February 23, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4126 4127 4128

Johnson's Russia List
#4127
23 February 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Appeal from former dissidents: The West Must Reexamine Its Policy Toward the Kremlin.
2. Reuters: Hawkish Putin beats drum on Russian campaign trail.
3. Itar-Tass: Preliminary Results of Elections to Be Known on Mar 27.
4. AFP: Vote official promises fair Russian elections.
5. RIA Novosti - Moscow Diary: Sergei Karaganov, NEW MILITARY DOCTRINE GUARANTEES RUSSIAN SECURITY.
6. RFE/RL NEWSLINE: SERGEEV'S DOCTRINE' NO TOUGHER THAN ITS PREDECESSOR. 
7. Cathy Fitzpatrick: Influence of Soviet Dissidents.
8. Rossiyskaya Gazeta: Iraida Semenova, The National Peculiarities of the 'New Poor'.
9. Timothy Blauvelt: re Jaworsky/Dissidents.]

*******

#1
Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2000 17:00:14 -0500
From: Lars-Erik Nelson <lnelson@edit.nydailynews.com>
Subject: Appeal from former dissidents

The West Must Reexamine Its Policy Toward the Kremlin

Signed: Elena Bonner, human-rights activist and widow of Andrei
Sakharov; L. Batkin, LLD; Yuri Burtin, writer; Yuri Samodurov, director
of the Saxharov Foundation; Vadim Belotserkovsky, writer; A.
Piontkovsky, director of the RAN center for strategic research; Sergei
Grigoryants, chairman of the board of the Glasnost Fund.

The great paradox of recent Russian history is that while the West has
applauded the democratic and market reforms of the various Yeltsin
governments, under the cover of and as a result of these reforms, Russia
is suffering from the establishment of a modernized form of Stalinism.
Under Stalin, approximately a third of the population worked for either
nothing or for symbolic wages. Now, two thirds do. The state of medical
service for 80% of the population is today worse than it was during the
Stalin era. More than a million people are imprisoned under the most
appalling conditions, and one third of them sit there for two or three
years awaiting trial.

Under Stalin, about 20 million people were shot or perished in labor
camps, in exile or from starvation over a period of 25 years. Today,
because of the dreadful living conditions, the population is shrinking
by one million people a year. Add to that the victims of the two Chechen
wars. Plus the Mafia terror throughout the country. Yet today, all the
citizens of the country are free people and may even freely go abroad.
Modernization!

Under Stalin, there was no free press and there were no free elections.
Today, there are. But the rise in prices for magazines and newspapers
combined with the impoverishment of the populations has resulted in a
40% drop in the circulation of periodicals, and an average ratio of 20
people to one copy of a newspaper or magazine. In addition, almost all
the newspapers and television are under the control of oligarchs in
league with the state authorities, which ensures a censor-like guidance
of the means of mass communication for the benefit of the authorities.
Elections in such conditions are a farce. The mass media pour filth upon
all serious opponents of the Kremlin and almost prevent them from being
heard. Vote counts are routinely falsified. In the Soviet era, there
were at least real elections of new officials to the Central Committee
and Politburo of the Communist Party, whose members were political
figures representing various agencies or branches of the government.

Under Yeltsin, the real election of leaders occured within the
President’s inner “Famil.” As a result of such elections, the world now
sees Vladimir Putin, a colonel of the KGB and Federal Security Forces
and a new variant of the all-powerful Presidential bodyguard, (Valery?)
Korzhakov.

Under Putin we see a new stage in the introduction of modernized
Stalinism. Authoritarianism is growing harsher, society is being
militarized, the military budget is increasing, “special detachments” of
the security services are being re-established in military units,
military education is being introduced into the schools, reserve
officers are being trained and students are being drafted. Nationalist
and anti-western propaganda is increasing. Such hostility toward the
West both in the mass media and among the population did not even exist
in the Soviet era. The security agencies are gaining influence. They
flamboyantly stress their kinship with the former “agencies,” and
celebrate the 80th anniversary of the Cheka—KGB-FSS. Putin personally
laid a wreath on the grave of the odious KGB boss Yuri Andropov, a
participant in the bloody suppression of the 1956 Hungarian uprising and
the originator of the practice of confining dissidents in psychiatric
prisons.

The mass media portray civil rights organizations as unpatriotic,
defeatist (in regard to the Chechen conflict), and operating in the
interests of the West for Western money. Three fourths of the civil
rights organizations have been stripped of the right to conduct legal
activity. In many regions of the country, the legal authorities and the
courts have stripped the natioinal minorities — Germans, Jews,
Armenians, Koreans, etc. — of their legal standing and their social
organizations.

The assault on freedom of the press has become vicious. The case of the
Radio Liberty reporter Andrei Babitsky illuminates the unparalled
amorality of the Russian authorities, their intolerance of free speech
and their cynical contempt.

So far, the West’s policy towards Russia bas been aimed at supporting
the Boris Yeltsin regime as a “guarantee of stability.” This support has
been granted despite the anti-democratic and criminal actions of his
administration, from the constitutional coup in 1993 to the Chechen war
of 1994-96. As a result, Russia has become an increasingly unstable
country with an increasingly anti-Western orientation. Now, the same
policy is beginning with regard to Putin. For example, the decision of
the (European Parliament?) merely to postpone granting Russia membership
until April facilitates the continuation of genocide in in Chechna and
increases Putin’s prestige. Such a policy not only encourages the
anti-democratic and inhumane activities of the Russian authorities but,
even worse, demoralizes Russian society. Despite everything, the West
still enjoys prestige among a great many Russians and unprincipled
connivance with Russian leaders on the part of Western governments
weakens the resistance of the democratic public in Russia.

