January 16, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4040 4041

Johnson's Russia List
#4041
16 January 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. The Russia Journal: Andrei Piontkovsky, Stasi for president.
2. AP: Deborah Seward, Russians Hope Putin Brings Change. (In Pavlovsk Posad)
3. Reuters: Kasyanov sees Russia economic recovery in 3-4 years.
4. Moscow Tribune: Fred Weir's in-your-face encounter with the secret police in Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia.
5. Interview with Basaev that appeared in the Turkish newspaper Yeni Safak: Basaev: May the Fakirs Pray for Us.
6. The Russia Journal: Mikhail Delyagin, Putin’s Russia – a return to totalitarianism.
7. Sevodnya: Sergei Mulin, THE ENERGY CHIEF OF THE COUNTRY PREPARES FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL RACE-2004.
8. The Electronic Telegraph (UK): John Simpson, This will not be the century of any one nation, however mighty. (Response to Condoleezza Rice)
9. AmCham News: Scott Blacklin, Russia's Choice - Rules or Ruin.
10. Boston Globe: Brian Whitmore, New Russian policy allows first strike.] 

*******

#1
The Russia Journal
January 17-23, 2000
Stasi for president
By Andrei Piontkovsky
Andrei Piontkovsky is director of the Center of Strategic Research in Moscow.

Vladimir Putin’s PR people have pulled off a decisive coup. The "family"
operation code-named "Papa, swallow the pill" turned out a success. Former
president Boris Yeltsin found himself obliged to sacrifice his forceful
biological instinct for power in the corporate interests of the
presidential clan.

Yeltsin’s heir thus received a truly royal new year’s present – a
presidential campaign cut by half – from six months to three. Just the
thing for Putin, for whom the time factor is crucial in his plans.

Putin’s so-called popularity springs entirely from the war in Chechnya, or
rather, from an ability to portray it on TV screens as an unbroken chain of
brilliant victories. But keeping up the picture for a whole six months is
impossible – three months is the maximum. 

By bombing some mountain village every week, losing several dozen soldiers
in the process each time, the authorities can raise the flag, put a tank in
the main street and declare that they control a bit of territory around
this tank, at least during the daylight hours. There are just enough such
villages to last three months, after which the final victory of Putinism’s
radiant ideas can be proclaimed.

In a sense, this idea of a final victory will be justified given that by
three months time, there won’t be any scope left for virtual victories.
That goes too, it appears, for the scenario which so excites generals’
imaginations – pursuing Chechen rebels hiding out in Georgia and making the
most of the opportunity to "liberate the Georgian people from the criminal
regime of Eduard Shevardnadze." The political fallout abroad would be too
unpredictable.

Instead of victory, the country will face the bloody and unsuitable for TV
day-to-day reality of propping up an occupation regime in a territory with
a hostile population and a protracted partisan war draining Russia’s
spiritual, human and material resources. But Putin will have been elected
president by then, achieving the aim that incited the Kremlin to launch
this full scale bloodbath in the first place.

When federal troops reached the river Terek in October, Moscow had a
chance, using both its military and legal advantage at the time, to bring
about a long-term political solution to the conflict that would have
answered its interests. But the PR people needed a different solution. The
ruthless and uncompromising macho was an image that dictated its own logic
of behavior, and state policy found itself hostage to the theatrical needs
of that image.

Yeltsin’s resignation opens Putin the way to the presidency in the first
round. The liberal putains from Putin’s harem, now the most hawkish of
hawks, are busy announcing the imminent coming of the messiah, who will
lead Russia with an iron hand toward market reform. That’s assuming Putin
doesn’t wipe them out in the Kremlin toilets once all power is in his hands.

But for now, let’s listen to a man who knows Col. Putin well from the time
they worked together in St. Petersburg. The talkative general and former
prime minister Sergei Stepashin, speaking in the enthralled tones that now
characterize all references to the soon-to-be crowned heir, described Putin
in an interview on NTV on Jan 31. 

"Vladimir Vladimirovich, with his inconspicuous appearance and calm, quiet
voice, showed such energy, firmness and brute determination right from his
first days of work, that in St. Petersburg financial circles he earned
himself the warm, friendly nickname of Stasi."

Happy New Year, dear citizens of Russia!

Happy New Stasi! 

*******

#2
Russians Hope Putin Brings Change
January 16, 2000
By DEBORAH SEWARD

PAVLOVSK POSAD, Russia (AP) - In this dying textile town where the fabric of 
life has been torn by a decade of political and economic tumult, Vladimir 
Putin has emerged as a symbol of hope for many Russians.

``I want Putin because I have hope in him. He does what he says he's going to 
do,'' said Katya Lyubimova, 20, who sells trousers in the local market. 
``He's not the kind of guy who makes promises and doesn't deliver.''

Pavlovsk Posad, a provincial city of 72,000 just 40 miles east of Moscow, 
looks pretty much as it did in Soviet times. The economic reforms and 
prosperity that have transformed the capital never arrived here.

A statue of Lenin stands on Revolution Square; one of Felix Dzherzhinsky, the 
founder of the Soviet secret police, is down the street. The local church is 
still in ruins. Nostalgia for the Communists is strong.

