew what could happen; they were not on a holiday 
cruise." There are considerably fewer "hard" Putin supporters 
in Moscow than "soft" ones (the relation is roughly 1:2).
So, who is a "hard" Putin supporter? Judging by 
everything, it is a person loyal to the authorities, who 
recognises the priority of state interests over individual 
ones, and who is not very sentimental (when the point at issue 
does not concern his or her near and dear ones). Such a person 
does not demand too much from the authorities, but neither will 
he or she forgive complete neglect of the interests of the 
"small man" (this is why the current "hard" Putin supporter 
usually has a negative attitude to the oligarchic period of 
Yeltsin's rule). And such a person is not embarrassed by the 
absence of glasnost in the work of state agencies (moreover, 
such glasnost is not one of such person's vital necessities, 
which developed during the Soviet period). 
On the other hand, the "hard" Putin supporters were 
influenced by the latest developments, too. They don't like the 
version about a collision of the Kursk with a foreign 
submarine, although it was advanced by the official quarters. 
It is another matter that they prefer not to focus their 
attention on this issue and not to accuse the authorities of 
spreading "misinformation." However, these people were critical 
of information provided by "the bosses": They thought they were 
again regarded as "the Soviet herd" ready to snatch whatever is 
offered to them. By the way, this information corresponds to 
the results of an opinion poll held by the VTsIOM National 
Public Opinion Research Centre: the version of a collision with 
a foreign submarine, which smells of the Cold War times, was 
accepted by only 14% of the respondents and was hence the least 
popular of all suggested versions. 
The second type of Putin's supporters can be described as 
"soft." These people think the president should have gone to 
the catastrophe site and that his behaviour during the crisis 
was clearly a flop. However, they have not withdrawn their 
support:
"Of course, it was his mistake, yet he does more good than 
bad." Far from all "soft" Putin supporters think that the crew 
could not be saved. They believe that the death of the whole 
crew was a result of "the traditional Russian carelessness" or 
even "the traditionally low price of human life in Russia," 
which is why it took so long to accept foreign assistance. 
However, "soft" Putin supporters blame it not on the 
president, but on the system. They think the recently elected 
head of state cannot bear responsibility for what has happened.
Putin has a considerable margin of trust in this group of 
population, which is not lessened by their rejection of some 
elements of the president's policy. Unlike the clear-cut 
opponents of the president in the electorate of the SPS and 
Yabloko, the "soft" Putin supporters do not see ill will in 
what has happened and regard Putin as a man who makes mistakes, 
but not a calculating and heartless politician, who "did not go 
[to the catastrophe site] in order not to lose face." It 
appears that democratic values are much more important to the 
"soft" Putin supporters than to the "hard" ones. A "soft" Putin 
supporter sets much higher demands to the authorities. If it 
turns out that Putin does not satisfy these demands, and if an 
alternative figure appears on the political scene, these people 
might leave the current president. 

