January 4, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4007 4008 4009

Johnson's Russia List
#4008
4 January 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Putin Seeks Victory In Chechnya "At Any Price": Gorbachev.
2. Financial Times (UK): John Thornhill, Putin may push for early poll.
3. Interfax: YELTSIN WILL KEEP HIGH PROFILE IN RUSSIAN POLITICS - KREMLIN AIDE.
4. Steven Solnick: How Many Signatures?
5. John Dabbar: New Year's Eve and Dyen Goroda in Moscow.
6. Dale Herspring: Observations.
7. John Squier: Intriligator Article.
8. Joseph Schotland: questions about Russia's Central Election Commission.
9. Newsday: Richard Haass, Putin's Rule May Leave U.S. Cold.
10. Interfax: Gorbachev doubts Putin will win early election.
11. Interfax: Chubais says Yeltsin's decision a "stroke of genius"
12. Interfax: Berezovsky says Yeltsin proved he was right choice for Russia.
13. Wall Street Journal: Daniel Yergin and Thane Gustafson, Yeltsin's Bold Departure....And His Successor's 'New National Idea' 
14. Ira Straus: Putin's "Russian Idea" (Re JRL 4002)
15. Robert Bruce Ware: Reply to de Waal JRL 4005]

*******

#1
Putin Seeks Victory In Chechnya "At Any Price": Gorbachev 
Reuters
January 3, 2000 

Acting President Vladimir Putin is prepared to do anything for victory in 
Chechnya, whatever the cost in human lives, said former Soviet president 
Mikhail Gorbachev in an interview published Monday.

"Putin knows better than anyone that in the event of defeat -- or simply of 
no victory -- his position could rapidly deteriorate," Gorbachev told the 
Italian daily La Stampa.

"So he will do everything to win, at any cost and whatever the number of 
deaths," he added. The war could last beyond the presidential elections, said 
Gorbachev. They are scheduled for the end of March.

Although the West was hoping that things might improve in Russia with 
Yeltsin's departure, those hopes were not always well-founded, Gorbachev 
continued.

According to Gorbachev, Putin is part of the oligarchy.

"The regime will not change, there will be no fight against corruption -- 
above all, the interests and the privileges of the oligarchy will be 
protected."

*******

#2
Financial Times (UK)
4 January 2000
[for personal use only]
Putin may push for early poll 
By John Thornhill in Moscow

Vladimir Putin, Russia's acting president, may try to capitalise on his high 
popularity ratings by bringing forward the date of the presidential 
elections, tentatively scheduled for March 26.

Such a move would give Mr Putin a significant advantage over other 
contenders, given the so far successful conduct of the war in Chechnya and 
his control of the levers of power during the election campaign.

Marat Valgai, head of the constitutional court, said yesterday Mr Putin might 
ask the upper house of parliament to alter the date of the elections, made 
necessary by the resignation of Boris Yeltsin on New Year's eve.

The suggestion was followed by the dismissal of Mr Yeltsin's daughter from 
her Kremlin post. The sacking of Tatyana Dyachenko was one of Mr Putin's 
first personnel changes and suggested he is eager to cut ties with 
corruption-tainted members of Mr Yeltsin's inner circle and prove he is his 
own man.

Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet president, had earlier questioned how fair 
the elections were likely to be in the light of last month's parliamentary 
poll.

Observers suggested that the state media were flagrantly biased in favour of 
the pro-Putin Unity movement, which came second in the elections.

"After what we have seen in this [parliamentary] election campaign and in 
this vote count, the idea of free and fair elections in Russia is simply 
ridiculous," Mr Gorbachev said.

Mr Valgai met Mr Putin yesterday and said afterwards that the acting 
president could ask parliament to set an election date at any time within 
three months.

"In the constitution it is clearly stated that presidential elections must be 
held within three months from the day of departure of Boris Yeltsin. But 
there are some uncertainties - in particular, how to resolve the issue of 
holding elections earlier than three months," he said.

"Vladimir Putin knows what is written in the constitution very well and 
weighs up his plans according to this document."

The upper house of parliament, the Federation Council composed of Russia's 
regional leaders, has the final say about the date of the presidential 
elections. Mr Putin can count on the support of several influential leaders, 
including Yevgeny Nazdratenko and Mikhail Prusak, the governors of 
Vladivostok and Novgorod.

But the group of governors that supported the anti-Kremlin Fatherland-All 
Russia bloc in last month's elections is unlikely to agree to a date 
disadvantageous to Mr Putin's rivals.

Mr Gorbachev said Mr Putin's decision to grant immunity to Mr Yeltsin over 
allegations of corruption meant nothing would change in the Kremlin. "The 
regime won't change, there won't be a fight against corruption, the interests 
and privileges of the oligarchy will be fully protected."

The former Soviet leader suggested that Mr Yeltsin had been persuaded to 
resign by his entourage. "They threw him out," he said.