A majority of voters in Pavlovsk Posad voted for the Communist candidate in 
elections last weekend for a new governor of the Moscow region. He lost, and 
some townspeople are bitter.

``I'm standing here and I'm fed up,'' said Alexandra Petrova, 70, who worked 
36 years in one of the local textile factories. ``I'm working to keep from 
dying.''

Petrova sells handmade brooms to supplement her monthly $17 pension. ``I'll 
probably vote for the Communists,'' she said, referring to the March 26 
presidential election.

But 71-year-old Tamara Stepanova, who supports an ailing daughter and her 
three children by selling cigarettes and sunflower and pumpkin seeds near 
Petrova, is willing to give Putin a chance.

``If Putin increases our pensions so we don't have to stand out here, and 
makes the police stop chasing us from the market, I'll vote for him,'' 
Stepanova said.

Putin was named prime minister last summer and became acting president when 
Boris Yeltsin stepped down on Dec. 31. Seen as a can-do leader, he is the 
front-runner in the race for Russia's highest office, and his past as a KGB 
spy doesn't seem to bother people.

``I think there will be improvements. It's clear he's experienced,'' said 
Vladimir Ivanov, a former textile factory worker who travels around regional 
markets selling sheets, pillow cases and towels.

``It's even maybe a good thing that he worked in the security services 
because there will be fewer bandits,'' said Ivanov, 47. ``I'll vote for him.''

Putin's tough conduct of the war in Chechnya also has won him support in 
Pavlovsk Posad, where fabric from some of the factories helps dress the 
Russian military.

``Putin has got to get this nation off its knees and put it on its feet,'' 
said Lyubimova, the jeans-seller, who quit school at 16 to make a living in 
the market. ``If he says he's going to fight, he fights.''

City officials hope that Putin - if elected - will increase subsidies to the 
local budget, which has shrunk because most of the factories in town are not 
able to fully pay their taxes.

``We're living through difficult times,'' admitted Vladimir Rosiyskov, deputy 
head of the city government. ``We hope the new leadership can help us.'' 
Putin, he said, ``has a lot of authority and we respect that.''

Known for its fabrics in czarist times, Pavlovsk Posad was a booming textile 
center in the Soviet era. Its factories turned cotton from Uzbekistan into 
cloth that was shipped throughout the Soviet bloc.

When the Soviet Union collapsed so did the supplies of cotton, now too 
expensive or not available. The town started to recover, when the Aug. 17, 
1998 ruble devaluation unleashed an economic whirlwind.

``Those who didn't drown are starting to increase production, even take on 
new workers,'' said Alexander Ananyev, chief engineer at the Kamvolshchik 
factory on the edge of town.

The factory gets synthetic polyester fabric from Belarus and wool from 
southern Russia to make fabric used in making uniforms for the police, army, 
customs service and airlines.

Factory bosses supported Putin's rivals in the Dec. 19 parliamentary 
elections, and they haven't decided which candidate they'll back in the March 
presidential vote.

``Whoever is president has to bring order, end the war (in Chechnya),'' said 
Ananyev. ``That would be the best thing.''

*******

#3
Kasyanov sees Russia economic recovery in 3-4 years

MOSCOW, Jan 16 (Reuters) - Finance Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, tipped as a 
possible future prime minister, said on Sunday Russia's economy needed 
another three to four years to fully recover from the financial crash of 
1998. 

``Our economy is weak. According to our forecasts, unfortunately, it will 
take three to four years to restore the level of the economy, the 
achievements of the market economy we managed to get in 1997,'' Kasyanov told 
RTR state television. 

In 1997 Russia posted its first tentative economic growth since the fall of 
the Soviet Union but the crash of 1998, when Moscow defaulted on some foreign 
and domestic debt repayments and devalued the rouble, threw the economy into 
turmoil. 

Kasyanov said the rouble would only reverse its current decline and begin to 
appreciate against the dollar and other Western currencies in five to seven 
years. 

However Kasyanov, named last week as first deputy prime minister by Acting 
President Vladimir Putin, added that the international business community was 
becoming more optimistic about the prospects for market reform in Russia. 

Shrugging off Russia's problems in securing a new funding deal with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Kasyanov, a liberal, noted that Russia was 
set to notch up about 1.5 percent growth of gross domestic product (GDP) for 
1999. 

He said the government hoped to maintain the present course of ``unambitious 
but steady'' growth this year, despite the political uncertainty surrounding 
Russia's presidential election due on March 26. 

Putin is the hot favourite to win the presidential election. He has given few 
details of his economic programme but has pledged to maintain the course of 
market reforms. 

Putin hinted on Saturday that Kasyanov might head the new government after 
the presidential election. Putin himself remains prime minister for the time 
being. 

Russia's prime minister is nominated by the president and must be approved by 
the State Duma lower house of parliament. 

