January 3, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4005 4006

Johnson's Russia List
#4006
3 January 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com


[Note from David Johnson:
1. Financial Times (UK): John Lloyd, Yeltsin set Russia free.
2. The Guardian (UK): Ian Traynor, Yeltsin's resignation caught opposition flat-footed.
3. The Times (UK) editorial: THE PUTIN MACHINE. A stranger to politics, perhaps, but not to power.
4. Financial Times (UK): John Thornhill, Hard-pressed Family finds a way out.
5. Christian Science Monitor: Judith Matloff, A stricter hand at Russia's helm. Acting President Putin vows to prevent separatists from tearing Russia apart, and return the faded nation's status. 
6. The Guardian (UK) editorial: Russian roulette. An election with a too obvious winner.
7. Arun Mohanty: END OF AUTOCRACY IN RUSSIA.
8. Kamaljit Sood: Vladimir Putin.] 

*******


#1
Financial Times (UK)
3 January 2000
[for personal use only]
Comment / Personal View
John Lloyd - Yeltsin set Russia free 
The author, a writer and broadcaster, was formerly Moscow correspondent of 
the Financial Times.


Boris Yeltsin, as Russian president, sought to mould Russia into a 'normal 
state' free from an oppressive government apparatus, writes John Lloyd


It is in his failings and strengths, which were often also those of his 
country, that we can discern both Boris Yeltsin's legacy and the skeletal 
outline of the future that awaits Russia. What he moulded in the early 1990s 
is hardening into a shell within which his successors will pursue policies 
formed by his actions, his choices and above all his constraints.


One of the best insights into what happened in Russia near the beginning of 
the Yeltsin era was that of the scholar Egor Yakovenko; he wrote that the 
coup of August 1991 against Mikhail Gorbachev ended both the Soviet Union and 
the Russian middle ages. At last, with the collapse of the great ideological 
empire, the way was cleared for Russia to be what Mr Yeltsin, as others, 
called a "normal state" - without a transcendent faith and the apparatus 
designed to exact obedience to it.


Mr Yeltsin grasped this intuitively better than almost anyone else - better 
than Mr Gorbachev. At his best, Mr Yeltsin saw that the justification for the 
state could henceforth lie only in its citizen's wishes; as he said in 1997 : 
"the sole measure of the greatness of our Motherland is the extent to which 
each citizen of Russia is free, healthy, educated and happy".


In a less elevated vein, he grasped the great longing of the Russians for 
some of the West's material luxury; he had a moment of near epiphany in 1989, 
on his first trip to the US, when he visited a Houston supermarket and saw 
what to a Soviet was an unimaginable cornucopia of choice. He felt, he 
confessed later, "pain - pain for all of us, so rich, so talented, and so 
exhausted by incessant experiments" - and vowed to staunch that pain by 
bringing choice to Russia.


To grasp the desire and need for freedom and plenty is one thing; to satisfy 
these demands is another. Mr Yeltsin inherited the institutions that Mr 
Gorbachev had half-reformed; a political class whose most enthusiastic 
spirits were avid for a perfect democracy but whose larger part wanted a 
spruced-up command economy; and an economic managerial system formed over 
four generations to abhor every kind of market transaction. These were also 
institutions in collapse; when the Soviet flag was lowered for the last time 
over the Kremlin a little over eight years ago, there were well-grounded 
fears of starvation in the country.


These twin pressures - of the failure of the Soviet system and the success of 
Soviet indoctrination - never let Mr Yeltsin rest. Inconsistent and 
increasingly sporadic in his work habits, he chose a group of young economic 
radicals to lead his economic programme then found he could not support them 
fully after a few months. He delayed in fashioning a new constitution and 
never decided to form a party for his support.


When the majority in the Russian parliament turned against him and threatened 
a coup, he temporised, then finally confronted it with a somewhat tardy 
detachment of tanks and paratroopers. That should have given reform a new 
lease; instead, he seemed psychologically wounded by the episode, retreating 
more and more into his circle of intimates, some of whom have written of his 
periods of drinking, illness or depression.


The first Chechen war was a debacle from which he scrambled a peace that 
masked Russian defeat; his re-election was a money-no-object affair in which 
the coffers of the state and of new Russian business were put at the disposal 
of the incumbent and the TV channels that supported him.


His second term has been darker than his first. The stabs at reform have been 
more desperate, the periods of stasis and drift longer. The fact of state 
corruption has become larger and larger, at times seeming to fill the 
available political space and engulf the presidency itself - a presidency 
routinely believed to be itself in hock to the private business interests 
that sustain the first family.


The second Chechen war was a response (it is often forgotten in the west) to 
a series of Chechen outrages in the Caucasus and Russia, at least some of 
which are certainly attributable to Chechen warlords; but it is brutal in its 
refusal to discriminate between terrorists and civilians. It is brutal too in 
its cynicism in promoting Vladimir Putin, prime minister, now acting 
president and Mr Yeltsin's choice as his successor, as the choice also of an 
exhausted, angered and disillusioned people when elections come in March.


Yet Mr Putin - if he does succeed - will not find a country uniformly worse 
than that which Yeltsin set out to govern. Chechnya apart, it is at peace 
with its 14 neighbours, the other former Soviet states, and suppresses no 
other national aspirations. Its people can speak their mind, even if it is 
often a sour one; and they are free to come and go, buy and sell, vote right 
or left.