********

#3
YELTSIN WILL KEEP HIGH PROFILE IN RUSSIAN POLITICS - KREMLIN AIDE

MOSCOW. Jan 3 ( Interfax) - The job transfers of two experienced
aides to Russia's first president Boris Yeltsin-Vladimir Shevchenko and
Valery Semenchenko-are no harbinger of "new broom sweeps clean" tactics,
a top presidential administration official commenting on Vladimir
Putin's reshuffle decrees has told Interfax on conditions of anonymity.
Yeltsin will carry out vigorous political and public activity,
travelling across the country and abroad extensively and meeting with
the public, the source said. This calls for the creation for Yeltsin of
structures principally new in Russia, including a state protocol
service, a chancellery, press service, personal protection and other
services essential for enabling the first Russian president to keep on
with his active political work and maintain his government role.
The creation of these services has been entrusted to Shevchenko,
the former head of the president's protocol department, and Semenchenko,
the former head of Yeltsin's office. Dmitri Yakushkin is expected to
carry on as Yeltsin's press secretary and spokesman.
For this reason, the transfer of Shevchenko, Semenchenko to the
rank of advisors to the new head of state and of Yakushkin to the rank
of administration chief of staff assistant are the first step toward the
formation of a principally new democracy in Russia, the source said.

******

#4
From: "Steven Solnick" <sls27@columbia.edu>
Subject: How Many Signatures?
Date: Mon, 3 Jan 2000 

A question that JRL readers might be able to quickly answer:

In the LAT story of 3 Jan (JRL 4007, #9), Igor Shabdurasulov explained to
the writer that the new election law signed on 12/31 by Yeltsin will help
Putin, since candidates will now be required to collect 1 million
signatures: "Under the previous election law, presidential candidates also
had to collect 1 million signatures to qualify for the ballot, but if an
early election was called, that number was slashed to 500,000."

However, in the wake of the resignation, on 12/31, Ekho Moskvy interviewed
CEC chairman Veshnyakov (JRL 4001, #9). Veshnyakov referred specifically to
"the new [presidential election] law that is to be published in literally
the first five days of January" and noted that "If these were normal
elections rather than early elections it would be 1m signatures but under
these circumstances, when there is less time, only 500,000 are needed."

I tend to believe Shabdurasulov--his account would explain why the law was
so important that Yeltsin made sure to sign it on his last day in office.
And we'll all know in the next few days when the law is published. But can
any astute JRL reader explain the apparent contradiction between the above
statements?

*******

#5
Date: Mon, 03 Jan 2000 
From: "John Dabbar" <Dabbar@CPC.Ru> 
Subject: New Year's Eve

David, Given the number of postings regarding the Yeltsin resignation, New
Year's Eve was a non-event from a worldwide news standpoint. I hope your
readers enjoy the following lighter alternative

New Year's Eve and Dyen Goroda in Moscow

As the world prepared for dozens of official celebrations, from Sydney to
Seattle, the residents and visitors to Moscow put on their own show. Moscow,
unlike many world-class cities, did not put on a state sponsored fireworks
show or an official performance adjacent to the center of government.
Rather, thousands of people gathered in Red Square for a celebration of and
by the people. 
Muscovites gathered in small groups, knots of family and friends, and loving
couples. Handheld sparklers, bottle rockets, and Roman candles shot off
spontaneously in every direction. Drained bottles of Sovyetskoye
Shampanskoye rolled down the cobblestones. And perfect strangers came up to
my family and wished us happy new year - alternatively in Russian and
English language. The atmosphere was one of warmth and collective
celebration.

The interesting observation on this event was the contrast with other parts
of the world, most notably Washington DC. Comparing notes with a long-time
Moscow resident now in Washinton, I offer the following differences between
the two celebrations:

Access control - To get on the Capitol Mall, site of the main DC show, one
had to stand in line, walk through a metal detector, and be prepared for
handbag inspection. Security was visible and alert. In Moscow, there was no
control whatsoever - anyone could walk in, and the only security visible was
the traffic police and a few militsya. Perhaps this is a sign of a
civilization with no tort lawyers.

Time observance - In Moscow, there was no countdown to the millenium. The
Spassky Tower clock, probably the closest thing to the official countown
clock you could find, was not adorned with flashing "2000" or exploding
announcements as one could see on other world capitols. Rather, the Moscow
revelers continued to celebrate before and after the event.

*****

#6
Date: Mon, 3 Jan 2000
From: Dale R Herspring <falka@ksu.edu>
Subject: Observations

Coming back from vacation and reading back copies of Johnson's list, I was
struck by two comments. First, Tim Colton's observation that there is
entirely too much "off the top of one's head" commentary on the
elections. It would be much more useful if fewer, but more analytical
pieces were written as Tim advises.

Second, I suspect Roger Hamburg is right on mark to worry about academics
and politicians making hay out of Chechnya. We may not like what is going
on there, but the last time I looked it was an internal Russian problem --
at least that is the way I suspect anyone respecting national sovereignty
would treat it. 

Roger is also wise to warn of a "who lost Russia" campaign. As was the
case with CHina, it was the local population. Our so-called experts from
places like MIT, who provided largely useless economic advice, did not
help, but the bottom line is that no one forced the Russians to accept
it. There is something of a colonial mentality that assumes we had the
power to determine which way Russia headed. It might be wise to remember
that these were times when no one knew what would happen tomorrow, let
alone next week.

The task now is to provide policy makers with solid advice on where Russia
is heading and for that we have to go back to Tim's advice. I suspect
that Putin himself doesn't have much of a plan -- as many have
noted. What will happen when the honeymoon (meant politically) of
Chechnya wears off? In the meantime, we need less statement of the
obvious and more analysis as Tim suggests.

