April 18, 1998  
This Date's Issues: 2153• 2154 • 

Johnson's Russia List
#2154
18 March 1998
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Matthew Rendall: Yabloko in comparative perspective.
2. Reuters: Yeltsin backers sense change on PM vote.
3. Reuters: Nemtsov forecasts end to Russia's crisis.
4. Irish Times: Seamus Martin, Oil and banking fuel the rise 
of Russian risk-taker. (Kiriyenko).
5. Sovetskaya Rossiya: Duma Dissolution Pros, Cons Viewed.
6. RIA Novosti: NO SECRET DEMANDS FROM IMF TO REDUCE THE NUMBER 
OF PUBLIC SECTOR WORKERS IN RUSSIA, SAYS CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL 
BANK SERGEI DUBININ.
7. RIA Novosti: YELTSIN SENDS EASTER GREETINGS TO PATRIARCH.
8. Moscow Times: Boris Kagarlitsky, Press Gives Moral Slant.
9. Itar-Tass: Court Backs Yeltsin's Right To Dissolve Duma Over 
Kiriyenko.
10. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Vladimir Mukhin, ARMY MAY GET OUT OF 
CONTROL. The Number of Young Officers Who Leave the Army Is
Above the Level of Permissible Reductions.
11. Interfax: Poll: Russia Supports Kiriyenko, Oppose Duma
Dissolution.
12. Pravda: Aleksandr Samovarov, Days of 'Favoritism' in Russia 
'Numbered.'] 

*******

#1
Date: Sat, 18 Apr 1998 
From: Matthew Tobias Rendall <mtr7@columbia.edu>
Subject: Yabloko in comparative perspective

In their exceptionally interesting piece on Yabloko (Prism/JRL
2153), Aleksandr Buzgalin and Andrei Kolganov argue that the party's
agenda of "moving Russia toward a social-market, parliamentary
system--'civilized capitalism'" is incapable of breaking the power of the
oligarchy, and that this can occur only "through a fight among the
corporate clans...or through the threat of revolution. It clearly does
not lie along the road of liberalism and democracy, which Yavlinsky would
prefer to travel."
This raises some theoretical questions. American politics isn't
my specialty, but wasn't the agenda of the early 20th century Progressive
movement rather similar to that which Buzgalin and Kolganov attribute to
Yabloko, and wasn't it fairly successful in curbing the trusts and robber
barons? When other countries have limited the power of monopolies and
cartels, has this come at the initiative of outside reform parties, or
from internecine struggle among clans and fears of revolution? Or both? 
Buzgalin & Kolganov also claim that Yabloko is unlikely to gain
mass support because it will "not advance their interests." This seems to
conflict with their earlier statement that intellectuals, Yabloko's core
constituency, "want social protection, not just for themselves, but for
the 'common people' as well, so that they will not view the flourishing of
the intelligentsia with malicious envy." Could Yabloko build a winning
coalition on the basis of a social democratic agenda? Again, what does
the experience of other countries suggest? Americanists and
comparativists, please comment.

