July 17, 1999    
This Date's Issues: 3396 • 3397   •

Johnson's Russia List
#3397
17 July 1999
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Business Week: Margaret Coker, A Brisk Market in Babies...Sparks Action 
for Reform.
2. Bloomberg: Russia `Uneven' in Reducing Weapons Exports, US CIA Says.
3. The Times (UK): Anna Blundy, 'Tsar' Boris turns back clock at Kremlin 
Palace.
4. Le Monde editorial: Russian Scandals.
5. AP: Angela Charlton, Heat, Reforms Hurting Russian Farms.
6. Michael Johnston: Corruption in Formerly-Communist Societies: On-Line 
Bibliography.
7. John Helmer: REPLY TO JERRY HOUGH ON US-RUSSIA TRADE POLITICS/3395.
8. Ira Straus: Death sentence for converting from Islam.
9. Jamestown Foundation Prism: Aleksandr Buzgalin, RIGHT CAUSE: YOU ARE 
NOT RIGHT, GENTLEMEN!]

*******

#1
Business Week
July 26, 1999
[for personal use only]
Spotlight on Moscow
A Brisk Market in Babies...Sparks Action for Reform (int'l edition)
By Margaret Coker in Moscow 

The blonde, 22-year-old single mother felt she had only one option: Pregnant 
again, with few job prospects in her village in the Republic of Moldova and 
with no child care available in any case for her four children, she answered 
a newspaper ad promising a trip to Israel and cold cash in exchange for her 
unborn child. ``I needed to feed my other kids. I was told he would be given 
to a good family, and that seemed better than a life in an orphanage,'' says 
the woman--currently serving two years in prison for trafficking a minor.
A black-market baby trade is flourishing in Russia and the former Soviet 
states, which use Moscow, with its international flights, as a transfer point 
to fly out expectant mothers. Investigators say the Moldova ring this woman 
fell into has sold at least 50 babies to American and Israeli families in the 
past two years, while a separate Moscow ring has sold 20 babies to American 
families, with each sale netting $20,000 to $30,000 per infant. These 
numbers, however, are dwarfed by the number of legal adoptions: Last year, 
U.S. citizens alone adopted some 4,500 Russian children.
``BLIND EYE.'' Still, illegal trafficking is a large enough business to have 
prompted an investigation at the U.S. Consulate in Moscow about how these 
pregnant women got to the U.S. and to have instigated Moscow's first 
prosecution. ``People have turned a blind eye to this trade for years. Now, 
some feel the tide must be stopped,'' says Kiril Mazurin of the Moscow 
Criminal Investigation Dept.
The number of orphans living in Russia climbed to 482,000 in 1998, the 
highest level since World War II, while money to care for them has shrunk to 
30 cents per child per day. Bad as these institutions can be, however, life 
beyond can be worse. Authorities report that 40% of the youths who leave such 
institutions at 18 end up homeless, 25% acquire criminal records, and 10% 
commit suicide.
Yet legal adoption is neither easy nor cheap. According to Russian law, 
the process should take about five months and should be free to citizens and 
foreigners alike. Reality, though, is much more complex. ``If you want your 
child before he's an adult, everyone knows payments must be made [to local 
officials]--not once, but multiple times,'' says one Moscow representative of 
an international adoption agency. Fees to a licensed Western adoption agency, 
plus the expenses of traveling to Russia to meet a child, slicing through 
bureaucracy, and speeding legal proceedings, can reach $40,000.
If baby trafficking endangers the welfare of the child sold, it also harms 
children in institutions. The State Duma Committee on Women, Family & Youth 
Affairs is responsible for securing budget funds for orphans and programs 
targeting single mothers and needy children. Critics of the chairwoman, 
Communist Party Deputy Aleftina V. Aparina, say international adoption is her 
target of choice to whip up anti-American sentiment and raise her profile 
within the party. ``She spends an inordinate amount of time on this issue 
while ignoring our efforts to expand programs,'' says Alexander Smuckler, a 
political lobbyist.
While the prosecution of the Moscow smuggling ring has been applauded by 
human-rights workers--those arrested included an ex- spokesman for the Duma 
International Affairs Committee--it's unclear how deep a dent the one case 
can make. A source at the Moscow investigators' office concedes that pressure 
brought to bear from U.S. authorities eager to stop the visa fraud 
perpetrated by the ring was instrumental in bringing about the arrest--and 
that conviction is still not certain. The publicity has fed the political 
backlash, including restrictive laws, against foreign adoptions in general, 
making U.S. officials wary. ``We don't want to hurt kids,'' says one.
A long-term solution would be to develop national foster-care programs 
like those implemented by Konstantin Titov, the governor of Russia's Samara 
region. At the end of 1997, only 239 foster families existed in Russia. In 
one year alone, Titov signed up more than 500 families in his program--and 
saved about $5 million in budget funds.
Titov is rumored to be considering a run for President of Russia in 2000. 
If he wins, child-welfare officials hope change will come in time to save a 
half-million Russian orphans from a grim future.