******

#7
Date: Mon, 03 Jan 2000
From: John Squier <JohnS@NED.ORG> 
Subject: Intriligator Article

David-I had some comments on Michael Intriligator's recent article which
appeared on December 29.

As always, I begin my comments by noting that the opinions that I offer are
mine alone, and do not represent the opinions of the board and staff of the
National Endowment for Democracy, its financial supporters, or its grantees.

I was interested to read Michael Intriligator's comments of December 29
regarding possible sources of growth in the Russian economy. What I found
so interesting about them was not their content, but rather, the fact that
Intriligator would have been able to make these kinds of comments five, ten
or even twenty years ago with virtually no modifications. In fact, I recall
writing a paper on the Soviet Union's prospects for competing in world
markets which reached conclusions not substantially different from
Intriligator's in 1986, when I was an undergrad. The quality of Russia's
human capital and educational system, and its leading role in several areas
of technology, have never been in doubt.

The problem is setting up the kinds of social and political arrangements
necessary for these resources to be used to their best advantage. These
conditions were utterly absent in the Soviet Union, and are at best
tenuously established today. Intriligator himself points out the most
significant problem facing Russia today when he notes "It will also be
necessary, of course, to press Russia to build the basic institutions of
free markets-protection of shareholder rights, accounting transparency,
legal due process and the like." The West has been pressing Russia on this
point for at least a decade, yet these institutions remain quite poorly
developed (as recent events connected with the Lomonosov Porcelain Factory
attest). Although the Western press has reacted favorably to Prime Minister
Putin's rise and described him as a reformer, it's really a little early to
say what he'll do to strengthen them, given that his only significant public
actions to date have involved consolidating power and/or overseeing Russia's
operations in Chechnya.

I don't think that the high-tech sector is likely to be an easy way out for
Russian economy, either. More than any other sector, information technology
depends on sound intellectual property rights which, any extant legislation
notwithstanding, simply don't exist in Russia. In 1995, for example, I was
able to purchase a (hilariously dubbed) videotape of Quentin Tarantino's
"Pulp Fiction" weeks before it came out in theatres in the USA. Russia
produces thousands of well-qualified computer programmers every year, but
until really stable conditions for business can be established, and until
salaries in Russia rise to a high enough level, I would imagine that
computer programmers will feel pressure to move abroad, and Russia's brain
drain will continue. On my last trip to Russia, I had at least two
conversations with computer programmers who were nearing the completion of
their university degrees and wanted to know about moving abroad, and at
least once a week on the Washington metro, I hear Russian-speaking computer
programmers talking about their jobs. In any case, sectoral development of
the high-tech economy will do nothing to alleviate crises in agriculture and
industry; certainly, nobody expects a 45-year-old machinist with no
education beyond vocational training to become, say, a network engineer.

In short, I think that Professor Intriligator is far too optimistic about
the possibilities for rapid growth in the Russian economy. The extent of
the current economic crisis seems too severe, and the political will to do
anything about it too weak, for high-tech development to make a big enough
difference. I really hope I'm wrong, but I fear I'm right.

John E. Squier
Program Officer for Russia and Ukraine
The National Endowment for Democracy

*******

#8
Date: Mon, 03 Jan 2000
From: Joseph Schotland <schotlan@fas.harvard.edu>
Subject: questions about Russia's Central Election Commission

Please assist me. I am a graduate student at Harvard and I am
studying Russia's Central Election Commission. I have a few questions
and I hope that you can answer them or help me answer them by posting my
questions, forwarding them to someone, or running more stories about the
"CEC." Thanks.
1. What, if anything, is the "CEC" doing about eliminating loopholes
in the financial disclosure of candidates? That is, will the CEC in the
future require candidates to disclose information about stock and equity
owned etc.?
2. What, if anything, is the "CEC" doing about creating a "fair"
pre-election environment? That is, what, if anything, will the CEC do
about the government using its power to influence the media and get
people fired etc.?
3. How effective is the CEC?
4. Why isn't the CEC more effective? What would make it more
effective?

******

#9
Newsday
3 January 2000
[for personal use only]
Putin's Rule May Leave U.S. Cold
By Richard N. Haass. Richard N. Haass is vice president and director
of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution.

