December 12, 1999    
This Date's Issues: 3677 • 3678  • 

Johnson's Russia List
#3678
12 December 1999
davidjohnson@erols.com


[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Chechnya, dirty tricks, top Russia poll campaign.
2. Reuters: Yeltsin defends Russian constitution.
3. The Sunday Times (UK): Chechens wait in hills for their turn to shoot. 
Marie Colvin reports from a rebel hideout in Chechnya on a war that can only 
get bloodier. 
4. Chicago Tribune: Steve Chapman, FOOLISH NOTIONS. KICKING THE RUSSIAN 
BEAR WHILE IT'S DOWN.
5. otechestvo-news-owner@post1.luzhkov-otechestvo.ru
6. Alexander Domrin: RE A. Miller and Russian Education.
7. Reuters: Elections seen fuelling Russia-U.S. row.
8. Newsday editorial: U.S. Policy on Russia Needs Balance.
9. Washington Post: Mark Galeotti, How It Has Come to This In Chechnya.
10. Reuters: U.S. sees Russia yielding to pressure on Chechnya.]


*******


#1
Chechnya, dirty tricks, top Russia poll campaign
By Ron Popeski

MOSCOW, Dec 12 (Reuters) - One week before Russia's general elections, policy 
debates have largely been eclipsed by coverage of the Kremlin's war in remote 
Chechnya and a surge in support for a newly created pro-government party. 


Campaigning for 450 seats in the State Duma lower house of parliament has 
also been distorted by allegations from nearly all camps of dirty tricks and 
attempts to alter the outcome. And everyone remains aware that the exercise 
amounts to a rehearsal for next year's race to replace President Boris 
Yeltsin. 


In the campaign's final stages, support has snowballed for the Yedinstvo bloc 
of ``can-do'' Emergencies Minister Sergei Shoigu, who supports Kremlin policy 
and enjoys the backing of popular Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. 


Other parties trying to ensure post-election favours and success are putting 
out feelers for new alliances, some with the Communist Party, which still 
leads public opinion polls. 


Political debate was upstaged last week by the army's relentless -- and 
popular -- drive into Chechnya and Yeltsin's defence of it during a trip to 
China, including his warning that Washington had better not forget Russia's 
nuclear arsenal. 


Shoigu, in office since 1991 in a half dozen post-Soviet governments, put the 
conflict to good use. News reports portrayed him as no less hawkish than his 
rivals on defeating Chechnya's separatists, but pursuing a peaceful 
settlement by trying to arrange talks with Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov. 


``I tried to find him yesterday, but couldn't manage it,'' Shoigu, dressed in 
an anorak, said of Maskhadov on NTV television at the weekend outside a 
deserted checkpoint set up to allow refugees to leave the Chechen capital 
Grozny. 


COMMUNISTS STILL HEAD POLLS 


Opinion polls, though unreliable in a vast country with huge disparities 
between town and country, still put the Communists ahead of the pack with 
18-25 percent support. 


Firmly in second with 14-18 percent was Yedinstvo, despite little being known 
about Shoigu's allies or policies. 


The Fatherland-All Russia (OVR) bloc of ex-Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov 
and Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, second through the early autumn, now lies 
third with 9-12 percent. 


The only other party certain to clear the five percent barrier in 225 seats 
contested by country-wide lists is Yabloko under liberal economist Grigory 
Yavlinsky. 


A week of mutual accusations culminated in the prime minister summoning party 
leaders on Sunday talks during which his spokesman Mikhail Kozhukhov said 
Putin ``from time to time used his authority to lower the temperature a 
bit.'' 


Kozukhov, quoted by Russian news agencies, said all agreed a fair campaign 
was the ``cornerstone of the democratic system'' and extended fresh backing 
for the military campaign in Chechnya. 


Three party chiefs had earlier complained that the Kremlin was hindering 
their campaigns. 


Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov said his party had been all but denied air 
time by partisan networks in a country where television remains the most 
important means of reaching voters. 


Luzhkov accused Yeltsin of interfering by removing the capital's police chief 
and Yavlinsky predicted widespread vote-rigging on election day. 


The campaign was also plagued by what has become almost routine post-Soviet 
confusion over procedures. Three parties were disqualified by election 
officials a mere 10 days before polling day and the Supreme Court ordered 
mayoral elections cancelled in St Petersburg, Russia's second city. 


PRIMAKOV WOOS COMMUNISTS 


The biggest shift in ground appeared to be engineered by Primakov after a 
storm died away over his charges that the Kremlin was offering members of his 
party bribes to withdraw. 


Kremlin figures denied the allegations and the official fingered by Primakov 
as the man behind the bribes said the storm was pointless as OVR's members 
were defecting en masse anyway. 


Primakov later suggested during a tour of Siberia that his group was not 
averse to forming an alliance with the communists. 


``A lot of people (in the Communist Party) think the way we do,'' Interfax 
news agency quoted him as saying. Communists, he said, might become 
``partners of Fatherland-All Russia in adopting certain decisions and laws in 
the State Duma.'' 


Moscow mayor Luzhkov, his chances of running for president more remote each 
week, took the risky step of questioning the Chechnya drive. He later went 
further, suggesting that Kremlin involvement in the campaign meant that 
democracy had ceased to exist in Russia. 


******


#2
Yeltsin defends Russian constitution
By Oleg Shchedrov

MOSCOW, Dec 12 (Reuters) - President Boris Yeltsin, who will have to hand 
over his sweeping powers to an elected successor in six months, warned on 
Sunday against making dramatic changes to Russia's controversial post-Soviet 
constitution. 