*******

#2
FOCUS-Yeltsin backers sense change on PM vote
By Martin Nesirky 

MOSCOW, April 18 (Reuters) - Supporters of President Boris Yeltsin lined up on
Saturday to predict victory for him in his tussle with Russia's parliament
over a new government. Even opponents began to hint they might change their
minds. 
The opposition-dominated State Duma, parliament's lower house, defied Yeltsin
on Friday by rejecting his chosen prime minister, Sergei Kiriyenko, for the
second time. 
Yeltsin, who left anyway for a weekend trip to Japan, has renominated
Kiriyenko and set the stage for a decisive vote by next Friday. The Duma must
either back down and accept him, or reject him again and face automatic
dissolution and an unwelcome early election. 
It is still far from certain the opposition will fall into line but the
Kremlin team seems to sense a shift. 
``I'm sure a government will be formed next Friday, 100 percent sure,''
Acting
First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov told reporters in Japan. 
In Moscow, a senior aide to Yeltsin took a similar line. 
``I'm a cautious person and I'm very sure that next Friday Kiriyenko will be
approved and the State Duma will not be dissolved but will continue its
work,'' Sergei Shakhrai, Yeltsin's representative at the Constitutional Court,
told Reuters. ``It's a big internal political and economic game.'' 
Many experts expect the Communists and other Kiriyenko opponents to back down
before next week's final vote, largely to maintain their position and perks in
the Duma. 
A senior member of the ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party, the third
largest in the Duma, on Saturday said the faction might change its position
and vote for Kiriyenko, chosen by Yeltsin after he sacked the old cabinet on
March 23 for going soft on economic reforms. 
``We have a conditional approach and we are not hiding this. Authorities
should fulfil a series of our demands,'' Alexei Mitrofanov, chairman of the
Duma's geopolitical committee, told Reuters. ``We'll make our decision
Thursday or Friday.'' 
The Communists, the largest group in the Duma with 138 of the 450 seats, kept
up pressure at home but one senior and hardline party member hinted even they
might change tack. 
Viktor Ilyukhin, head of the Duma's security committee, told Ekho Moskvy
radio
there were several possibilities for the way his party would vote at the third
hearing. The Communists will hold a plenary meeting to discuss tactics early
next week. 
``Even before the second vote, we started to receive many letters and
telegrams saying 'Don't allow the Duma to be dissolved. It is our last
hope','' he said in a comment that hinted at how Communists might explain a
change of heart. 
Speaker Gennady Seleznyov, a Communist, alluded to this. 
``I will go myself to the plenum and will explain to the people the price of
the Duma's dissolution,'' he told the weekly analytical television programme
Vremya. ``Our voters will say: 'We gave you power. You became State Duma
deputies. Why have you, because of Kiriyenko, given up power?''' 
Yeltsin, who has met parliamentary leaders to discuss Kiriyenko but has
not so
far gone to the Duma to appeal to deputies, appeared to be in upbeat spirits
during meetings with Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto on Saturday in Japan. 
Yeltsin, 67, told Russian trainees there it was time for the younger
generation to take over and noted Kiriyenko was 35. 
To nervous laughter from his entourage, he said some of those who had been
suggested for cabinet posts were old enough to draw pensions. ``That won't
happen,'' Yeltsin said in televised remarks. 
One man he has said he wants to keep in the team is Acting Finance Minister
Mikhail Zadornov, who will be 35 next month. 
Zadornov said political uncertainty was hurting the economy. 
``It is impossible to calculate an exact figure,'' he told Vremya. ``But it
means without doubt all state borrowing, both at home and abroad, costs more
and it involves real and quite large sums of money -- hundreds of millions of
roubles.'' 
One U.S. dollar is worth about six roubles. 

*******

#3
FOCUS-Nemtsov forecasts end to Russia's crisis
By Gareth Jones 

KAWANA, Japan, April 18 (Reuters) - Russia's First Deputy Prime Minister Boris
Nemtsov said on Saturday he was confident his country's political crisis would
soon be over and that a new government would be in place by next Friday. 
Joining a chorus of supporters of President Boris Yeltsin predicting a swift
end to turmoil, Nemtsov was even able to joke about the issue, saying Russia
was very stable compared with a country like Italy. 
``I'm sure a government will be formed next Friday, 100 percent sure,'' said
Nemtsov, who is accompanying Yeltsin on his weekend visit to Japan for a
summit meeting with Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto. 
``I hope the new government will be an efficient and capable one,'' Nemtsov
told reporters. ``Russia is very stable compared with countries say like
Italy.'' 
The crisis erupted on Friday, the day Yeltsin left for Japan, when the State
Duma lower chamber rejected for a second time Sergei Kiriyenko, Yeltsin's
prime ministerial nominee to head a new government. 
Yeltsin's foes say Kiriyenko, a 35-year-old ex-banker with only a year's
experience in government, is unsuitable to become prime minister. 
Kremlin spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky struck an equally relaxed note, saying
Yeltsin had not felt the need to call Moscow since he arrived in this seaside
resort for the summit. 
Asked about Yeltsin's reaction to Friday's vote, Yastrzhembsky said: ``The
president could not be expected to welcome the result of the vote, but it came
as no great surprise to us because it was an open vote.'' 
Opposition Communist deputies who rebelled in an open vote would be in danger
of expulsion from the party. 
In Moscow, a senior aide to Yeltsin also said on Saturday he expected Russian
lawmakers to approve Kiriyenko next week and an opposition leader said his
party might vote for Yeltsin's man. 
Yeltsin has nominated Kiriyenko for a third time, which means Duma deputies
can change their minds by next Friday or face automatic dissolution under the
constitution's rules. 
``I'm a cautious person and I'm very sure that next Friday Kiriyenko will be
approved and the State Duma will not be dissolved but will continue its
work,'' Sergei Shakhrai, Yeltsin's Constitutional Court representative, told
Reuters. 
A senior leader of the ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party, the third
largest in the Duma, said on Saturday that the party might change its position
and vote for Kiriyenko. 
In Japan, Yeltsin received backing from an unexpected quarter in world famed
cellist and conductor Mstislav Rostropovich, who said Kiriyenko would make a
``splendid'' prime minister. 
Rostropovich, who flew to Moscow to support Yeltsin during his resistance
to a
hardline communist coup in 1991, told reporters he thought the communist-
dominated State Duma was a ``madhouse.'' 
The cellist was in Kawana at the invitation of Hashimoto, who is a fan of his
music. 
Nemtsov was less harsh on the Russian parliament. 
He said the Duma had plenty of good people ``but when stormy people dominate
the Duma it behaves in a stormy way and when good people are in the ascendency
it behaves in a good way.'' 
Since arriving in Japan, Yeltsin has shown no sign that the political and
constitutional turmoil at home has taken any toll on his health and good
humour. 
Despite a 10-hour overnight flight from Moscow, Yeltsin has looked
relaxed and
cheerful. 
``I am completely satisfied with the physical condition of Boris Yeltsin, his
activity and capacity to work,'' Interfax news agency quoted the president's
doctor, Sergei Mironov, as saying in Kawana. 
But it was far from clear who was in charge of the stall back in Moscow, or
who might take over the nuclear-armed former superpower if anything happened
to the 67-year-old president. 
``If the man whose finger is on the nuclear button suddenly collapsed, what
would be the order of succession?'' mused the Tokyo Shimbun newspaper. 
The president has left Russia in a legal grey zone. Under the constitution,
the prime minister is next in line to rule in the event of the president's
death or incapacitation. But the Constitutional Court has said Kiriyenko could
not take the helm because he has not been confirmed by parliament. 
On Friday, Kiriyenko said Yeltsin had given him instructions for the
government to carry out during the president's absence. Yeltsin returns to
Moscow on Sunday afternoon. 

