April 12, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4239 • 4240 • 4241

Johnson's Russia List
#4241
11 April 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. RFE/RL NEWSLINE: RUSSIAN TEENS LIKE EMPIRES, DOLLARS, CLOSED BORDERS. 
2. AFP: Putin's Foreign Policy is more Realistic Than Old One Says Ivanov.
3. Reuters: Russia edges towards talks with Chechen leader.
4. The Independent (UK): Helen Womack, THE SHAMEFUL LITTLE SECRET THAT RUSSIANS SHARE.
5. The Russia Journal: Tatyana Matsuk, Something for nothing hinders progress.
6. The Guardian (UK): Ian Traynor, Historic church at heart of a modern row.
7. RFE/RL Russian Federation Report: Peter Rutland, MATVIENKO'S RETREAT. (St. Petersburg)
8. Vremya Novosti: Oleg SAVELYEV (VTsIOM), THE ELECTIONS ARE OVER, THANK GOD! (poll)
9. BBC MONITORING: NTV, RUSSIAN COMMUNIST LEADER ZYUGANOV TALKS ABOUT START, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, GOVERNMENT.]

******

#1
RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 4, No. 72, Part I, 11 April 2000

RUSSIAN TEENS LIKE EMPIRES, DOLLARS, CLOSED BORDERS. In a
survey of 1,600 teenagers at schools in Moscow, more than 50
percent said they would prefer Russia to have the same
boundaries as either the Russian empire before the 1917
revolution or the Soviet Union, "Kommersant-Vlast" reported
on 4 April. However, only 13 percent consider the Soviet
regime quite acceptable. More than 50 percent approved of the
circulation of foreign currency on Russian soil and would
like to be paid in dollars, while "the number of teenagers
who believe that Russia should be entirely open to refugees
drops to zero" by the final year of high school. The survey
also found that students of wealthier and more educated
parents tend to favor the "predominance of the interests of
the country's ethnic majority." The survey was conducted by
the Center of Educational Sociology of the Russian Academy of
Education. JAC

******

#2
Putin's Foreign Policy is more Realistic Than Old One Says Ivanov

MOSCOW, Apr 11, 2000 -- (Agence France Presse) Russian Foreign Minister Igor 
Ivanov described the country's new foreign policy as "more realistic" than 
the Yeltsin-era one, in a commentary published in Tuesday's Izvestia 
newspaper.

Ivanov hailed the 2000 foreign policy conceptualized by President-elect 
Vladimir Putin, saying the old one, created in 1993, needed an update.

"Serious changes are happening around the world and in Russia too. Foreign 
policy cannot stand still," wrote Ivanov in the daily.

Seemingly responding to widespread criticism by the international community 
of human rights abuses in separatist Chechnya, the policy purports to place 
the protection of rights at its fore.

"More attention is given to the protection of rights and interests of the 
Russian people and our allies abroad.... Our priority is protection of 
Russian individuals, society and the state.

"A new factor in the policy is that it is closely tied to the country's 
realistic opportunities and resources.

"The concept clearly says that Russia will carry out an independent and 
constructive foreign policy, staunchly protecting its interests."

Ivanov spent Monday in Luxembourg mending fences with European Union 
ministers after last week's diplomatic bombshell when the Council of Europe 
sanctioned Russia over Chechnya by taking away the country's voting rights 
and proposing Russia's suspension from the organization. 

******

#3
Russia edges towards talks with Chechen leader
By Andrei Shukshin

MOSCOW, April 11 (Reuters) - Russia appeared on Tuesday to be edging towards 
renewed political dialogue with Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov to try to end 
a war which has devastated the rebel region and drawn Western condemnation. 

Maskhadov, elected Chechen president in 1997, has several times offered peace 
talks to stop Russia's ongoing offensive. But Moscow opened a criminal case 
against him in response, saying it could not negotiate with a ``bandit.'' 

In an apparent shift, President-elect Vladimir Putin's Chechnya spokesman 
Sergei Yastrzhembsky said Moscow had never stopped seeing Maskhadov as a 
leader it could talk to. 

``It is absolutely obvious that we have to keep up contacts,'' he told 
Itar-Tass news agency on a visit to Uzbekistan, adding that Moscow had spoken 
to Maskhadov through regional leaders. 

``We have repeatedly made Moscow's point of view known to Maskhadov, aiming 
to launch some kind of political process.'' 

Russia has been the target of fierce criticism from Western leaders and human 
rights organisations for refusing to seek a political solution in Chechnya 
and relying overwhelmingly on military force to bring the rebel republic to 
heel. 

It was still unclear whether Putin, who launched the war and makes his first 
visit to the West as Kremlin chief next week, really intends to change 
course. 

With Russian troops now facing spring weather and a partisan war rather than 
a winter frontal assault, Moscow may be keen to talk if the conditions are 
right. 

In the interview, Yastrzhembsky reiterated Moscow's demands that all rebel 
groups lay down arms and said rebel commanders Khattab (eds:one name), Shamil 
Basayev and Ruslan Gelayev had to go on trial before negotiations with 
Maskhadov could begin. 

MASKHADOV LASHES OUT AT BASAYEV 

Maskhadov was at odds with Basayev and Khattab before Moscow sent troops into 
Chechnya last October, but did not speak against them at the height of the 
fighting. Basayev and Khattab are the most experienced rebel commanders and 
their units the best trained. 

But, in an interview published by Germany's international broadcaster 
Deutsche Welle, Maskhadov clearly distanced himself from these men. 

