January 19, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4047 4048

Johnson's Russia List
#4048
19 January 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Duma boycott continues amid anger over deal.
2. AP: Russia Says Chechen War Near End.
3. SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT on Russia and Putin.
4. Reuters: Chechens chafe under Russian rule.
5. The Times (UK) editorial: RUSSIAN RESURGENCE. Putin's tough talk is uniting his people.
6. Global Beat Syndicate: Kharon Deniev, Chechnya: A Land Without A Future.
7. Russian Life Online: Mikhail Ivanov, PUTIN'S REAL APPEAL.
8. Obshchaya Gazeta: Analysts View Anti-Putin Coalition Opportunities. (Views of Liliya Shevtsova, Igor Klyamkin, Igor Malashenko, Aleksandr Tsipko, Boris Grushin, Vsevolod Vilchek, Viktor Kuvaldin)

*******

#1
Duma boycott continues amid anger over deal
By Ron Popeski

MOSCOW, Jan 19 (Reuters) - Russian centrists and reformers, enraged by a
deal keeping them out of parliament's top jobs, stuck to a boycott of the
assembly on Wednesday amid speculation that the dispute could have
repercussions on presidential elections in March. 

Under Tuesday's deal Communist Gennady Seleznyov retained his post as
Speaker of the State Duma lower house. Unity, a party formed three months
ago with no platform beyond its support for Acting President Vladimir
Putin, won control of nearly half the key committees. 

Putin, thrust into the presidency on New Year's Eve by Boris Yeltsin's
resignation, is favourite in the March election. But some commentators said
his apparent deal with the communists could be the first blemish on his bid
to stay atop opinion polls. 

Four major factions which walked out of the vote for Speaker on Tuesday
also refused to attend a Wednesday morning meeting of the Duma Council --
the body overseeing day-to-day affairs -- and said they would take none of
the few jobs offered them. 

SPEAKER SELEZNYOV TO HOLD NEW CONSULTATIONS 

Seleznyov proceeded with the Council meeting anyway but feared the
boycotting parties might exploit the dispute in the poll. He pledged to
meet both the boycotters and Putin, but said there could be no review of
the distribution of Duma jobs. 

``I would ask all our colleagues to cool off,'' Seleznyov said in televised
comments. 

``I would not like, as we approach the presidential election, this to take
on a political aspect with another political force being formed in the
Duma. We must concentrate on our legislative work.'' 

The parties waited anxiously to see whether Putin would dissociate himself
from the deal. Few Russians believe that Putin, who has built his
popularity on a tough stand against Chechen separatists, can be beaten in
the election. 

But supporters of former prime minister Yevgeny Primakov, one of the
deputies who stormed out of the Duma, formally put forward his nomination
on Tuesday. 

Primakov would join Communist Party chief Gennady Zyuganov and economist
Grigory Yavlinsky, leader of the liberal Yabloko party, in the race. 

COMMENTATORS SAY SCANDAL DOES PUTIN NO GOOD 

Moscow newspapers said Seleznyov's victory could do no good for Putin's
election chances and bode ill for Russia's parliamentary democracy. 

``As of yesterday, it is not as exotic as before to be in opposition to the
all-popular Vladimir Putin,'' wrote Vremya MN. 

Sevodnya said the new alliance favouring the Kremlin meant Russia could go
the way of authoritarian states ``with parliament obediently endorsing the
will of the executive. Two (previous) parliaments have proved woefully
insufficient to form a 'Western' political culture in Russia.'' 

Primakov called the deal ``a total collapse of democracy'' and a
``desecration'' of the Duma, and Sergei Stepashin, another former prime
minister, also made a blistering speech. 

Sergei Kiriyenko, a former premier whose Union of Right Wing Forces has
been strongly pro-Putin, said it was too early to say whether Putin had
shown his true colours by linking with the Communists. 

``The main thing will be to see his reaction. Not to react -- this is also
a form of reaction,'' he said on NTV television. ``He must either correct
the course of his pro-government faction, or not correct it. That will be
the main question.'' 

Kiriyenko said his party still backed Putin for president, but support
depended on Putin pursuing a pro-reform programme. 

Yavlinsky, leader of the social democratic Yabloko party, said the
parliament deal proved that the Communists and Unity were ``one and the
same thing, and we must fight this.'' 

******

#2
Russia Says Chechen War Near End
January 19, 2000
By YURI BAGROV

MAKHACHKALA, Russia (AP) - Street battles raged today in the Chechen
capital as Russian troops pushed to capture the city center, the military
said, claiming the war in Chechnya would be over in a month. 

Federal forces were advancing on downtown Grozny from several directions
after seizing parts of central Grozny, including a bridge across the Sunzha
River and downtown Minutka Square, it said. 

Rebel commanders have described the bridge as ``the most strategically
important'' site in Grozny, a major transit route for militants moving
about the city. 

Artillery and aircraft targeted rebel positions while Chechen militants
were fighting back in small groups, relying heavily on snipers, the
military said. It also claimed that up to 100 rebel fighters were killed
and 10 were taken prisoner Tuesday. The claim could not be verified. 

Lt. Gen. Gennady Troshev, Russia's deputy chief commander in Chechnya,
announced Wednesday that the war was expected to be over by Feb. 26, though
``nobody is giving the forces any firm deadlines for ending the
operation,'' the Interfax news agency reported. 

Grozny has been a focal point of rebel resistance, and its capture would
give the Russian forces a boost after Chechen counterattacks and other
military setbacks. 

But control over Grozny could backfire, as it did during the previous,
1994-96 bloodshed in Chechnya. During that war, Russians took the city and
held onto it for more than a year, but then lost the capital to the
Chechens in a humiliating and costly defeat. 