*******

#4
From: "Fred Weir" <fweir@glasnet.ru>
Subject: in-your-face encounter with the secret police
Date: Sun, 16 Jan 2000 

Moscow Tribune
18 January 2000

VLADIKAVKAZ -- As in-your-face encounters with the secret police go,
this one was almost farcical. I've been to cocktail parties at the Canadian
embassy that were more onerous. But if you were wondering what the new order
under Vladimir Putin is going to be like when has climbed to its zenith, the
detention of two journalists on the streets of Vladikavkaz last week, myself
and Geoff York of the Toronto Globe and Mail, could be one worrisome little
straw in the wind.
The original plan had been to avoid the FSB altogether. That was why
we flew into the empty, tomb-like airport at Vladikavkaz, rather than head
for bustling Sleptsovsk in Ingushetia, where they tag you and follow you
right from the start. In fact, the security services have mobilized an
amazing array of resources down there with just one goal: to keep
journalists from getting into Chechnya or doing any direct coverage of the
war. So far, only a tiny handful of reporters have been granted the magic
military accreditation which enables them to go in from Mozkok, under
Russian military supervision. The rest of us, although we are properly
accredited to the Russian Federation through the foreign ministry, risk
arrest and being stripped of our journalist status if we are caught on the
territory of Chechnya.
But this was Vladikavkaz, in the republic of North Ossetia and some
distance from the war zone. Before heading to Ingushetia, we decided to stop
off at the huge military hospital in downtown Vladikavkaz in hopes of
interviewing some Russian casualties. We weren't allowed into the hospital,
but we struck up a conversation with a couple of soldiers on the street
outside. A plainclothes officer from the local MVD quickly swooped in and
ordered us to come with him. We asked what on earth we were doing wrong? He
said he couldn't believe our impudence, and made threatening noises. We went
with him.
At police headquarters we were taken to Colonel A. Ortabayev, a
tall, curly-haired Ossetian with a cartoon-character face. He seemed stunned
by our sudden appearance. Things grew surreal as Ortabayev tried to call
higher-ups, banging and cursing his phone -- one of those red plastic
things. We pulled out a cell phone and said "here, why don't you try ours?"
He looked a bit wild-eyed for a second, but managed a cool response: "No
thanks, mine works perfectly". Everybody relaxed. Soon the cell phone
started ringing, and I was even allowed to go out into the corridor,
accompanied by a minder who paced with me nervously as I explained the
situation to the editors of the Christian Science Monitor in Boston.
Then the FSB blew in, and the atmosphere chilled. Two tall Ossetian
lads in leather jackets, and a smallish, middle-aged Russian in a gray
blazer who gave his name, with an ironic smile, as "Nikolai Ivanov". He took
over Ortabayev's desk, and piled our documents before him in a businesslike
manner. There was no more chatting on the cell phone. Ivanov had an oblique
way of dealing with questions. We asked, are we under arrest? He answered,
"not exactly". So, are we free to go then? He responded, "I wouldn't say
so". And so on.
The dialogue went on, for two hours, roughly like this. What were we
doing wrong? "Violating order". What's the crime in talking to people in the
street? "They're simple people, you're foreigners". But we were just asking
simple questions. "You don't have the right accreditation. You need the
military documents from Mozdok". But this is not Chechnya, this is North
Ossetia. "Ah, but you were asking about Chechnya".
Eventually, after several phone calls, Ivanov gave us back our
papers and told us to either get out of his republic or go to Mozdok and
acquire army approval to work there. The Ossetian MVD boys, all smiles, saw
us off like departing relatives. Even Ivanov offered brisk handshakes all
around. We headed straight for the Ingush border.
As I said, not a particularly harrowing experience. But this
wouldn't have happened six months ago, even in Vladikavkaz. Officials
everywhere, and particularly the security types, are sniffing the wind and
hoping they sense an approaching shift. Ivanov actually told us so at one
point: "You wouldn't behave like this if we had the order that used to be".
Ten years ago the watchword was "glasnost". Even KGB guys would grit
their teeth and agree that journalists were on the side of the angels,
providing the information lifeblood of a healthy society. A Gorbachev-era
survey of students found journalism the most respected profession, even
before cosmonauts.
However, the operative terminology being introduced by Putin as the
Chechnya conflict grows bloodier is "information war". And we, it appears,
are the enemy.
Putin initiated this savage military campaign in Chechnya, and
manipulated it to build his popularity rating. But playing on the ugly side
of Russian nationalism is dangerous; it seems to be acquiring a momentum of
its own. Russian journalists have been the first to feel the hard edge of
this, to find themselves limited and pressurized. But the foreign press
corps are clearly next in line. The fact that it's being done in a bumbling
and backslapping way today doesn't mean it will be so nice tomorrow. 

*******

#5
Date: Sun, 16 Jan 2000
Sender: "TURKISTAN NET: News & Information Network"
<TURKISTAN-N@NIC.SURFNET.NL>
From: "Michael Reynolds <reynolds@SUPERONLINE.COM>
Subject: Basaev Interview: May the Fakirs Pray for Us

The below is an interview with Basaev that appeared in an Islamist oriented
Turkish newspaper, "Yeni Safak".
Translation is mine, content is not.
- MAR

"Basaev: May the Fakirs Pray for Us"
Yeni Safak Newspaper 16 January, 2000
By Sefer Turan

Q. What is the latest situation in Grozny?

The situation right now in Grozny is good from our point of view. The
Russians attacked persistently in recent days but they could not achieve any
results. We repulsed every assault. Now they are only shelling and bombing
from the air. They are striking day and night with long range artillery.
But they are hitting only civilian targets. They are killing the elderly
and children. Just yesterday they killed 15 of our elderly. Right now they
are attacking Shatil. But again they cannot achieve any result.