Basayev and Khattab led an incursion into neighbouring Dagestan last August 
which triggered the Russian offensive. Moscow also accused them of 
masterminding explosions in Russian cities which killed nearly 300 people. 
They have denied responsibility. 

Moscow had said that by refusing to distance himself from Basayev and 
Khattab, Maskhadov had de facto supported their action and undermined 
prospects for a political settlement. 

Russia has also said Maskhadov is a weakling who has no real control over the 
rebels. 

On Tuesday, after more than six months of war during which Moscow has 
established control over most of Chechnya, Maskhadov lashed out at Basayev 
for deliberately giving Russia a pretext to invade. Maskhadov said he was in 
command of all rebel units. 

``On the Chechen side (the war was masterminded) by Udugov and Basayev,'' he 
told Deutsche Welle in a telephone interview, posted on the station's 
Internet site. 

Movladi Udugov, a former journalist, helped the rebels win the 1994-96 war 
against Russia by waging an information campaign against Moscow. During this 
war he opened an Internet site, www.kavkaz.org, which Russia says serves 
nothing but lies. 

Maskhadov said the pro-Basayev site, a rare source of direct information from 
the rebel camp, was in opposition to him and his government and had no 
authority to speak on his behalf. 

``I am coordinating all (rebel) actions. Virtually all commanders are under 
my control and keep in touch with them,'' Maskhadov said, adding that the 
rebel force was still about 23,500-strong despite the loss of some 1,500 
fighters. Russia, which has lost more than 2,000 servicemen, says rebel 
losses are far higher. 

******

#4
The Independent (UK)
11 April 2000
[for personal use only]
THE SHAMEFUL LITTLE SECRET THAT RUSSIANS SHARE
STREET LIFE SAMOTECHNY LANE, MOSCOW
By Helen Womack

WHO SAYS accountants are boring people? I have had some frank and
meaningful discussions with the man who advises me on my personal finances
in Russia. 

When I first met him, he gave me only tax advice. But last April we moved
on to international politics and this spring he bared his tortured Russian
soul to me. 

A year ago, Nato jets were bombing Yugoslavia. I sat in his office and
listened as he expressed the full force of his outrage over this "breach of
international law" and "interference in the affairs of a sovereign
country", Russia's Slav brother to boot. I think he met few foreigners and
he was determined to use this chance to bend my ear while he had it. 

For my part, I put the Western arguments, though somewhat feebly.
Privately, I shared many of his misgivings and felt that, although the
situation in Kosovo was intolerable, bombing Belgrade was no solution. 

As the new tax year comes round, Chechnya is the issue that strains
relations between Russia and Europe and one that may raise itself when a
Russian, an accountant, say, meets a person from the West. 

My accountant came for coffee at Samotechny Lane. He asked timidly: "What
do you think about Chechnya, then?" I could see he was bracing himself for
a self-righteous tirade from me. "It's dreadful but it's your business," I
said. "Sooner or later, I expect Russia will sort it out. But let's not
talk about that. How are you, anyway?" 

Clearly relieved that I was not going to give him an earful on that painful
subject, he began to tell me about the new flat he and his wife had bought.
He was happy with the apartment but there was nothing he could do about the
filthy state of the rest of the building, which made him feel ashamed.
"We're the only private owners in the block," he said. "The others still
rent from the state. They don't give a damn. They drop their cigarette
butts all down the stairwell. They let their dogs foul the yard where my
child plays." 

His voice dropped to a barely audible whisper. "Sometimes," he said, "I
think that Hitler was right." "Pardon?" "You know, when he said Slavs were
untermenschen (sub-human). I am afraid he might have been right. I am very
afraid of that." I was stunned. He went on: "I'm afraid because this
Russian barbarity is in me too. When people are rude to me on the streets,
I find myself being rude back and then I hate myself." 

I hastened to assure him that there was nothing sub-human or superhuman
about any people. At the same time, I was glad that this ridiculous fear
had been voiced because now that it was out, it could be dealt with. He had
shown courage in verbalising an inferiority complex from which millions of
ordinary Russians suffer, a complex that sometimes expresses itself as
nationalist aggressiveness. 

Even with close Russian friends, I go through the pretence of believing
them when they pretend their country is no more behind than Britain or
Germany. Deep in their hearts, they know they are fooling themselves
because the Iron Curtain fell 10 years ago and they have seen with their
own eyes that the West is more developed than Russia. That is a sad fact,
although it is no fault of the Russians that they lag behind the West,
because for them the Second World War really ended with the fall of
Communism, not in 1945 as for us. 

******

#5
The Russia Journal
April 10-16, 2000
Something for nothing hinders progress
By Tatyana Matsuk, former head researcher
Tatyana Matsuk, is former head researcher at the Employment Institute, part 
of the Russian Academy of Scientists. 

The often-used Russian word "khalyava" means getting something for free, and 
a "khalyavschik" is someone who makes a hobby out of getting things for free. 

Every society has its "khalyavschiki." The American variety is fond of having 
little accidents in order to get big money out of lawsuits. The German 
species spends 10 years at university and displays feats of ingenuity in 
getting every social benefit available. Advertisers love "khalyava" and play 
on people's weakness for it in their various promotion campaigns.

For Russia, "khalyava" is a state-owned asset and the reason why many 
Russians are so keen on getting a foothold, or even just a toehold, in power.

It's not hard to see why. An acquaintance of mine, a young man with no steady 
career as such, but with charm, a head on his shoulders and a provincial 
bureaucrat for a father, heard about some international congress to be 
attended by almost all Russia's top leadership. 

