April 23, 1999    
This Date's Issues: 3253• 3254  • 

Johnson's Russia List
#3254
23 April 1999
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. AP: Yeltsin Health OK To Seek 3rd Term.
2. Jamestown Foundation Monitor: KREMLIN WARNS OF TOUGH MEASURES. 
3. Los Angeles Times: Richard Paddock, Russia Sees No Cause to Celebrate 
NATO Birthday.
4. Reuters: IMF may lend Russia $4-$5 bln-Chubais.
5. Bloomberg: Russia's Primakov Seen as Next President, Opinion Poll 
Reveals.
6. Reuters: Russia Envoy Wants To Meet NATO, Details Hazy.
7. Moscow Times: Andrei Piontkovsky, SEASON OF DISCONTENT: The Party Line 
On Yugoslavia: Hate, Hysteria.
8. Kanwa News (Japan) editorial: THE BALKAN CRISIS GAVE RISE TO A NEW 
SOVIET UNION. 
9. Komsomolskaya Pravda: Aleksandr Gamov, "Kremlin Can Win. Having Halted 
Series of Political Mistakes, Presidential Staff Seems To Be Recapturing 
Initiative."
10. Renfrey Clarke, RUSSIAN COMMUNIST YOUTH DEFEND THEIR INDEPENDENCE.
11. Itar-Tass: Political Standoff Fraught with Serious Consequences -Lebed.
12. Edward Lozansky: Invitation to concert and reception.]

******

#1
Yeltsin Health OK To Seek 3rd Term
23 April 1999
By VLADIMIR ISACHENKOV

MOSCOW (AP) -- President Boris Yeltsin is strong enough to seek a third term 
if the constitution permitted, and might be feigning some illnesses to trick 
his foes, his chief doctor said in an interview published today.

Yeltsin's health ``allows him to run again in 2000,'' the main presidential 
doctor Sergei Mironov said in an interview published in the daily 
Komsomolskaya Pravda.

However, Russia's highest court ruled in November that Yeltsin cannot seek a 
third presidential term in 2000 because he already has been elected twice, 
the constitutional limit, and Yeltsin himself has insisted that he does not 
intend to seek re-election.

The remarks by Mironov, Yeltsin's close confidant for many years, appeared 
aimed at the Communists and other hard-liners in parliament's lower house, 
who have said Yeltsin is too sick to lead Russia and are set to hold an 
impeachment debate against him in mid-May.

Mironov warned the president's political rivals against ``prematurely writing 
off'' Yeltsin. He even suggested that the president had faked some of his 
illnesses to mislead his opponents.

``Can't you admit that he may conceal his true condition from opponents?'' 
Mironov asked. ``Those cautious people who say that Boris Nikolayevich 
(Yeltsin) will catch cold at our funerals are right. There is reason in this 
saying.''

A number of illnesses -- from heart attacks to pneumonia to an ulcer -- have 
left Yeltsin hospitalized for weeks at a time in the last few years, turning 
him into a part-time president. With his grip on power weakened, his foes 
have stepped up efforts to oust him.

Mironov sought to downplay the seriousness of heart attacks that led to 
Yeltsin's quintuple bypass surgery in 1996. But he did express concern about 
Yeltsin's recent history of respiratory illnesses, which can cause fatigue, 
``bad sleep and, sometimes, an inability to concentrate.''

Despite those problems and his recent hospitalization for a bleeding ulcer, 
Yeltsin, 68, remains strong, Mironov argued.

``He works up to 12 hours on some days ... and four or five hours of rest are 
enough for him, although we believe he should sleep longer,'' he said.

Mironov denied that Yeltsin's alleged love for vodka had eroded his health, 
but didn't deny that the president had an occasional drink.

``Since old times, vodka has been an important stress-relieving medicine, and 
the head of state's job is very stressful,'' he said. ``I haven't seen any 
alcohol abuse, and, correspondingly, Boris Nikolayevich has had no 
alcohol-related health problems.''

He said details of Yeltsin's medical history were in great demand by the 
president's foes.

``It's no secret that they have offered big money for Yeltsin's health record 
-- millions of dollars,'' Mironov said without elaborating.

******

#2
Jamestown Foundation Monitor
23 April 1999

KREMLIN WARNS OF TOUGH MEASURES. The Kremlin continued to issue warnings in
the wake of the Federation Council's vote in support of Yuri Skuratov, the
Russian prosecutor general whom President Boris Yeltsin suspended earlier
this month. An account today summarized the comments of a high-level Kremlin
official, who asked that his name not be used, but whose face was featured
at the top of the article with a black strip across his eyes. From the
photograph, the official appeared to be Kremlin administration chief
Aleksandr Voloshin, who before the April 21 vote in the Federation Council
had delivered Yeltsin's letter asking for support, and who was interrupted
and even jeered while doing so. 

The official warned that the Kremlin is considering firing the cabinet of
Yevgeny Primakov, dissolving the State Duma--the lower house of parliament,
which is planning to consider impeachment of Yeltsin in mid-May--and jailing
Skuratov, who reportedly has a list of Russian notables with Swiss bank
accounts (Kommersant, April 23). This scenario corresponds to an account,
published earlier this month, of secret meetings in the Kremlin, at which
Anatoly Chubais, Russia's privatization tsar and current electricity chief,
reportedly advocated a hard line--including firing Primakov, dissolving the
Duma and even jailing Skuratov (Vlast, April 13).