*******

#2
Russia `Uneven' in Reducing Weapons Exports, US CIA Says

Washington, July 16 (Bloomberg) -- The Russian government
showed ``uneven progress'' during 1998 following through on
promises to stop transfers of technologies that could develop
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency said.
Businesses or government-connected entities in Russia, and
in China and North Korea as well, ``continued to supply ballistic
missile related goods and technology to Iran,'' the agency said
in an unclassified report released today.
China, though exporting missile technology, ``demonstrated
improved controls of nuclear weapons technologies to programs in
countries of concern,'' the agency said.
The congressionally mandated semi-annual report examined
attempts by Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Syria, Russia, China,
India, and Pakistan in the last six months of 1998 to obtain or
sell sensitive technologies the U.S. and West have pledged to
control.
``The (Russian) government's commitment, willingness and
ability to curb proliferation-related transfers remains
uncertain,'' said the CIA. ``Russia showed uneven progress''
during the six months ending Dec. 31.
``Moreover, economic conditions in Russia continue to
deteriorate, putting more pressure on Russian entities to
circumvent export controls,'' said the intelligence agency.
``Despite some examples of restraint, Russian businesses continue
to be major suppliers of weapons of mass destruction material and
technology to Iran,'' the CIA said.
The report comes as the Clinton administration is pressing
for better export relations with Russia and China. This week, for
example, the White House extended by four to 20 the number of
Russian Proton rockets U.S. satellite makers can use to launch
payloads. The White House took the action saying it believes
Russia is making progress controlling its technology exports to
Iran.

Launches Worth Money

The quota was kept at 16 launches for 18 months because the
administration wanted leverage against Russia to force it to
curtail trade with Iran. Each Proton launch is estimated to be
worth $70 million to Russia in hard Western currency. Lockheed
Martin Corp. provides the launch services in a joint venture
called ILS Launch Services with two Russian entities that have
not been tied to Iranian technology transfers.
A White House official said the CIA report doesn't reflect
the latest moves by Russia to establish the framework for
potentially effective export controls.
``The government has taken very significant steps to
establish the institutional and legal framework for establishing
export controls,'' said Gary Samore, National Security Council
Director of Russian programs, in reaction to the CIA report.
``Obviously, we still have some concerns about some Russian
entities doing business with Iran, but we believe the new steps
will give Russia tools to crack down on the entities,'' Samore
said.

Source for Iran

Still, Russian entities supplied ``a variety of ballistic
missile-related good and technical know-how to Iran and other
countries during the reporting period,'' the CIA said.
Russian companies provided Iran with some of the know-how
necessary to develop and deploy the Shahab-3 ballistic missile
that is capable of hitting Israel. It was test fired in July
1998.
Russian entities also ``remain a key source of biotechnology
for Iran,'' the CIA said. ``Russia's world-leading expertise in
biological weapons would make it an attractive target for
Iranians seeking technical information and training on biological
weapons production processes.''
Russia and China in the second half of 1998 sold Iran
antitank guided missiles, aircraft engines, and other weapons and
spare parts, the CIA said. Russian companies and institutes also
continued to support a variety of nuclear-related projects in
Iran that could be useful in weapons research and development,
the agency said.

China Progress

In spite of evidence it continues some weapons technology
transfers, China during the second half of 1998 took more steps
to strengthen controls over nuclear technologies exports, a
promise first made in the fall of 1997, said the CIA.
``These export controls should give the Chinese government
greater accounting and control of the transfer of equipment,
materials and technology to nuclear programs in countries of
concern,'' said the CIA.
To be sure, ``The effectiveness of China's nascent nuclear
export controls is not yet clear,'' the agency said.
China has made less progress, however, in controlling
transfer of technology for conventional ballistic and anti-ship
cruise missiles to Iran and Pakistan, said the CIA.
``During the reporting period, Chinese entities provided a
variety of missile-related items and assistance to several
countries and was also an important supplier of cruise missiles
to Iran through the second half of 1998,'' the CIA said.
The agency said Chinese President Jiang Zemin this year
pledged to cease supplying the missiles, which threaten U.S.
naval vessels and oil tankers in the Persian Gulf.
Chinese entities continued through late December to provide
Pakistan assistance critical to the production of its new
ballistic missiles, such as the 1,300-kilometer Ghauri, the CIA
said.

*******

#3
The Times (UK)
July 17 1999
[for personal use only]
'Tsar' Boris turns back clock at Kremlin Palace 
Russians say 550m restoration shows little has changed, writes Anna Blundy
in Moscow 

ONCE it stood as a proud symbol of tsarist power while peasants starved and
officials were accused of corruption. Now the Grand Kremlin Palace has been
returned to its old imperial glory, and cynical Russians say that little
else has changed. 

The cost of the lavish refurbishment is conservatively estimated at 550
million, outraging many poverty-stricken Russians at a time when pensions
and wages are in arrears and the state cannot afford to fund many basic
public services. One of the men in charge of the project is under
investigation for alleged money laundering. 