Having decided to join the party, he made friends with some Duma deputy's 
assistant who got him a seat on the plane, and with 10 rubles in his pocket, 
he flew to the Black Sea for free. There, he stayed in an expensive hotel, 
dined on salmon and caviar and returned to Moscow with a pocket full of good 
contacts. That's what Russian "khalyava" is all about.

That things should be any different simply doesn't occur to Russian 
officials. It's enough to listen to former Presidential Household Affairs 
Department head Pavel Borodin or former economy minister Yevgeny Yasin. They 
are quite sincere in their belief that their state dachas, cars and other 
sundry privileges are simply deserved reward for the fact that they work more 
and better than others. 

Of course, it's more of a headache to acquire private property. A private 
dacha or car can create a mountain of problems, you have to look after it, 
register it, wash it, repair it, etc. Service in Russia is either very 
expensive, very bad or both. But once you've got your snout in at the state 
feeding trough, all your problems are solved. 

The old Soviet Communist Party understood this - its upper echelons lived 
under genuine communism, where everyone got everything for absolutely free. 
The current nomenklatura also understands this, as do those who are busy 
trying to kick it out of the way and free up a place at the trough for 
themselves.

The best thing is that none of this is illegal. The president need only sign 
a decree, the Duma need only pass a law giving deputies the privileges that 
common mortals don't have. 

Just write into the budget some figure for upkeep of the presidential 
apparatus, and spend it how you please, on paper clips, a Mercedes, or 
symposiums in coastal resorts. And there are no worries and headaches - the 
state takes care of everything. 

Just look at former General Prosecutor Yury Skuratov, for example. For months 
now, he's been out of his job, locked in conflict with the Kremlin, but he 
still has his car with its flashing light and still lives at his state dacha 
- not that this seems to bother anyone.

The people watch all this and follow suit, snatching up anything not nailed 
down. Recently, TV devoted a whole program to "khalyava" and those who go in 
search of it. Fans of "khalyava" are abundant in Moscow, they even have an 
Internet site informing people where, when and what is going for free. 

I saw this for myself one day on my way to an embassy reception. I was alone 
and had an invitation for two people. People crowded round the entrance, and 
one young man simply asked me straight out if he could go into the reception 
with me. 

A lot of people hold Soviet power responsible for these attitudes. Under 
socialism, people forgot what it meant to own something or to earn money. But 
the way I see it, the roots of "khalyava" go back far deeper in our history. 

For centuries, the country lived by plundering its huge natural resources. 
Totalitarian regimes and serfdom compounded the situation. In his opera 
"Prince Igor," composer Alexander Borodin portrayed a certain Prince Galitsky 
who dreamed of replacing Igor at the top while he was away at war so as to 
have feasts and girls. "Then I'd live the sweet life, because that's what 
power is for," he says.

It will be no easy task to teach Russians the value of careful management and 
financial order. But so long as we continue to see the state as a bubbling 
fount of "khalyava," we won't even be able to take the first steps toward 
progress.

******

#6
The Guardian (UK)
11 April 2000
[for personal use only]
Historic church at heart of a modern row 
Ian Traynor in Moscow

Built in 1693 by a wealthy uncle of Peter the Great, the little red brick and 
stucco Church of the Intercession standing in generous parkland to the west 
of the city centre is the jewel of Moscow baroque. 

Its upper chapel is the sole 17th century church interior in Russia to have 
survived intact the ravages wrought through the centuries by Napoleon, the 
Nazis and Stalin's atheistic demolition men. But having coped with the 
barbarities visited on it over 300 years, the church now faces a new threat. 

According to some of Russia's architecture experts, incense and overcrowding 
could succeed where despots failed and destroy a precious national heirloom. 

The church hierarchy wants to use the building as a normal parish church, 
open to the public 12 hours a day. The experts are horrified at the prospect. 
After serving as a carefully-tended museum for years, the church is to be 
handed over to the Moscow patriarchate on the orders of the president-elect, 
Vladimir Putin. 

One morning last week Father Boris, an indefatigable art historian and 
campaigner for the restitution of Russia's orthodox churches, marched into 
the chapel waving the piece of paper just signed by Mr Putin. It was the 
climax to a 10-year battle for control of the church. 

Since 1990 the Russian orthodox church has recovered 16,000 churches and 
monasteries. The Church of the Intercession is the latest to be restored. But 
the curators, backed by the ministry of culture, are determined to fight Mr 
Putin's ruling. 

Officially the church is run by curators as part of the Rublev museum, but 
the Putin paper awarded use and control of the church to the Moscow 
patriarchate, bluntly rescinding a cul ture ministry ruling in January that 
the building should be allowed to remain in the care of its curators. 

"This is our cultural heritage and that is paramount. That's what we should 
be thinking about," says Gennady Popov, director of the Rublev museum. "But 
Father Boris is determined to take total control. Putin should not have 
signed that document. He had no right." 

Alexei Komech, an expert on old Russian architecture and director of the art 
research institute, is outraged at Mr Putin's decision and at the 
patriarchate's campaign. 

"The church is too valuable. We need a solution here that suits both 
believers and non-believers in Russia. It's part of our common heritage. But 
the government is just trying to curry favour with the patriarchate because 
orthodoxy is very fashionable these days and increasingly powerful." 

The Church of the Intercession comprises lower and upper chapels. The bottom 
part is currently used for exhibitions, art history seminars and other 
meetings. For years Father Boris, who will be the new parish priest, has been 
lobbying for it to be returned to its original function. 