The official also criticized Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov for only weakly
supporting Yeltsin's request to the Federation Council to support Skuratov's
ouster. The official expressed particular dissatisfaction with Primakov's
"Jesuitical" argument to the council members that the "struggle against
corruption" would be strengthened by Skuratov's ouster. The official also
chastised Federation Council Chairman Yegor Stroev for allegedly "shelving"
a secret letter from the main military prosecutor, who is investigating
Skuratov's alleged misdeeds, rather than presenting it to the council
members prior to the April 21 vote, as the Kremlin had requested. Finally,
the official also criticized Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, who, despite recent
gestures of friendship from the Kremlin, apparently voted in favor of
Skuratov and then said that the Kremlin should give the suspended prosecutor
a chance to carry out his investigations into high-level corruption. The
official, however, said that the Kremlin does not want to burn bridges with
Luzhkov (Kommersant, April 23).

Meanwhile, Oleg Sysuev, first deputy chief of the Kremlin administration,
said diplomatically in a television interview yesterday that it was
necessary to take "very tough actions" toward those who were trying to "rock
the boat." Sysuev said, however, that such actions must be taken strictly on
the basis of the constitution and the law (NTV, April 22). It should be
noted here that a legal basis could be provided for such radical steps as
arresting Skuratov and banning the Communist Party, while firing Primakov
and dissolving the Duma being, under certain circumstances, fully within
Yeltsin's constitutional rights. Presidential spokesman Dmitri Yakushkin,
however, stressed that tough actions do not necessarily mean "extraordinary"
ones (Russian agencies, April 22).

******

#3
Los Angeles Times
23 April 1999
[for personal use only]
Russia Sees No Cause to Celebrate NATO Birthday 
Europe: Moscow views airstrikes in Yugoslavia, alliance expansion and shift 
in power as security threats. 
By RICHARD C. PADDOCK

MOSCOW--When Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin decided to snub Washington 
and boycott NATO's 50th birthday party this weekend, it was a clear sign of 
how low Russia's relations with the United States and the alliance have sunk 
in the last four weeks. 
For Russians, there is nothing to celebrate in the longevity of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. They view NATO's month-old bombing 
campaign against Yugoslavia as an unlawful act of aggression that threatens 
Russia's security and could start a new Cold War. In the most dire 
predictions, some Russians warn that NATO's actions could provoke a new 
nuclear arms race or World War III. 
Always skeptical of NATO's intentions, Russian officials now say the 
airstrikes are proof that the alliance is willing to attack a country outside 
its fold. Russia, which waged its own ethnic war in the separatist republic 
of Chechnya, fears that it also could be vulnerable to attack under NATO's 
logic. 
"What we have is the first crisis in Russia-U.S. relations since the end 
of the Cold War," said Sergei M. Rogov, director of the USA-Canada Institute, 
a Moscow think tank. "Under an optimistic scenario, it will take years to 
rebuild what has been broken by the war in Yugoslavia." 
Where Americans see allied forces on a humanitarian mission, Russians 
see an illegal assault on a sovereign nation. Where Americans see NATO trying 
to stop an evil dictator, Russians see the West attempting to cut Russia off 
from the rest of Europe. 
"People are convinced that an arms race is inevitable and a buildup of 
nuclear weapons is inevitable and that Russia will face a much more unstable 
situation than even three months ago," said Sergei A. Karaganov, a former 
member of Yeltsin's Security Council. 
On March 24, the day the bombing of Yugoslavia started, Russia 
retaliated by breaking off relations with NATO and recalled its envoy from 
the alliance's headquarters in Brussels. On Wednesday, Russia announced that, 
in protest, it would not send a delegation to the NATO summit in Washington 
that starts today with the participation of leaders from 42 other countries. 
NATO was created by the United States and its European allies in 1949 to 
contain the perceived threat of communism after World War II. The Soviet 
Union countered with the formation of its own European military alliance, the 
Warsaw Pact. 
As the power of the Soviet Union waned, then-President Mikhail S. 
Gorbachev agreed to pull Soviet troops out of Central Europe and permit 
Germany to retain full NATO membership after reunification. In a gentlemen's 
agreement with Gorbachev, U.S. officials promised that the alliance in turn 
would not expand eastward, according to Jack F. Matlock, who attended the 
negotiations as U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union. 
That verbal commitment was broken in 1997 with the decision to invite 
three former Soviet satellites--Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic--to 
join NATO as full members. 
Attempting to soothe Russia's fears about NATO enlargement, the alliance 
stressed its origins as a purely defensive organization that would not attack 
other nations unprovoked. Even the charter of the 19-member alliance forbids 
offensive military action beyond the borders of NATO nations, Western leaders 
pointed out. 
Those assurances also proved to be short-lived. Predictions by Russian 
officials last year that the shifting balance of power in Europe and the 
widening role of NATO would lead to armed conflict have come true. 
"There are a number of points which worry us," Russian Foreign Minister 
Igor S. Ivanov said in a December interview. "Above all, it is the possible 
use of NATO forces without U.N. sanction. Secondly, the possibility of 
actions by NATO beyond its sphere of responsibility." 
The deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations is illustrated by a poll 
conducted earlier this month by the All-Russian Center for the Study of 
Public Opinion. 
Of 1,600 Russians surveyed, 56% said the U.S. and NATO were responsible 
for the escalation of the Kosovo conflict, while 63% said the ultimate goal 
of the U.S. and NATO was to set up bases and deploy troops in Kosovo. Only 
33% said they had a positive attitude toward the United States, down from 67% 
in a poll in December. 
Patriarch Alexi II, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, spoke for 
many Russians when he went to the Yugoslav capital, Belgrade, on what was 
ostensibly a peace mission Tuesday and delivered a sermon condemning the 
West's "orgy of sin" and "lawlessness" in Kosovo. 
"Bombs and missiles are pouring down on this land not because they seek 
to defend anyone," the patriarch told a congregation of Serbs. "The NATO 
military action has a different goal--to destroy the postwar order, which was 
paid for with heavy bloodshed, and to impose upon people an order alien to 
them and based on the dictate of brute force." 
The Russian government largely has sided with Yugoslav President 
Slobodan Milosevic in the war. It continues, for example, to deny that 
Milosevic's regime carried out "ethnic cleansing" against ethnic Albanians in 
Yugoslavia's Kosovo province before the NATO airstrikes began. 
In recent days, Russia has attempted to strike a more balanced posture 
and help find a peaceful way out of the conflict. Former Russian Prime 
Minister Viktor S. Chernomyrdin, recently named Yeltsin's special envoy on 
Kosovo, flew to Belgrade on Thursday and discussed with Milosevic a possible 
compromise in the conflict. 
Russia worries that it will become increasingly isolated from the rest 
of Europe if NATO continues to add former Communist countries as members or 
if the alliance takes over their territories by force. 
Russians fear that NATO's decision this week to update alliance plans 
for a potential Yugoslavia ground war--which Russia calls an invasion--could 
dramatically escalate tension between the two powers. 
"This is the road to disaster and would destroy whatever is left of 
Russia-U.S. relations after the end of the Cold War," said Rogov of the 
USA-Canada Institute. "If NATO can invade one country, NATO can invade 
another country. There are plenty of ethnic problems in Russia and other 
former Soviet republics" that might give NATO a pretext. 
With the deterioration of Russia's economy and military, Moscow 
undoubtedly would counter any threat from NATO by relying on its nuclear 
arsenal as a deterrent, Rogov said. That in turn could trigger a new arms 
race. 
Already, the warfare in Kosovo is affecting Russian domestic politics 
and building support for the anti-American views espoused by nationalists and 
Communists. Some analysts predict that hostility toward the West will color 
the presidential election scheduled for next year. 
"New and almost impassable dividing lines appear in Europe once again," 
Vyacheslav A. Nikonov, head of the Moscow-based think tank Politika Fund, 
wrote Tuesday in the newspaper Izvestia. "The dream of one unified continent 
from the Atlantic to the Urals has evaporated like snow under the April sun." 