BORIS YELTSIN resigned the presidency of his country much as he
ruled, with a flair for the dramatic. His announcement on the eve of the
new millenium surprised the Russian people and the world.
Yeltsin's timing could hardly have been better from his perspective.
Yeltsin all but guaranteed he will be succeeded by his hand-picked prime
minister, Vladimir Putin. With presidential elections to be held before
the end of March, Putin is likely to be voted into power thanks to the
widespread popularity of the war in Chechnya.
Yeltsin, who was due to give up the presidency by June in any event,
gained in other ways. Most important to him, he received assurances from
Putin that he will not be prosecuted for any actions he committed in
office.
Americans tend to think of Yeltsin as something of a buffoon, all
too often drunk and seemingly out of control. To be sure, this was part
of it, but there was also more to him.
Boris Yeltsin made some major contributions that deserve
recognition. In the summer of 1991, his defiance was the critical factor
in destroying the attempted coup against then-Soviet leader Mikhail
Gorbachev. And months later Yeltsin, as head of Russia, was central to
the decision that led to the breakup of the Soviet Union.
Yeltsin also deserves credit for presiding over the emergence of
limited democracy and free enterprise in Russia. Last month's
parliamentary elections, for example, were accepted as legitimate by
most observers.
But Yeltsin's rule was characterized by widespread corruption. Crime
became rampant. The economy has yet to recover from years of
mismanagement. He created a powerful presidency that poses a permanent
threat to Russian democracy. Twice his army went to war against the
republic of Chechnya, violating human rights in the process. Time and
time again, he proved to be more comfortable with the drama of gesture
than the details of governing.
It is too soon to know how Vladimir Putin, who spent the bulk of his
career in the KGB, will turn out. Putin's own writings suggest someone
who favors the continuation of a dominant presidency and the revival of
the state's role in the economy, the military and Russia's place in the
world.
Putin has a good opportunity to improve Russia. The economy has
bounced back from the August, 1998, crash. The new parliament gives him
a potential working majority, and he is surfing a wave of popularity
because of the Chechen war.
Also, he is a relatively new face, one who is young and healthy in
contrast to his predecessor.
It is instructive that Putin went to Chechnya as his first official
trip. The fact that the war against the Chechen rebels is perceived as
going well is the main source of Putin's popularity. But this will fade
if Russia cannot bring about peace without suffering many casualties. As
history has shown, this will be anything but easy.
The United States has a great deal at stake in Russia. Russia
remains a major power because it inherited an enormous nuclear weapons
arsenal from the Soviet Union. The top priority for American foreign
policy should be to reduce the Russian nuclear threat and to minimize
the chance that any nuclear weapons or technology will be used
accidentally or fall into the wrong hands.
Reducing the nuclear threat must take precedence over our
justifiable concerns about Russian violation of human rights in
Chechnya. It also takes precedence over our desire to see democratic and
economic reforms institutionalized in Russia, something we can want but
not will.
But working out a productive relationship with Putin's Russia
promises to be difficult. The country is an odd mixture of weakness and
strength. It is filled with resentment over its diminished status in the
world. Russia is unlikely to be the arch-rival the Soviet Union was
during the Cold War, but neither is it likely to be a partner for the
United States as we seek to shape the post-Cold War world.

********

#10
Gorbachev doubts Putin will win early election

MOSCOW. Dec 31 (Interfax) - Former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev has
questioned the certainty of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's victory at an
early presidential election. "Putin's positions are not strong as they seem,
because his opinions are unknown. Putin is holding on thanks to his
mystery. Mysterious appearance, mysterious glance, mysterious phrases. But
it so
happens that a man opens his mouth and has nothing to say," Gorbachev told
Interfax before his departure abroad on December 29. The former Soviet
leader had supposed two days before Boris Yeltsin declared his resignation
as president that the Kremlin leader might quit and pass over his powers to
Putin. "In that case, the president's initiative will aim to strengthen his
successor's positions," according to him. "In this connection, I believe
that one should not become flustered in front of this arrogant power which
wants to strike while the iron is hot. One should take a position which
would make Putin reveal his position, his views and program, and what he
is taking part in the election for," he said. "Second, it is necessary to
unite. There are forces which can unite and form a powerful association
which can put forth a strong presidential candidate" and Yevgeny Primakov,
formerly prime minister and currently leader of the Fatherland/All Russia
(OVR) election bloc is the man who fits the top job most. "The fact that
representatives of this bloc are a bit confused is even useful for them
like a cold shower. Because they were heroes and the wind blew into their
sails. But still, they have high chances, and everything can now change," he
said.

******

#11
Chubais says Yeltsin's decision a "stroke of genius"

MOSCOW. Dec 31 (Interfax) - Boris Yeltsin's decision to step down as
president was a "stroke of genius," Anatoly Chubais, a former senior
government official turned head of the Russian power monopoly, UES, told
Interfax. "It was the perfect decision, courageous and profound," he said.
Yeltsin will certainly go down in history, Chubais continued, adding that
many a politician will come to realize his importance in the wake of the
resignation. "Many will have good reason to be a little ashamed for
past opposition to the president," he said.

******

#12
Berezovsky says Yeltsin proved he was right choice for Russia

MOSCOW. Dec 31 (Interfax) - Prominent Russian tycoon Boris
Berezovsky, who was elected the State Duma deputy from the
Karachaevo-Cherkessian single-mandate electoral district, regards Russian
President Boris Yeltsin's decision to resign early as the right one.
"Yeltsin once again proved to everybody that he is the right choice for
Russia, a powerful, great and unpredictable country for everyone but us,
those who were born, live and will die here," Berezovsky told Interfax on
Friday.

*******

#13
Wall Street Journal
January 3, 2000 
[for personal use only]
Commentary 
Yeltsin's Bold Departure . . . . . And His Successor's 'New National Idea' 
By Daniel Yergin and Thane Gustafson. 
Mr. Yergin is chairman and Mr.
Gustafson is director of Cambridge Energy Research Associates. Mr. Yergin is
co-author of "The Commanding Heights" (Touchstone, 1999). Mr. Gustasfson is
author of "Capitalism Russian-Style" (Cambridge University Press, 1999).