In a two-year project, everything from the door handles to the crests of
the Russian double-headed eagle has been restored to pre-Communist style.
Exactly 33 kinds of Russian tree were used for the new parquet. When
President Yeltsin saw the renovation of his private apartments and offices,
he is reported to have wandered around stroking the materials and
muttering: "Would you believe it! What beauty! So, the President's work is
not in vain." 

It is said to have been Mr Yeltsin's personal idea to wipe out every trace
of Communism and to resurrect the pre-revolutionary splendour of the main
Kremlin buildings. "Put it back as it was before. Do it all in one style -
those were the golden words of the President," said Pavel Borodin, head of
the office which runs presidential properties, and now under criminal
investigation - among others - by Swiss prosecutors over Kremlin building
contracts. 

Ten thousand workers from 57 Russian firms and 23 foreign firms have worked
on the renovations, which received architectural help from the British
Royal Family. Nicholas I gave interior designs for some of the great halls
to Queen Victoria as a present, and an official spent weeks in Britain
looking at them. Interiors such as the Aleksandrovsky and Andreyevsky halls
were gutted in 1932 to make way for the meeting hall of the Supreme Soviet. 

It took 60 colours of paint to recolour the Terem Palace, just one of the
buildings that make up the Grand Kremlin Palace, along with seven churches,
some dating from the 14th century, and Konstantin Ton's 19th century
architectural masterpiece - the main Kremlin building in which most of the
presidential administration is housed. 

The President's private quarters are just behind the wall separating Red
Square from the Kremlin itself. It was built in 1787 by Mikhail Kazakov.
Initially housing the Russian Senate, it later became a private residence
and offices for Communist Party leaders and their inner circle. Lenin and
Stalin had offices there. 

Nothing inside the Kremlin had been touched since the Communists laid into
it in the 1930s. In some places, cracks 6in wide threatened to bring down
whole buildings, while other areas were sinking into the ground at a rate
of more than 2in a year. 

Mr Borodin said that more than 300 million was spent on repairs to the
President's office and residence alone. However, he argues that the
Russian people made a saving of 70 million on the work, since the final
cost fell below the original estimate and was a fraction of the cost per
yard that American taxpayers gave to refurbish the White House. 

Auditors investigating the cost concluded that no irregularities had taken
place but that the timing was tasteless. Although they agreed that
renovation was long overdue, they felt that a certain frugality might have
been in order, and that historic items had been sold for a fraction of
their real worth. 

Mr Borodin has denied that any expensive items were stolen, and says that
allegations of sleaze are politically motivated as Russia faces
parliamentary elections in December and a presidential ballot next year. 

Kremlin officials insist nothing will need to be altered for at least 60
years and, most importantly, given the seemingly never-ending Russian
heatwave, the whole thing is air conditioned. 

*******

#4
Russian IMF Abuses Viewed, Need for Closer Scrutiny 

Paris' Le Monde in French
14 July 1999
[translation for personal use only]
Le Monde editorial: "Russian Scandals" 

Should Russia be helped financially? The question 
is almost as old as Russia itself! Debated at the beginning of the 
century, then again when the USSR collapsed, it has continued to pose a 
problem for the international community over the past decade or so. 
Originally announced for 14 July, the meeting of the IMF board of 
governors must decide whether or not to renew its loans to Russia. The 
revelations of an increasingly independent Russian judiciary and of 
investigations by US firms investigating the use of IMF money over recent 
years are causing the West to think again. 

Information gathered in Moscow, Washington, and Zurich tend to confirm what 
many people have long suspected. The considerable sums the IMF has made 
available to Russia since the early 1990's are not being used to restore 
order to the economy. The money is being embezzled, essentially by a 
small oligarchy which holds real power in Moscow, the men who now 
surround Boris Yeltsin and who in future will surround someone else. To 
date, it has not been possible to establish any precise proof against any 
individual. The prosecutor charged with investigating allegations, Yuriy 
Skuratov, has been dismissed. The Price Waterhouse-Coopers audits have 
not yet been published. But the elements already available are staggering. 

Between 1993 and 1998 the Russian central bank charged an obscure off-shore 
company by the name of Fimaco, based on Jersey in the Channel Islands, 
with managing a part of Russia's monetary reserves. This tiny structure 
with a capital of just $1000 was charged with managing $50 billion! Fraud 
and embezzlement were the result. It has also been learned that former 
ministers and deputy ministers were active and skilled operators on the 
financial market. Some of the IMF money was used in the summer of 1998, 
under the pretext of defending the ruble, to protect the financial 
interests of a few oligarchs. Most of the time the IMF money ends up in 
the Swiss bank accounts of the privileged few. 

Thinking it is helping Russia, the IMF is helping a few Russians. This is 
clearly not its role. Does that mean the loans must be stopped? The 
country is too large and too powerful, especially in nuclear terms, to be 
abandoned to its fate. The argument is familiar, and used constantly by 
Moscow. It is perhaps not as pertinent as one may think. A year ago the 
ruble collapsed, and the wold economy was scarcely affected. One thing is 
certain: The international community must be more determined in its 
demands for greater transparency on the use of the money it loans. There 
is an urgent need to put an end to the "Russian exception" in this matter. 

