February 13, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4104 4105

Johnson's Russia List
#4105
13 February 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Itar-Tass: No Need to Panic Over Larger Vodka Prices- Kasyanov.
2. Reuters: 15 apply to contest Russian presidential election.
3. The Russia Journal: Andrei Piontkovsky, Putinism, Part II.
(DJ: Exactly my sentiments. Comments?)
4. Tom de Waal: A Monument for Yeltsin?
5. Yale Richmond: "Exiles on Main Street"/4102.
6. Nick Holdsworth: New book on Russia.
7. Chicago Tribune: Colin McMahon, GROZNY RETREAT: A WALK THROUGH BLOOD AND FLESH.
8. Inter Press Service: Efforts to Curb Capital Flight.
9. Itar-Tass: Think-Tank Drafts Framework for PUTIN'S Election Programme.
10. The Russia Journal: Piontkovsky interviews Yavlinsky.Yavlinsky: People feel "deceived". Presidential candidate takes on "Putinism" in RJ interview.
11. The Electric Telegraph (UK): Michael Williams, Russians murder their way through Grozny.
12. Itar-Tass: False Reports on Bombs Skyrocket in Moscow.
13. Reuters: Putin, Kasyanov hail Russia's debt deal.
14. Sydney Morning Herald (Australia): Christopher Lockwood, Russia goes along with Nato domination.]

*******

#1
No Need to Panic Over Larger Vodka Prices- Kasyanov.

MOSCOW, February 13 (Itar-Tass) - There is no need to panic over larger vodka 
prices, First Vice-Premier, Finance Minister Mikhail Kasyanov said on Sunday. 

Russian average prices on vodka were 65 rubles per liter in December 1999. 
Now the Ministry of Economics sets the minimum price at 62 rubles per liter, 
which is smaller than the average price of last year. 

"A rise of minimum prices is a regular measure dictated by market costs and 
economic factors that keep enterprises and industries working," Kasyanov 
said. 

"The government sets only minimum prices on vodka, maximum prices can be 
larger but they are finally regulated by the market... The minimum price on 
vodka is sort of a sign for the population. If a half-liter bottle of vodka 
costs less than 31 rubles, the government does not recommend to buy that 
surrogate," he remarked. 

*******

#2
15 apply to contest Russian presidential election
By Oleg Shchedrov

MOSCOW, Feb 13 (Reuters) - Russia's Central Electoral commission accepted 
applications on Sunday from 15 potential contenders in a March 26 
presidential election, but said some could be rejected after checks. 

As well as the overwhelming favourite, Acting President Vladimir Putin, and 
his main challenger, Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov, the list 
includes well-known public figures and some little-known, exotic challengers. 

Thirty-three applicants had initially indicated they had wanted to contest 
the election, but only 15 met the 1500 GMT deadline on Sunday to present 
signatures of 500,000 supporters and other supporting documents. 

``There are 15 now, but there could be fewer in the end. It is pretty clear 
now that not all will be accepted,'' Commission Chairman Alexander Veshnyakov 
told private NTV television. ``Some of the last ones filed do not appear to 
be without fault.'' 

The signatures and information about the contenders' financial situation and 
property will be thoroughly checked before the commission gives the go-ahead 
to start campaigning. 

So far only Zyuganov and Alexei Podberyozkin, who describes himself as 
social-democrat, have passed the tests and been formally registered as 
candidates. Putin is expected to be registered on Tuesday. 

The fate of other candidates, including liberal Grigory Yavlinsky, maverick 
ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and two regional governors -- 
Communist Aman Tuleyev and reformist Konstantin Titov -- will be decided by 
February 22. 

Latest polls put Putin far in front, with support hovering at about 50 
percent or more and Zyuganov trailing with around 15 percent. 

Other potential candidates in the early polls, called after Boris Yeltsin's 
surprise New Year's Eve resignation, have at most three percent support and 
are given no hope of winning. 

Among the apparent also-rans are film director Stanislav Govorukhin, chief 
prosecutor Yuri Skuratov, suspended over a sex scandal, and 
ex-parliamentarian Ella Panfilova, who has said she wants to set the 
precedent of a woman standing in the election. 

The list also includes hotel owner Umar Dzhabrailov, former Yeltsin aide 
Yevgeny Savostyanov and two obscure politicians -- Anzori 
Aksentyev-Kikalishvili and German Khrustalyov. 

A virtually unknown candidate, Ismail Tagi-Zade, submitted his documents ``in 
the final seconds before the deadline,'' Veshnyakov told Russian news 
agencies. 

*******

#3
The Russia Journal
February 14-20, 2000
Putinism, Part II
By Andrei Piontkovsky
Andrei Piontkovsky is director of the Center of Strategic Research in Mocow.

In a hard-hitting follow up to his piece last week, Piontkovsky claims Putin 
is a mere puppet in hands of Kremlin insiders intent on maintaining control 
of the country.
-----------

Continued from last week

Due to a number of constitutional and physiological reasons, the reliably 
privatized Boris Yeltsin was unable to run a third time. And the 1996 
campaign strategy -- dangling the threat of communism -- had exhausted itself. 
Stalinist concentration camps could only conceal official thievery for so 
long. It was time to find a new idea. The intellectual lackeys found it.

Disappointment, frustration at failure, personal and national humiliation 
reigned in society and worked, it would have seemed, against the party of 
power. The Kremlin strategists' trick was to channel this collective 
frustration in the desired direction. An enemy was designated and a simple 
plan proposed for the Renaissance of Russia. Thus it was that the theft and 
"privatization" of the patriotic idea was accomplished.