Q. Whose hands is Grozny in right now?

I am in Grozny right now and am talking to you from Grozny.

Q. The Russians are claiming that they have taken back Shali and Gudermes.

The Russians have not been able to take any place by fighting. We fought
and are fighting against them with weapons that we captured from them. We
went up into the mountains with the captured weapons. We inflicted huge
losses on the Russians in those battles. Our plan was not to take them in
and wait for them inside, but to attack and seize the weapons they are
carrying, and we succeeded in this.

Q. The Russians have banned Chechen [men] between ten and sixty years of age
from entering and leaving [Chechnya]. What do you say about this?

The Russians are planning to deport these people to Siberia as they did
before. This decision revealed the Russians' real face. Earlier they used
to say "We are fighting with terrorists and Wahhabis." Now they have
declared to the whole world that they are engaging in genocide and that they
are at war with the civilian population.

Q. When will this war end, how long will it continue?

When it will end only God knows. But it will not end with a Russian
victory, God willing. Their problem is not just the Chechens. The
Russians' war is not directed just against the Chechens, but against all of
humanity. And this tyranny will end only with the end of Russia.

Q. What is the state of the Russian soldier's?

The Russians are in a very difficult state. They pull out the survivors of
groups that we have annihilated and then send new ones in their place. They
are covering up their losses. They are suffering heavy losses. They are
constantly rotating their forces in order not reveal they have panicked and
in order not to show the broken morale of their soldiers at the front to the
outside. They are in a total panic, trying to finish this business as soon
as possible but they unable to. This war is a political war. It is
intended only to secure the presidency for Putin. Therefore they are trying
to look tough. Consequently, total fear dominates [them].

Q. What are the Russians' losses like?

We can't give a definite number but every day at least 200 soldiers are
dying. We destroy from 30 to 50 tanks [a day].

Q. What are the Chechens' losses?

Over the last five months up to today 300 mujahids have become shehids
[martyr's for Islam].

Q. Is a dialog with the Russians possible?

We cannot enter into any kind of dialog with the Russians. Moreover they
too are not willing. Even if they enter into a dialog they do not keep
their promises. They did not observe any of the agreements we reached with
them in the earlier wars. Yeltsin and Maskhadov had made an agreement but
they did not keep their promises. Churchill in his time said, "The
Russians' agreements remain on paper." That saying still applies today. I
absolutely will not attempt to make an agreement with them!

Q. Do you have any expectations from Turkey?

I say, May God be pleased with the Turkish people. Because they have rushed
to our aid in this war as they did in the earlier war. They felt our pain
in their hearts. They prayed for us. This boosted our morale. Their
friendship brings joy to us. We feel their warmth in our hearts. Right now
you are hearing the sound of Russian warplanes. The Russians are bombing
us incessantly. They cannot do anything else. There is just one thing we
wish from the Turkish people: We wish for the prayers of the fakirs [Note:
Fakir is an Arabic word literally meaning "the poor, destitute". Like the
Persian word "dervish," which also means "poor," it has a second meaning in
Sufism-- one who renounces all worldly possessions in favor of devoting all
to the love of God. In the context of this interview, "the devout" would
probably be the best translation for "fakirs".]

********

#6
The Russia Journal
January 17-23, 2000
Putin’s Russia – a return to totalitarianism
By Mikhail Delyagin

Prime Minister and Acting President Vladimir Putin and wife Lyudmila
welcome in the new year during a visit to Chechnya. 

The secret of Vladimir Putin’s phenomenal political success is quite
simple: He took the two warring clans of Boris Berezovsky and Anatoly
Chubais – which together have decisive control over much of Russia’s public
life – and united them behind him.

Today, this union is bringing an obscure former KGB officer to power, a
strongman whose activities gave rise to legends of crimes that were kept to
a whisper in Yeltsin’s Russia.

Analyzing Putin’s actions, what comes through is how he is quickly and
successfully building unlimited personal power. As always in Russia, a key
element is control over the security ministries, which has gone, it seems,
to the loyal head of the Emergency Situations Ministry, Sergei Shoigu. 

Shoigu, in a remarkably short space of time, built upon the ruins of the
old Soviet civil defense system a powerful financial and security empire
about which as little is known as about Putin’s work before September 1999.

The second element in Putin’s speedily built personal power system is
control over the media. The Russian political scientist Sergei Markov has
labeled this a "manipulative democracy" – a situation in which the state
uses democratic institutions to achieve its aims.

During parliamentary elections, the government, in giving both covert and
overt support to the "party of power," Unity (Yedinstvo), violated
electoral laws, went unpunished and demonstrated just how willing Russia’s
new leaders are to ignore the law if it is not to their liking. 

At the same time, the public has no way of influencing the state, which is
thus unaccountable to society – perfectly in keeping with the definition of
totalitarianism. 

The third element of the system is control over the parliament – the Duma.
This control can now be direct – as the "Kremlin bloc" of parties can
obtain a majority of 50 percent plus one. 