********

#5
Heat, Reforms Hurting Russian Farms
By ANGELA CHARLTON
July 16, 1999

MOSCOW (AP) - Vasily Kuprianov can't decide what roils him most. A drought 
and heat wave that are scorching his wheat crop. A government that has 
dissolved Soviet-era farm subsidies but has lagged on real reform. Western 
food aid that he maintains is unnecessary. 

``What's worse? That's a dismal question,'' said the director of grain and 
livestock at the Moskovsky farm south of Moscow. 

Kuprianov keeps the lights off in his office so they don't add more heat to 
the sweltering 90-degree afternoon. Flies hover around his phone. Sweat 
stains the business card he's holding. 

The weather is the most immediate problem. This June was the hottest month on 
record for his area, and the driest since 1951. July and August promise more 
of the same. 

Even if the weather improves, Russian farmers are facing another blight: 
locusts that are devouring crops in many regions. The bugs swept in from 
neighboring Kazakstan, where authorities usually kill them before they can do 
serious damage. But Kazakstan didn't have enough money to take care of the 
pests this year. 

Russian grain harvest estimates have been revised downward for weeks. Some 
forecasts predict just 51 million tons this year - well below the 89 million 
tons of 1997 and only slightly more than last year's woeful 48 million tons, 
which led to fears of famine and pledges of food aid. 

Another bad crop is the last thing Russian agriculture needs. Land is 
plentiful, but the farms that till it are mostly overstaffed former Soviet 
collectives that are unproductive even when harvests are good. 

The 1991 Soviet collapse brought an end to state support of agriculture and 
competition from cheap imports. Old-guard farm managers have frustrated 
efforts at reform, but have yet to find new funding sources. Machinery is old 
and inefficient - when farmers have the money for fuel. 

Farms of more than 250 acres saw production sink more than 50 percent from 
1990 through last year, according to the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development. 

Valentina Popova, who milks cows at the Moskovsky farm, remembers when it had 
5,700 cattle in the 1980s. Now it has about 1,200. 

``It's hard to be positive about the future,'' she said, prodding a cow 
lethargic from the heat to its feet so she could clamp suction tubes on its 
udder. 

The lack of rain has parched parts of the Moskovsky farm's wheat fields, and 
some of the grass that feeds its cows. 

Last year was also unusually dry. The result was the worst harvest in 40 
years, which, coming on top of Russia's financial market meltdown, prompted 
warnings of a winter famine. 

Those warnings prompted the Russian government to turn to the West for food 
aid. The United States pledged $600 million in donated wheat and $400 million 
in loans to buy more food. The European Union struck a similar $400 million 
deal. 

Winter came and went before the first aid started arriving in March. By the 
time it all arrives, this year's harvest will be clearer, and Russia's 
government may again be appealing for foreign food. 

But not everyone is convinced the country needs it. 

Fears of famine have been repeatedly invoked in recent years, but have not 
been realized. Russia still exports some grain. And analysts say many farmers 
underreport output, either to drive up prices or to sell some goods on the 
side. 

Critics say the American aid is only helping U.S. farmers, who are struggling 
to shed grain surpluses that have pushed commodity prices to their lowest 
levels in nearly 30 years. 

Kuprianov and other Russian producers say the food aid is hurting their 
business. Many had hoped last year's economic crisis would help domestic 
farmers, since the ruble's devaluation made imports more expensive. 

U.S. officials, however, note that Russia asked for the aid and insist it is 
going to places that need it. 

Meanwhile, Russian farmers disagree among themselves on the long-term answer 
to the country's agricultural woes. 

Nikolai Gladky, director of a farm in the fertile Krasnodar region near 
Russia's southern border, urges a return to Soviet-era practices. 

``Every government gives subsidies to agriculture. If they didn't, there 
would be no agriculture,'' he said. ``We should admit this, and let the 
government control farms.'' 

But Kuprianov says the answer is reform. Individual farmers face too many 
restrictions on what they can grow and the prices they set, corruption is 
pervasive and there is little incentive for investment, he said. The 
government has said it may grant loans to farmers if this year's harvest is 
bad, but Kuprianov has heard such promises before. 

Despite their troubles, many farmers fear serious reform will shut down 
inefficient farms and cost them their livelihoods. Bearing this in mind, 
politicians - particularly lawmakers facing parliamentary election in 
December - are unlikely to introduce any legislative changes soon. 

*******

#6
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 1999
From: Michael Johnston <mjohnston@MAIL.COLGATE.EDU>
Subject: Corruption in Formerly-Communist Societies: On-Line Bibliography

JRL readers may be interested to know about a new on-line bibliography and
collection of Internet resources
dealing with the general topic of corruption in Russia and the
formerly-Communist societies of Central/Eastern
Europe. It is located at http://people.colgate.edu/mjohnston, and is very
much a work in progress. Additions, suggestions,
and corrections are most welcome -- contact me at mjohnston@mail.colgate.edu.

Many thanks -- Michael Johnston, Department of Political Science, Colgate
University, Hamilton, NY 13346 USA.