The military said that some of the estimated 2,000 Chechen militants in
Grozny were attempting to flee or surrender, but that claim could not be
confirmed. One Russian commander, Maj. Gen. Vadim Timchenko, said the
rebels had built masterly defenses in the capital. 

``You have to give them their due,'' Timchenko was quoted as saying by the
ITAR-Tass news agency. ``They have excellently prepared the city for
defense in engineering terms, turning it into a many-layered fortress.'' 

Russia's Emergency Situations Ministry said today that due to the fighting,
only 59 civilians had managed to leave the city since midday Tuesday. That
brought the total of those who have fled Grozny since mid-December, when
the military opened escape routes, to 7,820. 

Estimates of the number of civilians still left in the city range from
10,000 to 25,000. Most hide in basements, suffering from cold and hunger,
and many are afraid to venture out even at quiet times. 

After facing relatively little resistance in Chechnya's northern lowlands,
Russian forces have been stalled in Grozny for months and only recently
began pressing into rebel strongholds in the southern mountains. In recent
days, they have intensified airstrikes, carrying out more than 100 combat
missions daily. 

Many of the 180 air attacks carried out by federal forces Tuesday focused
on the southern Argun gorge, a strategic mountain pass leading south from
rebel-held areas of Chechnya to neighboring Georgia. 

The rebels, meanwhile, were fortifying their positions in the mountains,
army officials said. 

On Tuesday, Russian jets also struck in the area of Vedeno, a key rebel
stronghold. Russian forces control the heights around Vedeno, but have been
cautious about entering the town, resorting instead to lacing footpaths and
fields around Vedeno with mines. 

The military command said today Russian troops had seized the village of
Turti-Khutor and surrounded nearby Shovkhol-Berdi and Alleroy, about 30
miles east of Grozny. 

Russian troops marched into breakaway Chechnya in late September after
Islamic militants based there staged armed incursions into the neighboring
Russian region of Dagestan. The militants also were blamed for a series of
apartment house bombings in Moscow and elsewhere in Russia that killed 300
people. 

******

#3
Excerpt
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
January 18, 2000
REMARKS BY SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT
ON "SUSTAINING DEMOCRACY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY"
THE ROSTOW LECTURE SERIES SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, Washington DC

Q: Tyler Marshall, Los Angeles Times. Madam Secretary, another
struggling democracy that you didn't mention was Russia. The US-Russia
relationship is not the best at the moment. American-sponsored reforms
have produced more disillusionment than prosperity and also some
suspicion; NATO enlargement, Kosovo war also added to that suspicion,
and now we have the Chechnya war, which has clouded the relationship.

You're going to Russia shortly. What can you do in your last year in
office to improve that relationship?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: It sounds so terminal. Let me just say, first of
all, I did mention Russia, not as one of my four countries, but in
terms of managing the relationships with Russia. It's clearly one of
the major issues we have to deal with in the year 2000.

I think that we want to see the continued reform programs going
forward. You know, it's very easy to see half-full/half-empty
activity, as far as Russia's concerned. And I think we have to
understand that President Yeltsin's actions were according to the
Constitution. They had Duma elections. They're going to have a
Presidential election. There are various aspects of a functioning
market economy going on. There has been some improvement in their
economic situation.

And Acting President Putin is somebody that I've been kind of
describing as having two strands to him, one where he has a tough side
in terms of his KGB background and his stand on Chechnya; at the same
time he has, I think, been one of the leading reformers, first of out
of St. Petersburg, and then within the Yeltsin administration. And he,
from what we can tell, seems determined to move reform forward.

So we are not kind of starry-eyed about Russia. We are very realistic
about the difficult problems, but also understand the importance of
pushing and working with them and having it seen as being in our
national interest, that we continue to provide assistance in the form
of threat reduction, and assistance to various parts of their civil
society.

When I go to Russia - and this is a very good example - I'm going to
have bilateral meetings with somebody who is actually is a very good
friend of mine, Igor Ivanov, and talk about the things on which we
disagree, obviously, but at the same time look for areas where we
agree. And the fact that we're going to be co-chairing a meeting on
the multilateral talks that come out of the Madrid Conference for the
Middle East is an example of that.

And so with a country the importance and size of Russia, we are bound
to have a relationship that has some pretty tough points and some
areas of cooperation, but I am pretty sanguine about it moving forward
properly, and our having an important role in making it happen.

******

#4
Chechens chafe under Russian rule
By Elizabeth Piper

GUDERMES, Russia, Jan 19 (Reuters) - European officials paid a trip to
Chechnya's second biggest town, Russian-controlled Gudermes, on Wednesday
and the message they heard from residents was probably not the one Moscow
had intended them to hear. 

The delegation from the Council of Europe, on a two-day fact-finding
mission to the region, heard a litany of complaints from locals about the
Russian troops, whom they accused of brutality, arrogance and drunkenness. 

``How can we live together (with the Russian soldiers)? Look at them,''
Movladi told reporters travelling with the delegation. 

His voice dropping to a whisper for fear of being overheard, he pointed to
rows of troops holding machineguns and speaking into headsets. 

``When they came here they said they would kill the Wahhabists (Islamic
militants), but now they want to kill every man between 10 and 60,'' he said. 

One woman yelled to the delegation that the Russian troops were always
drunk. ``We want them out,'' she said. 

Russian troops took Gudermes in early November without a single shot in an
advance hailed at the time by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin as a turning
point in the Chechen campaign. 

Putin is now acting president and favourite to win the March 26
presidential election because of the popularity he has gained among
ordinary Russians with his hawkish stance on Chechnya. 