What kind of Russian president will Vladimir Putin be? He has shown
himself a
careful politician, courteous in his dealings with fellow politicians,
including the opposition. He has been tough but businesslike in his initial
moves on economic policy. He projects vigor and positions himself as the
apostle of Russia's "new national idea." 

He spent much of his professional life in the KGB, including several
years in
East Germany, and has not hesitated to use the war in Chechyna for obvious
political purposes. Yet he has reformist credentials as well. He made his
first mark in the new Russia as the head of foreign trade affairs in St.
Petersburg under Mayor Anatoly Sobchak, a reformer and Mr. Putin's onetime
law professor. He was "the man to see" to get things done in the city. He
rocketed up the Kremlin ladder, briefly heading the FSB, the successor to
the KGB, and then Mr. Yeltsin's national security council. 

Mr. Putin was unknown to most Russians when he became prime minister in
August, but his popularity has soared owing to his hard line in Chechnya. We
may never know the true cause of the one event that transformed the
political
scene--the series of explosions in September that destroyed whole apartment
buildings and claimed hundreds of innocent lives in Moscow and two southern
cities. What is certain is that the Kremlin lost no time in responding. Mr.
Putin, the new prime minister, struck back with the massive deployment
against what he dubbed "Chechen terrorism." As the tanks moved toward
Grozny,
Mr. Putin's public image was transformed--from a taciturn cipher to a
vigorous, tough-talking leader. 

The timing of Mr. Yeltsin's resignation was clearly designed to harvest Mr.
Putin's popularity at its peak. As acting president, Mr. Putin's will have a
formidable campaign armory--all the machinery of the Kremlin, a good part of
the press and a great deal of money. The only obvious way he could lose the
March 26 presidential election would be for the war in Chechnya to turn bad
for the Russians. The next few weeks will see feverish political activity as
the other leading candidates, stunned by Mr. Yeltsin's New Year's surprise,
recoup and explore a united front, while Mr. Putin seeks to divide and
co-opt them. 

Mr. Putin will benefit from an economy that is doing considerably better
than
anticipated in the aftermath of the August 1998 collapse. This enabled Mr.
Putin to pay out overdue pensions, further enhancing his popularity.
Russia's
economy grew in 1999, for only the second time in the post-Soviet era.
Devaluation of the ruble dramatically improved the competitive position of
Russian industry, spurring domestic production. With oil so large a part of
both Russian exports and government revenues, the sharp rise in oil
prices is
providing a big boost to the economy. Domestic investment is up, and the
balance of trade is positive, keeping the ruble stable and the government
solvent. And a surprisingly strong consensus has emerged across the
political
spectrum about the need to contain budget deficits, fight inflation and
secure foreign investment. 

But one can hardly say the economy is thriving. Real wages and real consumer
expenditures have not grown at all in 1999. Without any growth in consumer
spending to sustain it, the recovery in domestic production could stall. The
continuing low levels of foreign investment demonstrate the well-founded
apprehensions of Western business about the obvious uncertainties in the
legal system and the conviction that the system is not only arbitrary but
also often manipulated against foreigners. 

Will Mr. Putin provide the "intelligent, strong, energetic" leadership that
Mr. Yeltsin promised in his resignation statement? First and foremost, Mr.
Putin presents himself not only as a democrat but also as a derzhavnik, a
proponent of a strong state. In a statement posted on his new Web site last
week--perhaps not coincidentally just three days before Mr. Yeltsin's
resignation--Mr. Putin emphasized his determination to restore
"paternalistic" state power. 

"Russia will not soon become, if it ever becomes, a second copy of, say, the
U.S. or England, where liberal values have deep historic roots," he
declared.
"A strong state for Russians is not an anomaly, not something that must be
fought against, but on the contrary is the source and guarantor of order,
the initiator and main driving force of all change." 

But he also emphasized the need for a vigorous "civil society" to balance
state power. He is positioning himself as the ultimate centrist, fighting
off
all extremes. He criticizes the "dark past" of communism, but at the same
time warns against "radical" reforms that attempt to "transplant to Russian
soil abstract models and schemes derived from foreign textbooks." He has
shown not only considerable political skill, but also a spirit of civility
and even compromise and an openness to negotiation. As the Duma, Russia's
parliament, recessed shortly before the December elections, Mr. Putin
appeared on the floor, thanked the legislators for their good work and
wished
them all success--a double-edged farewell perhaps, now that his party has
turned a good number out of office. But no one doubts his capacity for cold
calculation or his drive for control. 

Beyond the Chechen war, he faces two tests. The first is in the economy. He
knows what needs to be done--fix a pernicious, terribly skewed tax system;
attack corruption; protect contracts and minority shareholder rights;
promote
a sound commercial banking system; firmly establish the rule of law. All of
that is necessary in order to encourage investment, allow entrepeneurship
and small business to flourish, and stimulate economic growth. 

He is less clear on how this will happen. In last week's manifesto he
declared: "We call for pursuing an investment policy that would combine pure
market mechanisms with measures of state guidance." He is keen to gain the
benefits of tying Russia much more into the world economy. He promises to
promote exports, will likely seek an increase in the currently low levels of
foreign investment, and has made Russian membership in the World Trade
Organization a top priority. 