*******

#7
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 1999
From: helmer@glasnet.ru (John Helmer) 
Subject: REPLY TO JERRY HOUGH ON US-RUSSIA TRADE POLITICS/3395

Jerry misses the point entirely of US policy towards the Russian market by
failing to see what is unprecedented about the US-Russia steel trade
agreement, and the way it was negotiated. I'm surprised also that
Jerry doesn't seem to know the international trade law and trade rules which 
everyone believes the US observes, and everyone demands Russia should follow.

The Russian steel that might, from Jerry's point of view, be fairly
limited is hot-rolled steel. I don't believe the dumping case that was
accepted by the Commerce Department and the International Trade Commission.
but that's arguable. Both sides were ready to accept limits. 

What is indisputable is that the agreement that was proposed
by the Clinton Administration, and eventually agreed, sets limits
for 16 product categories, including cold-rolled steel, which is the target
of a current but inconclusive anti-dumping enquiry. The other 
products are in short supply in the US, and are not being
dumped by the Russians. Russian producers of the latter categories
opposed signing the agreement, because they believed the US was acting
in violation of its own trade laws, and because their competitive
position in the US market is a strong and defensible one.

Now that their market access is restricted or barred, other exporters
will get their orders, or US mills will be able to raise prices
uncompetitively.

If you think the US should pursue a policy of protecting US jobs, you
need to look closer at exactly which jobs are protected, which lost, and
at what cost to whom, by this type of protectionism. That too is arguable,
but clearly not when Al Gore is desperately in need of steel
mill and union cash to catch up with Governor Bush.

Here, if Jerry's attempt at a non-moralizing trade policy were adopted,
American food imports would be barred or regulated in exactly the same
way as the US now controls Russian steel. Chicken, the single largest
US import to Russia, would not have been allowed in volumes so great as
to damage the Russian industry. Meat import fraud, which is rife, but
which has been very beneficial for US smallgoods producers, would
have been halted. This year's US food aid program, which I have reporting
as misguided and unwanted from last October, long before the Washington
Post saw fit to put the matter on its front page, would never have
been agreed, let alone invited.

Don't misunderstand moral, political and economic judgements. The US 
government is not wrong to take advantage of the Russian market in every 
way it can, for the benefit of US constituents. That's exactly what my 
commentary on the steel agreement said. When a succession of Russian 
governments fail to act in their constituents' best economic 
interests, it is understandable that Washington will encourage the process 
when the US gains. 

If that process also encourages corrupt decision-making, which benefits
the decision-makers at the expense of an industry, again Washington is
not to blame. Well, not more to blame than the corrupt decision-makers
themselves, according to the principle in US law that it
is as unlawful to offer or pay a bribe as to seek or accept it.

What happened in the steel trade negotiations was unique. For the first
time, capable Russian negotiators, lacking political support from their
masters, managed to mobilize their industry constituents
to influence the outcome of the deal, and salvage something for the
national interest.

Washington's response was to offer a take-it-or-leave deal that sidesteps US 
trade law and World Trade Organization rules (Russia is not a member yet, so 
that's defensible, if not right). 

By a process of tradeoff bargaining, the Russians managed to remove a 
provision the Commerce Department wanted, which would have required Russian
steelmakers to indict and convict themselves on self-initiating
anti-dumping complaints against their products. No trade rules in the
world oblige trading partners to do that to each other.

And finally, if you care to look at the fine print, the provisions for
adjustment of the minimum prices set in the suspension agreement for hot-
rolled steel, and the quota volumes allowed for the other categories,
allow the US to give less than proportional market access to the
Russians, if US market demand grows. That may not be immoral.
It is certainly discriminatory. And that's wrong. 

*******

#8
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 1999 
From: IRASTRAUS@aol.com (Ira Straus)
Subject: Death sentence for converting from Islam

What are we to make of this RFE/RL report?

"TULEEV FACING DEATH SENTENCE? A group of Muslim clerics 
from Chechnya and Dagestan have sentenced Kemerovo
Oblast Governor Aman Tuleev to death for converting from
Islam to Christianity, Russian Television reported on 12
July. (JAC, RFE/RL Russian Federation Report No 20, July 14, 1999)"

Is this a unique case, or does it fit into a context? Here there's a need to 
know more about other attempts at imposing Islamic law. Also, about the size 
and stature of the group of Muslim clerics involved. Another possibly 
relevant context is the seemingly routine business, in Chechnya and its 
environs, of kidnapping Europeans, Americans and Russians. And the condition 
of Christianity in Uzbekistan; and the greater prevalence of dictatorships 
and non-competitive elections in both FSU republics and intra-Russian 
Federation regions with Islamic heritage. These phenomena could have 
important implications, but if we don't ever think or talk about them, we'll 
always be caught by surprise by them.

Shall we say that this death sentence is a sign of a clash of civilizations? 
Or at least a one-way conflict conducted by a fraction of one civilization 
against another civilization? Or is it a genuine religious conflict instead?