Moscow says the people of Gudermes freely joined the federal troops to
drive out the pro-independence fighters who have run Chechnya since Russia
withdrew its forces three years ago. 

Much of the town, a depressed cluster of Soviet-style apartment blocks at a
rail junction in eastern Chechnya, is still in ruins from Russian
bombardment during the 1994-96 war that ended in Moscow's defeat. 

TREATED LIKE TERRORISTS 

Mayerbek, 42, said the Russian soldiers did not trust the Chechens, even
though they were meant to be protecting the civilian population in the name
of preserving the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. 

``Russia is pretending to own this land, but they treat us all like
terrorists,'' said Mayerbek, who has not been able to find work for five
years. 

``The Russians broke the agreement of the last war. They have created
instability so they could destroy us completely.'' 

Another man, Hazan Dukayev, said he had fled to Gudermes from the Chechen
capital Grozny, which has now been under heavy Russian aerial and artillery
bombardment for months. 

``Everything is destroyed in Grozny. My house was completely demolished,''
he said. 

Western countries and organisations such as the Council of Europe have
criticised Russia's four-month campaign as excessively brutal and
indiscriminate. 

They are worried about the plight of some 200,000 refugees living in
makeshift accommodation in regions bordering Chechnya and about the
conditions of up to 40,000 civilians estimated to be trapped in Grozny by
the bombardment. 

The head of the Council of Europe delegation, Britain's Lord David
Russell-Johnston, reiterated Western calls for a ceasefire and the start of
peace negotiations during talks with Putin in Moscow on Monday. 

Moscow says it must first destroy the rebel fighters, whom it accuses of
carrying out bomb blasts and other crimes in Russian cities and towns. It
also says Chechens must accept that their province is an inalienable part
of the Russian Federation. 

CHECHENS SAY RUSSIANS ARE ARROGANT 

In Gudermes few of the locals who spoke with reporters seemed to agree with
this idea. 

``Why does Russia need Chechnya? Chechnya does not need Russia. This is the
second time I have lost my home. Every step in this country I have to pay
for. The next step I shall pay for with my life,'' said Wahid. 

Movladi said Russians had an imperialist approach towards Chechnya, which
has been a thorn in Moscow's side since it was conquered by tsarist troops
in the 19th century. 

``They think they are better than us. All we want is independence'' from
Moscow, Movladi said. 

******

#5
The Times (UK)
19 January 2000
Editorial
RUSSIAN RESURGENCE
Putin's tough talk is uniting his people 

Little is so far known about Russia's new acting President, Vladimir Putin, 
but the message he has been transmitting in recent days is clear enough. 
Russians of all persuasions are being invited to put aside the differences 
that have long divided them, swallow old discontents, and unite behind Mr 
Putin. The idea that by doing so they can help create a stronger, more 
centralised state is proving popular with an electorate embarrassed by a 
decade of confused searching for a post-communist way ahead, and increasingly 
resentful of weakness at the top. Three-quarters of Russians interviewed in a 
poll by the independent agency ROMIR this week said they approved of Mr 
Putin. This result must please a man facing a presidential election in two 
months' time, with opponents melting faster than spring snow. Yet the harsh 
tone of the specific ideas which Mr Putin is advancing - and which Russians 
are turning to with visible relief - offer a cheerless first glimpse of the 
direction in which Russia may be moving. 

Yesterday, Russian parliamentarians, who had fought ex-President Yeltsin for 
eight years, were politely told by Mr Putin that he had no plans to become a 
dictator and that they should end "the policy of confrontation". The newly 
re-elected legislature, its Communist majority diluted by a big showing for a 
new pro-Putin faction - whose name, chiming pleasingly with the acting 
President's current aims, is Unity - was told instead to get on with passing 
long-delayed laws. 

One such law would let land be freely bought and sold - a basic building 
block of capitalism which has never existed in Russia. The idea that the 
fractious parliament may at last efficiently debate and pass laws is 
attractive, allowing the possibility of unimpeded reform. But the idea that 
the parliament may now, under an assertive President, become a passive 
Soviet-style organ which simply rubberstamps Kremlin decisions, is not. 

Russia's new military doctrine, unveiled on Friday, is harsher in its outlook 
towards the West than its 1997 predecessor. It lowers the threshold for using 
nuclear weapons to counter what it presents as a growing threat from abroad; 
it accuses the United States of attempting to weaken Russia. It would be 
wrong to be too alarmist: this doctrine is not a radical break with the past, 
just part of a slow cooldown since Russia's pro-Western honeymoon in the 
early 1990s. With Russia's conventional armed forces in chaos, more-over, Mr 
Putin has few other options for projecting strength than to talk up nuclear 
power. Nevertheless, his language grates. 

Projecting strength is clearly the immediate electoral aim of Mr Putin, whose 
one visible policy in his last job as Prime Minister was pursuing war in 
Chechnya. He has removed some Yeltsin cronies (though not enough to make 
clear that the changes are more than cosmetic). Journalists give warning that 
new press freedom restrictions are in the pipeline. Mr Putin has also decreed 
that the security services (to which he owes personal allegiance) will be 
strengthened, the army's funding will be hugely boosted and state sector pay 
raised 20 per cent. He seems unworried that these expensive policies, at odds 
with his stated commitment to market reform, will annoy the IMF. He is using 
all the weapons to hand to persuade Russians that, if ruled by him, they can 
again walk tall in the world. 

Whether he can project himself as a strongman until the vote on March 26 
without being undermined by reality - either in the shape of a worsening 
economy or of military reverses in Chechnya - is one of the multiple 
uncertainties of post-Soviet Russia. What his long-term plans are for the 
country he aspires to rule may only start emerging after March 27. 