******

#4
INTERVIEW-IMF may lend Russia $4-$5 bln-Chubais
By David Chance

LONDON, April 23 (Reuters) - The International Monetary Fund looks set to 
agree a deal to provide cash for Russia, but former deputy prime minister 
Anatoly Chubais said that Russia may get little more than needed for its IMF 
repayments. 

``The basic thing is that an agreement between Russia and the IMF be 
achieved. The amount of money distributed will be a maximum $4.0-$5.0 
billion,'' Chubais said in an interview with Reuters on Friday. 

Russia has said it wanted at least $4.8 billion for IMF repayments this year. 

Chubais is out in the political cold due to his pro-market stance. He was 
sacked from the government after a scandal in which he took advance payments 
for a book. He said that he believed the IMF board would approve the loan in 
May or June. 

Although Chubais is no longer in charge of Russia's debt negotiations, he met 
IMF chief Michel Camdessus three weeks ago when Camdessus visited Russia. 

``I think the IMF refusing to give this money would be the last drop which 
could completely destroy the relationship between Russia and the West after 
the bombing of Kosovo,'' Chubais said. 

He said that an IMF deal would open the way for loans from the World Bank and 
other international financial institutions. 

Chubais, who currently heads electricity giant Unified Energy System 
EESR.RTS, said that the NATO attacks on Yugoslavia had completely destroyed 
any political compact between Russia and the West. 

As a result, hardliners such as Gennady Zyuganov and Vladimir Zhirinovsky 
would win extra seats in December's election to the State Duma, or lower 
house of parliament. 

``They will definitely get a number of additional seats in the Duma,'' 
Chubais said. 

Chubais, who recently joined with other prominent pro-reform politicians to 
establish a new centre-right political party, said he had no plans to revive 
his political career. 

``Our goal is to overcome the five percent barrier (for Duma representation). 
I myself will not run for deputy of parliament,'' he said. 

Speaking of his role in UES, Chubais said that he was trying to rebuild 
investor confidence after the parliament passed a law limiting foreign 
shareholdings to 30 percent in major companies. 

He said there were currently no plans to raise money for UES from 
international capital markets, but that he had met with European companies to 
discuss cooperation on power exports from Russia to western Europe. 

Chubais said that he would soon fly to China to discuss power exports from 
Russia. 

*******

#5
Russia's Primakov Seen as Next President, Opinion Poll Reveals

Moscow, April 23 (Bloomberg)
-- Russian communist party leader
Gennady Zyuganov leads the latest opinion poll surveying voting
intentions in next year's presidential election. However, a
majority of Russians now think Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov will
win the election.