Mr. Putin has no intention of presiding over an economic basket case. He
knows the stakes. "Russia's greatness" and its position in the world in the
21st century, he has said, will depend upon its economic strength--not,
as in the Soviet era, on military might. 

The second test flows from the first. What the system urgently needs is a
sense of fairness and legitimacy--beginning with a clean presidential
election. That means not only a break with corruption and backroom deals,
but
also a separation from the "Family," Mr. Yeltsin's entourage of kin,
functionaries and oligarchs. The answer to that test, which can come only
after Mr. Putin wins election in his own right, will depend not only the new
president's own values and intentions, and not only how strong he is, but
also on the constitutional system and freedom of expression that are among
Boris Yeltsin's most important legacies to 21st-century Russia. 

*******

#14
Date: Mon, 03 Jan 2000
From: IRASTRAUS@aol.com (Ira Straus)
Subject: Putin's "Russian Idea" (Re JRL 4002)

Putin's manifesto (on JRL 4002 give Tom Adshead gives a useful summary 
version of it) is as a whole sober and sensible. It shows a keen sensibility 
as to the actual situation of Russia. And skill in maintaining good sense 
across a wide range of tough issues and tough political pressures. That's in 
itself cause for hope.

It seems to me that most of the criticisms of the manifesto as hardline are 
misplaced. Nevertheless, there is one part of it to which I would like to 
devote some critical attention. This is Putin's version of "the Russian idea".

Putin says that "our programme will include three basic concepts: 1. The 
Russian idea 2. A strong state 3. An efficient economy". This makes the 
Russian idea pretty basic for him. 

He proceeds, a bit illogically, to develop "the Russian idea" empirically, 
not as an idea but as a collection of facts. That is to say, he adduces 
several empirical features in the Russian mentality and society, rather than 
developing a coherent idea or ideal or national purpose. 

Like Yeltsin's "Russian idea", Putin's is a failure as an idea. Perhaps 
that's fortunate, since the whole idea of a "national idea" is a pernicious 
one. But it also means that he is bound to leave in his train some 
disappointment and hankering after a stronger national idea; as long, that 
is, as he and the Russian government continues to maintain that a "Russian 
idea" is needed. It was a mistake of Yeltsin to call for a "national idea" in 
the first place a few years ago. A country in fundamental transition is in no 
position to settle on a "national idea" that won't become quickly obsolete 
and an obstacle to further development. The best it could hope for is a 
national _perspective_ on where it is trying to go, the role it hopes to play 
in the world in the future, and the positive meaning this will give to the 
long national history. It's hard enough to develop such a perspective and 
maintain it in face of the country's unsettled condition and role in the 
world (and in face of some failures of the outside world to validate the 
perspective); but far less difficult or pernicious, than to try to build 
consensus around a settled "national idea" in a time of inherent national 
unsettlement. 

There are already two competing national perspectives in Russia: the 
Westernist perspective and the Eurasianist perspective. The Westernist 
perspective: Russia is a primarily European country, the easternmost part of 
the West, with eastern Slavic and Christian roots, with some multiethnic 
character like America rather than purely European and purely national 
character; it was for centuries on the frontline for Europe against Mongol 
hordes, enjoying (mostly suffering) Mongol influences (mostly deformation) in 
the process; it is now trying to complete its five-centuries-long process of 
reclaiming its European heritage and catching up with the subsequent 
development of European society; with a view to a future in which it plays 
its great role in the world as an integral part of the West. The Eurasianist 
perspective: Russia is a unique separate civilization created by mixture of 
Slavic and Mongol-Tartar cultures and ethnicities, spared by its Asian 
elements from the decadent individualism of the West which is on its last 
legs; it inevitably has a separate destiny from the West, divergent 
fundamental interests; and indeed it ought to play a separate role in the 
world, mediating between the Asian and European civilizations. These two 
perspectives are serious, because they offer coherent explanations of what 
Russia has been and ought to be, not just conglomerations of conditions. The 
Russian government from 1985 to 1992 stood for the Westernist perspective, 
but got discredited for this due to the sense of being humiliated rather than 
validated for it by the West and by domestic economic suffereing. It switched 
in 1993 and under Chernomyrdin to a bureaucratic version of Eurasianism, 
without the anti-Western content of the ideological brand of Eurasianism, but 
merely affirming that Russia will pragmatically pursue its interests which 
are both in Europe and in Asia, and will deal with the facts of its national 
characteristics which are not purely European. This Official Eurasianism has 
turned out to be most Eurasian in form, Westernizing in content. It is 
Westernism aka Eurasianism, and it seems to be where Putin is to be found 
today. It is a perspective, not a fixed national idea -- and a circuitous 
double-feature perspective at that, a perspective on how to find a practical 
route back to a Westernist perspective, and how to hold onto some kind of 
mental and governmental stability in the meantime. It is probably the best 
that Russia can do today, given the failure for the time being of its project 
of forming a Common European Home. The latter is probably the authentic 
national project of contemporary Russia; it would finally provide a home 
within which to solidify the national perspective and identity.