********

#4
Irish Times
April 18, 1998
[for personal use only]
Oil and banking fuel the rise of Russian risk-taker 
By SEAMUS MARTIN

SATURDAY PROFILE: Sergei Kiriyenko 
FACT FILE
Name: Sergei Kiriyenko 
Real Name: Sergei Vladilenovich Israitel 
What does his real name mean to Russians? It means firstly that he is 
Jewish, and many Russians are anti-semitic. It means also that his 
father is named for Lenin, but this won't stop the communists from 
hating him 
Why is he in the news? Because Boris Yeltsin has pushed him forward as 
prime minister and possibly as a future president of Russia, but the 
Duma has rejected him again 
Could he become president? It's unlikely he would be elected, but Mr 
Yeltsin's constitution rules the prime minister would take over the 
Presidency for three months in the event of the president's death in 
off ice.
On the morning of March 23rd Sergei Kiriyenko kissed his little daughter 
good day and told her he would be home early for her birthday. It did 
not quite work out as he had planned, but in Russia it's hard to predict 
these things.
By midday President Yeltsin had announced that the entire government led 
by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin had been fired. Shortly after the 
surprise announcement the President told Russian TV and radio he would 
take on the post of Prime Minister himself. 
It would seem that soon after that statement the fate of Sergei 
Kiriyenko's daughter's birthday party was sealed. Advisers told Mr 
Yeltsin the constitution of Russia did not allow him to be President and 
Prime Minister at the same time.
Mr Yeltsin may have written his own constitution after he had ordered 
the tanks in to blast the parliament out of existence in October 1993, 
but he was now overstepping the law he himself had set. The legal 
advisers told him he needed to find someone other than himself to 
replace Mr Chernomyrdin. For reasons yet to be explained, Mr Yeltsin 
chose Mr Kiriyenko, and a girl's party was ruined.
Sergei Vladilenovich Kiriyenko was born 35 years ago in the town of 
Sukhumi in Georgia of mixed-ethnic parents. His father Vladilen Israitel 
was a Georgian of Jewish origin. The very name Vladilen signified 
communist adherence for it was a shortened version of Vladimir Ilyich 
Lenin, designed either to glorify the father of the Russian Revolution 
or to ingratiate the family with the Soviet power structure.
Young Sergei quickly took advantage of the developing situation in 
Russia. After his family had moved to Gorky in the Russian heartland he 
began to get involved in post-communist politics. He had already dropped 
his surname Israitel because of its obvious Jewish connections and had 
taken on his mother's Ukrainian surname of Kiriyenko.
When the communist system collapsed and the Soviet Union was dismantled 
the young Sergei Kiriyenko went into business. Gorky became Nizhny 
Novgorod, as it had been before the 1917 revolution, and Mr Kiriyenko 
became a millionaire through the system known as arbitrage. It was a 
simple procedure which needed quick thinking, very little money and a 
certain amount of cheek and courage to make one exceptionally wealthy in 
a short space of time.
The trick was to find a commodity which cost little in the former Soviet 
Union but cost a great deal more in the West. Siberian oil was a case in 
point. It cost next to nothing in Russia but if sold in the West the 
profit margin was immense. Mr Kiriyenko made his fortune quickly, 
particularly in oil, and put himself in a strong position in the new 
Russian economy.
He then went into banking in Nizhny Novgorod, a sure sign he was a 
risk-taker. Banking is regarded as the most risky business in the 
post-Soviet system.
The risk had nothing to do with money but a lot to do with one's health. 
In a society in which the average male life expectancy at birth is 56 
years the life expectancy of a banker in Russia is considerably lower. 
Competition between banks included the acceptance of the gun as a 
legitimate business tool. 
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Mrs Kiriyenko was somewhat 
worried that Sergei was not home on time on the evening of March 23rd 
for their daughter's birthday party. As time passed, however, it became 
obvious that Sergei had not suffered the bullet-in-the-temple fate of 
most up-and-coming Russian bankers. He had merely been proposed as prime 
minister by the President in one of his brainstorms.
Mr Sergei Vladilenovich Kiriyenko had been less than a year in the 
snakepit of Kremlin politics when President Yeltsin picked him from the 
obscurity of a minor position in the energy ministry to replace the even 
more wealthy and immensely more experienced Viktor Chernomyrdin.
Why Mr Yeltsin chose to make the convulsive decision to sack his entire 
cabinet and put such a completely inexperienced politician in as his 
choice to take over the political leadership of Russia is as difficult 
to explain as many of Mr Yeltsin's previous decisions.
Mr Kiriyenko's record is such that he is likely to keep an eye to making 
money rather than making war in a country which still has the ability to 
destroy Planet Earth several time over. For that at least we should be 
grateful.