Following are the results of the opinion poll conducted by
Russia's Public Opinion from April 9 to 13. The poll surveyed 1600
people and had a margin of error 4 percent.

Who would you vote for in the presidential elections?


Gennady Zyuganov 27%
Yevgeny Primakov 19%
Yuri Luzhkov 15%
Grigory Yavlinsky (Yabloko) 13%
Alexander Lebed (Krasnoyarsk Governor) 6%
Vladimir Zhirinovsky (LDPR) 4%
Gennady Seleznyov (Duma Speaker) 3%
Sergei Kiriyenko (Former Prime Minister) 3%
Boris Nemtsov (Former Deputy Premier) 1%
Viktor Chernomyrdin (Former Prime Minister) 1%
Others 1%
No opinion 7%

Who will be the next president of Russia?

Primakov 16%
Zyuganov 15%
Luzhkov 15%
Yavlinsky 4%
Zhirinovsky 3%
Lebed 3%
Chernomyrdin 2%
Kiriyenko 1%
Seleznyov 1%
Nemtsov -
Other 2%
No opinion 38%

*******

#6
Russia Envoy Wants To Meet NATO, Details Hazy
By Timothy Heritage
April 23, 1999

MOSCOW (Reuters) - Russia's special envoy on Yugoslavia is expected to meet 
NATO representatives Saturday to build on what he is hailing as a 
breakthrough in negotiations to end the Kosovo crisis. 

But details of the agreement which envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin says he reached 
in Belgrade with President Slobodan Milosevic, allowing for an 
``international presence'' in Kosovo, remain hazy. 

Britain and the United States have responded coolly to the proposal and said 
they had few details. NATO countries in Moscow said they had not been briefed 
on the agreement, but hoped Russian officials would provide details later 
Friday. 

``We have succeeded in achieving a breakthrough in this conflict, but this is 
only the beginning,'' Chernomyrdin was quoted as saying by Interfax news 
agency after he held more than eight hours of talks in Belgrade Thursday. 

``Now we are faced with the big task of achieving compromise between the 
sides...He (Milosevic) has made big compromises. Now we have to talk to NATO 
leaders and then sit them down at the negotiating table.'' 

An aide to Chernomyrdin said the former prime minister could meet President 
Boris Yeltsin Friday or Saturday, and would be ready to travel to meet NATO 
leaders later Saturday. 

Vladimir Ryzhkov, a leader of the ``Our Home is Russia'' party which 
Chernomyrdin heads, said the envoy would start talks with NATO after the 
party ends a conference in Moscow Saturday. He did not say where the 
consultations would take place. 

One possibility is that Chernomyrdin will fly to Washington, where NATO 
leaders are meeting Friday and Saturday for the alliance's 50th anniversary. 
Such a visit could upstage the summit, but he might alternatively arrive 
after it ends. 

Chernomyrdin, 61, is unlikely to let the U.S. and British opposition prevent 
him from seeking NATO backing for the plan. 

He has little to lose by seeking agreement. Success would boost his hopes of 
returning to top-level politics in Russia after his dismissal as premier a 
year ago, and his peace efforts could also embarrass NATO as it holds its 
summit. 

The key to the deal could be what Milosevic accepts as an ''international 
presence'' and who takes part. Belgrade has until now fiercely opposed 
letting foreign troops on to Yugoslav soil. 

Russian media gave conflicting signals Friday whether any international 
presence would include military forces, and Chernomyrdin offered only vague 
clues. 

``What kind of international forces they will be or from which countries -- 
this is yet to be discussed. But the main thing is that Russia take part,'' 
he said. 

Chernomyrdin later indicated the international presence would be part of a 
six-point plan including the following: 

the safe return of refugees and displaced persons. 

resuming talks on a political deal giving Kosovo autonomy. 

a possible reduction of Yugoslav army and police in Kosovo and the removal of 
NATO units from the Yugoslav border. 

international help rebuilding Yugoslavia's economy. 

an international presence in Kosovo under United Nations auspices and 
including Russia. 

NATO has demanded Yugoslavia remove all its forces from Kosovo, and a partial 
withdrawal is unlikely to satisfy it. 

``I think the military presence is no longer opposed in principle,'' said a 
Moscow-based diplomat from a NATO member state. ``But I think one obstacle to 
agreement is that the Serb side is offering only a reduction of its presence 
in Kosovo.'' 

******

#7
Moscow Times
April 22, 1999 
SEASON OF DISCONTENT: The Party Line On Yugoslavia: Hate, Hysteria 
By Andrei Piontkovsky 

There are people for whom the crisis in the Balkans rang out like a bugle 
call to an old army horse, returning them to the nostalgic days of their 
war-time youth. 

One had to see with what almost erotic delight Colonel General Leonid Ivashev 
pronounced formulaic phrases such as "NATO cutthroats" or "NATO is a criminal 
organization with no right to exist." In a way, he was rewarding himself for 
10 years of enforced reserve, when as the head of the Defense Ministry's 
international cooperation department he had been expected, through clenched 
teeth, to speak of "our Western partners." 

The Cabinet minister for social welfare (that is, for the care of the 
unemployed and the unfortunate) is an animated lady who flits about in mink 
coats, Deputy Prime Minister Valentina Matviyenko. This old party hand, who 
worked for decades in the Komsomol and the CPSU on matters of ideology, has 
also predatorily bared her fangs, announcing the "mass media must strictly 
follow the line developed by the president and the government." 