Mr Gorbachev did begin this change; but Mr Yeltsin carried it through, to the 
extent that any future president of Russia will find it hard to reverse - 
because the people who voted for and often cursed Mr Yeltsin were not curbed 
by him. They learned, harshly, that freedom does not necessarily mean any 
other good thing; but they have acquired more of a habit for it, and the 
first president of Russia certainly assisted them in that.


*******


#2
The Guardian (UK)
January 3, 2000
[for personal use only]
Yeltsin's resignation caught opposition flat-footed 
Ian Traynor in Moscow 


Russia's centre-left opposition has been plunged into disarray by Boris 
Yeltsin's snap resignation designed to boost the presidential prospects of 
his protege, Vladimir Putin. Reeling from the New Year's Eve coup, the 
opposition appears at a loss about how to mount a credible challenge to the 
acting president and prime minister.
The presidential election is expected on March 26 - three months earlier than 
scheduled. And the campaign effectively kicked off on New Year's Day, with Mr 
Putin shown live on state television during a morale-boosting visit to 
Russian troops in Chechnya. 'Russia thanks you,' he told Russian officers and 
soldiers.


Already the darling of the military because of his hard line on Chechnya, Mr 
Putin burnished his army credentials further by telling the top brass and the 
country that the military and not the politicians would decide on the pace 
and conduct of the war.


However, Mr Putin faces three declared candidates in the race for the 
Kremlin: Yevgeny Primakov, the former prime minister and foreign minister, 
Grigory Yavlinsky, the liberals' leader, and Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the 
extreme nationalist. It is also assumed that Gennady Zyuganov, the Communist 
party's leader who lost to Mr Yeltsin in 1996, will also stand.


The first three all declared their candidatures just before the elections to 
the duma two weeks ago in an attempt to enhance their vote. But only the 
Communist vote stood up, although they are 35 seats worse off in the new 
parlia ment, which is dominated by centrists and promises far greater support 
for Mr Putin than Mr Yeltsin ever enjoyed.


Can Mr Putin be stopped?


Mr Yavlinsky's candidacy can be effectively discounted, and Mr Putin's main 
opposition will come from the centre-left, the Communists and the 
Fatherland-All Russia movement (OVR) of Mr Primakov and the Moscow mayor, 
Yuri Luzhkov.


The former Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, responded to the Yeltsin 
resignation by urging the centre-left to unite behind a single candidate, Mr 
Primakov, to maximise the vote against Mr Putin.


The Communists are the best organised and most disciplined party machine in 
Russia and could probably guarantee Mr Primakov a quarter of the electorate. 
But that would entail Mr Zyuganov eating humble pie and standing aside.


But despite Mr Primakov's declared candidacy two weeks ago, it is no longer 
clear if he will run. Mr Luzhkov declined to endorse Mr Primakov last Friday, 
saying there would need to be 'consultations'.


Moreover, the number three in the OVR, Vladimir Yakovlev, the mayor of 
Russia's second city, St Petersburg, faces re-election in May and is already 
flirting with the Putin camp.


Gennady Seleznev, the Communist speaker of the outgoing duma says frankly 
that Mr Putin looks unbeatable. The interim president has returned the 
compliment by voicing support for the Communist in his bid to be governor of 
the greater Moscow region.


In short, while the opposition fractures in the face of the Putin phenomenon, 
the acting president and prime minister is busy building a broader support 
base - ambitious politicians of all stripes are suddenly eager to bask in his 
glory.


State television propaganda has been hugely instrumental in building up Mr 
Putin and in securing the strong showing of his allies in the duma election. 
The next three months will see a continuation of that campaign. And if Mr 
Primakov, 70, confirms his candidacy, he will be painted as an elderly, 
unreconstructed communist by state television.


At the moment, the question is not whether Mr Putin can be beaten, but 
whether the opposition can force him into a second round by denying him an 
outright victory on March 26.


*******


#3
The Times (UK)
January 3, 2000
Leading article/editorial
THE PUTIN MACHINE
A stranger to politics, perhaps, but not to power 


Politics in Russia defies many democratic rules, but in one respect the game 
is the same: a week is a long time. Whether he died in office or falteringly 
saw out his final presidential term, the last thing that Russians believed of 
Boris Yeltsin was that he was capable of masterminding the Kremlin 
succession. His favour was considered the kiss of death for any politician. 


Back in August, he was expected to leave a power vacuum, with rival opponents 
of the Yeltsin circle fighting for the crown. The front-runners were Gennadi 
Zyuganov, the old-school Communist leader, and a double act - expected to win 
- of Yevgeni Primakov, the most popular in the long list of Prime Ministers 
to have been dismissed by President Yeltsin, and Moscow's tough Mayor, Yuri 
Luzhkov. 


The one name on no one's lips was that of Vladimir Putin, who has whirled in 
from off-field to become far and away the most electable candidate. It is 
only four months since, to general derision about his chances of survival, Mr 
Yeltsin named him Prime Minister and chosen successor. Now, with some opinion 
polls putting his approval rating higher than 50 per cent - a level of 
support matched only by Mr Yeltsin in the early 1990s - the received wisdom 
in Moscow is that the only remaining question is whether or not the acting 
President will win the election this March outright in the first round. 


For once, received wisdom may be on the button. He is a good 30 points ahead 
of the septuagenarian Mr Primakov and of Mr Zyuganov; his youth and energy, 
at 47, are in his favour; and even his dour style and KGB past - he could be 
called, odd though it sounds to Western ears, a KGB "moderniser" - seem not 
to tell against him. He is new and, without saying much about his plans, he 
strikes Russians as a man who knows what he wants and how to get there. Above 
all, he sits in the Kremlin, whose well-oiled machinery of patronage and 
publicity is a massive asset. His opponents are still regrouping after last 
month's Duma elections, and the parties that did best then will rally to his 
side. 