******

#6
Global Beat Syndicate
Chechnya: A Land Without A Future
By Dr. Kharon Deniev 
January 17, 2000 
Dr Kharon Deniev is a human rights advocate, senior member of the
Chechen-Ingush community of Stavropol and a writer for the Institute for
War & Peace Reporting, a London-based independent media organization. 

STAVROPOL, Russia -- The latest round of fighting in Chechnya clearly
demonstrates that neither the Russian federal forces nor the rebels are
concerned about the mounting number of civilian casualties. 

In the runup to last month's elections to the Russian Federal Duma, only
one issue dominated the debate among the candidates: How best to protect
"our children, " Russian soldiers fighting in Chechnya. 

No one was talking about protecting "the children" of those citizens of the
Russian Federation who happen to be Chechen. 

Chechens are the victims of appalling treatment. It appears that no one
will be held to account for mass murder occurring in Chechnya today. The
desire to preserve the "unity of the state" has taken precedence over
everything else. 

The human rights of Chechen people are violated throughout Russia on a
daily basis. Their access to justice, representation at all levels of
government and equal opportunities in the job market are routinely denied. 

Meanwhile, a new generation has emerged inside Russia over the last ten
years that sees Chechens as aliens at best and enemies at worst. Russia has
abandoned the Soviet-era sense of internationalism, which at least
purported to protect and respect ethnic minorities. Russian soldiers
fighting in Chechnya today are filled with hatred for the people there. 

Those living inside the villages in Chechnya today are trapped between two
opposing forces which they are unable to appease. They know that every
attack by the rebels on Russia forces will provoke withering retaliation
against rebels and civilians alike. Sometimes, they'll try persuade the
rebels to leave their villages.

Occasionally they succeed. But when the dialogue fails, they're left with
no option but to flee themselves. These refugees are left cursing all
involved in the conflict -- the Russian army, former Russian President
Boris Yeltsin, Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov and the rebel fighters. 

In Chechnya today, human rights and humanitarian concerns are not even
considered. Russia operates on a policy of state terrorism. The rebels care
only for themselves. 

Everyone asks the same question: Where will it all end? The answer seems
clear. Russia will annihilate the rebels, irrespective of civilian
casualties. Maskhadov will probably spend the rest of his life as a
president in exile. 

For most Chechens today, there is a growing sense of despair. They have
watched their country descend into lawlessness, where every dispute was
resolved by force of arms, and criminals flourished. They realize they have
probably lost the chance to live in their own country, free of Moscow's
bidding. 

Yet, they realize they will never become full citizens of Russia, enjoying
equal rights and protection. And Russians realize they will never be
welcomed in Chechnya. 

Hatred and mutual suspicion between the two peoples will persist. 

******

#7
Russian Life Online
January 18, 2000
PUTIN'S REAL APPEAL
By Mikhail Ivanov
Mikhail Ivanov is Executive Editor of Russian Life magazine, a bimonthly 

The vast majority of both the foreign and domestic press are explaining away 
the unprecedented popularity of acting President Vladimir Putin via his tough 
stance on Chechnya. This is wishful thinking on the part of Western observers 
who have simply gotten used to Russia being an undemanding and pliant partner 
for the past 10 years.

Foreign observers are anxiously looking for the smallest cracks in the 
seemingly impenetrable Putin fortress. Yet, despite their prognoses, his 
popularity only keeps rising. Since Putin became Acting President on December 
31, he has added seven percentage points to his popularity rating,
according to 
a VTSIOM poll. In this same poll, Putin garnered 56% of the "votes" of those 
polled about their presidential preference, if the election were held today. 
Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov got just 14% (5 points less than in
December) 
and former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov was left with just 10%. Yabloko's 
Grigory Yavlinsky, came fourth with just 3%--less than the poll's error of 
margin. Even if, as some local sociologists claim, such polls are not 
indicative of the voters' true mood, the 46% gap between Primakov and Putin
is 
too huge to be explained by the Chechnya factor only.

If Chechnya is the only reason for Putin's skyrocketing presidential rating, 
then why did his popularity increase 7% in recent weeks? Certainly not
because 
Russian Federal troops have been racking up huge successes in Chechnya. Quite 
the contrary: Chechen counterattacks on Argun and Gudermes have stabbed
Russian 
troops in the rear. True, the two towns were recaptured, but casualties on
the 
Russian side were heavy, and the military commanders had to admit it, which 
could only damage Putin's image. Yet he continues to score points with the 
electorate.

The Chechnya factor, strong though it is, has never been the sole explanation 
for Putin's breakthrough on the Russian political scene. Putin's crackdown on 
terrorism in this Caucasian republic was just the first signal to his 
countrymen that Russia will now have a strong leader. Even the liberal daily 
Sevodnya (which has never been supportive of the Kremlin's inner Family,
nor of 
Yeltsin's heir apparent) admitted in an editorial published today that the 
Chechen war has already accomplished its "PR mission." Let's not argue with 
Sevodnya as to whether countering terrorism is just about PR. But the point
is 
otherwise well taken: that is why even the recent difficulties in the war
have 
not weakened Putin's position. "Putin's rating is growing; it separated
itself 
long ago from Chechnya," wrote Sevodnya observer Leonid Radzikhovsky. If 
Radzikhovsky writes this--having landed so many punches on the Kremlin in his 
columns--then there is indeed more to Putin's rating than meets the eye. In 
fact, Razikhovsky hit the nail on the head when he added that: "Only 
foreigners, who learn about Russia from CNN imagine that Russia is dreaming 
only of seeing the war in Chechnya. Russian man has enough troubles as it is."