``It was not only an important legal document which was adopted on December 
12, 1993. The principles of new statehood were laid down,'' Interfax news 
agency quoted Yeltsin as telling a Kremlin reception marking six years since 
the adoption of the country's fifth basic law this century. 


``No one is allowed to bend or break it at will, all the more so when such 
attempts are motivated by petty political interests,'' Yeltsin added. 
Critics say the 1993 constitution, adopted by referendum two months after 
Yeltsin sent tanks to crush a hardline rebellion in Moscow, was deliberately 
drafted to legalise the Kremlin leader's firm grip on power in post-Soviet 
Russia. 


The constitution has clipped the wings of the Communist-dominated State Duma 
lower house of parliament, leaving it no say in forming the government and 
exposing it to effective Kremlin pressure in firing and hiring prime 
ministers. 


Demands to redraft the balance of powers have become a familiar refrain for 
Yeltsin's communist opponents, who want to turn the president into little 
more than a figurehead and put the government under direct parliamentary 
control. 
Russian liberals have stood for maintaining sweeping presidential powers as 
long as they helped promote market reforms despite parliamentary resistance. 


But as Yeltsin's bad health has forced him to retreat from day-to-day 
management of affairs of state and Russia witnessed five government 
reshuffles in less than two years, liberal and centrist parties have started 
mulling a constitutional review. 


Critics also say there is no guarantee Russia's next president will use his 
powers to defend democratic principles, as Yeltsin did, rather than turn them 
into an instrument of authoritarian rule. 


Russia holds a presidential election next June and Yeltsin is barred from 
running after serving two terms. 


Ahead of next Sunday's parliamentary election, most centrist and left-wing 
parties, which oppose the Kremlin, have made changing the constitution an 
important theme in their campaigns. 


``We are ready for a reasonable dialogue on improving the Constitution,'' 
Yeltsin said. 


``But we should also remember that it was this Constitution which has more 
than once stood in the way of unprincipled politicians and extremists and 
stopped those who sought upheaval in politics and the economy,'' he added. 
``That is why adhering to basic principles should be a law for any 
official.'' 


*******


#3
The Sunday Times (UK)
12 December 1999
[for personal use only]
Chechens wait in hills for their turn to shoot 
Marie Colvin reports from a rebel ideout in Chechnya on a war that can only 
get bloodier 


THE mountains echo with the sound of bombs dropped from high-flying planes. 
Columns of smoke rise from behind craggy peaks into a clear blue sky. But the 
Chechen fighters are out of harm's way, concealed in a pinewood shelter 
camouflaged with fir trees. They control the ground, just as the Russians 
control the skies. 


This is not a battle between two armies. The Russians avoid close fighting 
with the Chechen soldiers. Instead, their tactic seems to be to bomb a town 
or village for days from planes and helicopter gunships, then move closer to 
shell them with volleys of Katyusha rockets until the villagers are killed or 
flee. Russian soldiers remain out of sight. 


The Chechen fighters have become inured to the bombing. When they hear the 
booms signifying a plane has dropped its load, they just look to see where 
the bombs have landed, pointing out the tell-tale plumes as they smoke and 
sip sweet tea. 


I crossed the border into Chechnya last Friday with a unit of Chechens. 
Little happens during the day: the fighters sleep in their shelter. A 
woodstove warms it and heats a kettle of water that boils all day for tea. A 
woollen hat dries on a grenade launcher. In the corner a Kalashnikov hangs 
from a hook with a handwritten roster for two-hour watches. 


The low table holds stale bread, cheese and some tinned beef from Holland. 
The hideout is just long enough for the six beds, side by side, on which 
fighters returning from the hills huddle like sardines. The shelter is lit by 
a single oil lamp. 


Later, while one man plays tunes on a balalaika, his restless comrades 
practise their aim on rocks in the crags above them, firing off shots from 
their solitary sniper rifle. 


They are a motley crew, but a far cry from the stereotype of the Islamic 
fundamentalist terrorist depicted by the Russians. 


In this camp are Hussain, a 34-year-old lawyer who took his degree in Moscow, 
and Ruslan, 50, a cartoonist at a newspaper in Grozny before the war, as well 
as Ali and Azeri, from Baku, who came to "fight for their Muslim brothers". 


They resent being portrayed as bandits. "Why are we terrorists?" said Ali. 
"What would you do if Russia came and destroyed your villages and killed your 
children?" 


Ruslan, the cartoonist, has a simpler theory. "I want to be a husband to my 
wife, a son to my mother, and not to be beaten in my own land." 


The Chechens move only at night: not just the fighters but the civilians 
fleeing the bombing. A steady stream of refugees passes this camp, mostly 
women and children, on their way to the Georgian border. 


They travel at night because the Russians are systematically bombing the 
roads. They target moving vehicles. According to some refugees, groups of 
people have also been attacked. 


This camp provides the first security and warmth the refugees have 
encountered since the war began. Some have walked for a day or more in 
sub-zero temperatures. The fighters take them in, giving up their beds to 
women and children who are too tired to move on, supplying tea and bread to 
those who want to take a break. 


Many are so traumatised that they communicate little more than fear at first. 
Anya, 53, was one such woman. All she could do was wave her arms as she 
struggled to describe what she called hell on the road. 


"They are killing everyone. They don't care if there are women, children or 
soldiers," she said eventually. "The world is asleep. Chechyna forgotten." 


She broke down and wept as she recalled her sons, aged 16 and 24, who were 
left behind. Their village had been bombed every day for two weeks but the 
family decided to move only after her brother and brother-in-law were killed 
four days ago. 