Even the most ardent supporters of the Chechen bloodbath admit that this is a 
war for the Kremlin and not for the Caucasus, conceived above all to ensure a 
handover of power to the successor chosen by Yeltsin's clan.

Where would presidential candidate Vladimir Putin and his rating be today 
without the war in Chechnya? And where would the war's mass support and chief 
toilet terminator be without the mysterious explosions in Moscow at precisely 
the moment when the authorities needed to whip up anti-Chechen hysteria?

War is the main instrument of Putin's PR. Everything, including Yeltsin's 
resignation, has been made subject to it. The Kremlin puppet masters realized 
that even with the help of the TV channels they manipulate, keeping up a 
picture of success and victories for six months solid would be impossible. 
Even over two months it would be very difficult. Public support is melting 
fast as the war goes beyond and belies the official aims of fighting 
terrorism and protecting all Russian citizens.

The acting president seems aware of this, and found it necessary to warn us 
of possible new terrorist attacks in Russian cities. He has achieved 
impressive results so far in his six-month-long titanic struggle against 
terrorism: thousands and thousands of soldiers' and civilians' lives lost.

If the puppet masters went to the desperate lengths of getting Yeltsin to 
step down in the interests of easing Putin's road to the presidency, they 
must have been certain of Putin's future loyalty. However, only deep 
knowledge of Putin's biography and career could guarantee that kind of 
certainty.

It is naive to expect that Putin will start dismantling the robber capitalism 
system when its most symbolic figures are key shadow players in Putin's game.

Putin's economic views are murky, but he does spend much energy and emotion 
on repeating the need for a strong state. As someone who has made his career 
in police organizations, he seems to sincerely believe that this is indeed 
the panacea for all economic ills. But this is not so. And in a privatized 
state with power and assets concentrated in the same hands, giving the 
authorities more muscle would still be catastrophic. 

But that's enough about Putin. Ultimately, he's just a chance figure. If 
there hadn't been Putin, there'd have been Pupkin, or whoever. What counts 
is Putinism, that selection of means the authorities use to reproduce 
themselves.

Putinism is the highest and final stage of robber capitalism in Russia. It is 
at this stage when, in the words of a now half-forgotten classic, the 
bourgeoisie throws overboard the banner of democracy and human rights. 
Putinism is war, it is national "consolidation" based on hatred towards a 
particular ethnic group. It is attacks on freedom of speech and use of 
information to create zombies, it is isolation from the outside world and 
further economic degradation.

Putinism is, to borrow from Putin's own much loved vocabulary, a control shot 
in Russia's head. 

That's the inheritance Boris Nikolayevich Hindenburg has bequeathed us.

*******

#4
From: "Tom de Waal" <tomdewaal@hotmail.com>
Subject: A Monument for Yeltsin?
Date: Sun, 13 Feb 2000 

Now that Boris Yeltsin has finally left office after eight years and Grozny 
has been taken again by Russian forces, isn't it time to think of some kind 
of memorial commemorating these two important events?

I have two suggestions:

A statue of Yeltsin in Grozny on the spot where there used to be a statue of 
General Yermolov, before the Chechens threw it in the river.

Taking a cue from Christopher Wren's commemoration in St Paul's Cathedral in 
London, a monumental inscription in honour of Yeltsin in the centre of 
Grozny which reads "SI MONUMENTUM REQUIRIS, CIRCUMSPICE" (Trans: If you seek 
his monument, look around you.)

Do any readers have any other ideas?

********

#5
Date: Sun, 13 Feb 2000 
From: Yale Richmond <yalerich@erols.com>
Subject: "Exiles on Main Street"/4102

Keith Gessen, in his article, "Exiles on Main Street," (JRL 4102) has
stated well the problems of Russian dissidents in exile. Having worked
in Soviet/Russian affairs for many years as a US Foreign Service Officer
and foundation employee, I know several of the people he has mentioned.

Gessen asks why the dissidents, who did so much to bring about the
demise of the Soviet Union, are not today among the leaders of the new
Russia. I would say it is because they did not have broad support among
the Russian people. As people who "think otherwise," to use the exact
English translation of inakomyslyashchi, the Russian word for
dissidents, they represented Western thought which is still alien to
most Russians. Moreover, most of the dissidents lacked managerial and
administrative experience, and had they come to power, I doubt that
Russia today would be any better off than it is now.

As history has often shown, those who make a revolution, however just
their cause, are not always best suited to lead the new regime.

*******

#6
From: "Nick Holdsworth" <nickh007@online.ru>
Subject: New book on Russia
Date: Sun, 13 Feb 2000 

New Book On Russia

Readers of JRL may be interested in my new book on Russia, "Moscow: The
Beautiful and the Damned -- Life in Russia in Transition" which is published
by Andre Deutsch (London) on Monday February 21st.

The book, which comes out in paperback priced at UK pounds 9.99, will be
available in the UK in most good bookshops or elsewhere in the world via
Amazon.com The ISBN number is: 0-233-99679-6

Drawing on my own experience of several years living in and reporting on
Russia and interviews with Russians rich and poor, famous and obscure, it
tells the human side of Russia's ongoing post-Communist revolution.

Richly illustrated, I hope it gives an informed glimpse into the world
behind the headline news we all read and discuss about Russia.