This combination of financial, information and security methods is enough
to nip any opposition in the bud. Not only will this turn the Duma into a
puppet parliament, as was the Supreme Soviet, but it will effectively stamp
out even a hint of democracy in Russia.

Looking after its own interests, the West will only welcome these
developments — supporting the strongman, all the more so as with the help
of compromising material, the strongman will be under its control. Italian
daily Corriera della Sera and several Russian papers have already written
about Putin’s "illegal enrichment" and the real estate deals that have
given him opportunities for some "big time thieving."

The international community’s position on Chechnya has softened noticeably,
and the United States can’t let relations with Russia worsen just when it
has its own presidential election on the way.

The test for how much Putin fits the West’s long-term interests won’t be
Chechnya but the fight against corruption as personified by Berezovsky.
President Bill Clinton has said that battling corruption is the new Russian
leadership’s priority; and the Swiss prosecutor’s office has expressed its
readiness to make all material on the "Berezovsky case" available to
Russia. Should Berezovsky leave the political stage, Putin could receive
IMF money by May this year.

This is in Putin’s interests. Removing Berezovsky just before presidential
elections would be good publicity and also a way of reaching an agreement
with "unwanted witnesses" from Yeltsin’s entourage. If anti-corruption
investigations target Berezovsky alone, the others will keep silent. If
Berezovsky’s punishment is fictitious, Berezovsky too will keep silent.

Also, removing Berezovsky would give Putin the chance to establish his own
control over Berezovsky’s media empire – another boost to his personal power.

As for the war in Chechnya, its continuation enables Putin to keep public
opinion in mobilization mode and to accuse the opposition of any sins he
pleases, from insufficient patriotism to treason.

For the second time, Russia is burying its potential for economic
development in Chechnya. There is now little room for maneuver in the
economy – the positive effect of devaluation has worn off, world oil prices
are falling, the debt crisis continues and the temptation to soften the
blows by printing money as elections roll around will only worsen the
financial situation. 

Russia’s future depends on what type of force Putin imposes. If it is
carefully considered, it could spark recovery. If it is senseless – if the
state runs up against insoluble problems – it will lead to terror.

When it comes to the economy, Putin is a clean slate upon which his
entourage – the clans of Berezovsky and Chubais – will write. But these
clans lack people competent to judge the state of the economy. It is also
they who brought the economy to crisis in August 1998, and the same will
happen again in August 2000.

Having shown their inability to solve economic problems, the only thing
these two clans can resort to is dictatorship. Even a still-underdeveloped
democracy is enough to ensure that an economically incompetent government
does not remain in power.

The future liberal dictatorship will turn away from genuine reform and work
on creating a new business elite that will feed and support the political
elite. After liberalization of domestic and then foreign trade will come
privatization of the natural monopolies — giving the criminal and corrupt
elite another chance to fill their pockets and strike deals with regional
governors and the international financial community.

Putin will become a Yeltsin-style figure, not responsible for the economy,
changing governments as the crisis deepens. For Russia, this will result in
further brain drain and general degradation.

*******

#7
Sevodnya
January 15, 2000
Sergei Mulin
THE ENERGY CHIEF OF THE COUNTRY PREPARES FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL RACE-2004
[translation for personal use only]

Yesterday, by having agreed to the position of the leader of the Right-Wing
Forces Union (SPS) caucus in the Duma, Sergei Kirienko in fact renounced
potential claims to the job of a Prime Minister from the right wing under
future President Vladimir Putin. Of course, he renounced it in favor of the
coalition's shadow leader Anatoly Chubais. There is a promise to knock up a
new party around Anatoly Borisovich on the basis of SPS, some time by
mid-February. Hardly anyone doubts that the current chairman of the board of
Russia's United Energy System, who has brought the Gaidar babushkas from
their underground and managed to recruit a new generation of voters will be
this party's de-facto general secretary. The question about this party's
name is a PR technicality. There are runours that, having seen the tormented
birth of the Bear Party, Chubais decided to created a vehicle for his 2004
presidential campaign well in advance.

It is also revealing that Yegor Gaidar, who was originally planned to become
leader of SPS caucus, is likely to quit for good the sphere of public
politics and claim only economy-related positions in the new Duma. This is
equivalent to admission that the first wave of the reformers is only good as
experts and is about forever to quit the political stage.

Having identified himself as the "new face" of a future party, that may be
somewhat at a distance from Putin's Unity and even from Putin personally,
Kirienko articulated the first divergences between SPS and Putin: in the
Moscow oblast gubernatorial election, they supported different candidates
(the right-wingers joined the camp of General Boris Gromov from the
Fatherland Party, against CPRF's Gennady Seleznyov). In St.Petersburg,
according to Kirienko, "our positions will again diverge", if Putin keeps
his promise to endorse Vladimir Yakovlev. In addition, the right-wingers are
"firmly against" the imposition on exporters of the obligation to sell 100%
of their hard currency earnings.