Putin's Victories and Losses 

The quantity studies carried out by VTsIOM revealed the 
same trends. The president's indistinct reaction to 
catastrophes can slash the level of people's approval of his 
policy, which VTsIOM says reached 73% in July (maximum level). 
A poll held before the official announcement of the death of 
the Kursk crew showed a fall in Putin's rating to 65%, and the 
August 28 poll registered a fall by another five points. 
However, it cannot be said that a considerable part of the 
population withdrew their trust for the president because of 
the Kursk catastrophe. 
VTsIOM director Yuri Levada says the difference between 
65% and the figures registered shortly before the Kursk 
catastrophe was barely 1-1.5% (which is in the limits of 
admissible statistical error). This means that the peak figure 
of 73% started sliding even before the sinking of the submarine.
However, the subsequent fall in the public support of the 
president to 60% means that a part of his supporters have 
turned their back on him, probably because of their negative 
reaction to the president's silence over the tragedy in the 
Barents Sea. 
Judging by everything, the president's policy enjoys a 
more or less stable support of 60% of the population, which is 
incomparable to the results of Boris Yeltsin's rule in the last 
few years of his tenure. It is indicative that fluctuations in 
Putin's rating (VTsIOM data) did not yet send it below this 
figure. In late May, 72% of the respondents approved the 
president's policy. This figure dropped to 61% in early July (a 
period of fierce debates over the federative reform, the 
outcome of which was not clear at the time). The president's 
victory in the struggle against his opponents in the country 
and his international activity raised his rating to the 
aforementioned 73%. So, it will be a failure for Putin if his 
rating goes down to below 60%, or worse still, below 50%. 
Sociologists say the level of the public trust for the 
president fell from 46% to 33% in the past month. 
It appears that 30-35% of voters constitute the core of 
Putin's electorate, who are spearheaded at providing deliberate 
and stable support to the president. This support presupposes 
even the justification of his outright mistakes (the "hard" 
Putin supporters). Interestingly, 40% of the respondents polled 
by VTsIOM on August 28 positively evaluated Putin's actions 
during the "sub crisis," a figure that is very close to the 
core of Putin's electorate. 
But the remaining 25-30% are the so-called "soft" Putin 
supporters. They regard the president not as an idol without 
blemishes, but as a politician who best meets their views of 
the leader of the state. This does not preclude a critical 
attitude to some of his actions and obvious mistakes. However, 
this part of Putin's electorate are unlikely to desert him in 
the hear future, for two basic reasons. 
First, there is no real alternative to Putin, as the fall 
in his rating by 13% in one month did not result in a 
substantial growth of the rating of his rivals. 
Second, this part of his supporters think that Putin's 
mistakes are much smaller than the positive elements of his 
policy. On the other hand, we cannot exclude the possibility of 
gradual "erosion" of the "soft" supporters. 
As for another 10-12% of the voters, who turned their back 
on Putin in August, they were temporary supporters, those who 
stand by their president on his good days and turn their back 
on him as soon as he fails in something. The Kremlin hardly 
regards them as a stable support. Since 52% of the electorate 
voted for Putin at the presidential elections, we can assume 
that the bulk of those 10-12% did not support him then. 
A combination of information of that quantitative (polls) 
and qualitative (focus groups) sociological studies prompts the 
conclusion that the August catastrophes did little damage to 
the president in the sphere of public politics. However, it 
should be said again that the consequences of these 
developments might appear much later, because the "axis" role 
of the president in Russian politics makes the draft reforms 
the hostage of his personal popularity. 

Difficult Way to Authoritarianism

The calls for the consolidation of society, accompanied by 
statements of presidential consultants (in particular Gleb 
Pavlovsky) on the need to change the elite, which allegedly 
failed to adequately and constructively react to the "sub 
crisis," could contribute to further strengthening of the rigid 
power vertical. Sociological polls show that a considerable 
part of society have no immunity from "the iron hand," not to 
mention the mobilisation economy. 
However, the creation of a rigid power vertical calls for 
a close-knit team, where all members would play clearly defined 
functional roles. There is no such team in Russia now.
Differences in Putin's team make the authoritarian way of 
development improbable. Of course, this team might be 
overhauled with due consideration for the August events. 
Likewise, the continued marginalisation of the Duma ("public") 
liberals is quite probable, too. However, it appears that the 
general logic of reforms calls for maintaining that fragile 
balance between the power departments, "the family" and 
"practical" liberals at the top of the power pyramid. This 
means that despite the August shocks, the situation will be 
noted by "inertia" development in the near future. 


******


#6
BORODIN VIEWS SWISS PROSECUTORS' CHARGES AGAINST HIM AS "POLITICAL ORDER
FROM RUSSIA"