Is this kind of death sentence over religion a natural product of a more 
primitive political-legal culture? Or is it a temporary inflamed reaction 
within a line-straddling civilization against the pressures of modernization 
and Westernization? Or -- a third option -- is it a result of irreducible 
difference of religion and of the highest values, something that we should 
respect and cherish, since it maintains the biodiversity of human cultures 
and holds together a local community against the ravages of the global market?

Should the difference between these cultures be described as greater 
brutality and primitiveness on the one side, and greater civility and 
civilization on the other; or should it be described as incommensurable and 
transcending any possibility of a fair value judgment? 

Is the action a small excess on the part of a religious minority that is 
acting in self-defense? Or an aggressive act of a group that believes its 
time is coming, or has already come? Or a natural reaction of an oppressed 
people after centuries of brutalization by Russian imperialism? (But then 
we'd have to ask whether similar things were done by the ancestral tribes 
centuries ago, when they were dominant over the Russians.)

Or shall we say the whole incident has no broad significance at all, because 
factional political motives may have been involved, so the religious-cultural 
motives can be dismissed as a mere pretext? (But they we'd have to ask why 
this particular kind of pretext is useful politically.)

Or shall we say that the report itself shows racism on the part of RFE/RL and 
that Westerners shouldn't mention such incidents at all? :)

These alternatives deserve to be thought through. Otherwise we are steering 
with our eyes shut. 

And information like this needs to be more systematically reported, within a 
framework that is fair and provides a basis for recognizing its significance. 
"Fair" in this context means two-way honesty: non-oversimplifying and 
non-dismissive, not exaggerating or neglecting the complicating factors, but 
also not making reductionist denials of the significance of the matter.

By the way, the report goes on to say that "Tuleev told Interfax the next day 
that rumors about his alleged conversion were planted by his political 
opponents. He added that 'he respects all religions' and that he has not 
converted to Orthodox Christianity. nor does he plan to." While this is 
probably not a full report of his remarks, still it sounds like Tuleev's 
complaint is mainly against being accused of conversion to Christianity, not 
against the criminalization of such an action. It would be useful to hear 
something about Tuleev's own personal religious-political game. It would be 
easy to speculate that it bears some relation to Zyuganov's idea of an 
alliance of all the organic community religions of the Eurasian space, to 
defend the purity and independence of the heartland from the worldwide 
corrupting influence of the imperialist West and from the infiltration of 
individualistic Western ideas and religions. But this is pure speculation; 
what is needed is information about these matters.

*******

#9
From: Jamestown Foundation <brdcast@mx.jamestown.org>
16 July 1999 Prism - Part 6

RIGHT CAUSE: YOU ARE NOT RIGHT, GENTLEMEN! 
By Aleksandr Buzgalin
Aleksandr Buzgalin is a doctor of economics and a professor at Moscow State
University. He is a leader of Russia's Democratic Socialist Movement.

Russian politics regularly takes some unbelievable turns. One might have
thought that the three failed attempts by Yegor Gaidar to form a party of
power to proclaim and implement right-wing liberal ideas had demonstrated
that there was no place for these politicians in the Russian parliament. But
no: They have been reborn. For there is substantial economic might behind
Right Cause.... But let us take everything in turn.

1. WHO STILL LIKES GAIDAR AND WHY?
After the Russia's Democratic Choice movement did not even get close to the
coveted 5 percent barrier in the 1995 State Duma elections, many political
analysts, even the pro-bourgeois and decidedly anticommunist ones, predicted
the political demise of these politicians. But life dictated differently.

So who supported Gaidar before, and who supports Gaidar, Chubais and company
today? This is not an easy question (though there are no easy questions in
Russian politics). I shall outline a number of thoughts on this point.

Above all, Right Cause is supported by... its bosses. This is not just a
frivolous assertion on the part of a writer who enjoys dialectics. This is a
statement of the situation which has now established itself in Russia, where
the leaders of the bloc in question are at the same time influential figures
in domestic business and politics. The best known figure in the West is
Yegor Gaidar, Russia's first prime minister, the odious architect of the
attempts to implement "shock therapy" (which for most Russians entailed
"shock without the therapy"), and the weakest economically of the leaders of
Right Cause. However, Yegor Gaidar is a symbolic figure, and, in his own
way, charismatic--but charismatic mainly (if not exclusively) for those for
whom "loyalty to the reforms" is a password: "He's one of us!." For
right-wing liberals Gaidar is "one of us." By his actions (a very rare
phenomenon in modern Russia), he proved that he would not back down, not let
them down and not flee (at least while Harvard pays him huge royalties for
the very reason that he is loyal to them). This is what makes Gaidar
extremely valuable, particularly to right-wing liberal circles in the USA
(and to a lesser extent in Western Europe). And these circles are powerful
political--particularly geopolitical--financial and even military allies (as
demonstrated by the Yugoslav experience). And though Russians are now
becoming more and more imbued with anti-NATO and anti-IMF sentiments,
neither NATO nor the IMF are any the weaker for that. Moreover, there has
only been an insignificant decline in the real influence of the
establishment of the United States and other G-7 countries, NATO and the IMF
on real politics within Russia. So Gaidar is still a force to be reckoned
with.