*******

#5
Duma Dissolution Pros, Cons Viewed 

Sovetskaya Rossiya
16 April 1998
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Aleksandr Frolov: "Could the Duma Be Bought?" --
words between slantlines published in boldface

[passage omitted claiming that the confrontation between the Duma and
Yeltsin over the approval of Kiriyenko's appointment as premier masks the
president's desire to discredit the Duma]
Gennadiy Seleznev is absolutely right when he says that the fate of
the State Duma is a thousand times more important than the fate of
Kiriyenko. And as chairman of the Duma it is utterly natural that he must
be concerned to preserve it. But circumstances are taking shape in such a
way that the fate of the Duma and the fate of Kiriyenko have become
inextricably linked. After settling the contender's fate favorably, it
will be very difficult to count on a happy fate for the Duma.
The rejection on three occasions of the president's nominations /will
destroy the cornerstone on which all today's antiparliamentary
anti-opposition, anticommunist propaganda rests./ The propaganda myth that
the deputies are concerned only for their own position and will do anything
to retain it will reveal itself to be unfounded and following this all the
other conclusions will go by the board. Canceling out at a stroke the fruit
of the enemy's efforts over many months -- that result is worth a lot.
Nevertheless for many people there is still no creature more terrible
than the dissolution of the Duma. People point here to a future period of
uncontrolled presidential "edict law" and to the fact that the new
elections may not take place at all within the constitutional deadline and
according to the previous mixed system.
Indeed, we must in no circumstances discount such an unpleasant
possibility. After all, it is primarily the regime itself which is utterly
unprepared for new parliamentary elections in four months' time -- there is
no unity among the oligarchs and they are obviously failing to agree on
coordinated actions. A pretext for deferring them has already been found
and is being circulated widely by the mass media: "There is no money for
the elections!" But the reply to that is elementary: "If there is no
money, do not dissolve the Duma, seek a compromise with it -- everything is
in the president's hands."
But, on the one hand, there are quite important factors preventing the
party of power from dissolving the Duma and at the same time deferring the
elections. Above all, without parliament the regime loses a potential
scapegoat. Yes, for four months or even longer the country will be left
facing the executive branch, but we should not forget that /the executive
branch itself remains facing its responsibility for future blunders/
inevitable if it retains its present course. Having approved the premier
the Duma and the opposition will have to share that responsibility with the
president and the government. Does that prospect appeal to the deputies?
One more very serious problem is how ready the opposition itself is
for elections under the conditions of a dissolved Duma and probable
alteration of the election rules. This problem deserves separate close
analysis and I intend to return to it in the next few issues of the
newspaper unless, of course, it loses its topicality this Friday. But for
the time being I shall merely say that the devil is not so black as he is
painted and I shall try to prove it.
But in weighing up all the pros and cons we must be mindful primarily
of the real content of the process taking place. The main question of the
crisis, I stress once more, is whether /the regime will be able to
consolidate itself/ and what this depends on. In such circumstances the
opposition's tactic can only be to fuel contradictions in its opponents'
camp to the maximum and not to promote their settlement. After all, if
Kiriyenko is indeed an uncommitted figure equally removed from all
oligarchs and capable of satisfying them as a group, then his appearance at
the head of the government is all the more intolerable. If he is
nonetheless committed then each extra day of uncertainty in this matter
encourages the squabbling behind the scenes to grow stronger and
objectively weakens the ruling regime.
That is the situation before tomorrow's vote. However it ends, the
situation will change substantially. And the direction in which it changes
depends on the deputies themselves. This is indeed one of those rare
occasions when the initiative is in their own hands rather than the
president's.