However, one should not overestimate the SPS zeal in upholding its
principles. Konstantin Titov, though a promising right-wing candidate for
the presidency, was asked by his allies to decide by himself whether to run
or not. Irina Khakamada went further by saying that SPS should support the
Acting President's candidacy, with some conditions attached. The logic is as
follows: if Putin, Yevgenii Primakov and Gennady Zyuganov are those to have
the real chances, Putin can be the only one to support.

******

#8
The Electronic Telegraph (UK)
16 January 2000
[for personal use only] 
This will not be the century of any one nation, however mighty
By John Simpson
John Simpson is World Affairs Editor of the BBC

"WHETHER the 21st century will be another American century, I can't say. What 
I'm certain of is that the 21st century will be based on American principles."
We were strolling through the cloisters of Stanford University, and that is 
my memory of what Dr Condoleezza Rice said. Since I was trying to keep out of 
the cameraman's shot while keeping us face-on to the feeble, rainy light and 
working out my next question, I may not have got her exact phrasing. But the 
sentiments were certainly hers.

Dr Rice, now in her early 40s, could play a significant part in America's 
approach to the world. In 1989, as President Bush's main Soviet specialist, 
she advised him how to cope with Moscow when the Berlin Wall fell. He took 
her advice.

Now she is foreign policy adviser to his son, George W Bush, as he heads into 
the Republican primaries and, perhaps, eventual nomination. Mr Bush is 
trailing in the opinion polls behind the distinctly weird Senator John 
McCain. But if he manages to win, Dr Rice may well be either his national 
security adviser or his secretary of state: not bad for a black woman less 
than 40 years after her clergyman father would have been prevented by 
segregationist laws from sitting at the same lunch counter as white people.

So what about the 21st century being based on American principles? That means 
the concept of the nation-state as based on a single racial group - the idea 
that made possible, for instance, the series of nasty little wars in the 
former Yugoslavia - has had its day, at least in the West. It means that in 
the coming century we will be so much more internationalised that we will 
base our national sense of ourselves on a set of ideas and principles, not on 
some kind of racial profile.

To European ears, of course, the ideas Americans have created for themselves 
can sound tiresomely self-regarding. An advertisement I saw in New York not 
long ago said: "If a thing is youthful, and new, and energetic, we call it 
American." But self-congratulation aside, the idea that a country can 
constantly reinvent itself has done extraordinary things for America.

In 1900, many Americans were horrified by the influx of hundreds of thousands 
of Poles and Italian and Russian Jews. A friend of Henry James saw a group of 
new immigrants and wrote to him describing them as unclean animals.

Yet within a single generation the sons and daughters of these huddled masses 
were recreating postwar America in new, remarkable and quite unheard-of 
directions, at the same time influencing the whole world. The same is true of 
Chinese, Indian, Iranian and Latin American immigration in our own time. Each 
new wave adopts the set of ideas and strengthens it. The experiment has been 
a superb success.

Of the other Western powers Britain - now the world's fourth largest economy 
- is closest to the American model. Year after year, Asian surnames appear in 
the upper reaches of the first-class honours list at Oxford and Cambridge. 
Some of our best-known surgeons are Egyptian or Palestinian. Many of our best 
sportsmen are black. The influx of Asians from Uganda and Kenya in the early 
1970s did wonders for British life. Before they came, shops closed at 5.30 on 
weekdays and never opened at all on Sundays. The children of the new 
shopkeepers are often top scientists or academics. The most quintessential 
form of British cuisine is now tandoori, and curry and lager is the standard 
meal out. Long before the British gave up discussing whether it was good or 
bad for Britain to be multiracial it had become so.

As we approach the real start of the 21st century, it seems reasonable to 
assume that history has indeed come to an end, and that liberal democracy has 
(to its surprise) triumphed over nastier ideological varieties. A small 
directory of countries headed by the US, and including Britain, France, 
Germany and Japan, will dominate the entire political, economic, and social 
life of the planet.

If we are polite we will call it the G8 group of industrialised nations, and 
include Russia; but that won't be essential. Of the others, only Japan will 
remain a nation based primarily on one race and one culture, and that will 
increasingly prove a disadvantage to it.

Not long ago a law was passed in Germany which allowed people with not a drop 
of German blood in their veins to become German citizens. Meanwhile France, 
like Britain, recognised long before that there were advantages to bringing 
outsiders into the national grouping.

The process is never easy. Nothing infuriates some people more, and my 
post-bag will now be filled with letters, typed or in ballpoint, usually 
anonymous and almost always rude or insulting. Well, I'm sorry; but among all 
the changes which the 21st century will witness, this - the death of the 
narrowly defined nation state - will be among them. My guess is that it will 
be the biggest.

********

#9
From: Scott Blacklin <SBlacklin@AmCham.RU>
Subject: Russia's Choice - Rules or Ruin
Date: Sun, 16 Jan 2000 13:06:02 +0300

The appended article will appear in the Jan-Feb issue 2000 issue of the
AmCham News (American Chamber of Commerce in Russia). 

Russia's Choice - Rules or Ruin
By Scott Blacklin

The year 2000 will go down in history as the year Russians succeeded or
failed to recapture the spirit of 1991. The excitement of that seemingly
distant moment was rooted in the hope that finally, after over 1000 years,
Russia's powerful would be under the rule of law. It all looked promising
as the totalitarian state was dismantled and the forms and structures of
civilized political life took shape. The substance would come with time,
or so it was hoped. But today it seems clear that this spirit of a new
Russia has been stolen just as certainly as has much of Russia's wealth,
and by the same people. 