No less symbolic (and for most Russians sinister) a figure among the leaders
of Right Cause is that of Anatoly Chubais. Where Gaidar is the architect of
price liberalization for most Russians, Chubais is the architect of
privatization. The former is associated with economic crisis and the
impoverishment of most workers, the latter with the looting and destruction
of the huge material wealth of the former RSFSR. While not forgetting that
Chubais--a man who has survived longer in the higher Russian political elite
than Gaidar--is also very popular in the West, I should like to stress
another point. Chubais today means, first, the huge and--despite all the
problems of the current crisis--rich "United Energy System" of Russia (RAO
EES). Second, Chubais is the key to Yeltsin's family (I do not wish to
reiterate here the observations of Russian journalists about the nature of
these warm relations), and Yeltsin is more than just a sick and soon to
retire president (though a president in Russia is more than a president,
almost a tsar). Yeltsin, and particularly his family, means the president's
administration. And the president's administration is a huge apparatus with
real power, which has connections with many business structures. It is
certainly more than stretching a point to identify Chubais with the
president's administration. But it is a well-known fact that Russia's former
privatizer is still very influential in these circles.

One could go on to discuss other "big boys" among the leaders of the bloc in
question, but we have enough examples.

So Right Cause is needed by its bosses, and these bosses are highly
influential figures in contemporary Russia. One may therefore conclude with
some justification that behind this bloc there is a broad circle of Russia's
administrative and economic elites which are prepared to foster and nurture
it. But there are also ordinary voters who need Right Cause. Not very many,
admittedly: Probably no more than the 2 or 3 percent who supported Gaidar's
Russia's Democratic Choice four years ago. Why so few? Because even in St.
Petersburg, that citadel of liberalism, even after the hysterical hullabaloo
in the central media in support of the Right after the murder of the deputy
Starovoitova, even against this background, the Right struggled to get just
one deputy and one other sympathizer into the city's legislative assembly.

So who are these 2 or 3 percent? In the main, they are not even the
bourgeoisie, but the elite intelligentsia, some young people and people who
are scornfully called "loony demmies" [democrats] by their opponents (whom
they call "loony commies" in return). The first group--the elite
intelligentsia--support Gaidar and co. because they are "their boys"--the
people they drank tea with in the dachas of the middle-level nomenklatura.
These are people they feel close to in style and in spirit, and these are
the people who (and this is perhaps the most important thing) opened the
doors to the West for this small elite of writers, musicians and so on, and
that meant opening the doors to big money; these are people who... well,
there is no need to go on with this list of well-known facts. The second
group of supporters of the right-wing coalition are rich young people (the
children of the "new Russians," including the new nomenklatura and their
friends and comrades), and a much broader group of those young people who
are not rich but are active, aggressive and business-oriented, and who have
not given up hope of getting rich quick, thanks either to good fortune in
the market, or to their abilities, or to a "friendship" previously struck up
with the bosses of Right Cause.

The third group is more difficult to get to grips with. There is a stratum
of poor intelligentsia in our country who grew up with a secret inner
loathing of the Soviet system, a sincere and almost fanatical respect for
the idea of human rights, and an unquestioning certainty that democracy and
the market would in and of themselves lead the country to the paradise of
the West (they were also convinced that the West was indeed a paradise).
These people believed that Yeltsin and Gaidar would do this. When "this" (a
democratic, market-oriented paradise) did not happen, they went down the
path well-trodden by Stalin's propagandists: If we are unable to do
something it means our enemies are hampering us. If Gaidar and his friends
have not succeeded in their radical market reforms, it means that they were
impeded. This fanatical faith in Gaidar and co. for these democrats is the
obverse of the old, uncritical, oblivious to the facts, communist
fanaticism. Does Russia need Right Cause? Russian politicians need it. All
of them, even the communists (in order to point the finger at their radical
enemies in the same way as Gaidar's people point the finger at the
communists). But for Russia, Right Cause is not only not needed. It is
dangerous.

2. WHO HATES GAIDAR AND WHY?
The writer concluded the last paragraph with the harsh assertion that Right
Cause is dangerous for Russia. It is dangerous in that these politicians
will implement their plans whatever the cost, and experience has shown that
these plans result in severe system crisis--both economic, social and
spiritual. Right Cause will continue down the path of "shock without
therapy" not because they are people of whom it was once said: "They have
forgotten nothing and learnt nothing." No. They understood everything a long
time ago. They studied well and learnt their lessons well. They did not make
mistakes; they did very efficiently just what was advantageous for
themselves and for those standing behind them. In 1991 Gaidar was appointed
by those--Russians included--who thought that Russia should be taken to the
"point of no return" (an aviation term meaning the point beyond which the
aircraft can no longer return the airport from which it took off, because
there is not enough fuel). They considered it their duty to destroy the
Soviet system whatever the cost (including the cost of deep crisis, a
reduction in income for the majority of citizens, a reduction in life
expectancy and so on). They knew that there would be a crisis (although to
be fair it seems they hoped it would not be quite so severe). They honestly
believed, and still believe, that there was no alternative for Russia, and
they are right: There was no alternative for their Russia. What is more,
they won. They profited from the fall in production of 50%; from inflation
(in comparison with the Soviet period, prices on consumer goods in Russia
rose by approximately 10,000 times [NB not percent, but times!]); from
institutional chaos and "prikhvatization" (a pun on the Russian words
"khvatat,'" 'to seize,' and privatization). They won. They were not afraid
that the airplane of Russian society would crash, because they had already
taken the precaution of equipping themselves with (as one journalist put it
perfectly) a "golden parachute."