*******

#6
NO SECRET DEMANDS FROM IMF TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF PUBLIC
SECTOR WORKERS IN RUSSIA, SAYS CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL BANK
SERGEI DUBININ
WASHINGTON, JAPRIL 18. /RIA NOVOSTI CORRESPONDENT ARKADAY
ORLOV/. "I never heard that the International Monetary Fund
would demand a reduction in the number of public sector workers
in Russia, Sergei Dubinin, chairman of the Russian Central Bank
now iWashington, said, commenting thus on the question put to
him at a press conference about the alleged "secret" IMF
requirements for the Russian government as a condition for its
further cooperation with the fund.
In Russia "there is no planned reduction in the number of
public sector workers," the head of the Russian Central Bank
stressed on Friday, adding, however, that authorities in
Russia's regions should nevertheless live in accordance with the
available budgetary resources. There are region where they have
subsidies for food products and public utilities, where the
local administration receives financial assistance from the
federal centre, but is not paying wages to school teachers and
other public sector workers, and therefore in such cases all
this must be appropriately regulated, said Dubinin. He did not
rule it out, however, that this is also true of certain spheres
of the federal budget. "The question is to organise the
budgetary process in accordance with federal resources," he
said, noting that this is exactly what the programme of
cooperation between Russia and the IMF is all about. -0-

*******

#7
YELTSIN SENDS EASTER GREETINGS TO PATRIARCH
MOSCOW, APRIL 18, RIA NOVOSTI - Federal President Boris
Yeltsin forwarded congratulations to Alexis II, Patriarch of
Moscow and All Russia, on Easter, which Christians of the Greek
rite celebrate tomorrow. The presidential press service is
circulating the message, whose unabridged text we are offering.
"Your Beatitude,
"Allow me to congratulate you on the joyous feast of
Resurrection.
"The Church has now resumed its charitable, peacemaking and
educational activities all over the country. The Russian
Orthodox Church is gaining ever greater prominence in the
promotion of civil accord, preservation of established moral
values, and settlement of essential public issues. Russians
heartily greet its good works and social initiatives.
"The State and the Church will toil on hand-in-hand for
Russia's strength and affluence.
"I wish health, peace and well-being to Your Beatitude and
your entire flock.
"Reverentially yours,
"Boris Yeltsin" 

********

#8
Moscow Times
April 18, 1998 
Press Gives Moral Slant 
By Boris Kagarlitsky 
Boris Kagarlitsky is a researcher at the Academy of Sciences Institute 
for Comparative Politics. He contributed this comment to The Moscow 
Times. 