It's my first book and I would appreciate any feedbook from those of you who
do read it.

With thanks,
Nick Holdsworth
Times Higher Education Supplement (London)
Moscow and Eastern Europe correspondent

*******

#7
Chicago Tribune
13 February 2000
[for personal use only]
GROZNY RETREAT: A WALK THROUGH BLOOD AND FLESH 
By Colin McMahon 
Tribune Staff Writer 

SAMASHKI, Russia -- Kheida Yusupova survived the deadly Russian siege of 
Grozny only to find herself trapped in a far more dangerous place.

Fleeing the Chechen capital with the separatist rebels for whom she cooked 
and cleaned, Yusupova stumbled with them into a Russian minefield. As her 
single-file column pressed on, explosions resounded in the dark. Rebels 
shouted in prayer as they raced to take the lead and take the risk. Others 
screamed in agony as they tripped the mines.

Somewhere in the middle, Yusupova fought back panic. Her two children wept.

"You didn't know where to step," Yusupova said. "We walked through blood and 
pieces of flesh."

Yusupova's account is not just a harrowing tale of the hell of war. It also 
offers a rare, firsthand glimpse of the Chechen defense of Grozny. It sheds 
light on how the Chechens were able to hold their capital for so long in the 
face of overwhelming Russian firepower. And it helps explain why, ultimately, 
the rebels were forced to abandon their battered city.

The retreat from Grozny, which began Jan. 31 and lasted for three days and 
nights, does not end the war in Chechnya. Though Russian forces control 
almost all of the breakaway republic, at least 7,000 rebel fighters remain 
holed up in Chechnya's southern mountains. They vow to fight for as long as 
it takes to oust the Russian forces, just as they did in the first Chechen 
war from 1994-96.

Yusupova's husband, Musa, is among those Chechen fighters. That is, if he is 
still alive.

"Maybe he is in the mountains with the others," Yusupova said during an 
interview Friday in the Chechen town of Samashki. "Somehow I do not think so."

Yusupova is searching for her man. She arrived in Samashki from Urus-Martan, 
looking there among the wounded in an overcrowded hospital. She heard of a 
woman who had a list of 60 dead from Grozny, but all the names were those of 
women and children.

Her search took her to Katyr-Yurt as well. There a heavy Russian bombardment 
left scores of civilians dead, Yusupova and others who had been there said.

"There was not a single street without a corpse in Katyr-Yurt," said 
Yusupova, who said she saw about 40 bodies herself. "There were some with no 
legs, some with no arms."

Yusupova has not seen Musa for a month. He fought in another part of Grozny 
with another group of fighters. Home to about 500,000 people before the war, 
Grozny is not that big of a city. Yet Musa, 40, and Kheida, 28, saw each 
other infrequently. There was, after all, a war going on.

"I was glad to be able to help," Yusupova said, recalling the day in 
mid-November when she was approached by a group of rebels under the command 
of Lecha Dudayev. Dudayev was Grozny's mayor and the nephew of Jokhar 
Dudayev, the late and storied Chechen independence leader.

She joined "the lads" in a basement of a five-story building in central 
Grozny. They had stockpiled supplies, not just ammunition but food and 
medicine too.

With two other women, Yusupova cooked soups and pasta and other starchy 
foods. The rebels did not eat luxuriously, she said, but they ate enough.

The group totaled 26 fighters, working in teams of 13 each. They worked in 
shifts, three days around the clock, three days to rest and heal their wounds.

Morale was high, said Yusupova, a tall and stout woman who tempers her image 
of strength with a constant show of humility. Like many Chechen women, she is 
deferential to men and to her elders. When a man enters the room, she stands 
up. But she speaks directly, and she looks you in the eye.

"They would sing and dance," she said of the fighters, especially when they 
were joined by a popular Chechen songwriter in Grozny. "They sang about 
freedom, freedom or death. They sang about the fight and about the injustice 
in Chechnya."

As the Russians closed in, of course, the fighting became more intense. 
Though Russian forces started bombing Grozny last October, warplane, rocket 
and artillery attacks increased as the troops moved across Chechnya's 
flatlands toward the capital. By mid-December, Russian troops said they had 
Grozny surrounded.

The Chechens repelled a major assault on Grozny that began Dec. 24. They 
repelled another shortly after the New Year. But losses among the Chechens 
mounted, and the Russians closed in on the center.

The bombings, meanwhile, intensified. Like other civilians in Grozny, 
Yusupova was afraid to venture out of her cellar. Each trip for water carried 
the risk of death.

The rebels were inflicting heavy casualties on Russian troops, they said. But 
they were severely outnumbered and outgunned.

They could no longer work in shifts. They rested whenever possible but not 
often.

Supplies were running out too.

On Jan. 27, Chechen commanders met in a bunker in central Grozny. Despite 
boasts that they would hold the capital another month, they decided the risk 
of staying was too great. They ordered a pullout.

Over three nights the rebels moved out of Grozny. Yusupova and her two 
children, a 10-year-old girl and a 9-year-old boy, left in the first group.

It was dark and cold; snow covered the ground. Ideally, the hike to 
Alkhan-Kala to the southwest should have taken about four hours. It took them 
10.

The Russians claim they lured the Chechens into the minefield by pretending 
to accept a bribe in exchange for free passage. The Chechens dispute this, 
claiming that if it were a Russian trap they would never have been able to 
escape with so many fighters intact. The Chechens say at least 2,000 rebels 
escaped the siege on Grozny alive.