We fear that under the present government, our country can expect, in
the foreseeable future, shattering upheavals that could impact
surrounding countries as well. And we appeal to the governments and
public of the West to re-examine their attitude toward the Kremlin
leadership, to cease conniving in its barbaric actions, its
dismantlement of democracy and suppression ofhuman rights. Specifically,
we expect support from the democratic world for:
——our efforts to stop the war in Chechnya
——restoration of freedom of the press and the activity of civil rights
and national-minority organizations.

Such a shift in policy toward the Kremlin by itself could increase the
odds that Russia will some day become a safe and stable country, safe
for other people and safe for its own population.

********

#2
Hawkish Putin beats drum on Russian campaign trail
By Irina Demchenko

VOLGOGRAD, Russia, Feb 22 (Reuters) - Russian Acting President Vladimir Putin 
beat a martial drum on the campaign trail on Tuesday, paying tribute to 
veterans at the scene of the bloodiest battle of World War Two. 

He promised victory soon in rebel Chechnya, where he said Russia's army had 
dispelled doubts about its might. 

``Seeing (this monument), one's breath is taken away by sorrow, and at the 
same time, by the greatness of our fatherland,'' he told veterans assembled 
on a freezing morning at a monument to those killed at Stalingrad in southern 
Russia. 

The city, now called Volgograd, was the scene of the decisive battle that 
crippled the invading German army in the winter of 1942-43. Nearly two 
million people died in the fighting, commemorated by a huge statue of Mother 
Russia bearing a sword. 

Visiting on the eve of Russia's Defender of the Fatherland Day, Putin hit the 
hawkish patriotic notes that have made him favourite in the March 26 
presidential election. 

``The last months have proven that all that talk of how our army has fallen 
apart and lost its preparedness -- it was all blatant lies,'' he told a 
regional government meeting. 

``We need not blush for our soldiers, officers and generals acting now in 
Chechnya.'' 

He told reporters he rated the army's performance in Chechnya as 
``excellent,'' and said the results of the campaign would be seen soon. He 
rounded out the visit with a stop at a hospital to award medals to soldiers 
wounded in Chechnya. 

But he tempered his martial message with what has become a customary pledge 
not to interfere with civil rights. 

``When I speak about strengthening the state I do not mean strengthening the 
security forces which will crack down on everybody. The state must guarantee 
people's rights.'' 

Russia's February 23 holiday, known in Soviet times as Red Army Day, is one 
of the most important holidays in a country that highly reveres its soldiers 
and veterans. 

But the date is also the anniversary of the 1944 mass deportation of 650,000 
Chechens to camps in Central Asia and Siberia, a day of mourning for all 
Chechens and a national rallying day for separatists opposed to rule from 
Moscow. 

Russian commanders have said they fear rebels might carry out attacks on the 
anniversary. 

Russian forces were on special alert, sweeping from house to house through 
Chechen villages, and said they would shut the rebel province's border to 
refugees at least until Thursday. 

*******

#3
Preliminary Results of Elections to Be Known on Mar 27 

MOSCOW, February 22 (Itar-Tass) - The preliminary results of the Russian 
presidential elections will be known already at 9:00 Moscow time on March 27, 
Chairman of the Central Electoral Commission Alexander Veshnyakov predicted 
here on Tuesday. 

"It will take less time to count the ballots now than during the elections to 
the State Duma, especially within the subjects of the Federation, where there 
will be no concomitant elections", he noted. 

Parallel with the presidential elections, by-elections to the State Duma will 
be held on March 26 in eight constituencies, and elections of the heads of 
executive and legislative bodies -- in seven subjects of the Federation. In 
Veshnyakov's opinion, "up to fifty per cent of the polling stations will 
transmit their information on the results of the voting to the Vybory State 
Automatic System by 2-3 a.m. on the night from March 26 to 27, and the system 
will get information from more than ninety per cent of the polling stations 
by 9 a.m.". Therefore, Veshnyakov noted, "we shall know for sure already on 
March 27 whether a second round of voting will be needed or not". 

*******

#4
Vote official promises fair Russian elections

MOSCOW, Feb 22 (AFP) - 
Russia's 11 candidates for next month's presidential elections will be 
granted equal media access and identical state handouts for their campaign 
warchests, the country's election watchdog promised Tuesday.

A day after registration for the March 26 poll closed, Election Commission 
chairman Alexander Veshnyakov set out the campaign rules, capping the amount 
Kremlin hopefuls can spend and granting television air time to all.

Each candidate will be allowed to spend no more than 26 million rubles (about 
900,000 dollars) on the campaign, Vehsnyakov said. A token 400-500,000 rubles 
will be granted to each from the state coffers.

The 11 hopefuls meanwhile will get one hour of free access to television, "of 
which half will be devoted to debates," Veshnyakov said, adding that another 
eight million rubles in spending would be allowed should the vote go to a 
run-off on April 16.

