February 19, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4119 4120

Johnson's Russia List
#4120
19 February 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Toronto Sun: Matthew Fisher, Russia hasn't yet got the hang of democracy.
2. AP: Angela Charlton, Putin Uses Discipline To Woo Russia.
3. Reuters: Russia's Yavlinsky gets election go ahead.
4. Itar-Tass: CEC Publishes YAVLINSKY'S Holdings.
5. New York Times: Andrew Bennett, Chechnya: Steps To Peace.
6. St. Petersburg Times: Andrei Zolotov Jr., Joint Newspaper Published on Babitsky.
7. The Times (UK): Giles Whittell, Putin clamps down on free speech.
8. Boris Nemtsov on NTV's Hero of the Day television program.
9. Rossiiskaya Gazeta: Irina NEVINNAYA, DOES THE GOVERNMENT SUPPORT RUSSIA'S WORKING PEOPLE?
10. Peter Mahoney: re Brodkin/Soviet Dissidents.] 

******

#1
Toronto Sun
February 18, 2000 
Russia hasn't yet got the hang of democracy
By MATTHEW FISHER (74511.357@CompuServe.com)
Sun's Columnist at Large

MOSCOW -- The United States is having its most thrilling presidential 
election campaign in years. 

Will the winner be war hero Sen. John McCain or the patrician sons of the 
Washington political establishment, Vice President Al Gore, or Texas Gov. 
George W. Bush? 

In Russia it's a foregone conclusion that acting president Vladimir Putin, 
whose main preparation for Russia's top job was to work as a low level KGB 
field agent in Dresden where he worked closely with East Germany's equally 
sinister and humourless Stasi, will win easily on March 26. 

Whatever their strengths and weaknesses, McCain, Gore and Bush are known 
entities. They have been in public life for a while and in the public eye for 
decades. Putin has never previously offered himself for public office. As 
recently as last summer he was unknown to 99% of his compatriots. Yet opinion 
polls now suggest the diminutive judo buff is three or four times more 
popular than any other politician in Russia. 

Of all the democracies, only Russia craves to be led by men who have 
presided over a catastrophic drop in living standards, colossal levels of 
corruption and civil wars so violent they make NATO's war with Serbia over 
Kosovo seem like child's play. 

The reason Russia doesn't behave like other democracies is that it isn't yet 
a democracy at all. As has been the case since czarist times, the police do 
as they wish as long as they don't cross their masters. Most of the media are 
slavishly faithful to the Kremlin. A handful of cronies are allowed 
privileged access to treasures such as the national aluminum industry. 

Putin's oeuvre, such as it is, has quickly become rather well known. After 
indifferent results at university in St. Petersburg, where by every account 
he was an unremarkable figure, he was tasked with stealing economic secrets 
from West Germany and apparently helped the East Germans, who were obsessed 
with spying on their own people. 

As Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika gave way to chaos, Putin 
returned to St. Petersburg to spy on students. Then, having resigned from the 
KGB, or so the story goes, he became a backroom operator in the 
administration there. A couple of years later he emerged in Moscow as 
Yeltsin's choice to run the secret police and then as his prime minister and 
anointed successor. 

It's a remarkable success made even more remarkable by the fact so little 
success is attached to it. 

Putin's work as a foreign operative was allegedly compromised when he was 
identified by the West Germans. During his time in St. Petersburg, where he 
apparently acquired a fabulous summer home, Putin was part of a regime with a 
reputation for corruption that surpassed Moscow's and reached Vladivostokian 
levels. His work for Yeltsin coincided with the collapse of the ruble and a 
growing clamour at how the president's family and friends had treated the 
country like their own piggy bank. 

On the day Yeltsin resigned, Putin confirmed his loyalty to his patron by 
granting him immunity from prosecution and making it difficult for 
investigators to get at his relatives. Since then Putin has dropped broad 
hints about his views of Russia's place in the world and no information 
whatsoever about how he intends to rebuild Russia's pathetic economy. 

Russia would henceforth reserve the right to wage nuclear war to protect 
itself from conventional war. Teenage boys would undergo compulsory military 
training at school. The army and secret police were praised and promised more 
money. 

Every president, American or Russian, brings pals into power with him. Putin 
has already reportedly tapped 17 colleagues from the secret police in St. 
Petersburg to help out. 

Whether it's McCain, Gore or Bush, the U.S. is in a pell mell rush to 
embrace the uncertainties of the information revolution. Putin's Russia 
harkens back to a more comfortable time when the spies were kings. 

******

#2
Putin Uses Discipline To Woo Russia
February 19, 2000
By ANGELA CHARLTON

MOSCOW (AP) - Russian high school students will soon be taking new lessons: 
how to clean and fire Kalashnikov assault rifles. Some 14- to 16-year-olds 
will be drafted as military trainees, to combat juvenile delinquency.

The revival of these Soviet-era programs is part of acting President Vladimir 
Putin's design for strengthening discipline and, in turn, strengthening 
Russia.

Russians have an army that can barely feed its soldiers and a government that 
cannot pay its bills. Legions of bureaucrats earn dismal salaries, and many 
subsist on bribes. Russia's global voice, once a roar, has faded.

Voters embrace Putin's ``make Russia mighty again'' motto and are expected to 
elect him president next month. Some in the West are less charmed, fearing a 
new Russian menace or a crackdown on freedoms Russians won with the 1991 
Soviet collapse.