War has made and unmade many a politician, and Mr Putin is so strongly 
identified with the fighting in Chechnya - a conflict he says is "about how 
to bring about the end of the break-up of Russia" - that his popularity would 
rapidly slide if it went badly wrong. But badly wrong, to most Russians, 
means catastrophic losses for Russian troops, not starving Chechens; and, 
although Russian casualties are rising, the military appear resolved to use 
any combination of high-technology weapons, however terrible, rather than see 
their men mown down. It was astute of Mr Putin, in terms of maintaining 
public support, promptly to abandon the pretence that this cruel war is all 
about small bands of terrorists and to describe it instead as a battle to 
stop the rot of Islamic separatism spreading through the Russian Federation. 


What, if this unsmiling organisation man secures his hold on the presidency, 
can the West expect? Some clues can be gleaned from the policy outline that, 
with suspiciously good timing, he put out on the Internet last week. Although 
he has sworn to protect democratic liberties, his will be a more dirigiste 
Russia. Claiming that reliance on Western models has been the reformers' big 
mistake, he says that democracy and free markets will have to be combined 
with "Russia's realities" and that one of these, like it or not, is that 
Russian society is still heavily dependent on the State. Russians want, at 
the very least, much better hospitals and schools. But to meet such demands, 
Mr Putin recognises that Russia will need the backing of international 
institutions and the trust of investors. Russia has a half-mended economy and 
a badly fractured society. But it has huge resources, talent and latent 
energy. The hope must be that Mr Putin may, just may, be the mechanic able to 
repair the gearbox of this mighty engine. 
*******


#4
Financial Times (UK)
3 January 2000
[for personal use only]
RUSSIA: Hard-pressed Family finds a way out 
By John Thornhill in Moscow


Nine months ago Boris Yeltsin's grip on power looked as shaky as his health.


Power was seeping towards Yevgeny Primakov, the popular anti-Kremlin prime 
minister, who had in effect been forced upon the president by parliament 
following the financial crash of August 1998. 


The presidential administration was stumbling from one political disaster to 
another. 


Mr Yeltsin's friends and closest relatives, known as The Family, were 
panicking at the prospect of public disgrace - or even criminal prosecution - 
once Mr Yeltsin's term expired in June 2000.


But by the time of Mr Yeltsin's stunning resignation on New Year's Eve, 
Russia's master escapologist had helped transform the political situation 
once again. 


His resignation boosted the chances of Vladimir Putin, his prime minister and 
chosen successor, winning the forthcoming elections and securing The Family's 
future.


Mr Yeltsin's dramatic move also left his opponents in near-total disarray. 


One independent political commentator assessed the acting president's chances 
of winning the election at 70-80 per cent. 


Russian television commented that it was a "beautiful" way for such an 
historic figure as Mr Yeltsin to bow out of public life.


How did Mr Yeltsin achieve his last - and perhaps most startling - political 
victory?


The Kremlin had begun quietly scouting around for a suitable successor early 
last year when it became obvious that there was no legitimate way to extend 
the president's term of office and that his health was fading fast.


Igor Bunin, director of the Centre for Political Technologies, a political 
studies institute, says that at that time the Kremlin ran several focus 
groups among potential voters to find out what qualities were required by a 
potential successor. 


The answer was a non-ideological "strongman" who could restore law and order 
and a sense of national pride.


Consequently, the dangerous Mr Primakov was fired as prime minister in May 
and in came Sergei Stepashin, the loyal interior minister and former head of 
the FSB, the domestic intelligence service, who had been one of the most 
prominent backers of the 1994-96 Chechen war. 


But although Mr Stepashin's popularity ratings began to rise quickly, he was 
viewed as too soft by the Kremlin and less than wholehearted in defence of 
The Family's interests.


With typical brutality, Mr Yeltsin sacked Mr Stepashin after just three 
months in office and promoted Mr Putin, also a former head of the FSB, in his 
place. 


Virtually no one - apart from Mr Yeltsin and his closest entourage - gave the 
obscure Mr Putin any chance of winning a democratic election.


However, the invasion of Dagestan by Muslim militants in August and a series 
of terrorist bomb blasts in Moscow transformed the political climate and 
provided the new prime minister with the perfect opportunity to act tough, 
invade Chechnya, and rally the country around him.


"How do you consolidate society around an unpopular regime?" asks one 
political commentator. 


"Last time [in 1996 when Mr Yeltsin was re-elected president] it was by 
fighting communism. But you cannot do that any more because communism is no 
longer a threat. Now society is consolidating around the fight against 
terrorism," the commentator says.


Though a political neophyte, Mr Putin also started showing a surprisingly 
deft touch and was blessed with extraordinary luck. 


Even his gaffes - such as using criminal slang in public - seemed to favour 
him, giving the automaton-like former spy the appearance of normality.


The west's attacks on Mr Putin's conduct of the Chechen war further boosted 
his reputation as a nationalist. 


The strong international oil price helped strengthen the government's 
coffers. The malleable state media moulded an image for Mr Putin as a 
determined war leader.


Mr Yeltsin's clear intention had been to soldier on until June when he could 
have handed over power to a democratically elected successor in the crowning 
moment of his career. 