So why are most Russians willing to vote for Putin? First, he restored the 
faith of Russians in themselves and in their country-not unlike what Ronald 
Reagan did for Americans in the early 1980s. This includes not only Chechnya, 
but also his new foreign policy (including the newly adopted military 
doctrine), his traveling to Chechnya on New Year's Eve and, last but not
least, 
his wrestling prowess.

Second, there is the age and health factor. Just as Mikhail Gorbachev was a 
welcome sharp contrast to the debilitated Brezhenev and Chernenko, Putin is a 
refreshing, energetic figure on the Russian political firmament--a leader who 
can work, and not only "with documents."

Third, Putin has successsfully exploited the economic upturn, brought on by
oil 
price increases, enabling him to make populist gestures such as increasing 
pensions and public wages by as much as 20%.

Fourth, Putin's no-nonsense style appeals to average Russians. His credo, 
"Skazano-sdelano," (Said-done) sums it up. He speaks very good Russian, 
reflecting on his law student education under ex- St. Petersburg Mayor
Anatoly 
Sobchak. His rapid and direct responses to reporters' questions have made it 
hard for them to catch him off guard. Putin, who made a point of saying in 
public that his father was a simple worker, combines a terse speaking style 
with popular, working-man humor and simple phrases like "wet terrorists in a 
closet." Like it or not, this appeals to the average Russian voter-those who 
tune in to the 1st and 2nd TV channels, which enjoy the largest audiences in 
Russia, and which are virtually monopolized by the Kremlin.

Fifth, Putin is showing himself to be a savvy politico. Even the
once-popular, 
aging Russian ex-premier Yevgeny Primakov is reportedly looking for any
pretext 
to not run a losing presidential battle. All week long speculations flew that 
Putin may have found a comfortable golden parachute for Primakov, allegedly 
offering to lobby for Primakov's candidacy as Duma speaker. But then, at 
press-time, there was a U-turn: the majority of Duma deputies seemed to agree 
on the candidacy of past speaker Gennady Seleznyov, who lost in his bid to 
become governor of Moscow region. Since such a turnabout could not have been 
concocted without Kremlin participation, it seems clear that "the enlightened 
chekist" has mixed up all cards, confirming he knows how to handle Kremlin 
personnel policies. Thus, Primakov's golden parachute may not open over his 
gray head.

Finally, observe how quietly--and quickly--Putin replaced the vast majority
of 
presidential administration aides, the press-service, etc. with loyal
institute 
mates or former operatives, most of which come from Putin's native St 
Petersburg. This caused some sarcastic local observers to evoke the notion
of a 
"second Leningrad case" turned upside down. Indeed, the Moscow Kremlin is
being 
taken over by former Leningraders. But then the "two capitals" have been
rivals 
since Peter founded the city on the Neva in the early 18th century.

And you say, "Chechnya, Chechnya ..."

******

#8
Analysts View Anti-Putin Coalition Opportunities 

Obshchaya Gazeta 
13 January 2000
[translation for personal use only]
Opinion roundup: "The President Has Been Appointed. It Remains To Vote" 

1. Does it make any sense taking part in elections with a winner that 
has been determined in advance? 

2. What can Vladimir Putin's competitors do if the conditions of the 
election contest are so patently unequal? May a united boycott of the 
elections be expected of them? 

3. Is the formation of a campaign coalition capable of competing on a 
par with the "Putin party" possible? 

4. If by March the military has not managed to smash the Chechen armed 
forces, will this influence the electoral mood? 

Liliya Shevtsova: 'Russia Is Trapped' 

1. A sizable part of society has already supported Putin in the course 
of the parliamentary elections. But this was a vote not so much for Putin 
as against the decrepit, corrupt leadership of Yeltsin. What Putin 
received on 31 December was not a discouraging gift but a loan that has 
to be paid off by 26 March, society--and the elites--having been offered 
something more tangible than an unattainable victory in Chechnya. The 
mood of our people is, meanwhile, treacherously changeable. Even if Putin 
manages to maintain--it is unclear by means of what--the popularity 
dynamics at the previous level, this will have the ring of a warning to 
the new leader. If he does not, this will be his downfall for the tasks 
facing him will require the maximum support of society. 

Yes, as the price for liberation from Yeltsin, they require of it 
consent to the renunciation of a most important principle of 
democracy--honest and equal elections--that is, consent, in fact, to the 
formation of the monarchical regime of a mysterious unknown. The proposed 
formula of power returns us to 1991, to the start of Yeltsin's rule, when 
Russia banked on personal power, not on institutions. And on this 
occasion, what is more, the regime is deprived even of the former 
democratic ingredient. The tragedy is additionally the fact that no one 
is thus far prepared to offer an alternative to this way back. Everything 
will depend on Putin, therefore, on his capacity for understanding that 
the power received from Yeltsin's hands has a conditional legitimacy and 
that a mine that will go off sooner or later has been planted in his 
regime. 

2. A boycott on the part of Putin's principal competitors--Primakov, 
Zyuganov, and Yavlinskiy--would, possibly, force the acting president to 
assent to more honest elections--he would hardly be gratified by the 
prospect of having Zhirinovskiy as his sparring partner. Putin should, 
incidentally, be more interested than the others if only in the 
neutralization of the head start that he received from Yeltsin. But 
considering the slowness of the reaction of all political forces, such a 
boycott is hardly realistic. The possibilities of Putin's rivals are 
limited by the fact that neither the ruling class nor society takes 
seriously the very idea of an opposition, regarding it as something 
needless or alien to national interests even. And a second "party of 
power" under the conditions of a regime that does not tolerate 
bicentrism is condemned to defeat. But even in this situation Putin's 
opponents have an opportunity to work for the future--they could advance 
the formula of order based not on force, not on a return to simple 
solutions, but supported by institutions. Putin's opponents will have 
nothing to offer only if he displays courage and himself renounces his 
previous "I" and the role prepared for him, the role, that is, 
of a new and simplified edition of Yeltsinism. 