``Putin believes in a strong state and obedient citizens, regardless of what 
he says about protecting rights,'' says Alexander Kostinsky of the human 
rights group Memorial. ``Russians also say they want a strong state - maybe 
they want it so badly they will sacrifice some rights.''

A 15-year KGB veteran, Putin has flexed Russia's military muscle in Chechnya, 
strengthened police patrols and increased monitoring of journalists and the 
Internet by security services. The nation's new national security doctrine 
broadens the Kremlin's authority to use nuclear weapons and accuses the 
United States of trying to weaken Russia.

``One must not keep pretending that we do not need state security bodies,'' 
Putin wrote recently.

A follower of the Russian Orthodox Church, Putin also calls for restoration 
of ``moral values'' to a country steeped in cynicism and crime.

According to a recent Putin decree, boys aged 14 to 16 who are orphans or 
fatherless can be conscripted to serve as trainees in military units.

Putin also decreed that starting in September, students 15 and older will get 
combat training and take classes in military history. Education Ministry 
officials say the lessons will resemble technically, but not ideologically, a 
Soviet-era program dropped in 1991.

Boys will also be required to spend five days at a military base to prepare 
for Russia's mandatory draft.

Putin is not the only one who seeks a sturdy state. Nearly all leading 
Russian politicians preach a similar gospel. And Russians have long yearned 
for a leader who can make their streets safe and guarantee the banks won't 
run off with their savings.

It's unclear, however, whether Putin can take his discipline campaign from 
the schoolyard to what analysts say is the root of Russia's weakness: 
corruption at the highest levels.

The government's finances are limited, and the Kremlin is under heavy 
pressure from tycoons who control the lucrative oil, gas, aluminum and 
electricity industries.

Putin has said a key goal is ``leveling the playing field'' for businesses by 
ending privileges for selected magnates. He has purged from his 
administration some Yeltsin allies at the heart of that privilege system.

But those players haven't disappeared, and observers expect fierce resistance 
to efforts to root out high-level graft.

While Russia's economy has shrunk dramatically, ``its elite have not lived so 
well since before the 1917 revolution,'' the daily Segodnya wrote last week. 
``How can one carry out reforms from the top in this situation, contrary to 
the will of the ruling class?''

Putin himself has not been accused of dirty dealings. But he worked as deputy 
mayor of St. Petersburg in the early 1990s, when the city became known as one 
of Russia's most corrupt and dangerous. He then worked in the Kremlin's 
property management office, an agency that Swiss and Russian prosecutors have 
accused of taking bribes.

Putin's hard line initially alarmed the West. But some Western politicians 
have decided a strong Russia is in their interest - with security organs 
strict enough to prevent the illicit export of nuclear materials and to 
punish organized crime bosses, and a government solvent enough to pay off its 
foreign debt.

Putin has stood firm against international criticism of the Chechnya war - to 
the delight of most Russians. But he also resumed ties with NATO after almost 
a year of impasse caused largely by NATO's bombing in Kosovo.

``Russia depends on the West too much for aid and trade to disregard it 
entirely,'' says Vyacheslav Nikonov, a former Kremlin aide who heads the 
Politika think tank.

``Putin is clever enough to understand this. The question is how harshly he 
will punish those who don't agree with his ideas about discipline.''

******

#3
Russia's Yavlinsky gets election go ahead

MOSCOW, Feb 19 (Reuters) - Leading Russian liberal Grigory Yavlinsky was one 
of three candidates who won approval on Saturday from the Central Election 
Commission to run in next month's presidential election and said he was 
determined to win. 

But Yavlinsky, head of the liberal Yabloko party, is well behind the 
favourite candidate, Acting President Vladimir Putin, in opinion polls ahead 
of the March 26 vote. Yavlinsky came fourth when he contested the last 
presidential election in 1996. 

``I intend not only to take part in the election, I intend to win,'' 
Yavlinsky said in televised comments. 

``The presidential election is not only the election of different people with 
their merits and demerits, it is the choice of our future,'' he said. 

Yavlinsky is running third in opinion polls, way behind Putin and 
second-placed candidate Gennady Zyuganov, the head of the Communist Party. 

Yavlinsky, who has refused to join any government since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, has received a low but steady level of support for his 
blend of market liberalism and strong opposition to corruption and human 
rights abuses. 

Unlike many other 'young reformers' who have risen and fallen since the 
Soviet era, Yavlinsky has avoided becoming tarred with the brush of unpopular 
economic reforms but has also failed to capture people's imagination. 

Putin's popularity has been built on his tough stance on the war in Chechnya. 
Although well ahead in opinion polls, recent surveys have suggested he might 
not get the 50 percent required for outright victory in the first round of 
the election. 

A turnout below 50 percent of the electorate, possible if Russians believe 
his victory is a foregone conclusion, would also cause a second round to be 
held. 

Putin was rated at 48 percent in an opinion poll released last weekend, 
Zyuganov, one of the first to register his bid, stood on 14 percent, a gain 
of two points over the past week. Yavlinsky also moved up two points to four 
percent. 

The commission also registered film director Stanislav Govorukhin and Ella 
Pamfilova, a former minister of social security and the election's only woman 
candidate. Both enter the election as outsiders. 

Under Russian election law, a candidate must collect half a million 
supporters and declare income, property and funding. Two political unknowns 
fell foul of the commission on Saturday, failing to collect enough 
signatures. 