MOSCOW. Sept 18 (Interfax) - State Secretary of the Russia-Belarus
Union Pavel Borodin has said he views the "recurrent bullying" that he
is being subjected to by Swiss investigation authorities first of all as
the intention of "certain Russian circles [to blacken the top leadership
of Russia and the Union] by Swiss hands."
"Earlier, they tried to get Boris Yeltsin via me, and now they are
aiming simultaneously at the present Russian president and the Russia-
Belarus Union," Borodin told Interfax on Monday. The former Kremlin
property manager has labeled the charges being brought against him by
the Swiss investigating judge, Daniel Devaud, as "a political order from
Russia."
There are two points that prevent Borodin from suing the judge who
is constantly bringing "absurd charges" against him, he said. First,
according to Borodin's estimations, the costs will amount to about
$350,000, while, if he wins his suit, he will get no more than $12,000
from the Swiss judicial authorities. Second, "I have too much actual
work to involve myself in a litigation."
The constant attempts "to accuse me of something" made originally
by prosecutor Carla del Ponte and then by Devaud are chiefly aimed at
boosting the images of the investigators themselves, Borodin insisted.
Del Ponte "has made a career exclusively from harassing prominent
political figures," the state secretary said. "None of the cases she
launched have been confirmed in court," he said.
"Devaud is now using the same method," Borodin said, adding that
"owing to loud threats," in particular, addressed at him, "the two
[Devaud and del Ponte] have become known to many people."
Borodin said he believes it is his political opponents in Russia
who "ordered" him. He has described the mechanism of the "order" itself
as follows. "First, some compromising material is published in the
Russian media, and then this scenario is developed in Switzerland." As
for the accusations against him, Borodin said he rejects them
"absolutely."
He recalled, in particular, that he has met the Mabetex owner,
Behgjet Pacolli, "only a few times, and that was at receptions or [to
discuss] purely technical issues."
According to Borodin, Mabetex received only 11 Russian contracts on
the tender basis out of 340 transactions on modernization and the
setting-up of federal installations. What is more, Pacolli often worked
actually on a parity basis with Russian companies, as was stipulated by
tender terms, Borodin said.
"Where is the logic in charges of [my] receiving kickbacks from
Mabetex?" he said.
Borodin said he is "always ready to meet with Interpol
investigators or Daniel Devaud if he comes to Moscow." However, the
state secretary has said he is not satisfied with the fact that, over
the two-and-a-half years that the investigation into the Mabetex case
has spanned, Moscow investigators have called on him only twice, and
that was as a witness.
No obstacles exist to his traveling abroad, Borodin said, adding
that he is planning to make business trips to Britain, Finland and a
number of other countries. "I am not questioned abroad, because I do not
have any accounts," Borodin stressed.
The state secretary yet again complained about the fact that his
accusers persistently try to present him as the holder of funds
belonging to "families" [corrupted clans] of any sort - once, the
"Moscow" family, then the "Urals" or "Petersburg" family.
"Whereas I am only a lonely Yakut," Borodin said, recalling that he
was Yakutsk mayor before being appointed to work in Moscow.


*******


#7
Christian Science Monitor
19 September 2000
Latvia's language tremors
By Christopher Walker
Christopher Walker is a New York-based analyst specializing in European 
affairs. 


Walking through Riga presents a curious irony. Here in Latvia's capital city, 
all the street signs, storefronts, and advertisements are in Latvian, while 
most street conversations are in Russian. 


During the 50-year Soviet occupation of this nation, tens of thousands of 
ethnic Latvians were deported to the fringes of the Soviet Empire, while 
thousands of Russians were resettled here. Before World War II, ethnic 
Latvians comprised over three-quarters of the population; today, they make up 
just over half. In Latvia's seven largest cities, ethnic Latvians are the 
minority. 


Like many post-Soviet Eastern European countries today, Latvia, a country of 
2.4 million wedged between Russia and the Baltic Sea, finds itself 
negotiating nettling questions of minority relations, integration, and 
identity. 


At the beginning of September, the issue came to a head when Latvian 
authorities put into place regulations for implementing the state language 
law - an act that has touched a sensitive nerve in Latvia's ethnic 
communities. 


The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other 
international organizations have kept a close eye on the language issue 
during the entire legislative process. The OSCE high commissioner on national 
minorities, Max van der Stoel, has said he views the regulations "as being 
essentially in conformity with both the law and Latvia's international 
obligations." 


But shortly after the adoption of the new regulations, the parliamentary 
faction For Human Rights in a United Latvia called on nongovernmental 
organizations and others to use all nonviolent means to resist the newly 
adopted state language-law regulations, which it believes infringe on 
Russian-speakers' rights. 


The 50-year Soviet occupation and Latvia's post-Soviet nation-building effort 
have led to enduring mistrust on both sides. 