The Russian elections can rekindle that spirit, but only if they yield; 1)
a constitutional transfer of power; and 2) a conscious vision and
willingness to put power into the hands of the people through vigorous
application of the rule of law. The Russian people have historically
demonstrated an unmatched capacity to struggle and overcome - when they
have something to believe in. 

Much more is at stake than political methodology. Devoid of belief and
hope, entities rot. The 20th century has demonstrated (after much
bloodshed) that the old beliefs such as ideologies, nationalism and
fundamentalism are disastrous and retrograde principles around which to
organize human activities. The result is decay, and it is evident
throughout this abused country.

In the broadest sense, Russia's "organizational culture" has failed.
Organizational culture embraces the patterns of thought, feeling and action
in, and with regard to, organizations - be they political, economic or
social - in other words, the rules, be they external or internalized.
Crime, corruption, failure to implement law, and the low level of social
cooperation are symptoms, not causes, of the country's inability to
organize itself. Secretiveness, obfuscation, information hoarding,
personalization of group objectives, non-cooperation and a
no-rules-atmosphere have characterized Russian organizational culture for a
millennium. This type of organizational methodology was already obsolete
in the 19th century, and is now so gangrenous as to threaten the Russian
state with disappearance in the 21st.

This is crucial because in the 21st century, the distinguishing
characteristic of the successful nation will be its organizational
efficiency. In the ever more tightly interdependent world of the
Information Revolution, national primacy, or even survival, will depend on
its ability to generate wealth, not power in the political or military
sense. The efficient nation state will have public, private and social
organizations which can manage essential and accelerating flows - such as
communications, data and other information; money; labor; and other
resources - with ever increasing speed and flexibility. 

The advanced pluralistic world is undergoing today not just an Information
Revolution, but also an Organizational Revolution. Its salient attributes
include: 1) a flattening out of formerly vertical and hierarchical
organizational structures; 2) dispersed decision-making authority and
responsibility by smaller groups within the whole; 3) setting clear and
measurable goals and objectives; 4) refined techniques for brainstorming,
information gathering and consensus building, and 5) creative methods to
ensure iterative flows of such information, authority, responsibility and
resources. 

The end result of these constantly refining methods is a system which is
increasingly inclusive and democratic, by pushing power, resources and
responsibility down to smaller groups and giving them the power to act
(within the guidelines of the organization's objectives). This yields not
only greater efficiency, but just as importantly, greater individual
satisfaction, loyalty and cooperation in structures where the individual
has a tangible and meaningful role. 

None of these attributes is apparent in the Russian power structures today.
Russia's power circles have never been under rule of law, nor accountable
to society in any meaningful way. Since 1991, the Russian government has
paid only lip service to the concept of rule of law, while the privately
powerful have not even maintained the pretense, and continue to regard the
Russian people as fodder.

Such a one-sided inclusion into an exploitative system propels rational
beings to escape or work outside the system. Accordingly, Russia's pattern
of governance has been subverted from both above and below, for purposes of
exploitation by the powerful, and for survival by the rest of society.
This has yielded a cynical and sullen public environment in which to solve
the current crisis. It is a zero sum game, where cooperation and
compromise are lacking to a shocking degree. 

It is this spirit of cooperation which is absent in Russia today. We have
witnessed this phenomenon only once in recent Russian history - World War
II, when the very survival of the nation was at stake. Faced with an
onslaught of epic proportions, the Russian people demonstrated an
extraordinary spirit of cohesion and self-sacrifice. But it must be
admitted that the Nazis were made-to-order enemies against which even
zombie societies could unite. Today Russia's elite is desperately looking
for an enemy. Chechens don't make the grade - neither do Americans. The
frightful truth is that the enemy is within. Russia's enemy is the
lawlessness of its ruling "class".

There can be no stability, no growth, no civil peace until Russia's
powerful are accountable to their people under law. Social cohesion and
cooperation are built only under circumstances when people know that there
are rules to which all must adhere. In the final analysis, social
cooperation, economic growth, and real strength are fostered only in those
societies where there is a belief that the system is fundamentally fair.
There can be no sense of fairness without rule of law.

Russia needs leadership with a vision of a new Russia. This is a Russia
where the weak are protected from the powerful, where strength is to be
understood in terms of increasing economic growth and social welfare - not
in military stunts. It is a Russia where its people respect and cherish
their own country.

The season of choice upon us here in Russia, and a patch of blue sky
remains. Let us make a New Year's wish for Russia - to have a proper
election under the rules of Russia's Constitution - and one more that those
seeking power may be motivated by a new vision for Russia, worthy of the
historical sacrifices of the Russian people and up to the challenges of the
21st century. 

*******

#10
Boston Globe
15 January 2000
[for personal use only]
New Russian policy allows first strike 
By Brian Whitmore, Globe Correspondent

MOSCOW - Frustrated with Russia's declining role in the world, Acting 
President Vladimir V. Putin yesterday proclaimed a new security doctrine that 
would allow the Kremlin to make the first nuclear strike in a conflict.