Those who don't strictly follow this party line were recently warned by one 
of the so-called "patriotic" newspapers that their home addresses and 
telephone numbers would be published - so that patriotically-minded citizens 
could personally express their disapproval. 

And according to one of the leading journalists of Moskovsky Komsomolets, the 
press secretary of another deputy prime minister, Yury Maslyukov, warned him 
that he could be visited by people in masks who could cause him lots of 
unpleasantness. 

For the first time in the past 10 or 15 years, society is seeing a reborn 
atmosphere of fear and ideological indoctrination. I have received many 
responses to an article I published in Novaya Gazeta under the headline, 
"Does Russia Need a Milosevic Victory?" Among them were calls from fairly 
famous people who said they shared my point of view, but weren't prepared to 
do so publicly. I can understand them. After all, it seems that we are now 
all in one unified state with Yugoslavia. 

This military, anti-Western, pan-Slavic hysteria, if it continues, will 
inevitably lead to the establishment in Russia of a police dictatorship. 
This, it seems, is belatedly becoming clear to that part of the liberal 
intelligentsia that itself participated in this hysteria (so as to appear to 
be even more of a rhinoceros than the rhinoceroses themselves). 

Last week, the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy published a broad 
document entitled "About the NATO War Against Yugoslavia." In the preamble 
the authors state that their work is also aimed at "keeping Russia from being 
dragged into what would be for her a deadly war hysteria." 

In this many-paged document, there is much that is noble and much that is 
just indignation, regarding this or that NATO action. But there is not a 
single word of empathy for the suffering of hundreds of thousands of 
Albanians. There is not a single word of judgment for the mass crimes against 
humanity carried out by the regime of Slobodan Milosevic systematically and 
methodically before the eyes of the world - the murders, the rapes, the 
robberies, the deportations. And there is nothing whatsoever about what is 
happening in Kosovo, other than a two-faced and misleading phrase that "the 
bombings have led to a gigantic flow of refugees of all nationalities, and 
have pushed Belgrade toward ethnic cleansing." 

******

#8
Kanwa News (Japan)
04/20/99
Editorial
THE BALKAN CRISIS GAVE RISE TO A NEW SOVIET UNION.

The direct result of the NATO’s air strike against the Balkan Peninsula was 
the birth of a "new Soviet Union". The history will prove that this was the 
last result that the NATO had wished to see and that for the NATO, of course, 
it is the worst strategic mistake of this century. 

This air strike saw an unprecedentedly united Slavic nations in its history. 
As the history records, Tito withstood the threat and pressure from Stalin to 
safeguard the independence and dignity of Yugoslavia. For over a hundred 
years, Ukraine was in conflict with Russia for its independence. Now, 
Yugoslavia has made a formal request to join the Russia-Byelorussian Alliance 
while Ukraine has formally given up its status as a non-nuclear country and 
has enhanced its military relationship with Russia. The "strategic new 
concept" that the NATO proposed in the hope of expanding its influence 
eastward to Ukraine may have become an illusion in history due to the 
vigilance of Ukraine. 

In fact, the "new Soviet Union" came into being in 1997. The difference 
between the "new Soviet Union" and the old one is that the former shows a 
stronger color of "federalization" while the latter was of a "confederation" 
nature. The old Soviet Union practiced the planned economy and the socialist 
system whereas the fundamental goal that the "new Soviet Union" wishes to 
reach is the market economy and the capitalist system of freedom. However, 
there are quite a few similarities in several areas between the two Soviet 
Unions, especially in the strategy and the value of national defense. 

On April 2, 1997, Russian President Yeltsin and Byelorussian President 
Lukashenko signed the Treaty on the Russia-Byelorussian Alliance in Moscow. 
According to the treaty, it was decided that the existing Russia-Byelorussian 
Community should be changed to the Russia-Byelorussian Alliance. It is not 
difficult to see from the constitution of the Russia-Byelorussian Alliance 
that the goal these two countries wish to ultimately reach is to become an 
organic whole in the capital market, science and technology, currency, 
customs duties, and finally in national defense so as to give rise to a real 
confederation. This will enable the defensive network of the "new Soviet 
Union" to extend westward by a critical 1000 kilometers. As a result of the 
Balkan crisis, Serbia officially announced that Yugoslavia had made a request 
to join the Russia-Byelorussian Alliance. President Yeltsin supported the 
request, so did Byelorussian President Lukashenko. At present, the 
departments concerned have received the instructions of drafting the 
Declaration on the Establishment of the Russia-Byelorussia-Yugoslavian 
Alliance. After this, Yugoslavia is expected to receive a large amount of 
military support and Russia may also send its troops to Yugoslavia. 

The NATO had been hoping to gain the diplomatic dominance over the Balkan 
area through the bombing and to finally further its southward expansion of 
influence after its eastward expansion, so that the NATO could drive back the 
influence of Russia in an all-rounded way. However, the action of Serbia 
demonstrated that Russia succeeded in its "southward expansion" without using 
even a soldier or a bomb. This was what Stalin and Breznev had dreamed about 
at their times. As far as this significance is concerned, the "new Soviet 
Union" gained more than it lost in this crisis. 