To defuse the row, the curators proposed building a new wooden church nearby 
for regular services and agreed to joint administration of the property with 
the patriarchate. The culture ministry endorsed this deal. But the orthodox 
clout with Mr Putin appears to be considerable. 

"For these experts our churches are not churches," says Father Boris. 
"They're architectural monuments. What are we supposed to be?" he asks. 
"Vandals of our own churches? We'll be having services there. The church will 
be open every day for believers." 

The curators refer to dampness charts and hydrological studies to argue that 
opening the church to normal services would imperil the delicate interior, 
although services would be held only in the lower part and not in the more 
precious upper chapel which is to be administered jointly by the museum and 
the patriarchate. 

"So you can have conferences, film shows, debates, but not church services," 
Father Boris points out. "It's just resistance and obstruction. They're 
always the same, it's ideological." 

But the priest, who says he can tell that Mr Putin is a genuine believer 
"from the way he walks into a church", is relishing his victory perhaps 
prematurely. "I went to the museum director the other day to discuss when I 
could take over. He said he hadn't seen the Putin paper yet, that no one had 
told him officially. So I left." 

******

#7
From: Peter Rutland <rutland@eu.spb.ru>
Subject: Matvienko
Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2000 

(forthcoming in RFE/RL, Russian Federation Report) 
MATVIENKO'S RETREAT 
By Peter Rutland 
(the author, a professor at Wesleyan University, is teaching this semester
as a Fulbright Fellow at the European University in St. Petersburg) 

Tuesday 4 April saw the dramatic announcement by Valentina Matvienko that
she was dropping out of the race for governor of St. Peterburg, which will
be held on 14 May. She said that was responding to a request from Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin to resume her duties as Deputy Prime Minister for
social affairs. 

The announcement came as a surprise - not least to Matvienko's campaign
team, who had just moved into gleaming new downtown offices and who had
already collected 120,000 signatures in support of registering her
candidacy. Over the past few weeks the Moscow establishment had been
gearing up for a full-court press to promote Matvienko's bid for the
governorship of the "northern capital." This was puzzling on two counts.
First, it is pretty rare for a national government - in Russia or anywhere
else - to become so deeply involved in the election of a regional official.
Second, all the signs showed that Matvienko had no chance of being elected.
Polls showed support for Matvienko stuck at around 10%, as against 50% for
incumbent governor Vladimir Yakovlev. 

It was at the funeral of Anatoly Sochak on 24 February that Moscow's desire
to remove Yavoklev surfaced into the public arena. Sobchak had been ousted
by Yakovlev in 1996, amid accusations of corruption, and an emotional Putin
hinted that it was the pressure of these political struggles that had
brought about Sobchak's premature death. Former premier Sergei Stepashin
announced at the funeral that it was time for Leningraders (such as
himself) to return to their native city. But it later became clear that
Matvienko, not Stepashin, was Putin's choice. Although she had not yet
formally announced her candidacy for the governor, she took a leave from
her government duties and in effect began running for the office, with
frequent appearances on national television. 

It was hard to understand why the Kremlin was expending such time and
energy on what seemed like a lost cause - at a time when they had other
things on their mind (like securing Putin's own election, designing a
reform program, and winning the Chechen war). Perhaps the idea was to prove
to regional governors that no-one is invulnerable. Perhaps it was to prove
that with enough money anybody can get themselves elected, to anything, in
today's Russia (a well-known boast of Boris Berezovsky). But the main
reason seems to have been President Putin's sense that he should honor a
debt to his deceased friend, Sobchak. That is a noble goal, but
inappropriate nonetheless. Loyalty to one's friends is a virtue, but it has
its limits. It is not a sound principle upon which to pick a governor, or
to run a country. 

It was clear from the beginning that Matvienko faced an uphill struggle.
First: it is always hard to dislodge an incumbent. (All seven governors in
Russia who ran for re-election on 26 March were successful, for example.)
Second, Yakovlev is fairly popular. A poll conducted by Leonid Keselman and
Maria Matskevich from Petersburg's Institute of Sociology on 15-17 March
found Yakovlev out-polling Matvienko in just about every category of voters
- even Union of Right Forces supporters preferred him over Matvienko (by
40% to 23%). They also saw no evidence that Matvienko would close the gap
if voting went to a second round, since supporters of other candidates
would split evenly between the two leaders. 

Matvienko's strategy would have been to argue that the city is corrupt and
poorly managed, while holding out the carrot of federal money and
privileges. Outsiders indeed often complain that Petersburg is dirty and
depressed: last month failed presidential candidate Umar Jambrailov said
that "the city needs to be shampooed, for a year." However, most residents
do not have such a negative view of their own city. The Keselman poll found
that most residents believe that the condition of the city's roads has
actually improved in recent years (by 55% to 19%), and that the city's
economic situation is better than the rest of Russia. 

Another problem for Matvienko was that she was perceived as an outsider.
Despite her frequent references to Petersburg as her "rodnoi gorod" ("home
town" or "native town"), in reality she only moved there at age 18, to
train as a pharmacist in one of the less prestigious institutes in the
city. More to the point, over the past decade she has served in government
positions in Moscow and abroad, and was seen as the Kremlin's favored
candidate. Yakovlev could plausibly portray himself as the local boy
fighting off outside interference. 