That scenario currently seems improbable as acting President Vladimir Putin 
boasts a popularity rating of almost 60 percent, nearly triple that of 
closest challenger, Communist Party boss Gennady Zyuganov.

Putin's popularity has been helped by favorable media coverage of the 
military campaign in Chechnya, on which his reputation rides, and his highly 
visible public stance since Boris Yeltsin's resignation on December 31.

About 700 observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) will monitor the presidential ballot, some even allowed into 
the Russian-controlled regions of war-torn Chechnya, Veshnyakov said.

"They will work where they want to, in Moscow and in other regions including 
Chechnya," Veshnyakov told reporters.

"The number of observers will be half that of the parliamentary elections" 
last December, he added.

Parliamentary elections bypassed the rebel republic as the "anti-terrorist" 
military operation there raged. Putin has since vowed to quickly finish off 
the offensive and election officials insisted early on that the separatist 
republic would participate in the vote.

Putin, on a visit to the southern Russian city Volgograd, on Tuesday again 
complimented the federal troops and insisted that the conflict was nearly 
over.

"Soon we will be speaking of the end results," RIA Novosti quoted Putin as 
saying.

"Few expected that our soldiers would be so precise, so professional and so 
brave while fulfilling tasks set out for them by the political leadership," 
he added.

Russian forces were disgraced in the 1994-96 Chechen war, which saw Moscow 
sue for peace and leave the republic with de facto independence.

This time around, however, military chiefs have vowed to give the rebels no 
respite and Russian forces are currently pressing against the last Chechen 
resistance in the southern mountains.

The number of candidates in the March 26 poll is identical to the 1996 
presidential elections that saw Yeltsin defeat Zyuganov in a bitterly 
contested run-off vote.

The field could still grow by one, as ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky 
filed an appeal with the Supreme Court to protest a decision leaving him off 
the ballot.

Zhirinovsky, whose popularity has slipped significantly since his party 
stormed into parliament with 23 percent of the vote in the 1993 legislative 
vote, was barred from the race for failing to disclose all of his property 
holdings.

*******

#5
RIA Novosti - Moscow Diary
February 21, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]

NEW MILITARY DOCTRINE GUARANTEES RUSSIAN SECURITY
By Sergei KARAGANOV, D. Sc. (History), deputy director, 
Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of European Studies

The Russian Federation's National Security Council has 
approved a new Russian military doctrine, which reflects 
present-day realities and long-term global political 
developments. The new Russian military doctrine is much more 
up-to-date and realistic than the previous, 1993-vintage 
doctrine, heeding the nature of specific threats to Russian 
security, as well as the national potential.
The new doctrine doesn't contain a specific list of 
Russia's theoretical enemies; and this seems to be very 
important, indeed.
Even NATO, which had displayed its aggressive attitude, after 
unleashing a Balkan war, and which is now expanding eastward, 
is not perceived as a possible enemy by Russia. The document's 
political section states expressly that Russia views all of the 
world's states without exception as its partners. Only those 
particular countries, which operate outside the UN Charter's 
framework, which harbor or implement aggressive plans against 
the Russian Federation and its allies, can't be perceived as 
its partners. Meanwhile Russia continues to expand relations of 
military and military-technical cooperation with all other 
states, intending to conduct such a policy in the future, as 
well.
At the same time, it's crystal clear even today that the 
new doctrine constitutes a temporary document for the current 
transitional period, e.g. a period for asserting democracy and 
market relations on Russian territory. Such a doctrine, which 
is not ready to respond to specific challenges of the 2015 
period, will become obsolete 10 years from now. The subsequent 
proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery means, e.g.
ballistic missiles, is seen as something inevitable.
Consequently, we have to study national-security prospects well 
in advance. Such national-security prospects should be duly 
reflected in a long-term doctrine, which will eventually 
replace the current doctrine.
It would be interesting to assess the evolution of 
Moscow's military doctrine since the creation of nuclear 
weapons. The Soviet military doctrine of the 1950s-1980s had 
stated expressly that the USSR would not become the first to 
use its nuclear weapons, nonetheless stipulating a mandatory 
large-scale retaliatory strike. However, the world used to 
distrust this doctrine just because Moscow often kept voicing 
contradictory statements, implementing entirely different 
policies.
Mikhail Gorbachev, who had gained power in the Soviet 
Union during the mid-1980s, noted that the USSR was ready to 
completely renounce the use of nuclear weapons, suggesting that 
all nuclear powers scrap their respective nuclear arsenals 
until the year 2001. Gorbachev's idea was both inopportune and 
counter-productive, failing to consider the crucial nature of 
the then Soviet domestic-policy changes that had eventually 
entailed the USSR's disintegration. That's why it was 
preposterous to discuss universal nuclear disarmament in the 
context of such changes. Apart from that, Gorbachev had 
apparently overlooked the so-called "civilizing" factor of 
nuclear weapons, as well as their tremendous potential for 
deterring any possible aggression.
Largely owing to nuclear weapons, it became possible to prevent 
any large-scale European and world wars for more than 50 
consecutive years. In fact, nuclear weapons account for at 
least 60 percent of all anti-war factors.
Strange as it may seem, but Gorbachev's idea was supported 
by quite a few Soviet generals, who, as a rule, used to oppose 
disarmament. This could be explained by the fact that the 
Soviet Union had attained an unprecedented military advantage 
in terms of its conventional forces throughout the mid-1980s;
consequently, the elimination of nuclear weapons would have 
enabled the Soviet armed forces to completely dominate the 
entire world.
The USSR and the Warsaw Pact Organization had crumbled to 
dust in the early 1990s, what with Moscow drafting a new 
military doctrine allowing Russia to be the first to use its 
nuclear arsenals in response to an aggression. Incidentally, 
NATO used to have a similar, albeit far-fetched, doctrine 
because no one intends to attack NATO. Technically speaking, 
Russia, which is now living through difficult times, can be 
threatened by other countries of the world. Therefore a 
possible decision for being the first to use nuclear weapons, 
which is stipulated by the 1993-vintage military doctrine, is 
also reflected in the current document, which specifies this 
provision still further. The new military doctrine states 
expressly that nuclear weapons can only be used in case of an 
aggression against Russia, and in case conventional forces 
prove unable to save Russia from destruction, from losing its 
status as a party to international relations and to prevent its 
people from becoming enslaved.
As far as historic aspects are concerned, a doctrine, 
which stipulates the possible use of nuclear weapons even in 
response to an aggression, constitutes a step backwards, but 
for today's Russia it is a step backwards in the right 
direction. The Russian Federation, as well as its people, 
require solid security guarantees at this rather involved 
historic stage; for their own part, nuclear weapons can provide 
such guarantees. The very discussion of the new military 
doctrine by this country's National Security Council serves to 
deter prospective aggressors.
Should the national and global situation change, in that case 
it would become possible to okay a new doctrine that would 
tally with new developments.
The latest events in Chechnya have seriously affected the 
new document's elaboration. (Chechnya is one of the Russian 
Federation's North Caucasian republics, where federal troops 
are now conducting combat operations against terrorists, who 
had gained power there, who had tried to secede from Russia by 
force of arms, and who also kept threatening neighboring 
Russian regions -- Ed.) In this connection, the new Russian 
military doctrine notes that the Russian army is called on to 
defeat and liquidate unlawful paramilitary units (in the course 
of domestic conflicts) within the framework of the Russian 
Federation's Constitution and current federal legislation.
Russia, which threatens no one, is determined to 
independently tackle its own domestic problems and to cooperate 
with other countries of the world for the sake of solving 
difficult regional and global problems, which now face the 
world community. The new Russian military doctrine fits 
perfectly well into this main Russian policy line.