Bringing home several foreign newspapers from a trip abroad during 
Soviet times used to be considered a sign of good form. People of an 
older generation still bring back foreign papers out of habit, although 
you can now buy them in the center of Moscow without much difficulty. 
What distinguished the foreign papers, of course, was that the Western 
press was free and the Soviet press was censored. But this was not the 
only difference between them. 
Western papers were quite unlike ours. They did not have either official 
decrees or slogan-headlines and lengthy editorials. Yet they were a lot 
thicker than Russian papers. Any Russian holding The New York Times in 
his hands for the first time inevitably asked himself: Do they really 
have so much free time that they can read such a huge newspaper every 
day? Apparently, newspapers abroad were not only written differently but 
read differently. 
A Soviet reader studied the paper from the first page to last, right 
down to the address and masthead of the publication, striving to extract 
hidden political ideas from insignificant details. Or he read only the 
headlines, thinking that everything there was to say had been said in 
them. The Western reader, on the contrary, looks carefully at only 
sections of the paper that are pertinent to him and does not pay much 
attention to the rest. 
Soviet censorship has since been eliminated, and many publications have 
appeared that hold various ideological positions. Now that the arrival 
of capitalism has been announced in Russia, it would seem that the 
Russian press should become more like the Western press. But the 
differences remain striking. 
The "Golden Age" of the printed word in Russia was the perestroika 
period. The censors were not much of a hindrance. Rather, they even 
helped the reputation of the journalists they opposed, given that Russia 
tends to sympathize with those who are wronged. The circulation of 
newspapers reached record levels. Publications were inexpensive and 
widely available. While exposing government misdeeds, they were still 
able to receive paper from the state at low, stable prices. 
The style and content of the papers were defined by an angry, muckraking 
spirit. If Americans are used to seeing on the front pages "All the news 
that's fit to print," then the Soviet reader during perestroika 
generally expected not news, but discoveries and exposés. Current events 
were of little interest compared to truthful information on incidents 
that took place a half century ago. Gradually, however, this muckraking 
spirit was replaced by irony. 
Kommersant Weekly, for example, had a huge influence on the style of the 
post-Soviet press. This was a tabloid with amusing caricatures on the 
front page and paradoxical headlines. Later, Kommersant became a daily 
devoted largely to businessmen, providing detailed analyses of 
stock-market quotations and optimistic articles on business successes. 
During the '90s, it became clear that the press simply could not compete 
with television as a source of news. In the West, the press formed its 
traditions when television had not yet existed or did not play a special 
role. Here, everything is different. The Soviet traditions have 
collapsed (even communist publications today do not work as they did 
under Brezhnev). New standards were adopted during the television era. 
Newspapers do not even try to outstrip the evening television news 
programs. But the press does enjoy commenting on them. Dailies have 
begun to resemble weeklies and weeklies have become more like monthly 
journals. 
If you are not in a rush, you can spend much time reading the long 
interviews and roundtable discussions that can take up entire pages of 
Russian newspapers. No one is put off by this. For readers of 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, for example, arguments about the meaning of life 
are still more topical than, say, the current stock market. Many Russian 
readers find the newspaper to be something akin to a customary Muscovite 
tea-drinking session. You can thoroughly discuss, contemplate and judge 
what is happening. The news that is provided is almost an aside. 
The Western press is fond of news, and the Russian press is fond of 
commentary. For an Anglo-American journalist, getting accurate 
information is the main criterion for what is called a quality press. In 
Russia, it is the other way around. Russian journalists are convinced 
that it is in principle impossible to avoid mistakes in a daily paper. 
The main thing is not to distort the sense of the events. 
The foreign press is worried about what happened. Russians are more 
interested in why something happened and what will come of the event. 
They ask the eternal Russian questions: Who is guilty? What is to be 
done? 
In the United States and Western Europe, the press underscores its 
objectivity and impartiality. Editorials are usually hidden in the 
middle of the paper, and theoretical and moral questions are mostly 
reserved for the opinion page. In Russia, there could never be such a 
concept. Distinct opinions are expressed in every published article. A 
moral and political appraisal of events is given immediately after they 
are announced. Then analyses and forecasts may follow. 
Lenin's criterion for the party press -- that it should propagate 
vanguard ideas -- is still alive in Russia, even in the most liberal 
press. It is quite another matter that there is no unity concerning 
which ideas can be considered in the vanguard. 
The ideological nature of the Russian press can be considered its 
shortcoming. But perhaps Russians journalists are simply more candid 
than their Western colleagues? 

*******

#9
Court Backs Yeltsin's Right To Dissolve Duma Over Kiriyenko 

MOSCOW, April 16 (Itar-Tass) -- Closing speculations about whether the
president will dissolve Russia's State Duma (lower house of parliament) if
it turns down Kiriyenko's candidacy three times, chairman of the
Constitutional Court Marat Baglay said Boris Yeltsin will have no other
choice.
Under the Constitution, the dissolution of parliament is not a duty
but an imperative for the president, Baglay said, adding that there is no
place for "mays" and "shoulds" and that Yeltsin will certainly do so.
He said he did not expect "Kiriyenko to remain acting premier for too
long.
Commenting on possible scenarios for the dissolution of Duma, voiced
by presidential representative at the Constitutional Court Sergey Shakhray,
Baglay firmly stated that any early election would be held strictly in line
with the old legislation.
Shakhray recently said the early election may run under the new
majority system.
"A presidential decree abrogating the law is impossible in our
country," the chairman said, referring to the situation where the Duma has
been dissolved and the country lives by the head of state's decrees.
He was also skeptical about Shakhray's proposal to pass a bill under
which the second person in the state could be the Federation Council
speaker instead of prime minister.
It requires changes in the Constitution, Baglay said. 
But Baglay admitted that lawmakers are yet "to settle" the situation
where the acting premier who has not been approved by parliament is to
stand in for the president during the latter's absence, for example during
the upcoming visit to Japan.
"The procedure to amend the Constitution does not depend on the
opinion of one person, even the head of state," the chairman emphasized.
Despite the growing tension between the legislative and executive
branches, "there is no Constitutional legal crisis in the country," Baglay
said, adding that "all develops in line with the Constitution," including
the actions by the president and lawmakers.
In his view, talks about the necessity to amend the Constitution in
order to make a transition from the presidential to parliamentarian state
are not always justified.
Baglay said a parliamentarian republic is better suited for states
with an established party system. "Judge for yourself, which system can
create stability in our country," he said.