"Everyone is afraid of losing their identity," observes Nils Muiznieks, 
director of the Latvian Center for Human Rights and Ethnic Studies. 


Russians in Latvia perceive that the Latvian authorities are putting them in 
an untenable position. 


Tatiana R., a Russian saleswoman at the Laima candy shop in downtown Riga 
argues, "I was born here and lived all of my 35 years in Latvia. People must 
recognize that there are many Russians who were born and lived their entire 
lives here. They have nowhere else to go." 


The dispute in Latvia is not centered on the precise text of the language law 
and its regulations so much as it is on the way in which these will be 
interpreted and implemented. 


"The Russian-speakers' fear is of bureaucratic harassment," says Mr. 
Muiznieks. The law regulates language-proficiency requirements for different 
state jobs, and is optional for private-sector enterprises, unless companies 
subcontract for the state. 


Tatiana, the Russian saleswoman adds, "I don't think the [language] law will 
be applied fairly." She believes "the law would be fairer if it was applied 
to reflect the proportion of each group of speakers in the country." 


This line of reasoning goes to the question of whether the Russian language 
deserves a special status, which is what many Latvians believe Moscow and 
Latvia's Russians actually are after. 


Armands Gutmanis, of Latvia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, argues that the 
Latvian government's "aim is to treat Russians as a normal minority. But 
Russia cannot agree to having Russians as a minority in Latvia." As further 
evidence of the Russian community's desire for privileged status of the 
Russian language, Latvians point to the post-Soviet experience of other 
minorities in Latvia, such as the Ukrainians, Poles, and Lithuanians, all of 
whom have established minority schools in Latvia. The Riga Jewish Secondary 
School was the first non-Russian minority educational institution to be 
founded in Latvia and the first such school on the territory of the former 
USSR. 


While Latvia has attracted considerable attention from international 
organizations and a steady stream of criticism from Moscow, the fact is that 
on both sides of the former Iron Curtain, real or perceived threats to 
identity are a serious problem. 


Complicated questions relating to national minorities - citizenship, 
education, immigration - are at the forefront of heated national debates. In 
the European Union, such established democracies as Denmark, France, and 
Austria are witnessing controversial political movements whose success arises 
largely from programs grounded in nationalism and intolerance of foreigners. 


The challenge is much trickier in Eastern Europe where countries are trying 
to manage sensitive minority-relations issues while at the same time working 
to establish democratic societies after five decades of failed Soviet rule. 


Latvia - as well as Estonia - faces an immense challenge. From one side it is 
squeezed by Moscow, which sees the ethnic Russian minorities living outside 
Russia as a fertile political issue, while from the other side, the EU sets 
the bar very high on a range of issues for transitional countries such as 
Latvia. 


Armands Gutmanis of the Latvian Foreign Ministry notes, "Western countries 
don't admit they have the exact same problems as we do, but they can treat 
Latvia differently because Latvia is relatively weak and an accession 
candidate [to the EU and NATO]. Latvia's problem is not unique." 


******


#8
BBC MONITORING 
RUSSIAN PAPER LOOKS AT IMPLICATIONS OF ARMED FORCES' CUTS IN 2001-2003
Source: 'Nezavisimaya Gazeta', Moscow, in Russian 16 Sep 00 


The next meeting of the Russian Security Council on military reform is
likely to take place on 25th or 26th September, according to a report
published on 16th September by the Russian newspaper 'Nezavisimaya Gazeta'.
Plans for armed forces' cuts by 350,000 men in the period 2001-2003 will be
discussed. Anonymous sources say the Ground Forces will lose 180,000 men,
the navy over 50,000 and the air force approximately 40,000 men. The
following is the text of the report: 


According to `Nezavisimaya Gazeta' information, intensive preparations are
currently being made for the Russian Federation Security Council meeting
scheduled for late September, at which the areas of military reform in
Russia will be examined once again. The Security Council may meet on 25th
or 26th September, but the exact date of the meeting, which is to be
decided by President Putin, has not yet been scheduled. 