Having benefited from this crisis, Ukraine, who took an uncompromising stand 
on Russia, has now changed its mind. The Ukrainian parliament has passed the 
resolutions for the solution to all the problems about the Black Sea Fleet. 
This clears up the major obstacles to an overall increase in the cooperation 
between Ukraine and Russia. In addition, Ukraine has also enhanced its 
military maneuvers. 

Of course, the action of Serbia will surely affect the Commonwealth 
Independent States (CIS) and will make the confederate nature of the CIS more 
worthy of its name in the future. Especially in the Orient, the "new Soviet 
Union" is also in the course of expanding its real influence eastward. Russia 
has signed an agreement with both Kazakstan and Tadzhikistan on uniting all 
their troops as an organic whole. In fact, the Russian nationality takes an 
extremely large proportion in the above-mentioned mid-Asian countries and 
these countries didn’t at all want to separate from the former Soviet Union 
at that time. Now, they are the mid-Asian countries that will most likely 
follow the suit of Byelorussia and Serbia to join the Russia-Byelorussian 
Alliance. The KANWA even believes that considering the closeness in their 
geographic locations and national cultures, both Russia and Byelorussia may 
eventually become united as a federation once Russia comes to the stage of 
complete recovery. The mid-Asian countries will later join this federation. 
They will all form a "new Soviet Union" that has a national structure totally 
identical to that of the former Soviet Union. 

In the 21st century, the NATO will face a new Soviet Union that has a social 
and economic system close to or even gradually identical to that of the NATO. 
In the meantime, this new Soviet Union was formed as a result of the NATO’s 
impact. The world is waiting to see how it will grow and change. 

*******

#9
Presidential Staff Seen 'Recapturing Initiative' 

Komsomolskaya Pravda 
21 April 1999
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Aleksandr Gamov under the "Maneuvers" rubric: "Kremlin Can 
Win. Having Halted Series of Political Mistakes, Presidential Staff Seems 
To Be Recapturing Initiative" 

If Yeltsin were not facing the prospect of 
impeachment, he would probably be spending much longer nursing his ulcer 
or some other ailment prompted by the political struggle with "the 
enemy's superior forces." But the panic in the ranks of the 
oppositionists, who have spent too long racking their brains over the 
question of which would be the most convenient day to start the procedure 
of removing the universally elected president from office, seems to have 
restored the health not only of the president but also of the 
Presidential Staff as a whole. 

Every day the Kremlin, as if on parade, is taking precise, tried-and-true 
(knock on wood!) steps both to resolve the Yugoslav crisis ("Russia must 
not be dragged into the war!" -- B. Yeltsin) and in domestic politics, 
including personnel issues. Aleksandr Voloshin's arrival in the 
Presidential Staff, Viktor Chernomyrdin's return to the power structures, 
and the restoration of almost family ties between the president and Yuriy 
Luzhkov -- all this inspires optimism: Our rulers are not yet totally 
incompetent, and, when they want to, it turns out that they can steer the 
ship of state on a constructive course. 

What was the Communists' miscalculation in this important phase of the 
struggle for power, as comrade Zyuganov would say? Above all, the 
Communists' mistake was probably that their over-tempestuous leaders were 
preparing for extraordinary measures -- the dissolution of the Duma, the 
sequestration of the Communist section of the government, Primakov's 
dismissal, and so on -- and had no idea that the Kremlin would react 
calmly, perhaps even too calmly, to all their far-from-peaceful 
initiatives concerning the toppling of the "incompetent president" and 
the rehabilitation of Yuriy Skuratov following his embroilment in 
politics of a rather unsavory kind.... 

Talking of the wretched Skuratov, you do not have to be a genius to predict 
the result of the general prosecutor's reappearance before the Federation 
Council today. The shrewd senators are now unlikely to extend his carte 
blanche to continue the fight against corruption. But not because they 
are afraid of the guardian of the law or have stopped sympathizing with 
him. It is just that the weather has changed. First, Skuratov the 
prosecutor-politician has become obsolete in the past few weeks. Second, 
as the warrants for the arrest -- whether actual or in absentia -- of 
offending oligarchs demonstrates, the fight against corruption is 
continuing quite vigorously even without Skuratov. Third, Yeltsin has 
indicated that a candidate for the post of general prosecutor will not be 
nominated until preliminary consultations have been held with the upper 
chamber. So what is the point of hanging on to the old one? 

Finally, in recent days Boris Nikolayevich [Yeltsin] has had an unprecedented 
series of meetings with the leaders of Russia's regions, who have pledged 
that no political considerations, let alone their own immediate, largely 
doubtful, interests, will persuade them to exchange the president for a 
general prosecutor facing dismissal. 

Meanwhile, the opposition, which has become thoroughly confused about the 
schedule for "impeaching the unimpeachable," is preparing to bring out 
slogans left over from last November's demonstrations for use on 1 May. 
And this is probably a good thing. Because these slogans are no longer so 
terrible as they were six months ago. If we are to believe Vice Premier 
Valentina Matviyenko, pension and wage issues have largely been resolved 
in the regions, and, as the governors' stance demonstrates, the provinces 
are not feeling so aggressive toward the federal center as before. 

Let us hope only that the Kremlin and its Master continue to have 
sufficient endurance and health, and that confidence does not turn into 
the euphoria which, for all these years, has prevented the consolidation 
of even the slightest political achievements. 