********

#10
>From RIA Novosti
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
April 17, 1998
ARMY MAY GET OUT OF CONTROL
The Number of Young Officers Who Leave the Army Is
Above the Level of Permissible Reductions
By Vladimir MUKHIN

There is an acute shortage of officers who directly work
with soldiers and sergeants in the Russian Armed Forces. Almost
a third of the posts of platoon and crew commanders, deputy
commanders of companies and batteries (especially in combat
units) have become vacant. And this despite the fact that more
than 100 military schools annually graduate up to 20,000 young
lieutenants. This statement was made by Colonel General Ilya
Panin, chief of the Main Personnel Directorate of the Russian
Defense Ministry at yesterday's press conference.
Low wages (about $100 a month) and heavy physical and
moral load make young officers search for any way of getting
out of the army. The average age of commissioned and warrant
officers who retired in 1992-1997 was 37 years. Two-thirds of
them retired before their terms expired. More than 91% of the
officers who have left the army over that period of time had a
higher military or a higher specialised military education, and
about 8% had a specialised secondary military education. So,
the efforts of the Defense Ministry to train highly skilled
personnel for the army and navy are in vain. General Panin
expressed alarm that there are still no factors conducive to
keeping young officers in the troops.
The problem is all the more aggravated by the fact that
the majority of officers serving in the Russian Armed Forces
today are to get their service contracts re-concluded in the
second half of the year. Opinion polls show, however, that more
than 20% of them have not decided yet whether they want to
extend their contracts or not, and almost as many are certain
that they will not do it.
According to General Panin, about 80,000 commissioned
officers and more than 57,000 warrant officers will be
discharged from the army this year. More than 19% of these
officers and about 10% of warrant officers have no housing.
Under the law, we may not dismiss them until we provide them
with housing, the general said. The Defense Ministry hopes that
the officers who are to be dismissed will agree to accept state
housing certificates, or GZhS, instead of flats. But this is a
very thin hope. These certificates are funded by the government
only by 80%. So, up to 70% of the officers reject the deal. It
may happen that the majority of commissioned and warrant
officers will be off staff for a long time, waiting for flats
to which they are entitled. This, in turn, will require
additional funds for their upkeep.

*******

#11
Poll: Russia Supports Kiriyenko, Oppose Duma Dissolution 

MOSCOW, 16 Apr (Interfax) -- The number of supporters of Russia's
acting Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko jumped 9% in one week to reach 45% 
on April 11, according to an opinion poll of 1,500 Russians conducted by
the Public Opinion Fund.
An earlier poll conducted April 5 determined that 56% of Russians
oppose dissolution of the Duma in the event it does not confirm Kiriyenko
to the post. The same respondents said Russian President Boris Yeltsin
should submit another candidacy if the Duma votes Kiriyenko down three
times.
Of these, 67% are supporters of leader of the Communist Party Gennady
Zyuganov, 62% -- of Yabloko party leader and presidential hopeful Grigoriy
Yavlinskiy.
One fifth (20%) support the Duma's disbandment. Of these, 29% support
acting First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov. 
The remaining 24% were in doubt.
A fifth (20%) of those polled on April 11 said they opposed
Kiriyenko's confirmation on the post, up 2% from the week before.
Fewer people, 35%, were undecided on the issue, down from 46% on
April 4.
The number of people with a favorable impression of Kiriyenko soared
13% over one week, to total 39% of those polled on April 11.
On April 11, 11% of the respondents said their attitude to Kiriyenko
was negative, up 2% from the week before.
On April 4, 55% of those polled said they had no opinion, but this had
fallen to 39% a week later.
Some 10% and 11% respectively did not answer the question.

********

#12
Days of 'Favoritism' in Russia 'Numbered' 

Pravda
15 April 1998
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Aleksandr Samovarov under the "Reflections..."
rubric: "Favorites and Favoritists"