Whatever the case, the minefield was a horror. The Chechens lost Lecha 
Dudayev and other commanders who led their men across the field. Some 
fighters vied for the chance to blaze the trail, even if it meant certain 
death.

"I'll see you in paradise," the Islamic militants would say, according to 
Yusupova and other accounts. They would then shout, "God is great" and race 
ahead.

About 40 civilians accompanied Yusupova's group, mixing in amid the 150 or so 
fighters. They tried to help the wounded, providing basic bandages and 
battlefield first aid. But many men died that night. Others who made it to 
Alkhan-Kala could go no farther and were captured by the Russians.

Yusupova's son, Magomed, and daughter, Markha, cannot shake the memories of 
that night. They jump at the slightest sound, she said, even the fall of a 
cat's feet.

"I wonder if they will ever be normal again," she said.

Yet Yusupova does not question the rebel goal or methods. She speaks openly 
of her hatred for the Russians. She wants her son to grow up to be "a man, 
first of all . . . an independent man."

Her children are staying with friends. She will continue her search. And if 
that search takes her to the mountains, she said, she will go.

******

#8
Politics-Russia: Efforts to Curb Capital Flight
Inter Press Service

MOSCOW, (Feb. 11) IPS - As Russia continues to lose billions of dollars in 
fleeing capital, both government officials and economists agree that drastic 
measures have to be taken to stop the exodus of funds. 

A variety of methods have been suggested, including a tax amnesty, but a 
viable solution has yet to materialize. 

Economists say mostly people are taking out their money to avoid taxes, dodge 
domestic debts, hide stolen assets or because they lack confidence in the 
local banking system. 

The illegal outpouring of money is having a devastating effect on the 
country's economy. 

In macroeconomic terms, Russia is reported to have fared well last year, 
recording an unprecedented foreign trade surplus. 

Russia's exports reportedly reached $72.9 billion in 1999, while imports 
stood at $40.3 billion. However, this healthy surplus has done little to heal 
the country's economic woes as most of the money earned is being poured out. 

Peter Westin, head of the Russia-European Center For Economic Policy, a 
Moscow-based think tank, blames the situation on Russia's failure to 
establish a functioning market environment. 

He says macroeconomic instability, as well as the lack of confidence in the 
domestic banks and disincentives to re-invest profits, have encouraged 
companies and individuals to move their money off-shore. 

In 1998 Russia's Central Bank introduced the obligatory sale of 50 percent of 
export revenues. This was increased to 75 percent last year and there are now 
plans to raise it up to 100 percent. 

Furthermore, last August, the Central Bank issued a decree that resulted in 
weeks of chaos at airports and borders when foreigners were suddenly told 
they could not leave Russia with hard currency without providing proof as to 
how those funds entered the country. 

Officials said the new rules were aimed at Chinese and Vietnamese traders who 
were selling goods on Russian soil, converting earnings into dollars, and 
taking $3 million to $5 million out of Russia every day. 

However, Western analysts slammed the move, saying funds leaving the country 
in this way were a mere drop in the ocean compared to the amounts lost to 
unauthorized bank transfers and false export and import contracts. 

According to Westin, efforts to impose regulatory curbs on the illegal 
transfer of money has had limited success. "As the new restrictions are 
introduced, economic actors usually find ways to circumvent them," he says. 

However, even some nations who are benefitting from Russian money are getting 
nervous. Yesterday, the South Pacific island nation of Nauru, a zero-tax 
haven, promised to review its banking system following charges that Russian 
criminals were using its offshore finance center to launder money. 

A 1998-1999 report by the U.S. State Department's Bureau of International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, the Russian organized crime syndicate 
was fully utilizing Nauru's banking facilities. 

Russian officials estimate that tens of billions of dollars has been 
transferred illegally from Russia to banks in Nauru, Vanuatu, Western Samoa 
and the Cook Islands. 

Other offshore destinations like Cyprus, Panama and the Virgin Islands are 
reported to provide more opportunities to those who are looking to circumvent 
Russia's regulatory restrictions. 

According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
Report for 1999, private capital flows pose more problems than solutions for 
the international financial system. 

The report said Russia was one of the countries where liberalizing trade as 
part of an export-led growth strategy had not paid off, implying that trade 
liberalization was often premature. 

Andrei Illarionov, director of the Institute of Economic Analysis, says the 
legal conversion of Russian roubles into foreign currency inside the country 
also amounts to capital flight. 

He says the phenomenon can be described as "flight from roubles" and it 
reflects the people's lack of confidence in the national currency. 

"According to our calculations money lost to capital flight...did not exceed 
$100 billion during the 1990s. Estimates like $300 to $400 billion are simply 
baseless," he says. 

Desperate government officials have hinted at amnesty as a viable option for 
the return of money illegally taken out of Russia. 

Vyacheslav Soltaganov, director of Russia's Federal Tax Police Service, says 
the money should be "legalized and amnestied so as to ensure its return 
home." 

*******

#9
Think-Tank Drafts Framework for PUTIN'S Election Programme.

MOSCOW, February 12 (Itar-Tass) - Russia's Centre for Strategic Studies is 
working on two documents which may provide the basis for Acting President and 
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's election programme, a source close to this 
non- governmental organisation said. 

He told Itar-Tass on Saturday that the first document is of a conceptual 
nature and will determine the strategy of Russia's development. The other one 
offers a concrete mechanism for implementing this strategy. 