But the Kremlin's strategy of pumping up Mr Putin was working better than 
anyone expected and there was a danger that his popularity might fade - 
especially if the Chechen conflict could not be quickly resolved. 


Following a strong showing for the pro-Putin Unity movement in last month's 
parliamentary elections, Mr Yeltsin's advisers persuaded him that now was the 
perfect moment to retire to give Mr Putin the best shot at the presidency.


But Mr Yeltsin's departure is far from an unqualified triumph his supporters 
claim. 


"First, it is a sign that this regime cannot fully entrust the people with 
the right to decide their future," says the political commentator. "Russians 
will not elect a new president this time - they will simply be confirming one 
in office.


"And second, Yeltsin has sacrificed the handing-over ceremony that would have 
been the historic achievement of his life for a smooth succession. For 
Yeltsin that is a tremendous sacrifice on a personal level."


*******


#5
Christian Science Monitor
3 January 2000
A stricter hand at Russia's helm
Acting President Putin vows to prevent separatists from tearing Russia apart, 
and return the faded nation's status. 
By Judith Matloff, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor


By making one of his first moves as acting president a visit with Russian 
troops in Chechnya, Vladimir Putin has signaled what his political strategy 
will be to stay in power - and how he might rule a nation that is going 
through one of the most important transitions in today's world. 


The Chechen jaunt was clearly a clever public-relations move. The war has 
sent Mr. Putin's ratings soaring, accounting for why Boris Yeltsin named the 
prime minister as his heir apparent in a surprise move on New Year's Eve, 
stepping down well before his term was over - a novelty in Russian history. 


But the battlefront trip also shows where Putin's priorities lie. He is a 
grim product of the security forces, a former head of the Federal Security 
Services (FSB), the successor to the KGB. The lean man in dark suits often 
speaks of his appreciation for order, and analysts say that Russians can now 
expect a heavier hand at the helm. 


Indeed, parallels are often drawn between Putin and Gen. Augusto Pinochet, 
the former Chilean dictator who blended authoritarianism with Western-style 
liberal economics. 


"Putin would probably tighten the screws," says Andrei Piontkovsky, the 
director of the Moscow-based independent think tank, Centre for Strategic 
Studies. 


But for many citizens of this former superpower, that's exactly what is 
needed. Russia's decline since the 1991 Soviet collapse has been a source of 
shame. The country has lost much of its international influence, and the 
potentially wealthy economy has disintegrated to third-world levels. 


Many Russians blame their nation's fall from grace on Mr. Yeltsin, who in the 
final years of his nine-year reign made several strategic mistakes due to 
illness and policy blunders. 


While Putin offers an iron-man alternative, many analysts question the wisdom 
of choosing a professional spy untested with governance to run the world's 
largest country. They say that Putin's meteoric rise from obscurity to become 
an intimate of the president was largely due to Yeltsin's perception that 
Putin would protect him and his entourage, widely known in Russia as the 
Family, once they left power. 


"The Family decided that from the point of view of its long-term interest, it 
would be better for Yeltsin to resign now, and pass the power to Putin to 
ensure the family's safety," Mr. Piontkovsky says. 


Hours after being named acting president, Putin signed a decree granting his 
predecessor immunity from interrogation, arrest, and prosecution. It also 
provides him a lifetime pension, a country house, and bodyguards. 


Under Yeltsin's stewardship, corruption continued to flourish. And despite 
continual pressure from the West, his government was never able to stamp it 
out. This will undoubtedly be the biggest task Putin faces. 


Analysts say Putin will most likely win the March elections, set by the 
Constitution, unless there is a disastrous setback in the Chechen war. What 
happens after that is unclear. 


Up to now, Putin's prime accomplishment is the engineering of the war in 
Chechnya. But he lists as his priorities completing the transition to a free 
market economy and building a stronger state. The latter, he says, requires 
strengthening the executive, more discipline, and fighting corruption. 


Analysts expect him to follow a semi-authoritarian rule in combination with 
liberal economic changes. Putin is good friends with generals as well as the 
country's young economic reformers such as Anatoly Chubais, the mastermind of 
the country's privatization program. And Putin might turn out to be the first 
leader to develop a long-term strategy for Russia's economic development. 
Already as prime minister, Putin commissioned a scientific center to draw up 
scenarios for a 10-year economic plan. 


"What we are witnessing in Russia now is a transformation to a more 
traditional Russian government. Not communist, but more going back to the 
tsarist period. I would expect it to be a stronger government," former US 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said Friday. "I think conditions in Russia 
will be chaotic for a while. Once a central authority is reestablished and a 
legal system is put into place ... then the Russian economy with recover 
fairly rapidly." 


Putin will have an easier time than Yeltsin getting economic changes passed 
in the Duma, where the Communists lost their dominance in Dec. 19 elections. 
But this does not necessarily mean that a new government will be able to 
overhaul the banking and tax system and tackle the corruption that besets 
economic development and disturbs Western creditors. Corruption is endemic in 
politics, and it would require a man willing to eliminate powerful people to 
grapple with it. 


Western analysts say the jury is out on whether Putin will usher in chillier 
relationships with the West. He favors words like "patriotism" and "national 
pride," which appeal to ultranationalists nostalgic of past Soviet might. 


And he has shown himself indifferent to criticism over reports of abuses 
against civilians in Chechnya from Western leaders. He has labeled foreign 
news media that have reported on these abuses and government defeats as 
propagandists. 