Footnote: 

Sergei Karaganov also chairs the Foreign and Defense 
Policy Council, e.g. an influential national public 
organization.

********

#6
RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 4, No. 37, Part I, 22 February 2000

'SERGEEV'S DOCTRINE' NO TOUGHER THAN ITS PREDECESSOR. In an
interview with the 19 February "Nezavisimaya gazeta,"
Vladimir Dvorkin, the head of the Defense Ministry's Fourth
Central Scientific Research Institute and the alleged author
of the section of the new Military Doctrine dealing with
nuclear weapons' use, denied Russia's position has toughened
on the first use of such weapons. Rather, he suggested, the
wording of the doctrine has been brought into line with the
nuclear strategy principles "preached for many years by the
U.S., Britain, and France." In the doctrine, Russia reserves
the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of
such weapons against itself and "also in response to large-
scale aggression with the use of conventional weapons in
critical situations for the Russian Federation's national
security." Asked who can be considered the main author of the
doctrine, Dvorkin asserted that Defense Minister Sergeev had
played a "decisive role," particularly in the "radical
changes" made to earlier versions of the document. JC

*******

#7
From: ilhr@perfekt.perfekt.net (Cathy Fitzpatrick) 
Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2000 
Subject: Influence of Soviet Dissidents

In assessing whether Soviet dissidents had influence or not, I find that
opinion is shaped by basic emotional and underlying beliefs about the
Soviet system: 1) one admires the Soviet system in some fashion, and needs
for it to be self-corrective (if Gorbachev didn't exist he would have to
be invented), and dissidents, in that scheme, are annoying gadflies
hindering his grand scheme; 2) one perceives the system as so monolithic
and powerful that it can't possibly be changed by a handful of dissidents,
and therefore they are brave but pathetic; or 3) one believes that
individuals make a difference and there are more sympathizers than you
might think, and therefore dissidents did have an important role to play in
dismantling the USSR -- and P.S., it isn't really collapsed fully. 

I favor 3), in the school of history-writing made famous by E.P. Thompson,
who believed that pressure "from below" was a factor equally important as
change from above, in defiance of the Leninist idea that "verkhi ne khotyat
i nizy ne mogut," with its corresponding belief that only when the people
at the top want to change will the system change. Readers should look at
Politburo and Central Committee minutes in the books published about the
archives of Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov, and others (Mitrokhin), where the Party
bosses fretted over every manuscript passed to the west by Solzhenitsyn's
helpers, or how to derail Elena Bonner from giving Sakharov's Nobel Peace
Prize speech, or how to sabotage meetings between foreign and domestic
human rights activists. Dissidents in the 1980s have talked about their
family and friends in the system with whom they exchanged views and
samizdat, so the dissidents weren't as isolated as some seem to think.
Orlov, Sakharov, Turchin, Scharansky -- these were all scientists at one
time in good standing in the Soviet Academy of Sciences. 