The refugees say they believe the bombing is aimed at turning people against 
the fighters. If so, it is not working. 


They also say that people are afraid to leave because they know the roads are 
dangerous and besides, they have no money or transport. 


They laugh at the mention of Russia's announcement that civilians can leave 
through a safe corridor. "There is no safe corridor," said Cristina, 70. 


"When we were coming, a van with a load of chopped wood and a family inside 
pulled out ahead of us. The Russians bombed from the skies and the family was 
killed. I saw a dead child of about six." 


Cristina said her family group, ranging from her daughter to her 
four-month-old great-granddaughter Asatv, had left Grozny early the previous 
day. 


They had been lucky, she said. They had walked for 24 hours through forests 
and had been intercepted by a fighter heading back to his base. 


Hard decisions were being taken in many families. Luther, 22, and his young 
wife Diana have been married for a year. Their village, Alkazurowo, had been 
bombarded by artillery last weekend and by planes on Wednesday. 


A family meeting was attended by Luther and his five brothers. It was decided 
that Luther should try to reach Germany. If the rest of the family were 
killed, at least one member would survive. If the family lived, he could send 
money home to rebuild. 


But the route to the mountains had shaken his resolve. "I sold my gun and I 
have that money in my pocket to buy a ticket to Germany," he said over a tin 
mug of tea at the Chechen post. "But what I saw on the road of what has been 
done to the women and children is making me think again. I am thinking of 
buying a gun and returning to fight." 


His wife was unable either to swallow tea or speak. Their experience has been 
repeated throughout Chechyna, according to refugees. 


They believe that by intensifying the bombing, Moscow wanted to force them to 
negotiate an agreement whereby the villagers would exterminate the fighters 
and allow in Russian troops in return for a halt to the bombardment. 


Luther's fellow villagers decided not to negotiate. They were warned off by 
reports from another village, named Gropte. The elders of Gropte apparently 
made an agreement with the Russians and many refugees came to their town 
because they thought it would be safe. 


"But even though the Russians guaranteed them safety, they bombed anyway a 
week later. Then the Russian special forces came to Gropte, throwing grenades 
into basements and killing anyone who stayed behind. So my elders decided to 
say no to the Russians and remain free." 


The inhabitants of another village, Kurchaloy, were said to have paid 
$300,000 to the Russians and have been left alone. 


Chechen fighters have no illusions that they could win this fight on the 
ground. Their strategy is brutal: if the Russians see this war as an endgame, 
said one senior commander, so do the Chechens. 


Victims: Chechen refugees

They believe they will lose Grozny within 10 days. Their strategy in every 
town is to fight until they run out of ammunition, then to disappear. 


"Throughout the campaign the Russians have said thousands of fighters were 
trapped in towns such as Urus Martan, only to arrive and find a handful 
remaining. 


"The fighters slip out when they run out of bullets. They will do the same in 
Grozny," the commander said. 


"We don't have enough men on the ground to fight the Russians face to face. 
We cannot lose as many as they can. But the war will begin when the Russians 
say it has ended. 


"When we leave Grozny, the Russians will occupy our country but they will no 
longer be able to bomb because their soldiers will be on the ground. Then we 
will start killing them." 


The fighters who go out from this camp are cheerful, despite the long faces 
of the commanders. Their rest may end at nightfall, but they seem to relish 
the challenges ahead. 


One of them, Imran, claims the Chechens cannot lose because they know their 
history. At midnight he grabbed the Kalashnikov from the hook on the wall and 
grinned wolfishly. "It is night time, the time for hunting," he said as he 
set off for the mountain. 


*******


#4
Chicago Tribune
12 December 1999
[for personal use only]
FOOLISH NOTIONS
KICKING THE RUSSIAN BEAR WHILE IT'S DOWN
By Steve Chapman


When he arrived in Beijing for talks with Chinese leaders, the president of 
Russia was thoughtful enough to let Americans know he hasn't forgotten 
President Clinton. "Yesterday, Clinton permitted himself to put pressure on 
Russia," he said, referring to criticism of Russia's military campaign in 
Chechnya. "It seems he has for a minute forgotten that Russia has a full 
arsenal of nuclear weapons." Um, yes. And thanks for the reminder.


Relations between Washington and Moscow have been plagued in recent years by 
contagious deafness: The U.S. has ignored Russian complaints about our 
crusading around the world, and Russia has stopped listening to anything we 
say. But President Yeltsin has found one way to get our attention.


Clinton's criticism of Russia's policy may not have accomplished anything for 
civilians trapped in Grozny, but it has produced one notable achievement: 
helping to heal the Sino-Soviet split. China is just about the only country 
that has firmly supported Yeltsin's efforts to crush separatists in Chechnya. 
Communism was not enough to bind these longtime adversaries together during 
the Cold War, but a shared antipathy toward the U.S. has made them acutely 
aware of their common interest in resisting American "hegemony."


The Russian resentment is mysterious only if you haven't been paying 
attention. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has posed no plausible 
threat to the West. Rather than be grateful for the change, the Clinton 
administration has treated our former enemy as an irrelevant weakling that 
can be safely ignored, lectured or pushed around, as our convenience requires.


"The Russians lost the Cold War, got out of Eastern Europe and let the Soviet 
Union fall apart," says University of Chicago defense scholar John 
Mearsheimer. "And what is the U.S. doing? Closing in on them."


We consider all sorts of factors in pursuing our international mission, but 
we've made it plain that we won't take account of Russian interests or 
sensibilities. If they like what we do, fine; if not, tough luck. After all, 
they can't do much about it. What's the harm in reminding them of that as 
frequently as possible?