Other registered candidates include left-leaning Siberian regional governor 
Aman Tuleyev and Alexei Podberyozkin, a former Zyuganov ally. Four other 
candidates await registration, including suspended Prosecutor General Yuri 
Skuratov. 

*****

#4
CEC Publishes YAVLINSKY'S Holdings. .

MOSCOW, February 19 (Itar-Tass) - The Central Election Commission published 
on Saturday property and income of Grigory Yavlinsky, one of presidential 
candidates, and of his family members, to be reported under the election law. 

Yavlinsky made a total of 2,480,848 roubles over the last two years. Sources 
of this money were the State Duma lower house of parliament, the Center for 
Economic and Political Studies, the Moscow representative office of Brunswick 
Ltd. and other organisations. Part of his income was proceeds from selling an 
apartment. 

Yavlinsky and his wife Yelena Smotryayeva own a 76.5 square meter apartment 
in Moscow. 

He also has a 81 square meter apartment in his native city of Lvov, Ukraine, 
and rents a state-owned dacha with a floor space of 134 square meters outside 
Moscow. 

Yavlinsly has a 899,642 rouble deposit in Austria Creditanstalt bank, Russia. 
His wife has 532,233 roubles in her account in this bank. 

Yavlinsky's son Alexei has no property, but has a deposit in Barclay bank, 
London. 

******

#5
New York Times
February 19, 2000
[for personal use only]
Chechnya: Steps To Peace
By ANDREW BENNETT
Andrew Bennett, a professor of government at Georgetown, is the author of 
"Condemned to Repetition? The Rise, Fall and Reprise of Soviet-Russian 
Military Interventionism 1973-1996." 

WASHINGTON-- With the inevitability of a Greek tragedy, Russia's military 
intervention in Chechnya has followed the script rehearsed in the war in the 
mid-1990's. 

As in February 1995, Russian soldiers are picking over the ruins of Grozny, 
the Chechen capital, after a costly fight and are facing a vicious battle in 
the mountains of southern Chechnya. Russia must now decide if it wants to 
repeat the closing act of the previous war, when it rejected negotiations 
with the Chechens after taking Grozny. It only conceded to a peace agreement 
in 1997, after two years of guerrilla warfare and terrorist attacks by 
Chechen rebels. 

Negotiations would require both sides to take political risks and face down 
their hard-line factions. But there are good reasons to think that this time 
both sides may try to make a deal. 

Vladimir Putin, Russia's acting president, is in a stronger position to seek 
negotiations than Boris Yeltsin was in 1995. Mr. Putin's ruthless offensive 
in Chechnya has won him much higher approval ratings than Mr. Yeltsin had 
after his ill-prepared assault on Grozny five years ago. Mr. Putin also knows 
that recent polls have shown that the Russian public's support for the war 
has softened as casualties have increased. And some Russian leaders, 
including Sergei Stepashin, a former prime minister, and Mayor Yuri Luzhkov 
of Moscow have begun to criticize the continued use of force in Chechnya. 

The greatest risk to Mr. Putin's election as president next month is not a 
backlash from hard-liners for negotiating an agreement, but a terrorist 
attack or counteroffensive in Chechnya. 

The Chechens, too, might be more likely to seek a truce this time around. 
President Aslan Maskhadov does not control all of Chechnya's factions. But he 
remains the republic's most legitimate leader, and he is far more reasonable 
that Dzhokhar Dudayev, the breakaway republic's leader five years ago. Mr. 
Maskhadov has never supported terrorist tactics, and has criticized radical 
Islamic leaders like Shamil Basayev. Last fall he even said that he might be 
willing to part with Mr. Basayev, but couldn't do so as long as he faced a 
Russian invasion. 

It would be politically risky for either Mr. Putin or Mr. Maskhadov to be the 
first to seek a settlement. Thus the first tentative steps toward 
negotiations might depend on the unlikely person of Malik Saidullayev, a 
Chechen who made his fortune running Moscow's largest lottery. Mr. 
Saidullayev is the head of the Chechen state council, a shadow government 
appointed by Moscow, which is viewed by many of the republic's leaders as a 
puppet regime. But Mr. Saidullayev has established some credibility with the 
Chechen people by forcefully criticizing Russian atrocities in the recent 
offensive. Speculation is that he might make a legitimate intermediary 
between Mr. Putin and Mr. Maskhadov. 

It is clear what the outlines of any mutually acceptable agreement must be. 
Russia will demand security from Islamic terrorism, including a buffer zone 
in northern Chechnya manned by Russian troops. A new Chechen government would 
likely insist on autonomy for the rest of its territory, as well as 
reconstruction assistance from Moscow and possibily military help in getting 
rid of extremist holdouts. 

And both sides would likely demand the expulsion of the hard-liners from 
Chechnya -- meaning not only Mr. Basayev and other warlords but also the most 
overeager of Russia's generals. 

What can the United States do to tip the scales toward peace? 

President Clinton has until now wisely avoided a confrontation over Chechnya. 
He has delayed several loans from the International Monetary Fund and the 
Export-Import Bank but has cited Russia's economic mismanagement and 
corruption as the reason rather than explicitly mentioning the war in 
Chechnya. Perhaps now is the time to inform Russia's leaders that 
American-backed loans will become inextricably linked to Chechnya if Russia 
fails to seek a settlement.

******

#6
St. Petersburg Times
February 18, 2000
Joint Newspaper Published on Babitsky
By Andrei Zolotov Jr.
STAFF WRITER

MOSCOW - Thirty media organizations joined together to put out a special 
edition of Obshchaya Gazeta, or Joint Newspaper, in a tradition that began 
during a crackdown on the press in 1991.