I did indeed speak to Alexander Yakovlev about the effect of the
dissidents. I translated his book of essays published by Yale University
Press, and was struck by the number of footnotes referencing various
foreign thinkers, with no reference to Sakharov or unofficial writers. And
yet he replied that of course he had read all those works -- they seemed so
self-evident to him, apparently, as to not require a special footnote.
Still, Marxism is what shaped him, and the bravery and morality of the
dissidents' actions viewed from the Kremlin may have had more influence
than their actual writings in his case. Most intellectuals read the Gulag
Archipelago or Tsvetayeva's poetry, this is well documented. The New York
Times even has a source claiming that Putin's law professor distributed
samizdat in 1968 (hardly credible) -- but you can't have it both ways.
Either people like Putin are reformist because they read at least
unpublished Zaslavskaya and at a bare minimum Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov,
or they are blind to samizdat and tamizdat. 

If the definition of dissident is broadened to include non-Muscovites,
there is plenty of evidence that dissent and samizdat did spark
demonstrations of hundreds of thousands of people in Armenia, Estonia,
Crimea, and so on. And the claim that dissidents had no effect on the law
is not supportable: the very first liberal action that the Soviet legal
reformers took when they began to reform the system in the late 1980s was
to establish a law enabling citizens to bring complaints to courts about
official malfeasance. Before that, some citizens would wind up in prison or
psychiatric hospital for such complaints. The right to complain was not
just granted to start a drive against lax bureaucrats, it was to relieve
the pressure of discontent. "They didn't release us from the camps, we made
them let us out because we rioted," Suzanna Pechura, an inmate of the
Stalin-era camps once explained to me about Khrushchev's supposedly
magnanimous gestures. And what if the dissidents -- whose complaints were
magnified far beyond their number through Western reporting -- were
insignificant and unpopular? We could hardly celebrate this, or take
comfort in a mass population that didn't share the universal humanitarian
values the dissidents reflected, anymore than we can accept Haider's
popularity for some Austrians. 

It is curious that anyone would expect a full-blown, positive economic and
political plan from a generation of persecuted intellectual dissenters,
many of whom suffered the destruction of their academic or literary careers
and spent years in labor camp or exile, living in an information vacuum
where every scrap of independent news was precious. After all, the people
at the top had all the information and all the power -- so what took them
so long to change? The dissidents represented a range of thinking from left
to right, and hardly operated under conditions where they could freely
develop and coordinate a positive reform plan. 

In fact some key figures like Sergei Kovalev, associated with the Chronicle
of Current Events (it was incorrectly stated that Sakharov's group issued
the Chronicle) did come to positions in the government and struggled to
dismantle the vicious systems like the KGB or the GULAG which they had
spent their lives criticizing. Of the 400 or so deputies in the liberal
caucus of the first Soviet parliament known as the Interregional Group,
not many were former political prisoners but certainly almost all read
samizdat. Dismantling -- not half-measures of reform -- is still required
of a lot of Soviet institutions, and sadly, only a few old-time dissidents
and some new, younger followers are still engaged in this effort. If they
have no influence or they aren't sufficiently "positive," it doesn't mean
they are wrong. 

*******

#8
'New Poor' Family Portrayed 

Rossiyskaya Gazeta
10 February 2000
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Iraida Semenova: "The National Peculiarities of the 'New Poor'" 

According to the official data, every third 
Russian citizen last year had an income that was lower than the 
subsistence minimum. Nevertheless, even the press, which has such a 
weakness for sensation, does not cite incidents of starvation deaths or 
an extreme degree of distress among Russian citizens. So does that mean 
the figures are lying? And if not, how does our individual survive in a 
reality that is, if we are to believe the naked statistics, so harsh? 

Having set myself the goal of understanding this phenomenon, I turned 
to the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Socioeconomic Problems of 
the Population, and in particular, to Liliya Ovcharova an institute 
laboratory chief and a Candidate of Economic Sciences. Analyzing her 
research on the state of households, it seemed to me curious to juxtapose 
it with the budget of the family of a school friend, the holder of the 
same name as mine. 

I do not doubt Ira's candor. Especially since her family, according 
to the definition of our scholars, has clearly fallen under the category 
of the so-called poor. After receiving her high-school diploma, she left 
her provincial village for Moscow - to work on a temporary work permit at 
the Likhachev automotive plant [ZIL]. At the plant, she met her future 
husband, Aleksandr Ivanov, also a temporary quota worker, a milling 
machine operator in an experimental shop. Twenty years have passed since 
then.

Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears 

The family was expanded by two little girls, born a year apart. And 
Ira managed to get training as a nurse and today works at a city 
stomatology clinic. Aleksandr continues to labor at the plant. The elder 
girl, Alena, is going to secondary medical school, and Katya is finishing 
up the 10th grade. 

The year before last, after 23 years of work at his own plant, 
Aleksandr was allocated a three-room apartment in the former plant 
dormitory. "It looked as if it had been hit by a tornado," recalls Ira. 

Since her husband had by that time been issued his wages for the 
whole six preceding months. The sum paid out plus savings helped repair 
the housing. 

"After 19 years of the four of us living in a communal apartment 16 
square meters in area, for us this apartment was a gift of fate," 
continues the mistress of the house. 

But previously there had been misfortune. The younger child, Katya, 
began to be ill more and more often. Until one time she ended up in the 
intensive care unit. The doctors made the diagnosis: open tuberculosis. 
Alas, it is hardly likely that the Ivanov couple would have ever gotten 
their separate housing if not for their daughter's illness, which placed 
their communal apartment-mates' health at risk. 