*******

#10
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 1999
From: austgreen@glasnet.ru 
Subject: Komsomol Fourth Congress

#RUSSIAN COMMUNIST YOUTH DEFEND THEIR INDEPENDENCE
#By Renfrey Clarke
#MOSCOW - On April 18 the Russian Communist League of Youth
(RKSM) held its fourth national congress here - and survived as
the largest, best-organised force on the Russian far left.
#For the RKSM - often known by the contraction ``Komsomol'' -
simply to have come out of the congress with its main forces
intact was a remarkable achievement. For years, the organisation
has had to fight to preserve its independence in the face of
attempts by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF)
to take it over.
#The recent congress appears to mark the success of this
struggle. The Komsomol will now be able to continue developing
its own political positions and organisational methods.
Characteristically, these have been much more militant and
democratic than those of the KPRF.
#But the congress also left the RKSM bruised and counting its
losses. The final cost of self-determination may include the
departure of as many as a quarter of the members. Of close to 60
regional sections of the Komsomol, at least a tenth will have to
be rebuilt, in some cases almost from scratch.
#The intensity of the fight around the Komsomol is a measure of
the organisation's potential as a force in Russian politics. For
the KPRF, however, this potential is not as a force helping to
lead militant campaigns by students and young workers, and to
recruit masses of young people to the fight for socialism.
Rather, the KPRF sets out to subordinate young people to its own,
strictly electoralist and bureaucratic vision of the role of the
Russian left.
#The next two years will see elections for the lower house of the
Russian parliament and for the presidency. When elections are
drawing near, Komsomol General Secretary Igor Malyarov noted at
one point during the RKSM congress, young people take on a much-
enhanced importance for the KPRF. Young people can be drafted to
stuff letter-boxes and ring doorbells. Mingling in public
meetings with the pensioners who make up most of the party's
voter base, they give the KPRF at least some image of youth and
vigour. Consequently, the party in election years is anxious to
mobilise young people, organise them, and above all, control
them.
#The efforts by the KPRF to impose its control on the Komsomol
have often been strikingly crass. Komsomol members from the city
of Novosibirsk in Siberia relate how KPRF officials years ago
tried to insist that the leaders of the local RKSM organisation
should all be members of the KPRF. #The Novosibirsk
``Komsomoltsy'' met this challenge by making a thorough political
break with the KPRF. But in other regions of Russia, RKSM members
have often lacked the political experience - or conviction - to
move so resolutely.
#Part of the problem has lain in the fact that in provincial
Russia, young leftists often depend heavily on the KPRF for their
ability to act politically, and at times for their livelihoods as
well. Especially in the so-called ``red belt'' of central Russia,
the KPRF wields extensive influence within local administrations.
It is often able to decide who will have facilities, premises and
employment. In regions where work for young people is scarce,
even temporary jobs as election campaign organisers are avidly
sought after.
#As late as 1996, relations between the KPRF and the Komsomol
were harmonious enough for the latter to have a deputy, Darya
Mitina, elected to the Russian parliament on the KPRF's candidate
list. But especially in the past year or so, disagreements
between the two organisations have grown steadily sharper.
Failing to inspire Komsomol members politically, the KPRF
leadership has called increasingly on its real strengths:
organisational manoueuvring, and dirty tricks.
#At a congress in February, the KPRF summoned a group of its
younger members to establish the ``League of Communist Youth of
Russia'', which party-linked press organs quickly took to
describing as ``the Komsomol''. Meanwhile, as related by RKSM
parliamentary deputy Mitina, local leaders of the real Komsomol
were told by regional KPRF chiefs that they faced eviction and
the loss of facilities unless they backed the KPRF's
perspectives. In some cases, according to Mitina, Komsomol
members with KPRF-linked jobs were threatened bluntly with the
sack.
#Slander evidently played a role as well. Mitina told <I>Green
Left Weekly<D> of a rumour to the effect that Komsomol General
Secretary Malyarov had accepted a large sum of money from Moscow
Mayor Yury Luzhkov to support Luzhkov's ``Fatherland'' electoral
bloc. Though groundless, this story suddenly acquired wide
currency in many parts of Russia. Meanwhile, the newspaper
<I>Sovetskaya Rossiya,<D> which is close to the KPRF, carried
persistent attacks on Malyarov and the RKSM.
#Within the Komsomol, opponents of the leadership launched a
number of hair-raising factional manoeuvres. For example, a
letter was circulated calling for the setting up of an
alternative organising committee for the fourth congress.
#Under this siege, the nerve of the RKSM leaders apparently
cracked. On the evening before the congress was to open, a
meeting of the Komsomol's executive bureau voted to dissolve six
regional RKSM organisations, mostly in districts where support
for the KPRF's line was strong. The delegates who had been
elected from these regions were disenfranchised, and a pro-
leadership majority at the congress was guaranteed.
#Asked later why the leadership had chosen this tactic, Komsomol
Siberian coordinator Yevgeniya Polinovskaya pointed out that the
issue of whether the RKSM should be an independent organisation
had already been debated exhaustively. None of the delegates, she
said, remained to be convinced one way or the other.
#But if this were the case, the leadership failed to count the
numbers at its disposal. Malyarov and his supporters would almost
certainly have prevailed even without exiling a group of might-
have-been delegates to the corridor outside the congress hall.
#In the event, representatives of the dissolved branches were
allowed into the congress to state their case. Throughout much of
the day, debate was dominated by arguments over whether the
dissolving of regional organisations by the executive bureau was
allowed under the RKSM statutes (it probably was), and by
expressions of outrage at the offense done to the spirit of
intra-party democracy. Eventually, a motion to endorse the
leadership's action was carried by a solid, though by no means
overwhelming majority. At that, more than 20 delegates from at
least four regions stood up and walked out.
#The KPRF's assault on the Komsomol had been beaten off. The RKSM
will now have the reputation of an organisation that cannot be
bought and is hard to intimidate. The impact of the Komsomol's
success in defending its independence will quite likely
reverberate through whole decades of Russian history. But the
cost of the victory was high.
#At the congress, people who had been party to grossly disloyal
factionalising were able to present themselves as indignant
protesters against leadership arbitrariness. Many Komsomol
members will see through the hypocrisy - but not all.
#More crucially, the need to concentrate on defending the
Komsomol's independence meant that little attention could be paid
to discussing the organisation's strategic tasks. The reason the
KPRF sought to take over the Komsomol was not only because it
wanted a source of cheap election campaign labour. At a more
fundamental level, the KPRF leaders fear the rise of a competing
mass formation armed with combative working-class politics. The
KPRF chiefs are not just indifferent to such ideas, but
positively hostile.
#The April 18 congress was the first the Komsomol had held since
1996, and an intensive debate on what the Komsomol needs to do,
and on how it should organise its work, is urgently needed. To
the extent that such a debate now takes place, it will be on a
haphazard basis, with only limited participation by rank and file
members. That in itself is a significant victory for the KPRF and
for all the Komsomol's adversaries.