However, several major newspapers - including Izvestia and two owned by Boris 
Berezovsky - stayed away, underscoring the political aspects of the Babitsky 
case.

"A threat to freedom of speech in Russia has for the first time in the last 
several years transformed into its open and regular suppression," leaders of 
the Russian Union of Journalists, who organized the special edition, wrote in 
a statement that led the paper.

The Babitsky case has been perceived by reporters "not as an isolated 
episode, but almost as a turning point in the struggle for a press that 
serves the society and not the authorities," the statement said.

It listed the creation last year of a Press Ministry to oversee the media, 
the information wars that "buried the very notion of democratic elections" 
for the State Duma and the restrictions on news reporting from the Caucasus 
as part of a pattern of infringement on the freedom of the press.

The first time such a joint publication came out was during the 1991 
attempted coup, when censorship was introduced and liberal newspapers were 
shut down. It reappeared again in 1992 when the Supreme Soviet attempted to 
renationalize privatized Izvestia, and in 1994 when Moskovsky Komsomolets 
investigative reporter Dmitry Kholo dov was murdered.

Under the headline "Wanted," Wednesday's special edition ran a short 
biography of Babitsky noting that he received a special award from Yeltsin 
for his coverage of the 1991 coup attempt, which he later returned to Yeltsin 
after the 1993 shelling of the White House. The newspaper also reprinted 
Yeltsin's decree signed in August 1991 that allowed U.S.-funded Radio Liberty 
to operate in Russia in recognition of its "role in ... informing Russian 
citizens about the course of democratic reforms."

The special edition ran the opinions of several well-known writers under a 
common headline, "I Accuse." Komsomolskaya Pravda journalist Alexander 
Yevtushenko contributed a report about finding traces of Babitsky in the 
filtration prison in Chernokozovo in northern Chechnya.

The 30 media organizations represent the interests of millions of Russian 
citizens, said deputy editor of Obshchaya Gazeta weekly Vitaly Yaroshevsky. 
"In the place of anyone in power, I would have noticed that [hiding the truth 
about Babitsky] is not like playing with toys," he said. "We are against 
lawlessness and say it bluntly, without using the subjunctive."

The list of media organizations that supported the joint edition speaks 
volumes about the political divisions within the Russian media community. 
Among them are all publications affiliated with Moscow Mayor Yury Luzh kov, 
as well as those that are part of Vla dimir Gusinsky's media empire, 
including NTV television and Ekho Mosk vy radio. Communist newspaper 
Sovietskaya Rossiya and liberal Mos kov skiye Novosti and Novaya Gazeta are 
on board, too, as is the Glasnost Defense Fund.

But conspicuously absent are Boris Berezovsky's Kommersant and Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta; Vremya MN, which is believed to be backed by the Central Bank; and 
major dailies Izvestia and Trud. The Union of Journalists did not approach 
The Moscow Times or Vedomosti, a business daily also published by Independent 
Media.

*******

#7
The Times (UK)
19 February 2000
[for personal use only]
Putin clamps down on free speech 
FROM GILES WHITTELL IN MOSCOW

ONE of them narrowly escaped being sent to an asylum. Another is missing and 
feared dead in Chechnya. A third is confined to a closed "nuclear" city in 
Siberia, facing a trial no journalists have been allowed to attend. A fourth 
asked the Government for an alternative to military service and got two years 
in jail. 

Across Russia, 15 years after Mikhail Gorbachev triggered the Soviet collapse 
by granting sweeping new press and civic freedoms, those who seized them and 
transformed the country now fear a systematic crackdown by a vast secret 
police force with a new mission - to rebuild the power of the Russian state 
under acting President Putin. 

Russia's new dissidents range from muckrakers and environmentalists to the 
scriptwriters for Mr Putin's puppet on Kukly, the local equivalent of 
Spitting Image. A group of St Petersburg academics has demanded that the 
programme face criminal charges for defaming the Kremlin's new protégé "with 
a special rage and frenzy". 

Mr Putin himself, a former head of the KGB's successor agency, the FSB, has 
pledged to protect the press freedoms that now seem likely to be remembered 
as one of President Yeltsin's finest legacies. But his assurance counted for 
little when FSB officers knocked on Aleksandr Khinshtein's door in Moscow 
last month and tried to take him to a psychiatric hospital hours from the 
capital for "tests". Mr Khinshtein, 23, a reporter on a popular Russian 
tabloid, is known for fearless if unreliable exposés on Kremlin 
power-brokers, especially Boris Berezovsky, the oil and media tycoon and 
Yeltsin confidant, 

He had the wit to show the FSB a doctor's note and claim he was too ill to 
leave his flat, but the implied threat to brand him insane recalled some of 
the worst excesses of the Soviet KGB. He ran for cover to a series of 
addresses which he did not disclose even to friends, and eventually agreed to 
psychiatric testing in the hospital of his choice. The charge against him - 
hiding a mental illness when applying for a driving licence - has since been 
dropped. 

Those who dare to question the Kremlin's policy on Chechnya may be risking 
life as well as liberty. Andrei Babitsky, a Russian reporter for the 
American-run Radio Liberty, has not been heard from since being detained by 
Russian troops over a month ago in Grozny, where he angered Moscow with his 
allegedly pro-Chechen coverage. 