But this could just be rhetoric, and all signs are that he is going to pursue 
the issue of arms control that Yeltsin endorsed but had trouble passing 
through the Duma. 


"The main danger for Russia is the weakness of its democratic institutions 
and civil society. It is these institutions that are to be the counterweight 
of state power," says Alexei Kara-Murza, director of the Center for Russian 
Reformism, an independent think tank in Moscow. 


"We'll see if Putin will be a good guarantor for the development of 
democracy. The main test will be his attitude toward criticism of the 
government. If Putin passes the test, it will mean that Yeltsin's choice was 
right and good." 


*******


#6
The Guardian (UK)
3 January 2000
Editorial
Russian roulette 
An election with a too obvious winner 


On New Year's day Vladimir Putin scrapped his plans to celebrate the 
millennium in Moscow and set off instead for Chechnya to congratulate the 
troops on the splendid job they were doing. In military terms that might 
suggest he is easily satisfied, for the quick resolution of the war expected 
last month shows little sign of arriving; the rebels are far from quelled, 
Grozny is, as we write, yet to be taken and more bloody conflict, in line 
with this weekend's escalation, is likely before Russia gets its way. But 
undoubtedly in terms of Mr Putin's own advancement, the armed forces have 
done a good job indeed. His breathtaking ascent from obscurity to the role of 
acting president - and more than that, president presumptive, as from the end 
of March - may not be exclusively due to the war in Chechnya, but that has 
clearly been its most powerful ingredient. Indeed, promoting Mr Putin, may be 
what this second Chechen war is all about.


That is not just because getting tough with the Chechens has played so well 
with Russian public opinion: it is also because Mr Putin looks clear-headed, 
decisive, indeed ruthless, when the leadership of the country in the closing 
years of President Yeltsin has looked utterly the reverse. He is riding so 
high in the polls because he promises order to a disordered country. He 
promises the smack of firm government, delivered if need be with a mailed 
fist. Once that was Boris Yeltsin's appeal, when with the kind of courage 
which borders on foolhardiness, he climbed on the tank in 1991 to rout the 
projected putsch against Gorbachev; and again as he successfully engineered 
the end of Communist rule. For their own political reasons - largely the fear 
of something still worse - western leaders have been doing their best in the 
late 90s to pretend that Yeltsin was still the deci sive leader of earlier 
days, when in fact he had been reduced, by ill-health compounded by drink, to 
a capricious, confused and sometimes literally tottering figure. So the 
economy foundered and the standards of daily life grew worse rather than 
better, and people increasingly yearned for the stability of communist times: 
a development to which the west has contributed by insisting on economic 
solutions which put ideology first and left the easing of change, which is 
part of all practical politics, limping woefully behind. Crime and corruption 
flourished. If this was the `genius' which some on the right in Britain 
continue to see in Yeltsin, it was genius of a fitful and sozzled kind.


And yet the end game, whoever devised it, has indeed had a touch of genius 
about it. The singling out of Vladimir Putin. The confection of a political 
party which has no greater remit than to support what he says and does. 
Elections for the duma which though democratic in name were profoundly 
undemocratic in practice, with a television coverage that was more party 
political broadcast on behalf of Unity than open democratic debate. And now 
the near-perfect scenario for elections in March rather than June, with no 
time for his country's uncharacteristic new year optimism to shrivel. And for 
Boris Yeltsin himself, a permanent exoneration for whatever he may have done; 
immunity from prosecution and an absolute guarantee of no questions asked, 
which given the suspicions hanging over him, he urgently needed; a fat 
pension and other perks to ensure a life of safety and comfort for the rest 
of his days. Most western tributes to him as he departs have so far been 
sensibly muted. Whatever Mr Putin may now produce, it was more than time for 
Russia to come under new management. 


*******


#7
From: "Arun Mohanty" <vkakm@cityline.ru>
Date: Mon, 3 Jan 2000
Subject: END OF AUTOCRACY IN RUSSIA 


END OF AUTOCRACY IN RUSSIA
Dr Arun Mohanty, Associate professor, Moscow City University

Watching Russia on the final day of the century seemed as if President
Yeltsin made a new century , a new millennium gift to millions of his
countrymen.


Starting from people like Anatoly Chubais ,Boris Nemtsov, Igor
Shabdurasudov and the like who owe everything in their life to Boris
Yeltsin to millions of russians welcomed the move, heaved a sigh of relief,
even rejoiced, though for different reasons.


Even the stock market welcomed the step with values of shares of russian
companies soaring up surprisingly.
In contrast to the trend of the local currency showing instability in such
occasions when the head of the State resigns unexpectedly,the russian
currency market amazingly remained steady by not reacting at all through
out the day. 


It appeared as if whole of Russia has been used to live with the ailing,
incompetent President who played no role in nation's governance while his
vast powers were used rather misused by his cronies.


The reaction of Russians, both ordinary people and intelligentsia, whom I
met in number of new year-eve drinking parties in the day, was that of
great relief stemming from President Yeltsin's resignation.
One of the most widespread toasts in new year-eve parties in Russia says
let all that bad remain in the old, outgoing year.


This time the toast had an additional content that all is that
bad,including the old president, let remain in the old, outgoing year.


The sudden end of Yeltsin era on the last day of the outgoing century
brought new hopes to millions of russian families who have been
impoverished in the process of President's bolshevik-like experiment that
reduced their once-mighty nation into a third world country and transferred
the totalitarian communist system into an elected autocracy, shattering all
their aspirations for economic prosperity and real political democracy.