The end of the Cold War might have prompted a re-examination of the need for 
NATO. The alliance, after all, was created solely to defend Western Europe 
against aggression by a nation that no longer exists. Instead, we not only 
preserved NATO but expanded it to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic. We ignored bitter objections emanating from Moscow, where the 
expansion was interpreted not as a defensive step but as an aggressive 
one--much like we'd feel if Russia were to forge a military alliance with 
Mexico.


The Russians also are alarmed by the talk in Congress and the White House 
about shredding the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty so we can get on with 
building a nationwide missile defense. Their conventional army is a ruin, 
their nuclear arsenal is deteriorating and their early warning radars are 
unreliable in detecting incoming warheads, causing them obvious anxiety. 
We're also pushing them to reduce the size of their nuclear stockpile.


Then, along comes the United States with a bright idea: a missile defense 
that could make it possible for us to launch a nuclear first strike without 
fear of retaliation. Someone high up in Washington seems to have the task of 
getting up every morning and asking, "What can we do today to make the 
Russians nervous?"


Especially galling to Moscow was the war in Kosovo, where the supposedly 
defensive NATO war machine spent months bombing Yugoslavia, a Russian ally, 
because we didn't like how the government there was treating its own people. 
Lately, we've been talking of cutting off the modest economic aid Russia gets 
from us and the International Monetary Fund to show our disgust with the 
brutal tactics it has used in Chechnya. Having done everything possible to 
antagonize and humiliate our vanquished foes, we now expect them to 
accommodate us on a matter involving the territorial integrity of their 
homeland.


There is nothing to stop us from riding roughshod over Russian concerns, but 
we may find they are not entirely powerless to do us harm. They can refuse to 
go along with arms reductions, use their veto in the UN Security Council, 
sell arms or nuclear technology to our enemies, or join forces with the 
biggest potential security threat on the horizon, China. Not to mention that 
the rise of anti-Western sentiment could pave the way for a nationalist 
dictator.


Ten years ago, we would have been more than happy to give Moscow a pass on 
Chechnya in exchange for victory in the Cold War and democracy in Russia. 
Asking for more than that miracle is asking for trouble.


*******


#5
Sunday, December 12, 1999
Source: otechestvo-news-owner@post1.luzhkov-otechestvo.ru


Yesterday, Fatherland-All Russia alliance submitted a letter of protest to
the Central Electoral Commission, regarding the situation with a campaign
commercial that included a speech by Yevgenii Primakov, the OVR leader, and
that was shown on ORT and RTR channels.


As mentioned in the statement issued by the OVR press service on Saturday,
Ye.Primakov's commercial was broadcasted in between the two records showing
Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Lev Ubozhko, the leader of Conservative party.
According to the statement, these records "in fact, represented copies of
both the content and the format of the OVR commercial".


The Primakov commercial was submitted to ORT a week before the scheduled
broadcasting. When it was shown, it turned out that it was both preceded and
followed by Zhirinovsky and Ubozhko commercials. The interior of the rooms
in which their speeches were recorded was an exact copy of the interior of
the Primakov's office, where his commercial had been filmed. Meanwhile, the
text that they read was almost an exact copy of Yevgenii Maksimovich's
address, only the name of the alliance was replaced by the names of their
parties.


This case, according to the OVR press service, represents yet another dirty
trick of the
Kremlin's "political technologists". It is obvious that the purpose of this
action was to create the impression among the voters that all the alliances
and parties are similar to each other, that their programs and goals are all
the same. The inventory of dirty techniques is being enlarged - before,
there were cloned candidates, cloned web-sites, and now, cloned commercials
have also appeared.


It is also obvious that Yevgenii Primakov's commercial was copied,
immediately after being submitted to ORT, and transferred to its would-be
imitators, which, at a minimum, represents a violation of copyright.
However, this is not a big surprise, especially after Mr. Lesin, the
Minister of Press, did not hesitate to comment upon Primakov's commercial on
the air, right after the commercial was received by RTR. This was in
violation of several articles of the electoral law and of the law on the
media.


*******


#6
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 1999 
From: Alexander Domrin <domrin@pc-club.ru> 
Subject: RE A. Miller and Russian Education