The FSB claims, bizarrely, to have exchanged Mr Babitsky for Russian 
prisoners, but the swap appears to have been faked. His wife is distraught. 
"If someone I trusted told me he was alive, I would believe it," she said 
this week. "But I don't trust anyone any more." Others have seen grounds for 
hope in the judiciary, if not the FSB. 

Last year two former naval officers who published information on 
contamination by Russia's rusting nuclear fleets, Aleksandr Nikitin and 
Grigori Pasko, won court victories after being jailed on the flimsiest of 
charges. But they are seen as the lucky ones, protected in the end by Mr 
Yeltsin's consistent stand for freedom of expression. 

The Glasnost Defence Fund, set up to foster an open society in Russia, lists 
88 instances of intimidation of journalists and writers by the authorities 
last December alone. The press is barred from the libel trial of Nikolai 
Schoor, an environmentalist and publisher in the closed city of Snezhinsk. 
Most of the cases are traced to a new zeal for official control of 
information since Mr Putin became Prime Minister last August. 

Mr Putin has set up an Orwellian-sounding Information Ministry with broad 
powers to regulate the media. He has also appointed a chief spokesman on 
Chechnya, whose first move was to ask Russian reporters to join the national 
struggle against terrorism even at the cost of objectivity.NTV, the largest 
private television channel, has accused the army of understating its losses. 
The results include being kept off front-line helicopter trips and a 
thinly-veiled threat from Gazprom, the state gas monopoly and a key 
shareholder, to invest elsewhere. 

Perhaps the bravest stand against the war is by Dmitri Neverovsky. Now 26, he 
has insisted since 1997 on his constitutional right to a civilian alternative 
to national service. Last November a judge threw out his claim to be a 
conscientious objector and sentenced him to two years in jail. 

Aleksandr Khinshtein, 23, a Moskovsky Komsomolets reporter known for 
aggressive stories on Kremlin corruption, resisted FSB demands for 
psychiatric tests in a hospital. His case was dropped. 

Babitsky: feared dead 
Andrei Babitsky, 35, last phoned Moscow from Chechnya on January 15. A 
reporter for Radio Liberty whose dispatches angered the Kremlin, he has since 
been held by Russian troops and allegedly swapped for Russian prisoners. His 
wife fears he may be dead. 

Aleksandr Nikitin, 47, a former Russian Navy captain acquitted of espionage 
and treason in December after a four-year struggle with the FSB including 11 
months in jail. 

Grigori Pasko, a former naval officer arrested in Vladivostok in 1997 after 
allegedly filming a Russian tanker dumping nuclear waste at sea and passing 
the film to Japanese television. Spent 20 months in jail without charge.

Nikolai Schoor, an environmentalist and newspaper publisher in Snezhinsk, 
faces trial on libel charges stemming from reports on local bureaucrats. The 
trial is closed to the press. 

Dmitry Neverovsky, 26, was sentenced to two years in jail for demanding a 
civilian alternative to military service, as guaranteed in the Russian 
Constitution. He claims to have been targeted by authorities since dropping 
out of college in 1995 to protest the first Chechen war.

Bonner: condemns FSB 
Yelena Bonner, 77, widow of human rights activist Andrei Sakharov, considers 
the FSB (successor to the KGB) "untransformable" and has called for 
international peacekeeping forces in Chechnya.

******

#8
Excerpt
Hero of the Day television program with Svetlana Sorokina (NTV)
11 February 2000
Interview with Boris Nemtsov, One of the Leaders of the Union of Right 
Forces Fraction in State Duma

[Translation by Olga Kryazheva, Research Assistant
Center for Defense Information
okryazhe@cdi.org}

....
SS: Vladimir Lukin said today that the Duma could not effectively work 
in these conditions; he does not exclude the chance that early 
elections will be held. Is that true? Is it an exaggeration or is 
there such a possibility?

BN: You know, I would not dramatize the situation. I think we have a 
possibility to work effectively on the key laws, on Land Codex, on 
Tax Codex, on passing the true budget, on international laws, and so o
n. I don't see a tragedy in what have happened today.

SS: You just said…

BN: The main thing is positive dynamics. Look, when we raised the 
question about holding hearings on Babitsky, less then a hundred 
deputies voted; today about 180 voted for us.

SS: Boris Yefremovich, you said that level of such tension and 
antagonism in the Sate Duma is 
relatively high. Maybe this designated split will continue to disturb 
the work. In this case, the words of Vladimir Lukin may be taken 
seriously.

BN: You know, until there is a peace in the society, there will be no 
peace in the Duma.

SS: Well, then…

BN: The interests are concentrated in the Duma, and there are many 
ambitious exalted people 
in the Duma. Sometimes I think that all of this simply happened 
because spring is coming.

SS: Well, you too have ambitions.

BN: Oh no, I said that there are many people like that in the Duma, and 
there is nothing bad about 
it. I am not sure that the next Duma will be better that this one. And 
I don't think that a month of work is enough to make such big decisions.

SS: I am rushing to move on to other topics. Sergeyev, Rushailo, and 
Koshman spoke today at the closed meeting. Did they say or report 
anything new?

BN: Well, to be brief, they repeated exactly what NTV and Echo of 
Moscow say, and what our newspapers write.

SS: Was it worth closing doors?

BN: One thing, absolutely wrong, absolutely wrong.

SS: So?

BN: I really think that sometimes not the speeches and documents of the 
state importance, but the low level of preparedness of the state 
officials are put into secrecy.