The single biggest achievement of Boris Yeltsin that remains for history,
is that he dealt the death blow to the totalitarian political system of
Soviet Union.


But in retrospection, one can conclude that he did it not for establishing
democracy in Russia.


Boris Yeltsin had never any ideological convictions, neither communist
conviction nor democratic conviction.


The ultimate aim of his life was to enjoy power and absolute power, which
was like a drug for him.
Embracing this or that political ideology, depending on the
convenience,was an effective instrument for him to rise to the pinnacle of
power.


He continued embracing the communist ideology as long as it served
achieving his goal.


Yeltsin was picked up for CPSU's central leadership and brought to Moscow
by no other than the hard-liner communist Igor Ligachev and perhaps,
Ligachev knew well what kind of hardliner Yeltsin is in his thinking.
Yeltsin's tenure as the Moscow party boss is replete with horrifying
stories reminding of Stalin's purges in mid thirties.


Yeltsin conducted several purges in the leadership of district party
committees during his time as first secretary of capital's powerful party
committee.


His harassment of party functionaries was so awful, that many simply chose
to resign from the post preferring to lose all the privileges.


One of the district party secretaries of Moscow was forced to commit
suicide by jumping from the balcony of a multi-storied building where he
was residing. 


After becoming the first secretary of Moscow city committee of the
Communist party and CPSU politbureau member , Yeltsin had only few small
steps to reach the highest post in the country for which he picked up a
fight with his mentor Gorbachev in the1997, October plenary session of the
party's central committee.


Gorbachev, the emerging democrat ,ultimately threw Yeltsin out of the CPSU
top leadership but still kept him as a minister and a central committee
member, breaking the tradition of his predecessors who used to send their
rivals to exile as ambassadors to foreign countries so that they can not
poke their nose in domestic politics.


If Yeltsin could have mustered support in the party and succored in ousting
Gorbachev from CPSU leadership then, the hope for any democracy in Soviet
Union could have been kept in cold storage for many many years and the
totalitarian system of Soviet union would have received another lease of
life. 


And also, if Gorbachev would hare sent him abroad as ambassador ,the
country would have treaded a different trajectory of development. 


But Yeltsin lost the power struggle with Gorbachev in its very start and
remained lying low for some time.
He publicly and repentantly begged for rehabilitation in the party in the
19th conference of CPSU, which took place in 1988 summer.


Yeltsin, famous for his political instinct, realising convincingly that
communist party is surely losing its grip on power, chose to announce his
total break with communist party in its 28th congress in June 1990 after
being elected as the chairman of the newly elected russian supreme soviet,
a post which he effectively used to erode the power of CPSU and Central
Soviet Government headed by Gorbachev.


Declaration of Russian sovereignty by its supreme soviet headed by Yeltsin
on 12th June 1990, followed by declaration of sovereignty by Ukraine,
Belorussia,which meant declaration of supremacy of russian and other
republican constituencies over the central soviet constituency, Russian
supreme soviet's decision for bi-channel revenue system leaving the central
soviet government under the mercy of Russian federation led by Yeltsin
hopelessly weakened the position of the Centre headed by Gorbachev and
paved the way for soviet break up.


Since then, Yeltsin appeared in his new incarnation as a democrat and used
country's anti-totalitarian movement to serve his own political goal.


He launched a crusade against privileges of communist party's top
functionaries and acted as if he has abandoned them.


Yeltsin reached the peak of hypocrisy when he traveled in the city
transport in an utter populist bid to get the sympathy of the common man
when his black limousine would be following the tram.


He visited a clinic meant for common people to show them that he was one
among them, but in reality he has never received treatment in his life any
such commmon clinic.


Yeltsin spoke against the luxurious life led by communist party leaders
including Gorbachev. 


But none of the luxuries enjoyed by president Yeltsin was ever dreamt by
any of the general secretaries of the communist party of Soviet Union.


The privileges of the present-day bureaucrats are much more than the
communist bureaucrats.


His tirade against privileges of party leaders was only a gimmick to rise
to power


Yeltsin's hypocrisy was exposed much later.


It is a mixture of political instinct, accident, elements of counter coup,
luck, last but not the least, the western support on the side of Yeltsin
combined with the indecisiveness and fear of blood on the part of the
coup leaders capitulated him to power in August 1991 which, nevertheless,
hastened the end of the totalitarian system through banning of the CPSU and
provided a brilliant opportunity to both Yeltsin and Gorbachev for building
up democratic institutions and establishing infrastructure for market
economy while keeping the country united.(When thousands of Moscowvites
were building barricade at Yeltsin's call near White House anticipating
attack by the plotters of the so-called coup, a relaxed Yeltsin, knowing
well that no attack is planned by the plotters, was enjoying drink and food
with his close associates in side the parliament building as revealed by
his first press secretary Pavel Vorshanov.
In his quest for absolute power, Yeltsin masterminded the Belaveshki
agreement in the Viskuli forest along with Ukrainian President Kravchuk and
Belorussian President Shuskevich announcing the dissolution of Soviet Union
contrary to the will expressed by the soviet people in the referendum held
on 17th March, 1991.


With Gorbachev, soviet government and soviet communist party vanquished in
the battle, Yeltsin embarked on a path of disastrous reforms that led to
decline of country's industrial production by 60%, agricultural production
by 35% in 7 years time.


While certain branches of economy were completely wiped out in the reform
process, ruble's exchange rate plunged from 62 kopeks in 1991 to 27000
rubles against a dollar at the end of 1999.