I really don't think that Russian readers of JRL should be surprised
by A. Miller's piece about Russian education (JRL, # 3670). The article
itself and especially A. Miller's slogan to "remake the Russian system
in light of [American] experience" is just another example of American
cultural imperialism.
I graduated from a Moscow Institute in 1985, the year of Gorbachev's
rise to power, so I am definitely a product of Soviet education. Like
most
students of my generation, I didn't like Komsomol meetings and subjects
like
"Scientific Communism", but apart from that the education was superb.
There's nothing in it I need to be ashamed of.
In the last six years, I have taught at four law schools in the U.S.
(in one of them six times) and in one College of Liberal Arts and
Sciences. I got my doctorate in law at an Ivy League law school, and
have
spoken at about a dozen of other law schools. In 1998-99, I was also
involved in
a program of the Russian Foundation for Legal Reform and had an
opportunity
to visit several Russian law schools outside Moscow. Several weeks were
spent in two of them - in St. Petersburg and Ekaterinburg.
No system is perfect, but I can testify that overall Russian
graduates are
brighter, more intelligent and better educated; not only compared to
most
American students, but to some American professors too. I realized this
fact
very vividly some time ago when I told a class of foreign policy at
a prestigious private U.S. University a story that happened to me in
1995.
At that time an American consultant, who came to Moscow on a US
AID-funded
mission, asked me to take her to Tiananmen Square...
Many students in the class laughed, but a professor of political science
(also teaching Russian foreign policy) laughed louder than anybody else
and
then exclaimed: "I hope you told her that Tiananmen Square is not
in Moscow, but in Korea"...
I cannot tell you about American professors of history, literature or
medicine,
but as to American law professors, more than 80 percent of them don't
even have
the degree of Master of Laws (LL.M), although LL.M. is definitely a less
advanced
degree than the Russian KANDIDATSKAYA. Many (if not most) American law
schools
don't have any professors having the degree of Doctor of Law (J.S.D. or
S.J.D.)
For comparison, Doctors of Law usually comprise between 15 to 30 percent
of
full-time instructors at the Russian law schools; up to 50 percent of
them are Candidates of Law.
(My guess would be that this is not a viable argument for Mr. Miller
who truly believes that Russian teachers "gained their positions through
political maneuvering in the Soviet system".)
A. Miller is not happy about elected Kursk Oblast Governor Rutskoi,
whom he falsely calls a "convicted" coup-plotter. So what? Is Mr. Miller
also unhappy about the convicted criminal Marion Barry who for many
years
was elected Mayor of Washington, D.C.? What effect did the election of
drug user Barry have on the level of education at Georgetown, GWU or
American University?
Mr. Miller complains that his Russian students have never heard of
Toni Morrison
or Pearl Buck. I bet 80 percent of Americans have never heard of them
either.
For those who disagree with that assessment, I recommend that they visit
the website of the U.S. Department of Education containing official
information
with shocking figures of the American adults who cannot read or do
simple math.
I never start teaching a new class in the U.S. before asking my
students
to take a sheet of paper and write down the first five images that they
have
on their minds when they think about Russia or when they hear the word
"Russia".
At some point I should analyze all such "polls" that I have held since
1993.
That won't be difficult to do, because, unfortunately, the scope of the
"images of Russia" on the minds of young Americans is quite limited.
Most of them are "vodka", "caviar", "bread lines", "history of
authoritarian governments",
"oppressed societies - historically", "Lenin / Stalin killing people",
"starving peasants",
"Communism", "Cold War", "Rocky 4", "killing property owners", "those
big fur hats &
cold weather", "bloodshed", "Yeltsin", "evil empire", and, my favourite,
"Bolsheviks
on horses riding through the countryside to small farmtowns grabbing
young girls".
It's hard to deny that knowledge of students is a reflection of
knowledge (or ignorance) of their professors.
I would recommend that Mr. Miller hold a similar "poll" in his
Russian classes.
No doubt that the "images of America" of his Russian students will be
much more
adequate and intelligent than "images of Russia" in the U.S.
Finally, if there is a problem in the Russian education today, it's
caused not by
mythical "tired old apparachik teachers", as Miller wrote, but rather by
the destruction of the Russian economy and social sphere in the last 10
years
of "great" reforms. Destruction, so enthusiastically supported by
American
consultants and so generously funded by the United States.
Personally, I have a great deal of sympathy for those Americans who
have
to spend weeks or even months of their precious lives in this backward,
uncivilized,
savage, "Stalinesque" Russia. Seriously, guys! Maybe you should consider
moving to Botswana?


Alexander Domrin,
Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law


*******


#7
ANALYSIS-Elections seen fuelling Russia-U.S. row
By Oleg Shchedrov

MOSCOW, Dec 12 (Reuters) - President Boris Yeltsin's advice to the United 
States not to forget Russia was a nuclear state has underscored tensions 
between the two countries unprecedented since the end of the Cold War. 


But some political analysts in Russia have said that although there is a 
genuine rift, much of the latest fury should be ascribed to election 
campaigns in both countries. 


Yeltsin lashed out last Thursday during a visit to China at U.S. President 
Bill Clinton's harsh remarks about Russia's military campaign in rebel 
Chechnya. 


``It seems he has for a minute, for a second, for half a minute, forgotten 
that Russia has a full arsenal of nuclear weapons,'' an indignant Yeltsin 
roared to cameras, reviving the worst Cold War-style rhetoric. 


His remarks coincided with Russia's decision to expel a U.S. diplomat seized 
allegedly in the middle of a spying operation and a similar move by the 
United States. 


The vitriol failed to impress Clinton, and Russia's increasingly popular 
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin immediately toned things down, saying Yeltsin 
did not mean to reignite the Cold War. 


Russia's presidential election next year, in which Putin is likely to stand 
as a Kremlin candidate, and parliamentary polls next Sunday, in which a 
pro-government party is fighting for seats, have added fuel to the latest 
U.S.-Russian row. 


CHECHNYA CAMPAIGN POPULAR AT HOME 


Amid a continuing economic crisis, the popular Chechnya campaign and a tough 
anti-Western stand have become levers to boost the popularity of Putin and 
the Yedinstvo (Unity) bloc. 


``A week before the polls it has become clear that 10 years after the Iron 
Curtain fell the authorities have no other argument to play on other than 
Chechnya and the nuclear button,'' wrote the liberal daily Sevodnya. 


But some Russian analysts suggest both countries will restore more reasonable 
relations once the elections -- including the U.S. presidential election next 
November -- are over. 


``The one bad thing about U.S. elections is sacrificing anything, including 
long-term national interests, to campaigning,'' former Russian ambassador to 
Washington Vladimir Lukin told Ekho Moskvy radio. 


``Some in this country would like to copy that habit, but it is a bad idea. 
Like it or not, Russia and the United States will have to coexist and 
cooperate even after the polls,'' he added. 