In a city where local pride matters, the advertising campaign which began
two weeks ago - billboards and TV spots announcing that "Our City is Tired"
- could easily have backfired. Telling people that the city they love is a
mess is a risky way to win votes. (It seems reasonable to assume that
Matvienko backers were behind the campaign, since it is hard to imagine who
else would have been interested in mounting such a costly exercise.) 

The fact that Matvienko is a woman also worked against her. Only one other
woman has succeeded in being elected governor - in the remote Koryak
region. European University professor Grigory Golosov has shown, through
analysis of regional legislature elections across the country, that Russian
voters tend to penalize women candidates. Matvienko's image was not
sufficiently distinctive to enable her to overcome this barrier, as have
some women politicians. In contrast to an independent, modern figure such
as Irina Khakamada (a State Duma deputy from Petersburg), Matvienko's
political style was forged during her 17 years as a functionary in the
Soviet-era Komsomol. She talks about politics in terms of "fulfilling
tasks" as does Putin - but Putin is a man, and is convincing as a
Soviet-style boss. 

In order to dent Yakovlev's popularity Matvienko would have had to play the
Putin card, hoping that a strong presidential endorsement would carry her
to victory. However, judging by Putin's cautious behavior (his willingness
to meet with Yakovlev on the day of Sobchak's funeral, for example) there
were limits to the president's desire to expend his political capital on
the Matvienko candidacy - especially given the good chance that Matvienko
would lose even with a Putin endorsement. 

Promising a cornucopia of future largesse from Moscow may have been too
hypothetical for the average voter. A more viable strategy would have been
to unleash a tide of corruption allegations (kompromat) against her
adversary. But this too could have backfired: if the evidence was not
convincing, or if Yakovlev could portray himself as the persecuted
underdog. One thing Matvienko could not do is campaign on her record. As
deputy premier responsible for social affairs, she would not want to get
involved in arguments about why the government is refusing to implement the
law on indexation of pensions, or why child welfare payments are up to a
year in arrears. 

That left only one major factor in her favor: the willingness of the
national media to massage her image. Over the past few weeks Matvienko had
more airtime on national TV than pop-idol Zemfira. The low point came on
Friday 31 March, when viewers of NTV were subjected to an excruciatingly
tedious half-hour documentary on a day in the life of the erstwhile
minister. Valentina Ivanovna was shown driving around St. Petersburg,
shopping, reminiscing with friends. 

However, if her image did not in fact strike a positive chord with
Petersburg voters, all this exposure may actually have harmed rather than
helped her ratings. The other factor to bear in mind is that local TV is
loyal to Yavlokev, and has been assiduously polishing his image, without
appearing too obvious and fawning about it. In a battle between national
and local media the advantage lies with the latter. There is a limit to the
amount of minutes national TV could devote to Matvienko, while viewers get
several hours of city news each day from local stations. 

A nasty and protracted struggle for the governor's chair would have done
little to solve the problems facing Petersburg, and would have been
unlikely to boost the authority of President Putin. Hence Putin's decision
to pull Matvienko from the race was a wise one, and shows that Putin has
some capacity to read the writing on the wall and, in effect, admit that he
had made a mistake. 

The Matvienko affair was an unfortunate way for Putin to start his
presidency. The manner in which her candidacy was promoted and then
unceremoniously dumped reeked of the "corridor politics" and reliance on
media manipulation which characterized the Yeltsin presidency. The
nomination and then abrupt departure of Matvienko left the democratic
parties without an agreed candidate, and has virtually assured a
first-round victory for Yakovlev. Moreover, the ease with which governor
Yakovlev saw off the challenge from Moscow implies that Putin will have a
hard time reining in the all-powerful regional governors, and that could
prove a major obstacle to his reform agenda. 

******

#8
Vremya Novosti
April 10, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
THE ELECTIONS ARE OVER, THANK GOD!
Oleg SAVELYEV, VTsIOM

The National Public Opinion Research Centre (VTsIOM) 
polled 1,600 adults by a representative system on March 31 to 
April 3 this year. Some results are given in percent together 
with the results of another VTsIOM poll, held after the 1996 
presidential elections. The permissible statistical error 
equals 4%.

It is interesting how the main party electorates of last 
year's Duma elections changed their positions during the 
presidential elections. For example, 77% of the Unity voters 
cast their ballots for Putin, 6% for Zyuganov, 3% for Tuleyev, 
and 9% did not come to the polling stations at all. As many as 
75% of the Communist Party electorate voted for Zyuganov, 12% 
for Putin, 3% for Tuleyev, and 5% did not attend the elections. 
A total of 54% of the OVR supporters voted for Putin, 11% for 
Zyuganov, 7% for Yavlinsky, and 22% ignored the elections. 54% 
of the SPS (Union of Right Forces) voters cast their ballots 
for Putin, 9% for Titov and 19% didn't come to the polls. Of 
Zhirinovsky's electorate, 32% supported Putin, 23% the LDPR 
leader, 13% Zyuganov, and 26% refused to come to the polling 
stations. As for Yabloko, 47% of its electorate voted for 
Yavlinsky, 32% for Putin, and 14% did not attend the elections. 