Certainly, the situation is not characteristic. Although it depends 
on how you look at it. After all, it is no secret that a lack of money 
and illness have been the "sisters" of temporary quota workers. At the 
same time, they were among the first to feel in their own lives the 
changes that had begun within the country. At first, the plant turned 
away the influx of working hands from the provinces, and then it began 
other types of reductions in force. Today, less than half of the 
previous, enormous collective - just over 70,000 - work at the ZIL. Of 
these, at least a quarter are former temporary quota workers, who have 
nowhere to go, and they continue to work at the most unskilled jobs, 
huddle in small rooms, and do not even expect the promised apartment, but 
hope that they will not fall under the latest planned 25-percent 
personnel cut. 

My Dear Capital 

Aleksandr believes that he was lucky. Back before the reforms, he was 
able to "break out" from the common mass and to become accomplished at 
his job. And for that reason he received a decent wage. 

Within the experimental research operations building, where the head 
of the family works, the development work and ideas of the designers take 
shape, and series production technology is perfected. So earnings are 
calculated not by the number of components that are ground out, but are 
issued as a salary. But today they are not comparable with previous 
years. 

The bulk of the Ivanov family's monetary income is formed of 2,000, 
at best 2,500 "clean" rubles [R] of Aleksandr's. Together with Ira's 
wages - R600 - this comes to R3,100 a month for four. Of this, up to R300 
goes to pay for housing, utilities, and electricity. Another R420 goes to 
feed the children outside the home (R10 per day for a pie or a bun). The 
adults take a "dry ration" with them from home: sometimes a potato, 
sometimes a thermos of hot soup. Some more minuses from the family budget 
- R71 to purchase the student "commuter ticket" for Alena (all the rest 
walk to work or school, since it is not far), R200 for the purchase of 
sanitary and hygienic supplies, and R180 for cigarettes for Aleksandr. 
Minus all the above-listed items, R482 per person remain. 

From the reference material of the Russian Academy of Sciences 
Institute of Socioeconomic Problems of the Population: The cost of living 
is formed taking into account the regional size of the subsistence 
minimum and income and cost factors. 

I will try to define it with the help of those same official 
statistics. The State Statistics Committee asserts that the cost of a 
selection of 25 basic food products for the end of December 1999 in the 
capital came to R744.60. In other words, that was how much a Muscovite at 
the minimum, subsistence level was supposed to spend on food. 
Incidentally, according to the Moscow City Statistics Committee, in the 
third quarter of last year alone, city residents with incomes lower than 
the subsistence level numbered 29.4 percent. The Ivanovs fit into this 
category. Their official income, minus their mandatory expenditures, does 
not even reach the cost of this selection. 

So the family is starving? But judging by the fare laid out on the 
table - salads, appetizers to go with the vodka, pies, everything just as 
it should be - I, frankly speaking, did not notice this. 

From the reference material: Householders are compelled to adapt 
themselves - to be involved simultaneously in the formal and the informal 
economy. At the same time, the population's incomes showed up in the 
following: employment at several jobs, informal employment, non-monetary 
payments (benefits), and foodstuffs from private household plots. 

It turned out that the head of the household really does regularly 
travel to his native village in Ryazan Oblast. He brings potatoes, 
onions, garlic, beets, carrots, and cabbage. The produce from the village 
"compensates" for more than half of what is lacking in the selection of 
the 25 basic food products (within its structure, fruits and vegetables 
make up 25.3 percent, or R189). The remaining portion was made up by 
Ira's extra job and Aleksandr's additional earnings. Plus their elder 
daughter receives a stipend, and the family is paid a children's benefit 
for the younger. All of this and the money for the children's food that 
was saved in the summer - the girls vacationed at their grandmother's - 
allowed the family to buy at the Vietnamese market a jacket each for 
Alena and Katya - for R800 and R750, some trousers for R400 for 
Aleksandr, and for R350, Ira bought herself some ankle boots. 

At the same time, the state guarantees each member of the Ivanov 
family treatment within the limits of the amount specified by mandatory 
medical insurance. And Ira has the opportunity of getting dental care at 
the expense of her own clinic. 

From the reference material: In an analysis of the standard of 
living, housing is considered separately. 

The apartment in which the Ivanovs live belongs to the plant. 
Therefore, it cannot be categorized as "property." True, with previous 
savings, the family had been able to acquire a kitchen ensemble ($400) 
and a sofa for the hall (another $100). That, perhaps, is all. The house 
does not have a microwave oven, imported television set, or other 
expensive household devices. The wall unit and Rubin color television set 
were gifts from their parents back at their wedding. And over the period 
of their life together, the Ivanovs have been able to acquire only an 
inexpensive video cassette recorder, dishes, one bed for both girls, a 
rug, and a napless woolen carpet. 

From the reference material: In spending one's savings, such a 
priority as "a reserve in the event of the loss of one's job, non-payment 
of wages, and other unforeseen circumstances" becomes significant. These 
savings are not deferred demand for expensive acquisitions, but a 
necessary reserve for future daily expenditures. 