3. The formation of an anti-Putin coalition is possible in theory. It 
is not even a question of a center-left coalition around Primakov, the 
formation of which not only would not be an alternative to Putin but 
would most likely facilitate his conquest of power through a return to 
the election formula that secured success for Yeltsin in 1996. An attempt 
could be made to build a broader coalition based on the idea of social 
harmony, which would provide primarily for reform of the 
superpresidential system of power. Even were such a coalition to lose, 
the readiness of political forces to switch to new rules of the game 
would be a victory. 

4. Everything indicates that the Chechen "operation" has 
passed into guerrilla warfare. Much will depend on Moscow's capacity for 
blocking information from the area of combat operations and its ability 
to create the illusion of a successful outcome. But it can be seen even 
now how difficult it is becoming for our illusionists. Putin needs to be 
thinking, therefore, about how to distance himself from the 
"link" with Chechnya for it is impossible to be the victor in 
this war. Unless Putin can compensate for the "Chechen factor" 
with other successes, primarily in the social sphere and in the fight 
against corruption, a decline in his popularity is inevitable. The 
failure of the present policy in Chechnya would be for Primakov and 
Yavlinskiy, incidentally, a powerful factor motivating them to enter the 
race and offer an alternative to Putin. For Putin himself the main 
problem is not at all that of obtaining formal confirmation of his 
appointment to the presidency. The moment of truth for him will begin 
afterward, when he is forced to pay the bills of those that are now 
giving him a loan of support. 

Igor Klyamkin: 'A Boycott Is Not To Be Expected' 

1. It makes sense for the electorate to go to the polls if only 
because if it does not vote, there will be no winner. At least, it is not 
worth those that are intending to vote for Putin sabotaging the 
elections. I believe that Zyuganov's supporters will surely go to the 
polls because the leader of the CPRF will orient them toward victory and 
will do his utmost to show that victory is possible. As far as 
Zhirinovskiy's or Yavlinskiy's constituents are concerned, they had no 
expectation of winning in 1996 either, nonetheless, they went to the 
polls. So even if the situation involving a winner who has been 
determined in advance does influence voter turnout, I do not think that 
this influence will be that significant. 

2. First, I am not sure that it is to Putin's advantage to initiate a 
dirty election campaign like that which preceded the parliamentary 
elections. He has the upper hand, and in his position it is far more 
advantageous to appear to be a person capable of winning by civilized 
rules. But even if this is not the case, a united boycott is not to be 
expected. The communists are already used to fighting under unfavorable 
conditions, and this even strengthens their positions to a certain 
extent, and Zhirinovskiy will not consent to a boycott under any 
circumstances. 

Besides, a boycott would immediately be interpreted by opponents as a 
manifestation of weakness, and this would do the "saboteurs" 
nothing but political harm. 

3. Nor do I believe in the possibility of a coalition of Zyuganov and 
Zhirinovskiy or Yavlinskiy or any other candidates. You should know our 
political leaders. In 1996 there was a great deal of talk about a 
possible alliance of Yavlinskiy, Lebed, and Svyatoslav Fedorov, and there 
were some consultations and coordination sessions, seemingly, but no 
alliance eventuated. A coalition presupposes a limitation of 
single-leader ambitions, and our leaders are not prepared for this. 

4. This could exert an influence only if the Chechen militants can 
carry out some demonstratively major action--something akin to the 
"Budennovsk raid" or the capture of Groznyy in the summer of 
1996--and if this makes its way into the news media and becomes the 
property of extensive publicity. But such actions are hardly possible in 
the immediate future nor would society be learning the truth about them 
any time soon. But were we even to forecast some influence of the Chechen 
situation on electoral behavior, what sort of changes might be expected? 
There would, most likely, be somewhat of an increase in Zyuganov's 
present electorate, and the leader of the CPRF would acquire 
approximately as many supporters as he had four years ago. Something 
could probably be gained by Yavlinskiy, who now also has a 
"truncated" electorate because some of his supporters have also 
switched to Putin. In this case the situation would be close to what we 
had before the first round of the 1996 elections. And in the home stretch 
we would see the Zyuganov-Putin pairing, and once again Zyuganov would 
not be the strongest in this pairing. 

Igor Malashenko: 'The Voter Wants a Strong Leader' 

1. It always makes sense for the voters to go to the polls, specially 
since legislation affords them the opportunity to also express their 
rejection of the election situation in which they have been placed. Many 
people are already calling these elections a plebiscite on Putin's 
candidacy. This is, possibly, the case, but I would not speak about the 
predetermination of the results of the ballot. For it is not only a 
question of whether Putin will win or not--what is important is the 
score. How many votes will the winner get, will a second round be needed? 
Since the expectations of society and the elite will be very high, an 
insufficiently high result would be perceived as a failure. 

The level of expectations is something that is extraordinarily 
important. Few people, say, were expecting so successful a performance 
from the Unity bloc, and this is why, although it came second, this was 
perceived as a colossal success. In 1995 Our Home Is Russia obtained less 
than was expected of it, and its generally respectable result was seen as 
a defeat, just about. And, then, I would not call these elections 
uncontested, all the same, because we lack a national consensus on many 
major issues, and whoever opposes Putin as an alternative will be the 
spokesman for the wishes of a sizable minority, with whose opinion the 
president will have to reckon also. 