The centre hopes to finish both documents by March 2000, just in time for 
presidential elections scheduled for March 26. 

The work involves many organisations. The centre has invited various research 
and public think-tanks, and Russia's two major energy and gas monopolies -- 
the United Energy System of Russia and Gazprom -- to contribute. 

Four main areas of work have been identified for exploration in the project 
which will determine the main guidelines for Russia's development in the next 
10 years. 

It will address such issues as social contract, government reform, economic 
modernisation and new international positioning. 

Experts working on the programme seek to make sure that it covers all aspects 
of reforms, including migration and demography. In their work they are 
considering various state systems, from ultra-communist to radical liberal. 

*******

#10
The Russia Journal
February 14-20, 2000 
INTERVIEW 
Yavlinsky: People feel "deceived"
Presidential candidate takes on "Putinism" in RJ interview
By Andrei Piontkovsky
A one-on-one interview with Yabloko presidentail candidate Grigory Yavlinsky 
about economic reform, democracy, the West and Putinism.
--------------

Andrei Piontkovsky, director of the Center of Strategic Research in Moscow 
and a columnist for The Russia Journal, spoke to Yabloko leader and 
presidential candidate Grigory Yavlinsky at the World Economic Forum in 
Davos, Switzerland

Andrei Piontkovsky: I was at a meeting nominating you as a presidential 
candidate. There were a lot of decent people present, people who spoke of you 
as the only Russian politician who consistently supports liberal and 
democratic values. But the atmosphere struck me as one full of a bleak 
staunchness, as if they were all setting off on some doomed crusade. How do 
you see your participation in this battle? Is it possible to overcome the 
authoritarian tendencies that have taken the upper hand in public opinion, 
especially when the "party of power" has such vast administrative and media 
resources at its disposal?

Grigory Yavlinsky: September-December 1999 saw some extraordinary events take 
place in Russia. Of course, these events had a public impact: apartment 
blocks blown up, deceit in Chechnya, when instead of an anti-terrorist 
operation we got a full-scale war, the military fever whipped up in the media, 
all these unexpected events have had an enormous impact on people. 
Naturally, this is reflected in how people feel about [acting President] 
Vladimir Putin and about what is going on in the country. 

But at the end of last year, it was already clear that there's nothing 
inevitable about this mood. At that time, 30 percent of the population 
already said they were against the war and were already looking for other 
options. I'm proud to have won the votes of 5 million people who called for 
an end to the war right when military hysteria was at its peak. In many 
countries, at such a time, I could well have gotten no 
support at all, but we did win support, and that gives me hope and faith in 
the future.

People feel deeply deceived and disappointed by what happened in 1991, when 
the Communist Party nomenklatura quickly changed its coat and took up the 
chorus of "reform," "democracy," "market," – misleading public opinion both 
in Russia and round the world. People find it hard to believe now that things 
can be any different.

I will bring in a new generation of politicians, people who understand that 
over the last 10 years, what we've had is not reform, but quasi-reform. I 
hope that during the election campaign, my actions will have a direct impact 
on people. This is already happening.

More and more people are looking at things differently, thinking about what's 
happening and can't agree with the strong-arm tactics the Kremlin is using in 
its domestic policy.

AP: All the same, it looks as if the public, including the liberals, have 
contracted Putinomania. People are falling over themselves to declare their 
loyalty and swear allegiance to Putin. This Putinomania takes various forms. 
[theater director] Mark Zakharov, for example, gave the simple and cynical 
explanation that he has his theater to think of, he got a phone call from the 
Kremlin and was invited to say something positive about Putin. Others, those 
with greater political ambitions and who see themselves as more refined 
intellectuals, have developed the theory of fighting for the "good" Putin. 
That is, Putin is something of a tabula rasa. For example, we, the young 
reformers, will fight for the liberal Putin, for the Russian Pinochet who 
will lead Russia with an iron hand into an era of liberal reforms. Will you 
join the fight for the "good" Putin during your campaign?

GY: Those who talk of a good Pinochet in Russia aren't fighting for the 
"good" Putin, but for their own political survival. They realize that what 
they need is someone who isn't a professional when it comes to the economy, 
so they can pull the wool over his eyes like they did with Yeltsin, making 
fabulous money on the side and developing further the system of corrupt, 
criminal-nomenklatura capitalism in Russia. The whole of Russian society has 
already lost out in the fight for the "good" Yeltsin. Stepping on the same 
rake seems to be a Russian national sport – we've already just gone through 
all this with Yeltsin.

Just recently, the people who are fighting for the good Putin, and who spent 
the last 10 years fighting for the good Yeltsin, said to me that once under 
Putin's rule, we will remember just how good Yeltsin was. I would say to 
those who are afraid of the same Putin they're planning to fight for that a 
man who has AIDS is hardly likely to have fond memories of the night he 
caught the disease. Yeltsin's legacy could turn out to be something similar. 
You can't judge the man without judging the legacy he's left Russia.

I don't intend to fight for the "good" Putin. I intend to fight Putin for the 
post of Russian president. I will fight the man under whose half year in 
power the dirtiest and most repulsive campaign tactics in the history of 
Russia have been used. It is under Putin that an anti-terrorist operation 
gave way to total war with huge numbers of victims. It is under Putin that an 
open union between the Kremlin, Communists and nationalists has been formed. 
It is under Putin that an assault on freedom of the press has begun.

AP: You've met Putin both when he was prime minister, and now that he's 
acting president. No doubt, you've discussed economic issues with him, when 
you proposed him an alternative budget, for example. What are your 
impressions of his economic views and preferences?