******

#11
Political Standoff Fraught with Serious Consequences -Lebed.

KRASNOYARSK, April 23 (Itar-Tass) - Krasnoyarsk regional governor Alexander 
Lebed believes that "the conflict between the president with the parliament 
and the government is fraught with far-reaching consequences." 

Speaking to journalists on Friday, Lebed said that "the pendulum of this 
conflict might be set in motion for two-three weeks and yield very bad fruit, 
which might create havoc in this country." 

In such a situation the president has to make sharp movements and it looks 
like that they have already been started, Lebed said. Nevertheless, the 
regional governor ruled out the possibility of imposing a state of emergency 
in this country because of the deterioration of the relations between the 
president with the State Duma and the Federation Council. 

Asked about the possibility of creating a new movement "Fatherland" -"All 
Russia", Lebed said that the Krasnoyarsk region was calmly 
keeping aloof from this process." Moreover, it is necessary to find out first 
what is meant by all Russia - perhaps it is merely a hall for meetings 
without all Russia present," Lebed wonders. 

In a separate statement, commenting on the president's instructions given to 
the government "to reinforce power structures of the Krasnoyarsk region," 
Lebed said that the instructions were given following a report made by an 
departmental commission headed by First Deputy Interior Minister Vladimir 
Kolesnikov which has been working in the Krasnoyarsk region. 

Lebed noted that he expects no harm from these instructions, but added that 
it should be specified what is meant by the "reinforcement of power 
structures," since this might be followed by decisions used to be made not 
long ago: "either overall dismissal or reshuffle," Lebed stressed. 

******

#12
From: Lozansky@aol.com (Edward Lozansky)
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 1999 
Subject: Invitation to concert and reception

YOU ARE INVITED TO PUSHKIN 200 - NABOKOV 100 GALA CELEBRATION AT CARNEGIE 
HALL Saturday, June 12, 1999 7.00 pm 
Presented by the American University in Moscow in cooperation with the 
Embassy of the Russian Federation in Washington and Consulate General of the 
Russian Federation in New York .

Under Patronage of the new Russian Ambassador in Washington Yuri V. Ushakov

Program features classical music and arias, russian romances and choral 
music with participation of Metropolitan, Bolshoi and Mariinsky Opera Stars, 
son and translator of Vladimir Nabokov Dmitry, Yale University Russian Chorus 
and more.

Tickets $50 and $75 can be ordered through Carnegie Box office 212-247-7800 
or by filling out the form below and sending it by e-mail to 
Pushkin@RussiaHouse.org.

Sponsors (silver $250, gold $500 and platinum $1,000) will be listed in 
Carnegie Hall Stagebill and invited to the Meet the Artists reception at the 
Russian Consulate in New York on June 10, post concert dinner at Russian 
Samovar on June 12 and Russian Embassy in Washington concert and reception on 
June 14.

All contributions are tax-deductible. 

If you are interested in becoming a sponsor or buy tickets please fill out 
the form below and mail with your check made out to Pushkin 200 or fax and 
e-mail to:

Pushkin 200, c/o Russia House
1800 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20009
Tel. 202-986-6010, Fax 202-667-4244, E-mail: Pushkin@RussiaHouse.org

I would like to be ___Platinum Sponsor $1000 (4 tickets)____Golden Sponsor (2 
tickets) ____Silver Sponsor $250 (1 ticket) 

Please send _____tickets @ ___$50____$75 (concert on June 12 only)
Name__________________________________________________
Address________________________________________________
City_______________State________Zip______________________
Phone_____________________Fax_________________________
E-mail________________
For additional information, please call 202-986-6010 or 212-779-1771

******