Many issues have contributed to estranging Russia and the United States in 
the past two years. 


Russia felt betrayed when NATO ignored its arguments against expanding 
membership to Moscow's Soviet-era allies of Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic and when NATO decided to launch a military operation in Yugoslavia 
over its objections. 


Russia is alarmed by U.S. plans to set up an anti-missile shield at the risk 
of dumping a cornerstone disarmament pact. 


'UNACCEPTABLE INTERFERENCE' 


Finally, Moscow viewed Western demands to halt its military onslaught against 
separatist rebels in Chechnya, marked with extensive use of artillery and 
aviation against civilians, as unacceptable interference into its internal 
affairs. 


Russian Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev has accused the United States of using 
the Chechnya campaign to squeeze Russia out of the strategically important 
Caucasus and Caspian regions. 


In addition to tough action in Chechnya, Putin's four months in office have 
been marked by several test launches of missiles seen as part of Moscow's 
reply to possible U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic missile 
treaty. 


Election interests have seen many politicians, once known as pro-Western, 
swap sides with conservatives. 


Reformist Anatoly Chubais, who is close to Putin, lashed out at fellow 
liberal Grigory Yavlinsky's suggestion that it was time to start talks with 
Chechen rebels. ``Anyone proposing that cannot be viewed as a Russian 
politician,'' he told Yavlinsky. 


On the other side, former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, suspected outside 
Russia of being anti-Western, has urged the Kremlin to avoid isolating 
Russia over Chechnya. 


``People who are no longer welcomed in the West are now pushing the country 
towards isolation,'' he said about Russian liberals eliminated from the 
government by last year's crisis. 


``They need this isolation to stay in power. But we should not allow Russia 
to cease being part of the international community,'' added Primakov, who 
believes Russia has overstated its operation in Chechnya. 


*******


#8
Newsday
12 December 1999
Editorial
U.S. Policy on Russia Needs Balance


ONE DAY Boris Yeltsin is not too subtly reminding Washington that
he heads a country that still possesses thousands of nuclear weapons.
The next day the United States is kicking out a Russian spy on the heels
of the claimed Russian expulsion of an American spy. And some U.S.
presidential candidates seem to be competing to see who can take the
hardest position against Russia's actions in Chechnya.
It's time for the United States to add perspective and balance to
its approach to Russia.
The perspective ought to be this: In the long run, whether
democracy, even a primitive form of it, survives is the most important
foreign-policy issue facing the United States. Only China's future
course rivals it. And while things have certainly been difficult in
Russia during the last decade, it will take a generation or two for the
transition from the failed Communist system to something resembling a
market-oriented democracy to take hold. If it takes hold.
That Russia next Sunday is about to conduct its third set of
parliamentary elections is at least an indication that the country is
headed in the right direction. That it's uncertain whether Yeltsin will
follow the Russian constitution and relinquish power this summer is an
indication of how fragile it all is.
The balance that's required is an intelligent, measured,
nonemotional formulation of American and western policy toward Russia.
The early euphoria that greeted the downfall of the Soviet Union, with
its expectation that in a few years Russia would be just like the United
States and would be our partner in shaping a new world order, was never
realistic. The sense now that Washington and Moscow are on the verge of
a new Cold War and that Russia is acting again as an evil empire is an
equal overreaction.
The call to punish Russia for its brutal crackdown in Chechnya by
cutting off all aid and rapidly expanding NATO to include the Baltic
countries, is downright foolish. Russia deserves to be condemned for
what it has done, but there ought to be an appreciation of the limits of
western influence and of the complexities of the situation in a
breakaway republic.
Why, for instance, should the United States cut back on funds for a
program designed to bring Russian nuclear warheads under control?
Preventing those warheads from getting into the hands of the likes of
Saddam Hussein or terrorist organizations is in the interests not just
of Russia but of the United States as well. And why should Washington
want to expand NATO to include Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, countries
that border Russia, when it would be taken by Russians of every
political persuasion as threatening to Russia's security and a
deliberate attempt to humiliate it? Isn't that reminiscent of how
Germany was treated after World War I-and with disastrous results? There
is also a fundamental misunderstanding about the United States' ability
to influence events in Russia. The debate in Washington about who "lost"
Russia is laced with an unbecoming and inappropriate ethnocentrism. If
only the United States and the West had that type of power. They do not.
The United States can have an effect on the margins and what it says
does register. But the fate of Russia is in the hands of the Russians,
for better or for worse.
Devising a sensible, balanced approach to Russia isn't about being
"nice" to the Russians or being morally obtuse about some of their
actions. It's about protecting the long-term interests of the UnitedStates.


*******


#9
Washington Post
12 December 1999
[for personal use only]
How It Has Come to This In Chechnya
By Mark Galeotti
Mark Galeotti is the director of the Organised Russian & Eurasian Crime 
Research Unit at Keele University in Staffordshire, England. 


To understand Russia's ruthless campaign in Chechnya, perhaps all you need to 
do is understand Viktor, and the insecurities and ambitions that drive him 
and a whole generation of Russian officers and politicians. A career Russian 
soldier, now a lieutenant colonel, with decorations from Afghanistan and the 
first Chechen war, Viktor's soft voice belies his burly build. He's no fool, 
though, and so initially in talking to me--a Western academic--about changes 
in the Russian military, he offers the party line, praising opportunities for 
cooperation with the West and stressing how the new Russian army is a world 
apart from the old Soviet one.