In contrast to US guidelines, the Soviet Union's official policy had long 
renounced any so-called ''first use'' of nuclear weapons. Subsequently, 
Russia also said it would not use nuclear weapons except to protect its 
sovereignty.

In a reflection of Moscow's increasingly belligerent mood and its souring 
relations with the West, the new document also said attempts by the United 
States to dominate international affairs are a threat to Russia's national 
security.

There was little immediate reaction in Washington. White House spokesman Joe 
Lockhart said the doctrine ''is something that we look forward to getting a 
chance to review,'' but he did not elaborate.

While military officials in Moscow played down the doctrine's bellicose tone, 
analysts said it reflects a growing consensus among Moscow's elite that a 
weakened Russia is under assault from a hostile world and needs to reassert 
itself internationally. 

The increased emphasis on nuclear weapons, observers said, is also an 
implicit recognition of the weakness of Russia's conventional military 
forces, which for months have been bogged down trying to quash a separatist 
rebellion in Chechnya, just four years after Moscow gave up in an earlier 
attempt.

''The level and scale of threats in the military sphere is growing,'' the new 
doctrine declares. ''The Russian Federation considers it possible ... to use 
all forces and equipment at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, to repel 
armed aggression if all other means ... have been exhausted or proven 
ineffective.''

The doctrine replaces one implemented in 1997 that said Russia would use 
nuclear weapons only if its national sovereignty were threatened.

That was at a time when military and political cooperation with the West was 
still fashionable here. But following NATO's eastward expansion, the 
alliance's bombing of Yugoslavia, and Russia's war in Chechnya, Moscow's 
relations with the West have soured. Washington's desire to amend the 1972 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Russian parliament's failure to ratify 
the START II nuclear weapons treaty have further increased tensions.

The main foreign threats facing Russia, the new security doctrine says, are 
NATO's expansion to include former Moscow allies Hungary, Poland, and the 
Czech Republic, the possibility of NATO military bases being positioned at 
Russia's borders, and the United States' increasing dominance of world 
affairs. The document also accused the United States of circumventing 
international law and trying to resolve international crises on its own.

''The new doctrine reflects the overwhelming opinion of the Russian military 
and political elite that the West is a danger, and that given the weakness of 
Russia's conventional forces, reliance on nuclear weapons is necessary,'' 
said Pavel Felgenhauer, a Moscow-based defense analyst.

Military officials in Moscow, however, were quick to stress that Russia does 
not seek confrontation with the United States and its allies.

''Moscow is interested in expanding cooperation with the West,'' Colonel 
General Valery Manilov, deputy head of Russia's general staff, told the 
Interfax news agency.

But several defense analysts said the new doctrine could herald an era of 
confrontation between Russia and the West.

The United States has never renounced the first use of nuclear weapons, and 
NATO, in a summit last year in Washington, expanded the alliance's role to 
include intervention in conflicts beyond its members' borders.

''There is cause for serious concern here although it should not be overly 
dramatized,'' said Alexander Pikayev, a military expert at the Moscow 
Carnegie Center. ''Russia is not strong enough to seriously confront the 
West, but it could become a big rogue state with nuclear weapons. '' He 
called the document's confrontational tone ''very dangerous.''

Pikayev and others said domestic political concerns also played a role in the 
document, which has been in the works since last spring following NATO's 
airstrikes against Yugoslavia, a traditional Russian ally. The alliance's 
campaign in the Balkans set off a wave of anti-American sentiment and violent 
demonstrations in Russia. 

Putin, who became Russia's acting president when Boris Yeltsin abruptly 
resigned on New Year's Eve, faces an election in March in which he is the 
overwhelming favorite.

Since being plucked from obscurity by Yeltsin to become prime minister, Putin 
has spoken several times of his desire to revive Russia's status as a great 
power and to beef up the military. He, like Yeltsin, has expressed 
frustration with what he views as the increasing hegemony of Washington, a 
popular view in Russia.

''That this document was released just before the election is no accident,'' 
said Pikayev.

''This is a weak imitation of a new Cold War,'' said Konstantin 
Preobrazhensky, a retired foreign intelligence officer who served in the 
Soviet-era KGB. ''This is a political step by Putin aimed at winning the 
military's support.''

But, he added, ''It is still very dangerous because it gives the military a 
legal basis to act more aggressively and it will feed into anti-Western 
sentiments among the public.''

''The doctrine was written in this way because there is an anti-Western mood 
in the country. Everything the Kremlin does is dictated by domestic political 
concerns,'' said retired Army Colonel Alexander Zhilin, a Moscow-based 
military analyst. ''If the mood in the country were different, then our 
leaders would be kissing up to the West and declaring their love.'' 

The document also said terrorism has increasingly become a threat to Russia. 
In September, a series of apartment bombings killed more than 300 people in 
Moscow and other Russian cities. Officials have blamed those blasts on 
Chechen separatist rebels. 

The doctrine also identified Russia's weak economy as a security issue and 
called on the government to take steps to remedy the problem.

*******

Web page for CDI Russia Weekly:
http://www.cdi.org/russia