GY: We've had no real discussions about the economy, either serious or not so 
serious. After the apartment block explosions and the beginning of war in 
Chechnya, the economy stopped being such a topical issue. It's not possible 
to talk about Putin's economic views because for whatever reason, he has no 
economic views. That's why there are so many people swarming around him who 
want to use him to further their own interests under the guise of "economic 
programs."

The specific feature of all our economic reform was that people pursuing 
their personal interests called all this "reform programs" and looked for top 
officials, far removed from the economy, whose help, signatures, and 
authority could be used to push these "programs" through. And not to reproach 
Putin, but I can quite definitely say that he has no hand in these economic 
programs, views and approaches.

AP: Coming back to the Russian national sport of standing on rakes and 
fighting for the good Putin, don't you find it strange that not only the 
liberal Moscow intelligentsia, but also the Western establishment, especially 
in the U.S., has become caught up in this fight? While meeting with Western 
businessmen and politicians here in Davos, I've confirmed for myself once 
again that they see our democracy as a second-rate product. They say that 
democracy, of course, is a fine thing, but not for Russia and not right now. 
The best thing for Russia now, they say, would be an authoritarian regime 
that would restore order and put in place good predictable conditions for 
foreign investors. That's the best choice for Russia today, and Putin 
symbolizes that choice. How do you explain these kinds of views coming from 
the U.S. establishment?

GY: I think things are even somewhat worse than you imagine. The U.S. faces 
elections this year, and it's a dangerous thing for them to have to admit 
that Yeltsin's legacy isn't all so good. Essentially, it's the single most 
significant assessment of the Yeltsin era. Not to call Putin a reformer 
today, means undoing President Clinton's entire policy over the last 8 years. 
And what about the elections? What about [democrat candidate Al] Gore? That's 
why they, as before, and as in many other countries, decided to call Putin a 
reformer. For the moment at least, until Gore wins the elections, and after 
that, we'll see. U.S. assessments of what is happening in Russia at the 
moment are dictated by U.S. domestic political interests. 

As for this desire to see an authoritarian regime in Russia, one that would 
support U.S. and other businesspeople, there's nothing surprising here. This 
was always the case. A great many businesspeople would like to have to deal 
with just one high-up official to whom you pay bribes and with whom you reach 
agreements. Then they would have absolute guarantees about what they can do 
in Russia.

Once, speaking at an international organization, I talked about our 
oligarchs, our bankers, about how banks in Russia were entirely different to 
their Western counterparts. In the West, banks take depositors' money and 
invest it in industry. In Russia, banks exist to take budget money and send 
it to Malta or somewhere else. Afterwards, a well-known U.S. political 
scientist came to me and quietly said "do you think our bankers wouldn't like 
to do the same? They'd love to, but the system doesn't let them."

Here in Davos, people have said to me that Russia is a second-rate country 
and why bother then with human rights. If our privatization cheats people, 
that's just the way it is. If we're at war in Chechnya, that's just the way 
it is, too, Russians can't do things any other way. I had to say to them yet 
again "you live in wealthy countries where today's prosperity came about 
because people were guided by moral values, but it often seems that you hate 
those very values that have made your wealth possible."

That explains why everyone broke into applause when they saw Sergei 
Kiriyenko, why the Germans wanted to celebrate Primakov's birthday and why 
today, Putin is being called a reformer.

AP: 10 years of post-communist transformation have led Russia into the trap 
of so-called robber capitalism. You can give it a variety of names, but the 
essence of the system is clear to most serious observers. Can this system 
eventually become a social market economy? How would you achieve this 
transformation as president?

GY: It was often said to me, especially before 1998, that I was unjustified 
in getting so upset about the oligarchs. I was told that there had been 
oligarchs in the U.S., that they built Chicago, laid railway lines, conquered 
the wild west. But there's a huge difference between Russian and American 
oligarchs. American oligarchs stole in America and invested in America. 
Russian oligarchs steal in Russia and send their money out to America and 
wherever else. So I don't see how the system we have can undergo a 
transformation. 

As president, I would win the bulk of the population over to my side. For the 
first time in recent decades, I would work in the interests of that 90 
percent of the Russian population rather than in the interests of narrow 
groups who don't know themselves what they want: to blow up the world with 
their nuclear arms, or rob the country bare and take the booty out to 
off-shore zones.

I'm convinced that if we work in the public's interests, then in six 
months, a year's time, the country's leaders would have massive public 
support. It is this that will enable us to put an end to this destructive 
robber capitalism that is nothing but an offshoot of the Communist 
Party-nomenklatura system.

AP: No matter how important economic issues are for Russia, the first task 
will be finding a solution to the Chechen crisis. What long term solutions do 
you see for Russia and Chechnya?

GY: We had a solution at hand last September: our security in exchange for 
your sovereignty. Day after day, step by step, word by word, we have to work 
toward establishing some kind of balance. We can't talk yet about all the 
details of Chechnya's future status, but the basic idea is already there: We 
give Chechnya greater independence and Chechnya guarantees the security of 
Russian citizens. Russia would keep the right to ensure these guarantees are 
enforced through whatever means necessary, right up to military-police 
operations. But we have to begin this process by ending full-scale military 
operations and starting political negotiations.

AP: The Russia Journal has no right to meddle in Russian politics and support 
this or that candidate in the presidential elections, but we can and must 
wish the success of those democratic and liberal values which you defend.