Russia's foreign- debt over the years has piled up to 160 billion dollars
and its economy has taken a colonial form depending mostly on export of raw
materials.


When the Russian Supreme Soviet, which had once elected Yeltsin as its
chairman and had given extraordinary power to him in the sacred belief
that he would lead the country along the path of market economy and
democracy, started opposing his ill-conceived reforms that included
criminal privatisation, looting of the masses through unbridled
liberalisation of prices and construction of financial pyramids in
connivance with the government etc, Russian President chose to get rid of
it through unconstitutional means .


Yeltsin, the reincarnated democrat, virtually organized series of coup
attempts to finish off his new found opponents like the parliament.


Following the failure of his first bid to dissolve the russian parliament
unconstitutionally in the spring of 1993,Yeltsin meticulously planned his
second attempt to get rid of the supreme soviet that tried to impeach him
and stood in his way to absolute power.


Blatantly violating the russian constitution, Yeltsin dissolved the russian
parliament and suspended the constitutional court in September 1993,fearing
it will not approve his action.


He shelled his own parliament- building housing thousands of law-makers and
supporters of the constitution, and killed hundreds of people in contrast
to the action of hard-line communist plotters of August, 1991 who
preferred to surrender rather than let bloodshed on Moscow streets.


In the aftermath of the bloody October coup by Yeltsin, he banned all
political parties and newspapers in the country contrary to the believe
that yeltsin has never closed a new paper, never banned a political party.
He even sacked his utterly faithful Justice Minister Pavel krasselnikov in
August 1999 for his failure to find a pretext to ban the communist party,
the largest political party in the country as publicly revealed by the
minister himself. 


In a referendum conducted virtually at the gun point and in blatant
infringement of the law on referendum which passed through under his strict
supervision to suit his personal designs, Yeltsin got a constitution
through highly doubtful,undemocratic means that concentrated dictatorial
powers in his hands at the end of 1993.
"May be through the back( zhopa ), but nevertheless now, we have a
constitution that outlines the rules of the game;" said Yeltsin's State
secretary Gennady Burbulis. 


The new constitution made Yeltsin a modern tsar with absolute power, and he
enjoyed, loved to call himself 'Boris -the Second'.


With a largely powerless duma,designed for the purpose of making it the
scapegoat, Yeltsin got the right to rule the country through decrees.


He was not satisfied with this. His close associates went ahead with plans
to create a monarchy in the country to perpetuate Yeltsin's rule, fearing
it will not be possible to organise a victory through election for the
largely unpopular president.


In 1996, when Yeltsin's first tenure approached its end, his associates at
first contemplated not to hold the election on some pretext but then went
ahead with the election plans with hesitation.


Yeltsin and his clique tried to organise another coup in mid March 1996
when Duma denounced the Belavetshki Agreement dissolving the Soviet Union.


But the attempt could not take off as the power ministers, particularly
home minister Anatoly Kulikov refused to take part in the dangerous adventure.


Yeltsin was forced to face the election and won it through unprecedented
unfair and undemocratic means by befooling his country men and hiding the
fact about his serious sickness from the nation.


Thus history of Yeltsin's rise to absolute power and its retaining is the
history of coups , conspiracies ,hypocrisies and betrayals.


However, his heart ailment, after the victory, did not permit him to enjoy
the power which slowly slipped into the hands of Anatoly Chubais, architect
of Russia's criminal privatisation and mastermind behind Yeltsin's
undemocratic election campaign.


While Yeltsin enjoyed, basked under absolute power, it was his body guard
Alexander Korzhakov, during his first term, and Anatoly Chubais, later
Yeltsin's daughter and her friends during the second term, who used the
power .


Yeltsin's attempt to be the president for the third term was aborted by the
constitutional court ruling against it.


Ailing Yeltsin spent most part of his second term in the country-house
receiving treatment and relaxing while the country was going to dogs and
was ruled by a corrupt clique known as the 'family' on his behalf.


Nine years of Yeltsin's rule heaped abject poverty on millions of russians,
brought them embarrassment through
his antics during foreign trips, stole their pride as a mighty nation and
belied their hopes for building a prosperous, democratic country . 


Yeltsin would get a place in russian history as a power-hungry, despotic,
autocratic ruler, but never as a democrat, who in his battle for power did
not stop at destroying his country and who through his ill-conceived
reforms reduced the mighty country into a poor nation struggling for its
identity.


But he will also remembered for his contribution for bringing the end of
the totalitarian system.


*******


#8
From: "Kamaljit Sood" <wpc@cableinet.co.uk>
Subject: Vladimir Putin
Date: Sun, 2 Jan 2000 


For almost the first time since 1917, Russia has seen a transfer of power
based on a relatively open constitutional procedure. 


Although the deal bringing in Vladimir Putin to the top was worked out by
the what may be called the extra constitutional power brokers, almost a
palace coup d'etat, the actual transfer of power has devolved according to
constitutional structures. This in itself should be considered as a success
of the evolving democracy currently in place in the Russian Federation. 


Russia now has a president, Vladimir Putin, who is relatively unknown,
even within his own country. In the democratic structures of the West, even
the relatively unknown Bill Clinton, when he decided to seek the office of
the President, became pretty well known through the process of public
scrutiny. This cannot be said of Valdimir Putin. But he is the person who
the west will have to reckon with, at least until the election and most
probably thereafter as well. So we should analyse his character traits
which should enable us to understand him better. 