But for most workers, from unskilled laborers to university professors
earning US$50-80 per month (there is a joke doing the rounds now at Moscow
State University that the collapse of the communist system has resulted in
the victory of communist labor--it is creative, it is satisfying and
fulfilling, and... it is free), this attempt to effect radical reforms
resulted in tragedy. It resulted in tragedy not just for the "patriots" and
"supporters of a strong state" who are nostalgic for the USSR and support
the People's Patriotic Union and its core, the KPRF. It resulted in tragedy
above all for that section of society which has always supported and will
always support democracy (in the sense of people's power, not the power of
the "democrats", as the joke goes in Russia), because the policies of Gaidar
and Chubais discredited democracy in the same way that Stalinism discredited
socialism. These journalistic musings do not, of course, constitute a system
of scientific proof. But the author (just like his many colleagues, teachers
and pupils) has proved these propositions on several occasions, armed with
facts. Moreover, for the purposes of this particular article, which is
weighing up the prospects for Right Cause as a political movement, it is not
important to provide a theoretical proof of the proposition that the
right-wing liberal policy of reform was and remains dangerous for Russia.
Here, the important thing is that the majority of citizens of our country
have understood (sensed? suffered?) and expressed through the ballot box the
conclusions demonstrated by many theoreticians: Russia could have had a
different path to democracy and wealth. We have understood that the radical
reforms failed not because of mistakes or because they were hampered (as we
know, a bad workman always blames his tools), and not because of the
inconsistency of the reforming forces themselves (these are the main
arguments of Right Cause, who are hungry for revenge, for "real" shock
therapy). Exactly the opposite was true: Mistakes were made, the reforms
were carried out inconsistently and there was interference from all sides
for the very reason that Russia (its system, economy, traditions, the
interests of most of its citizens and so on and so forth) rejected this type
of reform. And inasmuch as this has all become clear now, Right Cause cannot
hope for any sort of positive result at the forthcoming elections.

But they must be hoping for something. They are surely not stupid enough to
play a game they know they must lose?

3. They do have something to hope for (in lieu of a conclusion) Gaidar,
Chubais and Co. hope, not without justification, that the disparate,
amorphous "party of power", which is scared of misjudging, of losing, of
making mistakes, of backing the wrong horse (it is scared of everything!)
may well call on them again. Why? This is worth some thought. First of all,
Right Cause could come in handy as a powerful financial structure which, on
top of that, enjoys great support in the West. Money is always welcome in
election campaigns, even if the price is having to pander to unpopular
politicians in order to get hold of it.

Even more importantly, this right-wing coalition (and I repeat, this theory
is the fundamental one) is a way of making the centrism of the main players
more noticeable. The various governors' blocs and other centrists (including
Our Home is Russia) are always keen to demonstrate their moderation in
comparison with the Gaidar-Chubais group. And this is doubly advantageous:
Firstly, the Russian electorate as a whole has moved to the left, and it is
now unprofitable to be on the far right. Secondly, and even more
importantly, the "centrists" can always point their fingers at Right Cause
and say "It wasn't us, it's Gaidar and Chubais who are responsible for all
the problems of this difficult period. The crisis is their fault, it's
nothing to do with us. On the contrary, we'll put everything right and get
rid of right-wing extremism."

And finally, Yegor Gaidar, Anatoly Chubais and their less distinguished
colleagues may well be called back as "whipping boys" if this or that party
of power decides to begin a new round of "reforms" with a "tightening of
belts" (so-called "unpopular measures"). Some "centrist" or other may well
do this after winning the presidential elections in 2000. And Yeltsin is
even more likely to do this if he somehow manages to hang on both to the
presidency and his health in the new century. But here, great danger may be
in store for anyone who takes it into their heads to toy with Right Cause:
The leaders of this bloc are no longer "boys" (and not just in terms of
their age). They are quite capable of getting rid of their "puppeteer" and
of becoming not just the real bosses, but also the bosses in name, cynically
walking all over those who brought them back to power in the hope of gaining
their loyalty and gratitude. A new struggle for power between irresponsible
groups of the elite may indeed have terrifying consequences in a Russia
which it is already difficult enough to safeguard from a catastrophic
downward spiral of economic, political, regional and other disasters. But
even if the worst does not happen, what the West calls the
"thirdworldization" of Russia is inevitable.

However, the most likely scenario is that the "supreme commander" of Russian
politics will keep the right-wing liberals in reserve, where they will be
given lucrative little jobs, and regularly given air-time on television, but
will only be granted access to big (real) politics in a background role. 

*******