2. I do not expect this, to be honest. The situation requires the 
Communist Party, say, to nominate and support some candidate because 
otherwise it would forfeit the status of biggest political party. In 
addition, there is a presidential candidates' club, let's say, and the 
people who are members of it are required to maintain their status. 
Consequently, they have to run, regardless of their chances of success. 
And, finally, it is not known to what extent our political elite is 
interested in the uncontested nature of these elections. The Constitution 
of Russia was put together in such a way that it affords the president 
tremendous powers. If it is imagined that the elections are practically 
uncontested and that Putin wins a convincing victory in the first round 
even, it would then be entirely unclear whom we had elected--a president 
or his majesty the emperor. Democracy exists as a system of checks and 
balances, and society and the elite have an interest, I believe, in these 
checks and balances existing. I would not be surprised, therefore, were 
there to appear together with the candidate of the forces of the left 
some third candidate, who could obtain quite a substantial number of 
votes and who would, possibly, have to be reckoned with, as was the case 
in 1996 with Lebed, for example. Something similar could occur at these 
elections also. It is sufficient to recall the recent success of the 
Union of Right Forces, which no one was expecting. 

3. On a par would be difficult. The point being that the central issue 
of Russian politics at this time is, it seems to me, the question of the 
strength of the state. The voter wants to see a strong state and, 
accordingly, a strong president. He will respond primarily to the 
candidates' strong-will attributes, therefore. From my viewpoint, this 
was demonstrated by the last Duma elections since Putin was perceived as 
the embodiment of national will, which, in the view of the electorate, 
the country had lacked for many years. You may talk all you wish about 
resourceful electoral techniques, but, in actual fact, it was the 
determination of Putin and the people who supported and 
"boosted" him that brought about the success of the Unity bloc. 
In just the same way, by a tremendous effort of will, Anatoliy Chubays 
pulled the right from deep in the breach. Now let's ask a simple 
question: who could offer an alternative to Putin in this respect, 
considering not only the strong-will attributes of the principal 
candidate but also the colossal resources of power that are behind him? 
It is hard for me to imagine. Chubays? But he does not thus far appear to 
be a person who is prepared to play this game. 

4. This would certainly influence the mood, but in what way it would 
so do, it is hard to tell. It is entirely possible that public opinion 
would demand of the federal authorities even stronger actions and give 
carte-blanche for the use of any kind of force, any kind of weapons, as 
long as "the filth is choked off at root," as Putin himself put 
it. Yes, some voters would probably recoil, taking fright at the chasm 
that had yawned before us in Chechnya, but I don't believe that this 
could cause a radical, 180-degree, turn in public opinion. After all, 
disenchanted with Putin, society would thereby have to acknowledge its 
own errancies. It is hardly prepared to do so at this time. 

Aleksandr Tsipko: 'Inequality Is Legalized by the Constitution' 

1. Democratic procedure cannot be placed higher than the interests of 
national development. There are moments in the history of a state when a 
demonstration of national unity and the consolidation of a substantial 
part of society around a popular leader are valuable in themselves and 
represent the basis of the state's survival. Yes, Putin currently has a 
greater chance of winning early presidential elections than Yavlinskiy, 
Zyuganov, and so forth. But what's wrong with this? An impressive 
election victory would ensure the legitimacy of Russian power, strengthen 
civil peace, and untie the future president's hands for fighting crime 
and corruption. Putin has, indeed, been very lucky in his life, in his 
political career. But this is not his fault. Had there not been in him 
what is expected of a new president of Russia, he could not have attained 
to his present position. 

2. The inequality of the conditions of the contest for the presidency 
is legalized by the Yeltsin autocratic constitution. Today we are once 
again seeing for ourselves that the popular election of a president 
invevitably results in the uncontested nature of elections and that a 
democratic transfer of power is impossible under the present 
constitution. It can be guaranteed years in advance that the next head of 
Russia will be the one who at the moment of the elections is either prime 
minister or, even better, acting president. Presidential elections with 
us would be ten times more democratic were they effected either by the 
Federal Assembly or a special electoral college. But at this time we are 
hostages to the situation. It is now too late to raise the question of a 
change in the election procedure. Specially since all Putin's main 
competitors in the contest for the Kremlin are supporters of the present 
procedure. 

3. There are very influential forces endeavoring to prevent a Putin 
victory. They will undoubtedly do everything possible for a counterplay. 
Should the Russian Army's losses in Chechnya grow, these forces would 
step up their activity and form a variety of anti-Putin coalitions. 

4. Two types of response to failures of the Russian Army in Chechnya 
are possible. We know about the first from the experience of 1994-1996. 
Condemnation of the military operations, calls for a political solution 
of the question, for the separation of Chechnya.... But there could be an 
entirely different response to military failures also. It is possible 
that society would demand that the Chechen separatists be done away with 
at any price and would call on the national leadership "not to be 
afraid of bloodshed" and to "go on to the end". It seems 
to me that the second type of response would be more likely today. 

Boris Grushin: 'Politicians Love Themselves More Than Us' 

1. I would not proceed from the assumption that the winner is 
determined in advance. This is a mistaken assumption. In a society like 
ours, one distinguished by the utmost instability of both political 
structures and the consciousness of the masses, that is, it is impossible 
to determine absolutely anything in politics in advance. Any scenarios 
are theoretically permissible here. As far as the absenteeism of the 
public is concerned, this is fatal, from the historical viewpoint. The 
electorate should, on the contrary, understand that active involvement in 
the elections is essential in any event. Both for lessening the chances 
of a variety of accidents, which would subsequently have to be paid for. 
And for learning to answer to oneself and to one's children for one's own 
decisions. 