Of what little is known of him, he was a KGB resident in East Germany.
Following that, he took a position with Anatoly Sobchak in St Petersburg.
After Sobchak's fall as the supremo of St Petersburg, he took a position in
the Presidential Secretariat through the efforts of Anatoly Chubais, and
then rose rapidly to become the head of the FSB. Following that he was
made the Prime Minister. The circumstances surrounding his becoming the
Prime Minister are rather unclear. The military had certainly a hand in
imposing him on Yeltsin. But why did the military choose him remains
unanswered as of today. 


Thus Putin's career is steeped in bureaucracy, in the service of a patron.
He has never held any elected office. First the KGB (albeit a faceless
boss, but nevertheless a respected entity within the Russian
establishment), followed by the service to the liberals Sobchak and then
Yeltsin (if he could be called a liberal, though he has indisputable claim
on providing liberty to the Russians while not giving up his own habits of
the nomenklatura). 


In all these positions, loyalty to his patron has been his hallmark. He did
not venture into any activity which which would embarass his bosses. His
usefulness must have been due to his capacity of diligent, enterprising
work and his intelligence. These have been Putin's defining features. 


He is now the President of Russia. What is his beacon of loyalty in the
absence of any new patron? In his speech to the Army in the Caucasus, he
said "This(the war) is not just about restoring the honour and dignity of
Russia. It is rather more important than that. It is about putting an end
to the break-up of the Russian Federation. That is the main task." Reading
between the lines, his statement places the Russian nation as his new
entity of loyalty. Taken to its logical conclusion, this would mean that he
would strive to restore the honor, dignity and the geopolitical position
of Russia. These objectives can be interpreted in many ways and we need
to understand how Putin will strive towards and what policies and tools
will he favor. 


To his credit, Putin has a liberal bent of mind in as far as freedom of
press and expression is concerned. ``Freedom of speech, freedom of
conscience, freedom of the mass media, the right to private property --
all these basic principles of a civilised society will be reliably
protected by the state,'' Putin said in a New Year's Eve address to his
countrymen before flying to Chechnya. 


In economic policies, his policies are a continuation of those started by
Primakov and continued under Stepashin, save perhaps for the protection
currently given to the likes of Berezovsky. Foreign policy is largely that
initiated by Primakov, and now supported by military industrial structures
which brought him to power. 


So how will Putin react vis a vis the interests of the West? The
indications currently are that he will fight for the national interests of
Russia. His policy towards the USA will be so determined. This in itself is
not a bad outcome for the interests of the US. Despite the anti US feelings
in Russia currently, the russians under the new found democracy have
proved to be responsible international citizens, not seeking confrontation
with the West. The most hawkish stand that Putin would be pushed by the
military backers take would be to push backwards what the Russians see as
the "encroachments" by the west on their national interest. These will be
counterbalanced by the business faction supporting him. So the end result
may be that the State Department may have to work harder to impose a
unipolar world structure. But a multipolar structure in itself is not a
bad outcome for the US. 


The US will still maintain its number one position as the richest and most
vibrant economy of the world. Even the western Europeans are seeking some
kind of slowdown of the US approach to unipolarism. Putin's Russia will be
a new impediment to the unipolarism of the US. These signs were already
visible in the last months of Yeltsin after he was humiliated in the
aftermath of Kosovo. But this need not present a threat to the national
security of the US and the west in general. In fact, it was unrealistic to
expect another Yeltsin in the Kremlin groomed to deliver the West its
requirements of strategic geopolitical considerations without having
concern for the national interests of Russia. 


The evolving and maturing democracy in Russia would have provided some
counterweight to an "incompetent" head of state overseeing the declining
influence of Russia in international affairs. The main anxiety about Putin
is to understand his real backers, at least until he is elected the
President. Though not much is known of the nature of the "Palace Coup"
that drove Yeltsin to resign, it is a good initial assumption that the main
backers of the resignation were the Chubais group and the the business
group headed by Berezovsky and Abramovitch. The military were more or less
satisfied with the Kremilin policy and could have been sidelined. 


Putin owes his position to Chubais but his victory has been mastered by
Berezovsky and his TV channels. It is clear that Putin will bow more to
Berezovsky more than to Chubais until at least the elections. While Putin
does look relatively clean in public life, he could still be compromised by
skilfull journalism. Berezovsky's dealings with the Chechen leader
Maskhadov have been mentioned in the Russian media as have also his
contacts with Basayev. Who knows whether these contacts could be the seeds
for Putin's compromat. Putin was also the second in command to Pavel
Borodin when the Mabetex contracts were being issued. Thus Putin needs to
tread a thin wire until he becomes the President. 


What happens after he becomes the constitutionally elected President? His
loyalty to his country may start guiding him to take decisions in the
higher national interest and independent of the interest groups that
brought him to power. This may lead to internal conflicts. But he will have
to reckon with the financial power of interest groups. Then the classic
interplay of interest groups that are the hallmarks of mature democracies
may lead him to compromises. What will be nature of the compromises? Is
the formula used for Yeltsin's resignation a template for future
compromises? Give him a comforatable exit but let the state policy move
forward. It would be interesting to watch how Putin decides to make real
progress on the economic front which backers wins his confidence. This will
also determine his foreign policy. 


Kamaljit Sood Publisher Wimbledon Publishing Company/Anthem Press P O Box
9779 London SW19 7QA Tel: 0171 401 8855 Fax: 0171 731 7908


******


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