But an hour and several drinks later, Viktor's tone has changed. Talk of 
military cooperation gives way to dark suspicions of potential threats from 
the Islamic world, from China, from Europe. He envies NATO's military 
technology, he says. But ultimately, he resents and mistrusts the West, 
convinced that it is scheming to deny Russia its rightful place on the world 
stage. He wears his Russian nationalism on his sleeve, illustrated with 
historical allusions. His vote in next Sunday's parliamentary elections, he 
says, will go to the candidate who will best protect Russian interests.


Insecurity, nationalism, history, politics. From this explosive mix the 
latest Chechen war has emerged. Moscow's bombing campaign began in late 
August. The first of what would be 100,000 troops entered the breakaway 
region Oct. 1, in search of "bandits." Within a week, Moscow's stated 
objective was to regain control of the region. Viktor and his unit are in the 
war zone now, presumably assembling their tanks, guns and missile launchers 
around Grozny, the Chechen capital, which Moscow announced last week it will 
level.


Grozny--the name means "terrible" or "dread"--was built as a Russian bastion 
after the Chechens were conquered by the Russian Empire in the 19th century. 
The city was meant to act as a warning to the Chechens not to challenge 
imperial power. At the end of the 20th century, it looks as though Moscow 
means to make an example of the city again, for much the same reasons. 


There is an almost medieval aspect to this war, and that confounds many 
outsiders. As Russian planes scattered leaflets across Grozny last Monday, 
warning civilians to flee or be destroyed with their city, foreign analysts 
were asking: Can Moscow really mean it? Or is this some piece of 
psychological warfare? A political stunt?


I have spent too much time talking with the Viktors and other Russian 
soldiers, as well as members of the security apparatus and their advisers, to 
doubt that Moscow means what it says.


Russia's insecurity is both general and specific. It feels slighted over 
Kosovo, denied the voice it thought it deserved as NATO highhandedly staged a 
war with only token attention to Russian concerns. But Kosovo was a catalyst 
for, not a cause of, this disillusionment with the West. For years, the 
Kremlin has been drifting back into the hands of people who neither 
understand nor like the West. Many are veterans of the Soviet KGB or other 
police agencies (including Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and his two 
immediate predecessors). Their bugbear is a "monopolar" world dominated by 
the United States and its allies. To them, Moscow is on its own and must look 
after its own interests. On a visit to a Russian military academy, I saw a 
poster that said "Russia has no friends except for its army and navy." It's a 
105-year-old quote from Czar Alexander III.


This generation of Russian leaders is particularly concerned about Russia's 
southern flank, the North Caucasus. Unruly, Muslim, multiethnic, yet also 
vital for access to the area's oil, the region and its peoples have been a 
perennial worry for Moscow. The Chechens have long been the most independent 
and recalcitrant of subjects. Stalin had the entire nation's population 
deported in 1944, scattering them across Siberia and Central Asia. From 1994 
until 1996, a raggle-taggle collection of Chechen guerrillas took on the 
Russian army in the first Chechen war--and won. So the current war is not 
just about a threat to Russia's security, it is also about pride and 
vengeance, historical enmities and raw Russian nationalism.


Even so, that doesn't explain why Moscow has launched this war now, or its 
sudden escalation. The key to understanding this is politics. Officially, the 
war was triggered by Islamic fighters launching raids from Chechnya into 
neighboring Dagestan in August, and by deadly explosions in Moscow and 
elsewhere, for which the government blames Chechen terrorists.


But Moscow's official reasons for starting the war make little sense. Chechen 
President Aslan Maskhadov had made real headway in controlling the most 
extreme rebel element, in quiet but effective partnership with the Russians. 
Indeed, Russian security analysts and the general staff at first interpreted 
the raids into Dagestan as a sign of desperation on the part of the Chechen 
rebels. One Russian policeman I knew, involved in cross-border cooperation 
with Grozny, was frankly exultant: "This is the beginning of the end for 
them," he said last summer. "It means that they have nowhere to go in 
Chechnya."


That was then. Next Sunday, Russians will choose representatives to the State 
Duma, the lower house of parliament. The Duma has little real power, but the 
vote will be a curtain raiser for the main event, the presidential election 
next June. Putin, despite his status as Boris Yeltsin's chosen successor, was 
until recently languishing with approval ratings so low as to be 
statistically meaningless. A former KGB agent who reputedly felt that the 
only reason the first Chechen war failed was a lack of determination, Putin 
needed something dramatic to establish his presidential credentials. That 
something was this war.


And the politicians aren't the only ones playing politics in Russia. Anatoly 
Kvashnin, the military's chief of the general staff, is a formidable general 
and veteran of the first Chechen war. He was locked in competition with the 
defense minister over control of the military and desperate to find ways to 
force the Kremlin to provide the increased funding it was always promising 
but never providing.


The result was an unholy pact. Russian intelligence sources have confirmed 
for me that it went something like this: Kvashnin would give Putin a 
victorious little war. In return, Kvashnin expected a higher profile for the 
general staff; funding that would more than cover the cost of the invasion; 
and a completely free hand to fight the war as he saw fit, free of political 
interference. A deal was struck on Sept. 20 with a final proviso: If it could 
all be done without too many Russian casualties--never a vote winner--Putin 
would get a suitable victory just before the Duma elections. Thus, war 
returned to the Caucasus.


So far, both sides of the bargain have been kept. Since the war began, the 
government has promised to increase the defense budget by $1 billion, or more 
than 25 percent. Meanwhile Kvashnin has assembled a 100,000-strong 
sledgehammer of a force in Chechnya, which is less than half the size of 
Maryland.