This is just the way that it is at the Ivanovs': The family counts 
its money. Any purchase is thought over and discussed at a family 
council. If "unplanned" money appears in the home, Ira puts it aside "for 
a rainy day" - what if, Lord forbid, something unforeseen were to befall. 
Here, the woman of the house did not disclose the amount of the family 
reserve. Possibly because her husband, who was not supposed to know about 
it, was sitting right there. And possibly because she, as the "keeper of 
the hearth," has her own secrets. 

Gena the Red 

With all the concerns about the family budget, the Ivanovs are 
convinced that there is a way out of any situation. 

"There was a mongrel living at our shop," the head of the family 
shares with me. "We called him 'Genka the Red.' It used to be that he 
would not let anyone he didn't know come near our products, and he kept 
track of who brought the ingots in and who took away the finished 
components. When they decided at the plant to catch all the stray dogs, 
they shot Genka as well. They found him bleeding. All of us in the shop 
chipped in and rented an "iron" (a special vehicle put out at ZIL for 
government officials) for a few hours and took him to the veterinarian. 
He survived." 

Ira believes that reality is very similar to the story of that 
mongrel. When Katya fell sick and then they moved, not only their 
relatives, but their colleagues and acquaintances hastened to their aid: 
Some assisted with money, and some with a vehicle and help with moving 
the household effects. Market reality has not been able to "rub out" this 
national peculiarity of ours. 

And the financial burdens will one day, even if they do not know 
when, come to an end. The children will grow up, will start earning on 
their own; just watch, it will get easier. And even if the girls come 
home with "a bun in the oven", they will help raise them. Just as long as 
they do not become drug addicts. The fear of this "disease of the 
century" and other events developing in the country are constant topics 
of conversation at the spouses' kitchen table. 

"Order is necessary in the country," Aleksandr assured me. "And it 
should be governed by a strong personality. There is no other way of 
dealing with our corruption." 

Ira nodded her assent. This position was curious to me. After all, 
the family had already struck roots in Moscow. And in the capital, as 
everyone knows, there are more opportunities for those same perks, here 
it is easier to find both a high-paying job and, alas, to conceal the 
income received in that same "informal sector of the economy." 

It turned out that neither Aleksandr nor Ira plans on changing jobs. 
Even despite an offer that has surfaced to leave for a private clinic, at 
which they promised a salary just about five times higher. "It is a big 
risk," explains Ira. "It is not known whether the firm will survive. 
Then, it is far away. And the money - less than that that was promised, 
it is true - I can earn on the side at my previous job as well." 

The man of the family does not even want to think about another job. 

"You understand," explains Aleksandr, after a drag on his "Yava," "we 
in the shop, on a par with the designers and production engineers, 
resolve all kinds of clever problems. Sometimes you rack your brains for 
a week, grind out one dummy after another. And suddenly after a smoking 
break comes the right solution. You even start to shake with the 
knowledge that this is it." 

Aleksandr is happy that his labor is needed. For him, that is the 
most important thing. And so what if he does not make a lot of money. 
Money is the kind of thing, he believes, that as much of it as you might 
make, it is never enough. It is important that he is a professional and 
creates unique things, which no one else can make better than he does. 

From the reference: Needy citizens suffered more than anyone else 
from the crisis of 1998. Their ruble savings depreciated by a factor of 
1.5. Their incomes were reduced in the same proportion. A significant 
segment of families found themselves among the "new poor." 

The Ivanovs number themselves among such as these. Back two years 
ago, they dreamed of acquiring an automobile. But the money they had 
accumulated was "consumed" by the August crisis. And now they dream of 
buying everyone at least a bed apiece. But alas, it is not working out. 
At the same time, neither Aleksandr nor Ira suffers over the fact that 
their desire does not coincide with their possibilities. The head of the 
family spoke more about the plant's experimental research work, 
high-quality machines - they are much better than their foreign 
counterparts. If only funds could be found at the enterprise to start 
them in series production. Then the family would start to live better, 
and they would be able to help their elderly parents. 

...On leaving the Ivanovs' apartment, I spent a long time balancing 
what I had heard and seen against the scholars' research. Without making 
any claims to the truth, I will offer my understanding of the problem. 
Judging by everything, the reason for our poverty really does lie in the 
peculiarities of our economy. We reformed everything, but managed to 
preserve from the previous Soviet way of life the "maximal disengagement 
of material boons from their direct production." The Ivanovs use no fewer 
than three hours from their main job earning extra income. Having 
finished his shift, Aleksandr hurries to a place where he was offered 
"moonlighting work," and Ira is detained at her job more and more often. 
But at least for the time being, they are not getting richer for it. And 
the more there are of such poor people, the larger-scale is the "shadow," 
or informal, economy. Judge for yourself. The subsistence minimum at the 
end of December of last year in the capital amounted to R1,375.91. The 
Ivanovs' income in that case should have been no less than R5,504. By my 
count, the family in reality earns more - about R7,000. Of this, the 
illegal income amounts to no less than 30 percent. 

So reach your own conclusions. 

[From the author: In the interests of the family, the last name and 
places of employment and study have been changed. Any coincidence is 
fortuitous.] 

*******

#9
Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2000 
From: Timothy K Blauvelt <blauvelt@acsu.buffalo.edu>
Subject: Jaworsky/Dissidents

So far in the discussion of the Soviet dissidence movement two distinct
questions have arisen: (1) what was the role of the Soviet dissidents in
the collapse of the USSR, and (2), what were the characteristics of the
Soviet dissidents, what inherent characteristics could have affected their
ability to govern and construct new institutions, rather than oppose the
old ones. In response to John Jaworsky's comments I'd like to address
specifically only the second question.