*******

#11
The Electric Telegraph (UK)
13 February 2000
[for personal use only] 
Russians murder their way through Grozny
By Michael Williams in Nazran 
Michael Williams is BBC World Affairs Correspondent 

THE Zubayev family thought their ordeal had finally ended when the Russian 
troops captured the Chechen capital of Grozny last month. After weeks spent 
sheltering in a basement while a vicious war was fought above their heads, 
the patriarch, Said Zubayev, 68, decided to venture out and check what 
remained of the family home.
He did not know the risk he was taking. The Russian war for Chechnya has left 
Grozny and is now being fought in the high mountain gorges of the south, 
where more than 8,000 rebels are fighting a desperate rearguard action. But 
in the Chechen capital, the mopping-up operation is being conducted with the 
same callous brutality as the battles that preceded it.

Said headed off alone, leaving eight relatives from three generations behind 
him. An hour later, his wife, Zeinap, and daughter Malikah went to join him. 
There are two men who know what happened next: Wakha and Sultan. They are too 
scared to have their real names printed, because they fear that their 
testimony could condemn them to death. Wakha is a teacher, Sultan is the 
director of a school in Grozny. Both were friends of the Zubayev family.

The two men heard screaming from the street and found the two women crouching 
over the body of Said Zubayev. He had been shot dead in an attack with no 
witnesses. They helped the wailing wife and daughter carry the body back to 
the family home. There was nothing more they could do for the old man so, 
after paying their respects and praying over the bloodied corpse, they left.

The Staropromyslovski neighbourhood was full of Russian soldiers who stopped 
the two men. "They put us on the floor with our hands on our heads. They 
started beating us with guns," Sultan said. Both men thought they were about 
to die, but they were lucky. A Russian officer appeared and questioned them. 
They pleaded for their lives, explaining that they were not fighters, simply 
teachers. Eventually the officer told them they could leave, but warned that, 
if they went out into the streets again, they would be shot.

The rites of Islam demand that the dead be buried quickly. So, despite the 
threat, they slipped out the following day to see the Zubayevs again. They 
said the customary prayers rapidly, then helped the new head of the Zubayev 
family to bury his father in the yard. Wakha and Sultan made it safely back 
to the basement where they lived. But in the morning they were hungry and 
their food had run out. The two men decided to risk the streets again, to ask 
their friends the Zubayevs if they could spare some bread.

The earth was fresh over the grave they had dug the previous day. But the 
dirt in the yard had been churned up and they could see the distinctive 
tracks of the armoured personnel carrier that had crashed through the gate. 
"What I saw was awful," said Wakha. "All the members of the family had been 
shot."

On the ground by the grave were the bullet casings from a heavy machine gun. 
Two of the young women were holding their daughters and all the bodies lay in 
a single pile, as if they had huddled together at the end. The large, heavy 
bullets had caused terrible injuries and the head of one of the women had 
been all but destroyed.

The two men searched through the rubble for a while, looking for the youngest 
child. Her name was Eliza - just eight years old - and in the end, they gave 
up. "She was probably burnt along with the house," said Wakha, "It was still 
smoking."

The two men knew the Russian patrols would come soon, so they did what little 
they could for the family. There was no time for a burial, so Sultan covered 
the bodies with canvas and weighed it down, to stop the city's scavenging 
packs of dogs devouring them. That was the end of the Zubayev family from 
Grozny.

The horrific massacre is just one of many brutal tales that are now emerging 
from Grozny. The atrocities have been carefully documented by researchers 
from the organisation Human Rights Watch. Despite the lack of independent 
witnesses, they have been given a series of consistent accounts by refugees 
leaving the city.

Peter Bouckaert, a spokesman for the group, said: "Some of our worst fears 
about what could happen are being confirmed." They have documented 41 summary 
executions in this one district of Grozny alone and are investigating dozens 
more. More than 400 civilians are believed to have died in the siege of the 
capital. These are acts of murder by Russian soldiers," he said, "not acts of 
war." 

*******

#12
False Reports on Bombs Skyrocket in Moscow.

MOSCOW, February 13 (Itar-Tass) - The number of false telephone calls about 
bombs has skyrocketed in Moscow over the past six months. The rate was over 
2,000 phony calls in 1999, sources at the Moscow Prosecutor's Office and the 
Interior Department told Itar-Tass on Sunday. 

Following bomb blasts in Moscow apartment houses last fall, the police had up 
to 20 phony calls a day and each time sent teams to check up the claims. The 
Moscow Prosecutor's Office and the police will now verify reports more 
attentively and institute criminal proceedings in case of deliberately false 
information. 

Twenty two people were charged with deliberately false reports on terrorist 
acts (article 207 of the Russian Criminal Code) last year. They are facing an 
imprisonment of up to three years. 

The rate of false calls remains high. Last Friday alone the Moscow police was 
informed about alleged bombs at a secondary school, a professional training 
school, an apartment house, a night club and a company office. All the 
reports proved to be wrong. 

Most of the callers are mentally unstable people, drunkards or teenagers, the 
police said. A 28-years-old mentally unstable resident of Moscow was detained 
on January 31 for claiming a bomb in his own house. A ten-years-old boy from 
Grozny called the police on January 30 to claim a bomb in the house where his 
family rented an apartment. 