SS: So today…

BN: In order that people don't laugh. Today the only thing said by the 
Minister of Internal Affairs was that he has the pictures, confiscated from 
Babitsky. The pictures are really horrible, pictures of our soldiers.

SS: Have you seen them?

BN: Well, Irina Gulovna has seen them. They are pictures of the soldiers 
with eyes taken 
out, the ugly scene. The Minister of Internal Affairs made the 
conclusion that pictures were 
made by Babitsky, because they were confiscated from him, so he is an 
accomplice.

SS: The story is really confusing. One version is that they confiscated the 
film from his wife, she 
turned it in, the other is that it was confiscated from him, it is not 
clear.

BN: Yes. The minister stated that it was confiscated from Babitsky, and 
concluded that 
Babitsky made these inhuman pictures in the moment of murder, execution.

SS: Well, it still has to be proved.

BN: So he is an accomplice. All of this is vague. Excuse me, but I am not a 
specialist in 
investigating. First, he might have gotten pictures from somebody. 
Second, it is not clear how it 
was organized and pictures taken, it needs an investigation. Besides, there 
is the Constitution, there is a presumption of innocence. Why the conclusion 
that the person is an accomplice of the massacres is being made based on the 
confiscation of these or other pictures? In addition, I know Babitsky; he 
would never hurt a fly.

SS: And most importantly, if he was brought to trial or something, if they 
conducted an investigation…Who prevented these regular procedures? And who 
knows where he is right now? And as a result, he is already being blamed 
for all earthly sins.

BN: And you know there is another problem. In reality the question is not 
just about Babitsky, the question is about all who are war prisoners, and 
who are captured hostages in Chechnya. But many communists ask the question 
why are we taking about Babitsky all the time. Here is the nuance. The point 
is that the highest authorities of the country, I am absolutely sure, gave
the 
citizen of Russia Babitsky into the hands of the Chechen fighters. It did not 
happen to any other citizen. They stole Shpigun, you know, many of our 
soldiers were captured. In other words, the power itself gives away its 
citizen. The state should protect, but not trade its citizens to the bandits 
and bastards; this is the most important thing. Besides, what you talk about 
all the time: is it the only case of Babitsky or all other reporters who 
disagree with one or another official put themselves and their families in 
danger? Will we ever have a freedom of speech? That is the question. But 
the Union of Right Forces will always fight for the freedom of those who are 
imprisoned: soldiers, officers, or generals that we had mentioned today. The 
other thing that I did not understand in today's hearings is when the 
Minister of Internal affairs stated that we exchanged five military men for 
Babitsky.

SS: Without last names…

BN: Yes, long and loud applause burst. Communists applauded. They always 
despised the future of one separate individual, considering him a screw, or 
something, and they just demonstrated it today in their applause. The future 
of every person is important to us, and we fight so nobody gets killed, 
imprisoned, or interned.

SS: Interned?

BN: Yes, and captured. There is the thing.

SS: Boris Yefremovich, all of this is absolutely clear. But we still have 
not seen those who had been exchanged for Babitsky, and again I've heard now 
five, not two, three, one persons, but then again no last names were 
announced, and we don't know who these people are. Boris Yefremovich, let me 
ask you something. Yesterday Anatoly Chubais and I finished on critical 
quantity of the events, deeds, words of the acting president Putin that 
should happen in order to change the Union's of Right Forces attitude 
towards him. We have not finished the discussion with Chubais. Could you 
clear up the situation? Or is this a decision?

BN: The Union of Right Forces has not formed its attitude yet. Putin's 
actions push the leaders and the ordinary members of the Union of Right 
Forces to making a certain decision. I personally think that the Babitsky 
story is one huge mistake. I am convinced that Putin has to publicly 
recognize and correct this mistake, instead of saying that Babitsky has 
nothing to do with agrarian producers, as he did today in Krasnodar.

SS: Yes.

BN: I believe it is an unacceptable thing. Here what comes to mind. 
Remember, on December 31, Boris Yeltsin, our first president, swore in 
front of the people?

SS: Asked for forgiveness.

BN: And 40% of Russians, yes, he asked for forgiveness, and 40% of Russians 
supported, and started to treat him better; this is what surveys show. But 
in the Kremlin many think that if you recognize your mistake, you demonstrate 
your weakness. I believe Putin should recognize his mistakes, he is a 
beginner candidate for presidency. And this will show his power, not 
weakness. Our people like the confession, and forgive even more serious 
things. Until there is a stable stance that we do everything in a right way: 
we organized the crisis in the Duma properly, we treat reporters properly, 
we sold the problems with 'Transneft' in a right way,- until such a stance 
exists the chances for support from the Union of Right Forces decrease every 
day.

SS: Is there a possibility that you'll decide to support, let's say, 
Yavlinsky's candidacy?

BN: It is not an appropriate question, because there is a history of long 
relations between Yabloko and the Democratic Choice of Russia. It is 
discussible. We hold in-party disputes for now, and everybody has a right to 
express his opinion, as he wants. But anyway, we'll hold a congress, and 
we'll have to determine our position, we need to.

SS: Sure. Thank you, Boris Yefremovich. Let me remind you that we are speaking
with Boris Nemtsov, the representative of the Union of Right Forces, in the
time 
of the Duma crisis, just as we did last time in January. The Duma majority 
did not support his candidacy today; he did not become a vice speaker of the 
State Duma. But it is not over, and there will be other voting for him.