Part of the question concerns whether Gamsakhurdia was an aberration, or
rather represents a more general tendency. Following the Georgian civil
war and ensuing ethnic conflicts Gamsakhurdia earned a reputation in the
West as an authoritarian and a fascist. I think this is greatly
exaggerated - as Ghia Nodia has argued, Gamsakhurdia's problem wasn't that
he was overly authoritarian, but rather that he wasn't authoritarian
enough. He was in fact neither xenophobic nor a nationalist extremist. He
was considered a 'moderate' at the start with regard to national
minorities issues, and figured prominently in Western literature on
dissidents (including Alekseyeva's book). It appears that he did use some
appeals to ethnic nationalism as an attempt to rally popular support
during his embattled presidency, but the degree of this is a contentious
question. In any case, I think the situation in Georgia was shaped by the
fact that many of the other dissidents-turned politicians acted in much
the same way as Gamsakhurdia. His opponents, both opposition
intelligentsia and elements of the nomenklatura (both eventually in
collusion with bands of armed thugs), at the time were making the same
kinds of appeals.

I think John is correct to point out that it is dangerous to make
generalizations a single, all encompassing 'dissident political culture.'
I'll go out on a limb, though, and suggest that there are in fact three
possible dissident political cultures. The determining factors are the
relationship to the system of authority on one hand, and group cohesion
and solidarity on the other. Dissidence can, in the abstract sense, be
directed against either authority in society in principle or toward the
current arrangement of authority that exists in society. That is, either
dissidents are not content with the very principle of authority and the
restrictiveness of the hierarchical system, or they are not content with
the way authority is set up in society in the given incidence - either
they feel that deviants are undermining the system that, in the ideal, can
work better, or they feel that their own authority and position in society
should be greater - but they do not reject the idea of authority in
principle or that they should be subject to authority themselves. The
first category is truly anti-system; the second is more reformist in
nature. 

The three possible cultures that result from this are as follows
(anthropologists and political scientists may recognize this schema as
being based on group/grid cultural theory): (1) opposition to the
principle of authority in combination with a high degree of collectivity
and group-orientation (egalitarian dissidence culture); (2) acceptance of
the principle of authority, in combination with high degree of
collectivity and group-orientation (hierarchical dissidence culture); and
(3) opposed to the principle of authority, but not collective or group
oriented, network oriented (individualistic dissidence culture). There is
a fourth possibility, acceptance of authority and not collective or group
oriented, but this social orientation, being restricted and not having the
possibility of turning to groups (being atomized, in other words) is most
likely fatalist, and unlikely to engage in protest against the system.

If one accepts this schema, the question then becomes one of
determining which dissident political culture was (is) more prevalent
among Soviet dissidents. I think Gamsakhurdia was truly opposed to the
principle of authority and was truly anti-system, and therefore falls into
the first category. Despite being very effective in opposing the system of
authority, the problems with the egalitarian social orientation more
generally are reflecting in the behavior that I described early as being
so destructive for Gamsakhurdia and his contemporaries: because of the
difficulties of maintaining groups boundaries and cohesion in the absence
of authority, what results is constant fracturing and splitting,
difficulty in reaching compromise or coalition, paranoia and conspiracy
theories, etc. 

It is very possible that some members of the Soviet era
dissidence movement fall more into the individualist category, the ones
who were most committed to the ideas of individual liberty and the
injustice of the nature and extent of authority in the Soviet Union. Given
the structural and historical background of the dissidence movement,
though, I get the sense that such people were in the minority, and that
the dissidence movement as a whole was much more oriented towards the
collective than towards the rights of the individual. 

I can offer some evidence from the Georgian case: in doing
dissertation research in Tbilisi over the last several months, I carried
out participant-observation, survey and interview research in a number of
social groups represented different elements of society - dissident
parties and academic intelligentsia, administrative/technical
associations, low-level nomenklatura groups. I also did a city-wide random
sample survey among the population of Tbilisi (all of this in cooperation
with a team of Georgian graduate students and the NGO "Union of Georgian
Scientiests"). Although I was primarily interested in the relationship
between social class and conceptions of nationalism, the questions that I
asked were relevant to the current discussion. Using survey questions
relating to relationship to authority and group solidarity (as well as
questions relating to aspects of social orientation, such as feelings
about blame, scarcity, apathy, risk, inequality, human nature, etc.) I
tried to ascertain which of the categories different social groups fell
into. 

While I expected the intelligentsia to be egalitarian, the
administrative and nomenklatura groups to be hierarchical, and the
population to be fatalist, what instead resulted was high levels of
hierachy all across the board. The opposition intelligentsia (in my sample
made up of three opposition political parties, two 'Zviadist,' one
anti-Zviad) turned out to be much more hierarchical (and, incidentally,
much more liberal with regard to issues of ethnic minorities) than most
other groups and classes in society, although there was a strong
egalitarian undertone. The academic, technical, and creative
intelligentsias also seemed to be very hierarchical, but with egalitarian
leanings. What the relationship is between the social orientations of
Soviet era dissidents and those of the Soviet intelligentsia which gave
birth to them remains an open and I think very interesting question.

*******

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