WHAT INFLUENCED YOUR DECISION TO VOTE FOR THIS CANDIDATE?
(Those who attended the elections could provide several 
answers, with the overall number equalling 100%) 
----------------------------------------------------------------
-
Of the Of those who voted for:
overall ------------------------------
number of Putin Zyuganov Yavlinsky
respondents
----------------------------------------------------------------
-
1. I saw that it was 
the most reasonable 
choice in the current 
situation/There was no 
other choice for Russians 46 50 48 43
2. I was convinced by 
the latest actions, the 
practical steps taken by 
that candidate/his latest 
meetings with voters 26 35 13 8
3. I was influenced by his 
addresses on radio, TV and 
in the press 22 21 21 28
4. I read his programme 
and saw what would come 
of his election 15 4 31 36
5. I learned that the 
people whose opinion 
I respect would vote 
for him 7 8 7 3 
6. I was convinced by 
the articles and speeches 
of specialists, commentators, 
scientists and poll results 4 4 3 4
7. I saw that the candidate 
for whom I intended to vote 
had no chances 2 3 1 3
8. I liked the election 
footage of that candidate 2 - 2 5
9. I was convinced by the 
canvassers who campaigned 
for that candidate 1 1 3 1
10. I was disappointed 
in the candidate for whom 
I planned to vote 1 1 1 -
11. I was convinced by 
the actors, musicians and 
figures of culture, who 
campaigned for that 
candidate 1 n.a. 1 -
Other reasons 7 4 11 9
Difficult to say 4 4 3 3
----------------------------------------------------------------
-
The respondents provided interesting reasons that 
influenced their choice, as seen from the next table:
WHO (WHAT) INFLUENCED YOUR CHOICE (YOUR DECISION NOT TO 
ATTEND THE ELECTIONS)? (Several answers possible) 
----------------------------------------------------------------
-
Of the Of those who voted for:
overall ------------------------------
number of Putin Zyuganov Yavlinsky
respondents
----------------------------------------------------------------
-
1. TV, radio, newspapers 25 41 11 27
2. I did not like other 
candidates 17 27 20 19
3. I always vote for 
this candidate 16 3 61 33
4. Candidates' addresses 15 20 14 20
5. My family, relative 13 17 12 11
6. Friends or acquaintances 9 11 6 8
7. Televised debates 6 6 6 17
8. The candidates' 
election canvassing 5 6 3 5
9. The publication of 
the candidates' ratings 4 7 2 11
10. I did this to "steal" 
votes from those who could 
win the elections 4 5 4 7
11. Recommendations of 
respected people 3 5 1 4
Other reasons 11 5 1 -
Difficult to say 4 5 2 1
These and following answers cover all respondents
----------------------------------------------------------------
-
And here are answers to the question about the "propaganda 
pressure" (taken apart from the mass media pressure):
DID YOU FIND IN YOUR MAILBOX (OR GET FROM CANVASSERS) 
LEAFLETS, POSTERS, NEWSPAPERS ENCOURAGING YOU TO VOTE IN THE 
PAST TWO WEEKS BEFORE THE ELECTIONS? DID THE CANVASSERS OF THE 
FOLLOWING CANDIDATES COME TO YOUR OFFICE OR HOME?

----------------------------------------------------------------
-
Of those who voted for:
----------------------------------------------------------------
-
Zyuganov Putin Yavlinsky
----------------------------------------------------------------
-
Yes 21 14 19
No 75 83 76
Difficult to say 4 3 5
----------------------------------------------------------------
-
And here are the respondents' impressions of the operation 
of the mass media during the election campaign.
WHAT CAN YOU SAY ABOUT THE WORK OF THE TV, RADIO AND 
NEWSPAPERS BEFORE THE ELECTIONS (Two answers possible) 
----------------------------------------------------------------
-
1996, of the 2000
overall number ------------------------------
of respondents Of the Of those who voted for:
overall -----------------------
number Putin Zyuganov Yavlinsky
of res- 
pondents
----------------------------------------------------------------
--
1. They did not 
influence me at all 32 30 26 38 43
2. They drew my 
attention to the 
presidential elections 16 25 36 21 31
3. They clarified the 
election situation 
for me 13 18 26 18 18
4. They only complicated 
things, prevented me from 
making the decision 12 12 11 16 12
5. They changed my 
intentions concerning 
participation in the 
elections/or my intention 
to vote for this or 
that candidate 6 6 6 3 3
6. I don't pay attention 
to such shows/articles, 
because I don't believe 
the TV, radio and 
newspapers in principle 12 11 9 12 7
7. I don't watch or 
listen to such shows/read 
such articles, because 
I'm not interested 
in politics 9 10 4 6 3
Other reasons 1 1 1 - -
Difficult to say 5 4 3 3 3

*******

#9
BBC MONITORING
RUSSIAN COMMUNIST LEADER TALKS ABOUT START, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, GOVERNMENT
Source: NTV International, Moscow in Russian 1535 gmt 10 Apr 00 

Russian Communist leader Gennadiy Zyuganov has said that his party will
vote against the ratification of the START-2 treaty at the forthcoming
session of the State Duma. In a wide-ranging interview given by him to the
"Hero of the Day" television programme on 10th April, he described the
treaty as "absolutely damaging" to Russia and "beneficial" to the USA. He
criticized the Chechen war and said that Chechnya should be ruled from the
centre. Zyuganov also denounced the Parliamentary assembly of the Council
of Europe for its decision to strip Russia of its voting right over
Chechnya and accused it of applying "double standards". He urged Vladimir
Putin to appoint people to a new Cabinet of Ministers irrespective of their
party affiliation. The following are excerpts from the interview broadcast
by Russian NTV International television on 10th April. Subheadings have
been inserted editorially. 

[Presenter] Hello, the "Hero of the Day" programme is on the air. It's only
natural that in the light of the seriously worsening relations with the
West, a sitting of the country's Security Council was devoted today
precisely to our international commitments... 