******

#13
Putin, Kasyanov hail Russia's debt deal

MOSCOW, Feb 13 (Reuters) - Acting President Vladimir Putin praised on Sunday 
Russia's deal with the London Club of creditor banks to write off part of 
$31.8 billion in debt and reschedule the rest. 

Under the deal, reached late on Friday, the London Club agreed to cut the 
debt by about 36.5 percent, and stretch repayments of most of the remaining 
sums over 30 years. 

``The terms are good,'' Putin said in remarks broadcast by NTV television. 
``A write-off of more than a 36 precent, a 30-year rescheduling including a 
seven-year grace period during which we will effectively pay nothing. Those 
are really good terms.'' 

Putin congratulated First Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, who had 
overseen the lengthy talks which paved the way for Russia's return to 
international capital markets after a debt default in 1998. 

Putin, also Russia's prime minister, is heavily favoured in an early 
presidential election called for March 26 after Boris Yeltsin's surprise New 
Year's Eve resignation. 

Kasyanov, interviewed by ORT public television, said the deal provided 
substantial savings to the Russian debt amounting to 50 percent of the 
original sum of Soviet-era foreign debt. 

``We're all very satisfied because all the tasks we had before us have been 
fulfilled,'' he said. ``It is even better than we might have hoped.'' 

Savings to the Russian treasury amounted to about $16.6 billion, including 
the wiping out of part of the sum, agreement by creditors to accept terms 
below market rates plus agreement to alter repayment dates. 

Political analysts name Kasyanov, a leading debt negotiator whom Putin put in 
charge of day-to-day management of the government, as a possible future prime 
minister. 

The London Club deal is good news for Russia, whose budget has been strained 
by the need to service huge foreign debt despite a suspension of credits from 
the International Monetary Fund. 

Russia has to pay about $3 billion in foreign debts in the first quarter of 
2000. 

Putin also praised the decision to restructure the debt, so far carried by 
Russia's state debt agency Vneshekonombank into new Russian Federation 
Eurobonds, envisaged in the deal. 

``Vneshekonombank is formally a separate legal entity and the government 
carries no formal responsibility for its obligations,'' he said. ``But we 
kept saying that Vneshekonobmank is a state-run bank and we will never 
distance ourselves from its obligations. 

``If we did so now we would look like petty swindlers,'' he added. ``I think 
one cannot build relations between the states or even between people on such 
basis'' 

*******

#14
Sydney Morning Herald (Australia)
12 February 2000
Russia goes along with Nato domination
By CHRISTOPHER LOCKWOOD in London

Yevgeny Primakov, then Russia's prime minister, was in his plane heading for 
Washington last March when the satellite call from US Vice-President Al Gore 
came through.

After a week of mounting tensions in Kosovo, Mr Gore told him Nato had 
decided to start bombing to pre-empt Serbia's long-feared spring offensive, 
Operation Horseshoe.

Mr Primakov turned his plane around. The Russians were incensed.

True, Slobodan Milosevic had repeatedly broken his promises. Yet Nato was 
also operating in dubious territory. It had no mandate to operate outside the 
territory of its 19 member states.

The only time Nato had acted out of area was in Bosnia in 1995, also against 
Milosevic. It had been a major success, but it had resolutions from the UN 
Security Council to back it up. This time there was no UN authority.

America argued it was not necessary, but no one believed that. To the 
Russians, the whole framework of international law had jast been torn up. The 
Chinese were just as furious and stepped up their rhetoric against "US 
hegemonism".

In a series of carefully-coordinated gestures, Russia and China talked loudly 
about a new strategic partnership that would strive to keep the world 
"multi-polar".

But Russia never quite broke off relations. A good relationship with the West 
was and remains more important to Russia than relations with Milosevic.

So as the war dragged on, it was Russia not America that persuaded Milosevic 
to back down. 

For the UN, Nato's war has been a crippling blow. Its authority has been 
deeply undermined by the decision of three of its five Permanent Members 
simply to ignore its procedures.

In the year since then, great efforts have been made to restore its 
credibility. Nato has been careful to authorise its occupation with a UN 
resolution and to place the civil administration in UN hands.

But the damage has been done. The battle-lines on the UN Security Council are 
drawn more tightly then ever, with the US and Britain favouring a tough 
"world policeman" stance on most issues, while Russia and China push an 
extreme form of the doctrine of non-intervention. For commerical reasons, 
France generally sides with the latter. The Security the Council is 
deadlocked, almost useless.

In one way, this has turned out to suit Russia and the West rather well.

Russia has acquiesced in Nato's now-complete domination of the Balkans. Not 
only is Nato effectively occupying Bosnia and Kosovo, but Russian troops are 
serving under Nato commanders, and Russia has been forced to recognise that 
every single Balkan state, bar Yugoslavia, wants to join the Alliance.

What Russia gets out of the deal is rather unpleasant: that the West should 
turn a blind eye to what it has been doing in Chechnya.

To any reasonable observer, there is little to choose between what Russia has 
done to the Chechens and what Milosevic did to the Kosovars. Yet the West's 
criticism of Russia has been muted and its actions non-existent. Last year, 
then President Boris Yeltsin brilliantly fobbed the West off by threatening 
to walk out of a major security summit if pushed too far.

In the last few days, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has been warmly 
praising the man who destroyed Grozny. British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook 
is off to see acting Russian President Vladimir Putin at the end of the 
month, and the Nato Secretary-General Lord Robertson will press his flesh 
next week, drawing a line under the awkwardness of 1999.

It is realpolitik as usual.

The Daily Telegraph

*******