BN: To Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Vasily Shandibin.

SS: These are the personal greetings that Boris Nemtsov wanted to send on 
air. On this I am finishing, all the best. Good bye.

*******

#9
Rossiiskaya Gazeta
February 18, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only] 
DOES THE GOVERNMENT SUPPORT RUSSIA'S WORKING PEOPLE?
The State Must Solve Four Main Problems During That 
Acute Stand-Off Between Labor and Capital 
By Irina NEVINNAYA

Trilateral cooperation between the state, labor unions and 
employers, e.g. social partnership, seems to be really 
essential, provided that all of us want to live in conditions 
of civilized market relations. What can the Government and 
labor unions do for the sake of ensuring more constructive work 
in the given field?
This was discussed February 16 by the General Council of the 
Federation of Independent Russian Labour Unions (Russian 
acronym, FNPR). The General Council's session was also attended 
by Russia's acting President Vladimir Putin.

Everyone apparently knows the direction of such work just 
because all the main goals are stipulated by a general 
agreement between labor-union associations, employers and the 
Government that was signed not so long ago. However, it's not 
enough to merely sign such an agreement, which must be 
fulfilled accordingly. Apart from that, there exists a protocol 
listing specific differences because the three contracting 
parties have failed to attain a "common denominator" on all 
issues.
In his speech, Vladimir Putin dwelt on a strategic task, 
e.g. the formation of a civilized national labor market. The 
relevant problems are known to everyone, e.g. the extremely 
cheap price of labor, eroded social guarantees, unstable 
employment, as well as the resultant low popular incomes.
How can one compromise at a time when local businessmen 
are interested in obtaining maximum possible profits, first and 
foremost, what with workers craving for normal, rather than 
hopelessly inadequate, wages, vacations, health care, child 
benefits and other social guarantees? Russia's labor unions, 
which are supposed to play the part of mediator, traditionally 
act as such a mediator capable of curbing exorbitant business 
claims and influencing the relevant state policies.
This was also stated by Putin, as he addressed labor-union 
leaders. "But for your active role, we, the state, would hardly 
prove able to create favorable conditions for paying worthy 
wages to our workers and for ensuring their well-deserved 
vacations", Putin went on to say.
For instance, the employment problem can't be solved, 
unless enterprise managers and local authorities are able to 
cooperate with each other. Long-term regional 
production-expansion programs, related workforce-migration 
trends, as well as specific personnel-retraining programs, can 
only be accomplished through joint efforts. For its own part, 
the state would be expected to legally formalize the direct 
responsibility of those employers, who decide to axe their 
jobs. However, market economy makes it well-nigh impossible to 
avoid personnel cuts in some cases.
Conference delegates agreed that labor unions, which are 
supposed to defend workers' interests, must also predict 
subsequent developments well in advance, insisting on the 
expansion of small businesses and the implementation of 
specific production-expansion programs and controlling 
corporate economies all the same.
If need be, the concerned parties must negotiate, looking 
for a way out together with employers and local self-government 
bodies. According to Putin, one often simply has to react on 
time, inducing any specific enterprise to invest its money into 
the appropriate new forms of production.
A new labor code constitutes yet another serious task.
Everyone knows about the fate of the Government-sponsored draft 
labor code, which was submitted to the State Duma for 
consideration. That document was not duly coordinated by the 
trilateral commission, before being taken to the State Duma.
Moreover, far from all labor-union proposals were heeded during 
its elaboration. Consequently, its examination was virtually 
blocked by State-Duma members. Quite possibly, we would have 
managed to come a bit closer to rectifying that abnormal 
labor-market situation, provided that the document's authors 
had discussed their brain-child with labor-union 
representatives beforehand, also enlisting their support. That 
abnormal market-labor situation is as follows -- the old-time 
labor-law code doesn't work at a time when this country hasn't 
yet acquired any new labor legislation of its own. Those taking 
part in the council's session noted that a commission 
responsible for drafting such a code, which unites FNPR people, 
is now being established. Consequently, it turns out that the 
Government's task to pass the labor code as soon as possible is 
becoming more feasible today.
Yet another pressing problem, e.g. protecting the 
personnel of small and medium-sized enterprises that often lack 
any labor-union organizations whatsoever, was discussed 
separately.
Labor legislation, as well as the Russian Labor Inspectorate, 
should play the lead in such cases.
Russia's labor-union legislation still leaves a lot to be 
desired. For example, issues pertaining to the simultaneous 
operation of two or several labour-union organizations at one 
and the same enterprise haven't yet been settled. The situation 
would seem quite normal, in case such organizations manage to 
strike a deal between themselves, subsequently hammering out 
joint collective-agreement terms. However, enterprise 
administrations often have to sign several collective 
agreements, which, in the long run, don't meet the interests of 
employers and workers alike.
Labor unions and the Government have also met each other 
halfway in yet another really important sphere, e.g. 
controlling specific working conditions. Corporate workers 
(labor-union members) alone know everything about their 
respective production facilities. Therefore they, rather than 
outsider inspectors, would find it much easier to control the 
state of all equipment and to ensure compliance with 
work-safety regulations. "If you need government support in 
this field, then we are ready to enhance the role and 
importance of labor unions along this direction", Vladimir 
Putin told those present.
On the whole, those taking part in the meeting didn't 
confine themselves to labor relations alone, discussing 
numerous other issues, such as the future of Russia's northern 
territories, the organization of summer-time recreation camps 
for children, as well as sick-leave payments. Apart from that, 
it was noted that Russian labor unions are duty-bound to help 
people find their bearings in a new market environment and laws 
dealing with their rights and opportunities.
The general agreement strives to ensure an economic 
recovery, by rendering every conceivable support to operational 
enterprises and by encouraging the creation of new entities, 
too.
Should Russia's powers-that-be, employers and labor unions 
fulfil this provision, then one would have every reason to 
speak about real improvements in the Russian social climate.