Anyway, here is how Putin gets to his "Russian idea" which is not an idea. He 
headlines a section "the Russian idea", and starts out with an appeal for a 
consensus approach (a reasonable appeal in politics, but not in the 
development of ideas): "You cannot push a society forward if it is split. 
However it is not acceptable to me to achieve civil accord using the same 
methods as under Soviet power. This is not compatible with a democratic 
society. However, one of the reasons for the slow pace of reform has been the 
absence of unity behind common ideas, although some shifts in this direction 
can be observed. People have come to take for granted such things as freedom 
of speech, and of foreign travel. They are happy to have the right to own 
property, and to undertake their own businesses. 

"Alongside this are traditional features of the Russian character, which are 
likely to prevail". 

Then comes his list of four specifically Russian characteristics, the 
"traditional features of the Russian character, which are likely to prevail": 
"patriotism", "Russia as a great power", "looking to the state", and "social 
solidarity". These become an essential basis for his Russian idea.

A bit of analysis of these four points reveals that they are a poor basis
for a "Russian idea":

1 & 2: These points don't seem to be particularly Russian ideas, except in 
the simple fact that they are RUSSIAN patriotism and RUSSIA as a great power. 
Putin himself indicates that they are ambiguous and need to be shorn of 
negative connotations such as imperialism; which is to say, he would separate 
them from a lot of their specifically Russian historical content. His most 
interesting arguments for these attitudes are: "Without patriotism, we lose 
our pride, our sense of ourselves as a people capable of great things. Russia 
as a great power. This has always been part of the Russian mindset." True 
enough; but it is also the case that, without a universalistic outlook, no 
people can achieve things that are good as well as great. A truly proud 
nation is one that is proud of its contributions to the universal pool of 
humanity; a nation that tries to be proud only of itself, with a sense that 
this is being done manipulatively for the sake of a need for national 
solidarity, is one with a poor and fragile pride indeed. There is no 
"American idea"; Americans are proud because they have pioneered ideas which 
they believe are universal (and have lots of immigrants and imitators to 
confirm their belief). The "great power" point is also ambiguous. Yes, the 
"great power" role is a part of the mentality of Russia, as it is of every 
other country that has in recent history been a great power. But we live in 
an interdependent world, and the question of the age is whether the great 
powers will realize their sense of importance through integration with one 
another and development of a sense of a combined role and mission, or through 
continued counterposition to one another. The Western and Central European 
great powers have sustained their sense of greatness after 1945 through 
integration with one another, after having nearly destroyed it in the 
previous half-century by trying to emphasize it vis-a-vis one another. 
Emphasis on "national ideas" and "great power status" tends to encourage 
national particularity and attempts at greatness through counterposition 
rather than integration. To be sure, integration requires respect for the 
dignity of its participants and provision of adequate status within the new 
collective for them. Putin's formulation is thus not incompatible with an 
integerative role for Russia -- not yet, and not inherently; but still the 
tendency in it is negative. Perhaps the greatest failure of the West since 
1991 has been its failure to provide Russia with a role in joint endeavors 
commensurate with its traditional greatness, or even to conceptualize such a 
role; leaving Russia nowhere to go for renewing its sense of greatness except 
to separate national actions and licking of its own identity-wounds. Putin's 
mistake, like Yeltsin's whole mistake in calling for a "national idea", might 
thus be said to flow from a mistake on the part of the West. But that's scant 
consolation for a process of national idea/identity-formation which tends to 
serve to consolidate the mistake, potentially for a long time to come.

3 & 4: Putin actually seems to be saying (in his elaboration on these points) 
that paternalism, collectivism and looking to the state are more negative 
than positive characteristics; they simply aren't going to go away very soon, 
and are something that he will have to work with prudently. All of this is 
eminently sensible, but what, one might ask, does it have to do with the 
Russian idea?

This is where Putin drops his bombshell (quietly):

"The issue is not whether these features are good or bad ­ the important 
thing is that they not only exist, they currently prevail. The new Russian 
idea will be an alloy of the universal principles and these Russian values."

Here Mr. Putin is contradicting himself. The most generous interpretation I 
can give here is that he doesn't realize what he is saying, or how serious 
would be its implications for Russia's future if it were to be accepted as 
national idea (ideology). 

If the Russian characteristics which Putin describes are just particular 
Russian realities to which universal ideas have to be adapted for functioning 
in present-day Russia, then they're NOT an idea, much less "the Russian 
idea". If, on the contrary, they're an integral part of "the Russian idea", 
then the implied claim is that these features are good, something that 
Russians should be proud of and attached to, and have some kind of permanent 
or even universal significance. 

The most terrible evils in politics flow from making a virtue out of a 
necessity, an end out of a means, something permanent out of what should be 
temporary, a universal out of what is particular. This happens, not out of 
malice, but out of the process of finding justifications for doing what seems 
necessary, trying to feel proud about it, and extrapolating this process from 
the individual to the group level, convincing a group not just to go along 
with a line of action but to act cohesively and consistently along this line. 
Thus the creation of group ideologies, about the dangers of which Russians, 
as people who have been through Marxism, ought to have some understanding. 
And thus the difficulty of a group to keep adapting to new situations. 

Putin falls into this trap. It is what is entailed in any program of taking 
Russian peculiarities and practical necessities and turning them into parts 
of "the Russian idea".