The Security Council will examine plans to further reduce the armed forces
by 350,000 men during the period 2001-2003. Anonymous sources in the
military department also give the parameters of the upcoming reduction: The
Ground Forces will lose 180,000 men, the navy [will lose] more than 50,000
men and the air force [will lose] approximately 40,000 men. Despite
statements by the top military leadership that there are no contradictions
in the approaches to military organizational development, a polemic over
the fate of the Strategic Missile Troops is continuing between the defence
minister and the chief of the General Staff. The General Staff proposes to
transform the [Strategic] Missile Troops from a branch of service into a
combat arm by 2002 and to incorporate them in the air force by 2006. 


Although missilemen regard such a decision as premature, they object more
actively to another proposal by the General Staff, which intends to remove
the military space forces from the Strategic Missile Troops and to make
them subordinate to itself as early as 2001. 


Whatever you might think of the 1997 decision to transfer the military
space forces to the Strategic Missile Troops, you cannot deny the fact that
the work of combining the missile and space units has produced significant
economies. Expenditure on research and development alone has been reduced
by R300m and the strength of the combined branch of troops has been cut by
34,000 men. The reverse process is now to be carried out with an inevitable
increase in expenditure and in the size of the managerial apparatus both at
the centre and on ranges, in military training institutions and in military
acceptance offices. Experts believe that it is for these very reasons that
the General Staff is not submitting a military-economic substantiation of
the military space forces' removal from the Strategic Missile Troops this
time. 


And yet it is not the Strategic Missile Troops' fate that will be the main
topic at the upcoming Security Council meeting. The fundamental decisions
on the separation of the armed forces' administrative and operational
leadership which were adopted in July may be specified there. An
examination of fundamental cadre issues also cannot be ruled out. At the
same time informed experts believe that the proposals advanced earlier for
the simultaneous dismissal of [Defence Minister] Igor Sergeyev and [Chief
of General Staff] Anatoliy Kvashnin are hardly likely to be implemented.
The chief of the General Staff, at any rate, will most likely keep his post. 


******


#9
Financial Times (UK)
19 September 2000
Editorial 
Russia's task


When Mikhail Kasyanov, Russia's prime minister, meets bankers and investors
in London today, he will have some good news to tell. On the macro-economic
front, the Russian economy has undergone a remarkable transformation since
the financial collapse of August 1998. 


Annual growth is running at more than 5 per cent, the trade surplus should
top Dollars 50bn this year, the budget should see a surplus of some 2.5 per
cent of gross domestic product, and inflation is down to around 20 per
cent, from 80 per cent in 1999. 


In spite of the recovery, Mr Kasyanov is going to face a thoroughly
sceptical audience, and rightly so. For much of the improvement is simply a
result of the rise in oil and commodity prices. As far as investors are
concerned, the Russian government has yet to deliver on its promises of
economic reform, improvements in corporate governance, bankruptcy
legislation, and transparency in the application of commercial law. 


Mr Kasyanov and his boss, President Putin, started well by pushing through
the first phase of tax reform - cutting income taxes to 13 per cent - in
July. As far as investors are concerned, however, the next phase is what
matters: they are promised eventual replacement of turnover tax by a
profits tax. Getting it past the Duma will be a step in the right
direction, and a short-term test of the government's resolve. 


Much remains to be done. The government's much-vaunted reform programme has
still only been published in draft form. There is great uncertainty about
the status of past privatisation, and whether the new regime might reverse
decisions of the Yeltsin era. The banking system has yet to be
restructured, although many parts are clearly insolvent. And most important
of all, the legal system is opaque, unpredictable, and notoriously corrupt,
especially at lower levels. 


If foreign investors remain sceptical, so should Mr Kasyanov's official
hosts. He will be meeting Tony Blair, the prime minister, and Gordon Brown,
the chancellor, as well as the directors of the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development. 


They should all provide a consistent message. This is not the moment for
further debt relief from official creditors in the Paris Club. Russia can
afford to service its debt from its soaring oil revenues. 


As for the EBRD, it should be clear that new loans will be tied to strict
conditionality. Good governance, transparency, and consistency in the
application of the law are essential preconditions, for public and private
sector investors alike. 


******