******

#10
Date: Sat, 19 Feb 2000 
From: pmah@glasnet.ru (Peter Mahoney)
Subject: Brodkin/Soviet Dissidents 

I would like to respond, briefly if I can, to two postings concerning the
role of the Soviet dissidents: that from Ben Brodkin (JRL 4114) and Patrick
Armstrong (JRL 4117).

Brodkin disagrees with my statement that "the actions of the Russian
dissidents had absolutely nothing to do with the eventual collapse of the
Soviet Union, any more than the actions of the American anti-war dissidents
during the Vietnam era had anything to do with the end of the Vietnam war". 

I suppose, in all honesty, I would have to say that I disagree with the
absoluteness of that statement also. As with many whose youth was spent in
the pursuit of ideals, I find myself torn today between a cynical analysis
of that time and a continued idealism, between pessimism and optimism. For
whatever it's worth, doing a stream-of-consciousness JRL response at three
in the morning brought out my more cynical mood.

The question, then, is not whether those actions had any effect -- in both
cases, they did -- but whether those actions had a significant effect, that
is, caused something to happen which would not have happened otherwise.
Here I would continue to disagree with Brodkin.

As Gessen points out in his original article, by the sixties and seventies
in the Soviet Union, it was possible to maintain a certain level of private
intellectual freedom, as long as the requisite public compromises were
maintained. The dissidents, of course, chose to ignore the public
compromises, and attempted to bring private intellectual freedom into the
public arena. In this sense, the dissidents grew out of an already existing
social trend. The key point, it seems to me, is did the dissidents then
lead that trend to the point where it seriously challenged the existing
power structure and forced them to make changes they otherwise would not
have made, or were they merely symbols, heroic and highly visible, but
nothing more than an irritation to those in power. 

On the first point, I would contend that the dissidents did not lead. True,
the dissidents provided the material -- the samizdat publications and the
banned songs that Brodkin refers to -- for the pursuit of private
intellectual gratification, but it doesn't seem to me that this provided any
major stimulus to go public. Gessen's wife, Anya, quoted in Gessen's
article, provides a rather harsh summation of the actions of most
dissidents: "They sat around in kitchens and complained about the Soviet
Union. That's all." Certainly, the fate of those few dissidents who did go
public would have given serious pause to anyone considering abandoning the
safer go-along-get-along route. My point is that the actions of the
dissidents did not lead to massive public protests for human rights in the
Soviet Union. Rather, they fueled a private, passive resistence, which did
not spur change, but, perhaps, provided a fertile ground for reception once
that change was initiated.

I am not in a position to refute Brodkin's claim that the actions of the
dissidents spawned any widespread appeal of actions of government officials
or initiation of civil suits based on the hithrto ignored Soviet laws. I
would be interested in hearing about concrete examples of this, and whether
these examples were indeed widespread or merely isolated instances. As for
the exodus of hundreds of thousands of, mostly Jewish, emigrants, I would
contend that this had little, if anything, to do with the ultimate fall of
the Soviet Union. Indeed, it provided an opportunity for the Soviets to get
rid of a large part of a minority which they, unfortunately, already had
little use for.

Certainly, those dissidents who did choose to go public attracted attention
-- that was, after all, their principal objective -- and certainly, they
attracted the attention of those in power, as Armstrong pointed out
concerning the Politburo minutes. I remember the story of how Richard Nixon
looked out the window of the White House one day, and was, apparently,
exceedingly perturbed by one lone anti-war protester parading up and down
with a placard. Dissidents are, by nature, irritating to those in power,
and can provoke a response disproportionate to the threat that the
dissidents actually pose. That is one of the few gratifications that
dissidents get from their actions. We may not change the decisions of those
in power, but we sure do BOTHER them. 

But the central question remains, did the actions of the dissidents change
the actions of those in power? I think not. Gorbachev initiated his
changes to save the Soviet system, not to overthrow it. The cracks in the
Soviet facade which ultimately led to its collapse, in my view, were not
created by the dissidents, they existed independent of the dissidents'
actions. Had Solzhenitsin never written "Gulag", had Sakharov never gone
public, had Volpin never unfurled his banner, in my opinion, Gorbachev would
have done exactly the same, and the resultant collapse would have inevitably
occurred. 

One final note on the question of the dissidents' taking power. This is not
my thesis, but rather from a private communication I received in response to
my original posting. Since the communication was private, I won't reveal
the person's name, but I hope the person won't mind if I share the thought:

"The vileness of the Soviet system was so overwhelming that it made
principled opposition morally simple. Enormously difficult in terms of
consequences, yes, but fundamentally uncomplicated in terms of calling
attention to the evils of a profoundly unjust, hypocritical, and repressive
order. The simplicity of this opposition produced a certain group of people
-- the dissidents -- who were morally admirable, but never compelled to
develop a coherent sense of what they were for. Put differently, they were
against a wealth of very specific evils; yet what were they for? Some
nebulous concept of 'truth' ..."

Peter P. Mahoney
Moscow

******

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