One of the participants in today's sitting, the leader of the Communist
Party of the Russian Federation [CPRF], Gennadiy Zyuganov, is our guest
today. Hello, Gennadiy Andreyevich. 

[Zyuganov] Hello... 

[Q] What exactly was discussed? 

[A] We discussed the START-2 Treaty and all problems, real problems,
connected with it. Yes, that was a heated debate especially as the issue of
security is an important issue for any country and for any nation. It is
important for our country as it has spent 700 out of 1000 years of its
recent history fighting and marching and as our fathers and grandfathers
had to pay with the lives of 27m people for stability and security in the
world. 

We invested one third of the national wealth in the missile defence system
in almost 50 years. Now we should resolve the issue of whether to have this
stability or lose it for ever. Therefore, the debate was very heated. 

[Q] As regards [changes tack] let us deal with the issues step-by-step:
what was the discussion like as regards the Strasbourg incident and in what
way was it discussed? 

[A] I would like to mention several events here: NATO's eastward expansion,
Yugoslavia's unprecedented bombing and the war against it, the latest
detention of vessels and a degrading position in which our delegation at
the PACE summit has been placed. 

[Q] Are these the points as outlined by you or is this the order in which
they were discussed by the Council? 

Russia may be forced into isolation by "influential forces" in Europe 

[A] Let us not talk about the council. Many issues were discussed at the
meeting. Incidentally, these problems were discussed in detail at the State
Duma's Council today. We should examine all these issues together simply
because there are very influential forces in Europe which do not want
Russia to join international institutions and which want to insult it in
every possible way and which want to rob and disarm it. 

They have now placed Russia in a situation whereby it may be forced to slam
the door and leave all the organizations. They want to force us into
isolation again. And then they will tell us: since this is your fault, you
have only yourselves to blame, despite the fact that over the past 10 years
they have been very supportive of those in power in Russia. 

Incidentally, Svetlana, we had been admitted to the Council of Europe in
1996. That was the time of the first Chechen war and 100,000 people had
already been killed and 300,000 ousted from their homes by that time.
Almost half of the population had been robbed by that time and their
savings had been confiscated. 

Millions and millions of people have been made jobless. Despite that one
third had voted [for our admission] at the time. While now - when we are
trying to suppress terrorism and maintain the country's integrity and
restore some kind of order, which at times is done in a stupid and
talentless way, etc - they decide to punish us. We are paying 24bn dollars
which is one fourth of all contributions made to the Council of Europe and
they want us just to sit there, without having the right to vote. 

I think that our delegation has done the right thing by walking out. But a
dialogue should still be maintained. We must have talks. We must have talks
with many delegations. Just look at the voting results: I am really
surprised that France is trying to snub us in every possible way as well as
many German deputies who showed more loyalty before. As regards the Baltic
states, they have spoken and they speak against Russia quite often. We
should also restore bilateral ties and at the same time we should
facilitate work in all the European institutions. 

[Q] Gennadiy Andreyevich, let us examine the issues step-by-step. European
parliamentarians in fact drew our attention to human rights violations in
Chechnya which indeed take place. That was admitted in our studio recently
by for example Oleg Mironov, your party comrade. 

[Zyuganov] You are absolutely right, Svetlana. 

[Q] Why are we blaming the mirror then? 

[A] There are plenty of such instances. 

[Q] Exactly. This is what they were talking about. 

[A] But we were admitted in 1996 - 

[Q] It was done as an advance in the hope that there would be a gradual
improvement. 

[A] No at the time that was not just the case of human rights violations.
Those were savage and dreadful violations. While now we are trying to
improve something for the better. This kind of terrorism is dangerous for
Europe as well. 

[Q] We were not denounced for our aims, but for the violations. 

[A] No, no. 

[Q] It was not for the aims. 

[A] They applied double standards... No-one has ever been kicked out of the
Council of Europe in the 51 years of its history. There was a colonels'
coup in Greece at the end of the 60's, but Greece stayed. In the year 1981
a coup d'etat in Turkey, Turkey stayed. They simply decided to insult
Russia. I am confident that the majority of the population in Europe as a
whole does not want this. 

[Q] Many think that the PACE decision was by and large provoked by the
tough and uncompromising stance of the majority of the Russian
parliamentary delegation. 

[A] This is not true. 

[Q] It was a demarche, so to speak... 

[A] If we speak about our delegation, the previous delegation was more
experienced. They had worked there longer and, therefore, they knew the
situation better. This delegation went there for the first time. They were
quite united, except for [Sergey] Kovalev and two deputies from Yabloko,
who did not even support the main delegation when it walked out. 

[Q] Well we cannot be expected to toe the line. Everyone is entitled to
have his own stance. 

[A] However, while abroad we are expected jointly to defend the interests
of the state. 

[Q] Gennadiy Andreyevich, if you remember [UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights] Mary Robinson visited us here immediately before the PACE sitting.
In fact she was not allowed to visit the sites that she wanted to visit and
meet the people that she was planning to meet. Some strange comments were
made at the time at the very top: who is she and we are not interested in
her views. 

You know the kind of impression this can make on European parliamentarians
because Robinson is an authority for them. 

[A] European parliamentarians were allowed everywhere. They used our
helicopters, they were protected, etc. Whenever you travel somewhere as a
member of a delegation, you are charged for a helicopter, for guards and
then you have difficulties in paying. While everything was free for them
here: the flights and trips. They received everything they needed. But as
soon as they returned, insults began. 