2. Speaking in the abstract, there is a great deal that the 
competitors could do. Mount, for example, an information campaign showing 
that the protege of a president hateful to the masses would, naturally, 
continue the policy of his predecessor, so that to vote for Putin would 
be to vote once again (for a third time!) for Yeltsin himself. Or unite 
their organizational efforts around the single figure of an authoritative 
politician from the opposition who could realistically take on the 
present prime minister. All this is merely at the level of purely 
theoretical argument, though. In practice no joint, united actions of the 
present opposition are, alas, possible. Neither Zyuganov nor Yavlinskiy 
nor Zhirinovskiy nor Kiriyenko would ever in this life give the votes 
that are due them either to Primakov or Luzhkov or, even less, one 
another. And this means that there will never be any united boycott of 
the elections on their part either. 

3. With the rarest of exceptions (literally one or two), there is by 
definition among the political leaders of Russia currently in office none 
that would put the interests of the nation and the good of the people 
above his own, including frankly selfish, interests. And this is one of 
our principal present-day problems. Russia, as we all know, has never 
been particularly lucky when it comes to leaders, but just as long as it 
is not as unfortunate as it is now!... 

4. Certainly, and most decisively. I am sure that it is this primarily 
that should go to explain the unparalleled haste that the Kremlin has 
demonstrated in the business of early presidential elections. 

Vsevolod Vilchek: 'It Is Impossible To Unite Against This Candidate' 

1. The question conceals a logic trap: belief in the outcome of the 
elections being predetermined is a "self-fulfilling" prophesy. 
But I shall respond as if I have not spotted the trick. The second 
president of the Russian Federation has already been elected, appointed, 
that is. It remains to observe the due formalities: "run it through 
democracy," as a kolkhoz chairman said, giving a decision sent down 
from above to the secretary of the party bureau. This is a farce, and I 
see no point in taking part in a farce. I also understand another 
decision here: going to the polls to console one's elected 
representatives or to help politicians and analysts understand the 
breakdown of forces in society. 

2. It is naive to expect a boycott of elections by politicians. If the 
worst came to the worst, "democracy" would be saved by 
Zhirinovskiy, and some Doridze would publicly have it out with the 
"refuseniks," calling them cowardly intriguers. But the worst 
will not come to the worst. Outsiders will make use of the opportunity to 
haggle over positions with the boss, adjust their image, or simply save 
face. Vladimir Putin will on this occasion do everything possible to 
ensure that the airwaves not resemble a john in which his rivals are hit, 
demonstrating in this way his commitment to democracy and risking 
practically nothing: his rivals will not have, for all that, such 
electioneering weapons as the printing presses of the State 
Administration for the Issue of Banknotes or army corps in Chechnya. 

3. An anti-Putin coalition is impossible owing to the absence not only 
of a positive, principled but also a negative basis of consolidation: 
Putin is not the figure against whom it is possible to unite. Aside from 
the triumph of the will demonstrated in Chechnya, he reveals no distinct 
outlines, no ideology, no program. And this is his strength, 
invulnerability to criticism, and capacity for striking a bargain either 
with a red devil or a yellow imp. What sort of coalition capable of 
competing with the Putin party could there be? It is not a question of 
leaders' ambitions but of their ideological bankruptcy. They have nothing 
to offer the country other than publicity slogans and themselves. The 
people are weary, have lost their faith, and, it seems to me, are not 
eager for elections at all, preferring the power that has by some miracle 
arisen and already exists to further scrapes of a struggle for power. 

4. The war in the mountains will not be over in March, evidently, and 
each Chechen that is capable of bearing arms will be (per the Chukchi in 
the joke) on even dates a police officer, on odd dates, a militant. But 
Putin's popularity is threatened not by a protracted war (negative 
information will be blocked) but the inevitably approaching pointless 
victory and disenchantment with the results of the war. The date of the 
elections was brought forward for this, specifically, lest the electorate 
have time to sense the social, economic, and ideological consequences of 
the war and to recognize that the ruling group needed the war for victory 
over Russia, not over Chechnya. 

Viktor Kuvaldin: 'The System Will Not Accept a Serious Opposition' 

1. If we aspire to democracy, it is absolutely necessary to take part 
in the elections. Otherwise other people will make the choice for us. 
Elections can and should be boycotted only if it is known in advance that 
the results will be falsified. And this, as they say, is not yet a fact. 

In addition, an election campaign and the polls are not there merely 
to determine a winner. They are designed to ascertain the alignment of 
political forces in society, chart possible paths of a solution of life's 
fundamental problems, and effect a regrouping of political subjects. 

2. There will be no united boycott of the elections. It is necessary 
to put into words specifically where the unequal conditions of the 
campaign contest lie and how they may be reduced. Specifically, it is 
necessary to address to the acting president a proposal for a decision to 
be made on the appointment of a new premier, guided by the Duma majority, 
as quickly as possible. The election campaign should be used to clarify 
Vladimir Putin's positions on the main problems preoccupying society. 

3. No, this would be unrealistic. As the Fatherland experience showed, 
our political system organically does not as yet accept a serious 
opposition capable of really fighting for power. The self-preservation 
instinct--either of the new ruling class or of society as a 
whole--operates. 

4. Hardly, although the Chechen operation played a big part in the 
formation of Vladimir Putin's support base, it has now acquired 
independent dynamics. A more thorough jolt is needed for the positions of 
the acting president to be seriously shaken. 

******

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