Fortunately Putin is aware that the features he cites are mostly ambiguous if 
not downright pernicious, and hopes eventually for Russia to get past some of 
them. Whether he will continue in the future to turn around 180 degrees in 
mid-argument and idealize these features as formative elements of a national 
ideology: this is something that remains to be seen.

********

#15
Date: Mon, 03 Jan 2000 
From: Robert Bruce Ware (rware@stlnet.com)
Re: Reply to de Waal JRL 4005

I remain grateful to Tom de Waal for his persistent illustration of my
point. In his latest contribution to JRL he demonstrates that an
authority on Chechnya, no less than himself, is unable to initiate an
outline of a political solution to the current Chechen conflict. Of
course, no one has done so, apart from naive and obscure allusions to
some sort of security zone, that would surely prove impracticable. That
is, in part, the failure of Western analysis that I have sought to
identify.

No one that I know has apologized for the brutality of the Russian
military campaign, and I, for one, have consistently condemned its
excess, as I, more recently, have deplored Mr. de Waal's penchant for
rhetorical distortion and strawman arguments.

I also have requested that Western analysts and policy makers take full
note of the brutality suffered by residents of the region as a
consequence of Chechen lawlessness. The informed choice is not between
massive human rights abuses, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, no
human rights abuses. Rather the choice, thus far, is between one set of
massive human rights abuses (presently suffered by the people of
Chechnya) and another set of massive human rights abuses (previously
suffered by their neighbors). As Mr. de Waal has noted, the people of
the North Caucasus are "fed up with Chechen lawlessness", and Russia's
defense of their rights is long overdue.

To this I have sought to add that so long as Western analysts, such as
Mr. de Waal, prove incapable of outlining a political solution for
Chechnya then it is nothing more than vanity to pretend that spilt ink
can possible prevent spilt blood. If we in the West are sincere about a
political solution in Chechnya then we must finally set aside our
hysteria, our pomposity, our ritualized Russia bashing, and our naivete
in order to take a hard look at the tragic reality of the situation and
apply our collective expertise toward a realistic and constructive
consideration to the problem. Because if we remain incapable of doing
this then it is simply folly to expect the Russians to do so.

In August 1996 Russia negotiated a settlement with Chechnya. The result
has been more than 1000 people kidnapped, tortured, dismembered,
murdered; the result has been two invasions of Dagestan in which fathers
were murdered before their children and 32,000 people were displaced.
The next negotiated settlement will have to be different. How must it
differ?

Aggressive elements in Chechnya spent the last three years preying upon
their neighbors in the region and no one in Chehnya prevented it. When
a society chronically preys upon its neighbors, war is often the
result. In the past, wars sometimes have produced constructive changes
in such societies. For example, the second world war was required to
restructure the mythology, culture and society of Germany and of Japan,
where passive and exhausted civilians also suffered tragically for the
crimes of their predatory compatriots. One might hope that the present

conflict would encourage the people of Chechnya to examine problems in
their culture, mythology and social structure that have contributed to
the present situation, such as those that I and Mr. A. Lieven have
identified in separate contributions to these pages.

Yet this can be no more than a crucial first step in resolving the
conflict, for as Mr. de Waal and I agree, ultimately there is no
military solution. Ultimately, the only alternative to a political
solution is protracted partisan warfare, contributing to long-term
instability and suffering throughout the region.

Hence, as Mr. de Waal and I have separately observed, the solution also
involves a reorganization of Russian priorities to the benefit of all of
the citizens of the North Caucasus, including the people of Chechnya if
indeed they are, as Moscow claims, Russian citizens. Precisely such a
reorientation of Russian policy has been occurring in Dagestan since
September. While it is too early to draw any conclusions, we might hope
that such benefits will be extended, during the coming months,
throughout the entire region.

Yet if these two steps weren't problematic enough, a political solution
eventually will require the identification of someone who can negotiate
for the people of Chechnya both authoritatively and efficaciously.
Unfortunately, this would not appear to be Aslan Maskhadov since he has
rarely proven capable of delivering anything. The fact that Mr. de Waal
witnessed Maskhadov combatting kidnap gangs is inconclusive for three
reasons: 1) Maskhadov failed. 2) Elsewhere (Washington Post 11/27/99)
Maskhadov's organization has been linked to kidnapping. 3) Many Chechen
leaders were fighting other Chechen leaders, with charges of crime and
corruption flying in all directions. That was, after all, among the
principal flaws in the kinship structure of Chechen society.

If indeed Maskhadov, or anyone else in Chechnya, is capable of
delivering anything at all, then surely a good, concrete, first step
would be for such a leader to call upon the people of Chechnya to
release immediately all of the hundreds of civilian hostages that they
are presently holding. Such a move would help Moscow and the rest of
the world to identify such an authoritative and efficacious leader.

At the same time, it is crucial that Moscow must guarantee all human
rights, and all the lawful protections, privileges, and benefits of
Russian citizenship, to Chechens behind the line of Russian advance.

If Western analysts and policy makers are sincere about a political
solution in Chechnya, then they might begin by focusing their attentions
upon first steps such as these, and by compassionately seeking this much
from Russians and from Chechens.

Department of Philosophical Studies
Southern Illinois University Edwardsville

*******