Russia's ultimatum to Grozny expired yesterday, and the Russians could begin 
their attack at any moment. By the time they go to the polls, there should be 
a Russian flag fluttering over the center of Grozny, or so I've heard in my 
talks with advisers to the general staff. Then Putin can claim that the 
military phase of the operation is over, and all that is left is a "police 
action" against remaining rebel stragglers. If they are to meet this tight 
timetable, the Russians will have to start a major offensive within the next 
few days. 


During previous international crises, from Desert Storm to the first Chechen 
war to Kosovo, there have been differences of opinion within the Russian 
political and military elites, even if just over priorities and methods. Now 
a consensus is forming between the Kremlin and the generals, which share the 
same interests and instincts. Under these circumstances, there is little the 
outside world can do. To the politicians and the general staff alike, 
Chechnya is little more than their Kosovo, a piece of necessary disinfection. 
They see Western warnings of retaliation as driven by hypocrisy and a 
vindictive desire to belittle Russia and prevent it from protecting its 
legitimate security interests. These days, I find that even relatively 
liberal and well-informed Russians bristle when talk turns to human rights 
violations in Chechnya. They ask, what about Russia's rights? What about 
civilian casualties caused by NATO attacks in Kosovo?


Given that the West is not prepared to cause a serious and long-lasting 
breach with Russia over Chechnya, the future of the Chechens is in their own 
hands. That Grozny will fall is not really in doubt. Then many--perhaps 
most--rebels will slip away toward the mountains of southern Chechnya. There 
they can wage a war of their own choosing, sniping and raiding, as they wear 
down Russian troops. After all, most of Afghanistan was easily seized by the 
Soviets in 1979--it was the subsequent "police action" to pacify the country 
that Moscow was eventually forced to abandon 10 years later.


Viktor and his compatriots will not be able to rely forever on their air 
power and artillery. Eventually, they will have to engage with rebel fighters 
described even in an internal general staff document as "skilled, determined 
and ferocious bandits."


That describes Ali well. He was a grizzled Chechen I met once in Moscow; as a 
survivor of Stalin's deportation, of the Soviet army and a gunman for the 
local Chechen mafia, Ali was returning to Chechnya to join the rebels. I 
wrote off 90 percent of his tales as braggadocio, until a police officer told 
me matter-of-factly, "He has personally killed four mafia godfathers and 
never even been seen by his victims' bodyguards." Ali made no apologies for 
his martial spirit: "We Chechens have been fighting the Russians so long we 
will almost miss them when they are gone."


Whether Russia will be able to pacify Chechnya in the long term is anyone's 
guess. But for now, I can't help but think that the Viktors will meet their 
match in the likes of Ali. In his own way, Ali and his people seem as much 
eager captives of their bloody history as Viktor and his.


******


#10
U.S. sees Russia yielding to pressure on Chechnya
By Peter Szekely

WASHINGTON, Dec 12 (Reuters) - Top U.S. officials said on Sunday Moscow 
appeared to be yielding to international pressure over the Russian military 
campaign in Chechnya that has disrupted the lives of hundreds of thousands of 
civilians. 


White House National Security advisor Sandy Berger cited Russia's dropping of 
an ultimatum that civilians in the besieged Chechen capital of Grozny leave 
the city as a sign that Russia was heeding the outcry from abroad. 


``I think the international community is speaking here with one voice and I 
think there are some signs that perhaps it's having some impact,'' Berger 
said on ABC's ``This Week'' programme. 


Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called a meeting between Russian Prime 
Minister Vladimir Putin and a senior member of the Chechen government of 
President Aslan Maskhadov in Moscow nine days ago a ``hopeful'' sign. 


``They want to make sure that Chechnya does not keep causing them problems,'' 
she said on the CBS ``Face the Nation'' programme. ``On the other hand, I 
think that they have understood the international pressure to some extent and 
there is a sense that Russia is becoming isolated.'' 


Albright said Chechnya would be a topic of discussion in the coming week at a 
scheduled meeting in Berlin of the Group of Eight foreign ministers, 
including Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. 


``I have talked to Foreign Minister Ivanov every day,'' she said. ``And they 
know how seriously we take this.'' 


Washington and the European Union have condemned the nine-week-old Russian 
operation against Chechen guerrillas that has already driven some 200,000 
refugees from the separatist Caucasus region. 


Following Western condemnation, the Russian army lifted its ultimatum for up 
to 50,000 Grozny civilians to leave the city by Saturday or become targets 
during a threatened all-out onslaught. Putin has said the ultimatum is not 
intended for civilians and Russia's envoy in Chechnya, Nikolai Koshman, made 
clear there were no plans for a frontal attack on Grozny. 


The Russian military said Grozny had not been bombed for several days and two 
safety corridors were now open for civilians to flee. 


U.S. OFFICIALS PLAY DOWN YELTSIN NUCLEAR REMARK 


Amid the growing tension between Moscow and Washington over Chechnya, Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin last week issued a reminder to U.S. President Bill 
Clinton that ``Russia has a full arsenal of nuclear weapons.'' 


Berger and Albright played down the remark, saying they did not view it as a 
threat and noting that Putin quickly moved to defuse the tension by calling 
Russia's relations with the United States ``very good.'' 


``I think that what President Yeltsin was doing was basically reminding the 
world that Russia counts,'' said Albright. 


While Berger said the United States would like Russia to extend its halt to 
bombing Grozny, he said a ceasefire alone would not resolve the problem. 


``The solution here is, in our judgment, for the Russian government to engage 
in a political dialogue with leaders in Chechnya ... that can speak for the 
Chechen people and enter into some sort of political arrangement,'' said 
Berger. 


******