[Q] Did you expect them to praise you since it was free? 

[A] No, this isn't what I am saying. Everything should be done in line with
international norms. I told the meeting today that we should present them
with the bill and let them pay their own way. They have a large budget. We
are paying towards it. Incidentally, they paid their own way when they
travelled to Kosovo and other regions - 

[Q] Did they support your proposal? 

[A] It's only here that they enjoy special assistance and support. But
after that they applied double standards in voting. 

[Q] Why are you saying this? 

[A] I am sure that everything will come back to normal. Let us move to
another issue. 

[Q] All right, the next topic then. I would like to continue talking about
Chechnya, but this time from a different angle... 

Chechnya must be ruled from the centre 

[A] As far as governance is concerned, I think that it should be governed
from the centre: be it a presidential or governmental form of governance
but it should be done from the centre. This is to start with. Not a single
clan there is currently capable of nominating one person that would be
approved by everyone. 

[Q] So you are talking about the introduction of some sort of direct
presidential rule? 

[A] I think that he [President-elect Vladimir Putin] would be afraid to
introduce direct rule for a simple reason that he would be held responsible
for everything on a day-to-day basis. For everything. Therefore, I am
confident that the government will appoint its own representative there who
will act as a governor-general... 

[Q] Can you tell us when the State Duma is planning to examine START-2? 

[A] On Friday [14th April]. But I would like to say straightaway that this
is going to be the most fateful law in recent years. 

[Q] So you are going to examine START-2 as early as this Friday? 

[A] Yes, yes. Today I suggested not rushing anything and weighing things up
once again. Why? We created the missile nuclear shield at the same time as
the Americans - 

[Q] Generally speaking we know its history. 

START-2 is damaging to Russia 

[A] Everyone knows it. According to START-2, we should destroy our heavy
missiles which are in a fixed position in the least populated areas as a
rule. They are absolutely reliable. There is no access to them. They cannot
be destroyed by an ordinary unit or by conventional weapons, only by
nuclear. If you decide to destroy them, you will have to use nuclear
weapons. That would mean a nuclear war. This has always been a deterrent.
It is being suggested that we should destroy our missiles and at the same
time we have not yet started assembling new ones because we don't have
money. At the same time the Americans are suggesting that we should
transfer these missiles to the submarine fleet. They have free movement and
immense oceans at their disposal while we have only two small outlets - in
Murmansk and in the Far East. 

On top of that [Boris] Yeltsin's team has destroyed virtually the entire
infantry army. Just look at the state of it in Chechnya. Aviation has also
been destroyed. There isn't a single boat, aircraft, two or three tanks and
some of the things have only just been ordered. And everything is getting
outdated so quickly. 

We should look at everything together: conventional weapons, strategic
weapons [word indistinct]. I favour cuts. Maybe even on a larger scale than
envisaged by the START-2 Treaty. But our own triad [as received] - we have
more infantry units, navy aviation - should take the form that will be
beneficial to us. Right now this treaty is drafted in a form which is
beneficial to the United States. Therefore, they are putting pressure from
various angles for this treaty to be ratified as soon as possible. They
themselves will abandon the START-2 Treaty as early as summer this year.
[Bill] Clinton himself has announced this. 

[Q] Have I understood you correctly that your faction is going to vote
against the START-2 Treaty? 

[A] We have invited the Foreign Minister [Igor Ivanov] and Defence Minister
[Igor sergeyev] and experts who were in charge of talks to [a meeting of]
the faction. We will have one more meeting on Thursday. We believe that in
its current form, it is absolutely damaging. It is destroying our main
missile nuclear umbrella and we are not yet capable of creating anything
else to replace it. Our small budget of slightly more than 20bn does not
allow us even to maintain the army or to equip it with new weapons. In the
[Soviet] Union we had a budget of more than 600bn. 

[Q] Does that mean that your stance is not going to change in the near
future or possibly in the next few years. So you are going simply to hear
out the experts. 

[A] Yes, it will not change. Because no thorough analysis has been done on
how to ensure national security in the next ten years. 

[Q] OK - 

[A] Let me say something else Svetlana... We haven't yet approved the
government, but already we are being put under pressure to adopt this
document as soon as possible. 

[Q] Speaking about the government, can you tell us briefly about the future
government? Judging by everything, that will not be a coalition government.
What do you think of that? 

New cabinet must not take into account party affiliation 

[A] The government should answer one simple question: the course was
implemented in the past 10 years which destroyed the country and turned it
into a second-rate country whose views are being ignored. Our vessels are
being captured and we don't even bother to respond. Just try and seize one
US vessel and you will see what it means to be a powerful state. You will
see immediately. 

The government should answer the question: if it carries out with the old
course - this would mean a total crash within the next couple of years. If
it embarks on a new course - what kind of a course will that be? Our
country is a very cold country for production. It is very cold. Everything
is located further away here and everything is more complex here. Therefore - 

[Q] I understand that. 

[A] Therefore, the government should tell us about its course and then
nominate people who will implement the course. If they are clever people,
they will nominate people irrespective of their party affiliation... 

[Q] Now the most topical issue for St Petersburg: whom the Communist Party
of the Russian Federation is going to support in St Petersburg's
gubernatorial election? 

[A] We discussed the issue when the announcement was made on the election.
Yakovlev is a qualified person and skilled administrator. He has never made
any stupid anti-Communist remarks. Our organization will support him... 

******

Web page for CDI Russia Weekly: 
http://www.cdi.org/russia