The events of recent weeks in Russian public life have presented
political observers with a clear impasse. No unequivocal answer to the main
question -- What does B. Yeltsin want to achieve through his actions? --
has been worked out. There are plenty of suggestions and hypotheses, but
nothing more. We offer our readers one more.
The main purpose of V. Chernomyrdin's dismissal is not a cadre
reshuffle, but the implementation of the administrative reform that B.
Yeltsin announced back at the extended session of the government.
Russian society should be well governed and under control. With the
present system of power we are seeing neither the former nor the latter. 
There are not many other countries in the world where everything is so
confused. Usually if a state is a presidential republic the president runs
everything, and if a state is a parliamentary republic either there is no
president as such, or else, as in Italy or Germany, he plays a purely
decorative role and the premier or chancellor is in charge of everything.
It is no accident that our country has been compared to a monarchy. 
The comparison is superficial rather than accurate, but nonetheless we do
have some things in common. After ascending the "throne," B. Yeltsin, like
a monarch, has delegated his powers first to one person, then to another.
Imagine the picture: Clinton is elected president, and the next day
he summons some local "Gaydar" and tells the nation: "He's an excellent
guy with very smart ideas, under his leadership there will be reforms in
the country. For the time being, I'll watch everything from the
sidelines." Absurd? For the United States -- yes; for us, it is the norm.
That is precisely how B. Yeltsin has acted, beginning in 1991. In that
sense he has ruled like a monarch. Monarchs always used to have favorites,
to hand over state affairs to them and send them away if they failed to
cope.
Yeltsin, at first glance, was in a win-win situation. He was in
charge of everything and responsible for nothing.
But favorites swarmed around B. Yeltsin. They made enemies of each
other, forged alliances, and so forth. It was the system of favoritism
that enabled G. Burbulis to play such a black role in Russia's life. It
was the system of favoritism that elevated the ordinary bodyguard Korzhakov
to unprecedented heights.
Now the political scientists are starting to do a "head count" of all
those who have been around the president at various times, and they are
horrified at the numbers.
But we should be even more horrified at the destructive role played by
late 20th-century favoritism in the history of Russia. Favorites, vested
(if only for a time) with enormous power, wrecked the state machinery. In
the end the state split up into a series of corporations which started to
exist by themselves, as the war in Chechnya graphically demonstrated. Some
favorites started the war, others did everything to make Russia lose it.
Even the army and the special services, whose activities should be
above favoritism, were prey to this evil. B. Yeltsin regards Grachev with
favor, and Grachev does not let anyone interfere in his department's
affairs. The FSB [Federal Security Service] is headed by Kovalev, whom the
president does not like, and that affects the service's activity; Kulikov
has a certain "standing at court," and this has a beneficial effect on the
MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs].
In this situation, what can one say about our unfortunate economy? 
After all, every favorite has his own favorites, and so on ad infinitum.
Tarpishchev wins the right to the duty- free shipment of goods for his
"sports ministry" (or whatever that office of his was called), and, judging
by reports in our press, dozens or even hundreds of firms promptly spring
up, trying to make money out of it.
Favorites engage in lobbying over almost all the sales of Russia's
biggest and most profitable enterprises. And often they are sold for a
song. Russia is torn up into pieces, big and small.
Dissatisfied with the way things are going, B. Yeltsin sweeps aside
some favorites and brings in others. But the wheels of the robbing and
squandering machine, once set in motion, only run faster.
Any system of control is simply impossible in this situation. A
favorite, while he is a favorite, is always above the law. And then, he
need not necessarily do any thieving himself.
The situation was greatly complicated when the big "moneybags" -- the
oligarchs -- appeared in the political arena. Prior to the 1996 elections
they played no great role, but after "fixing" the victory for B. Yeltsin
they decided their turn had come.
Well, who would have let Berezovskiy or Gusinskiy put his head above
the parapet in 1992 or even 1994? But now, well.... The press today does
not shrink from calling B. Berezovskiy a modern Rasputin, the real ruler of
Russia, and so forth.
Meanwhile affairs in the state are not improving and in principle
cannot improve.
What is to be done? What we have already said -- change the system of
governing the country.
Favoritism has had its day, it has revealed its vile nature in full. 
B. Yeltsin must change everything. He must stop being a monarch and become
an ordinary president. A president runs a cabinet of 30-35 ministers. B.
Yeltsin needs intelligent executive clerks, not obkom [oblast party
committee] and Kremlin intriguers. It is quite possible that that is why he
has taken such a liking to S. Kiriyenko.
The way the country is governed must be changed, there is no question
about it. But is B. Yeltsin capable of doing it? And another, equally
worrying question -- why would he do it? To save the country or to save
himself?
Administrative reform could be the prelude to the normalization of the
situation in the country, or it could become the basis for a new, even
tougher form of authoritarianism.
Historical experience shows that while an open struggle is under way
in the leader's entourage a dictatorship is impossible. A dictatorship
comes along when there is no one left to fight.
Any dictatorship is inconceivable in a state of chaos, it presupposes
tough and efficient government of the state and society. In the absence of
developed democratic structures in our country, the distance from
regulating the work of the state machinery to dictatorship is only a single
step.
And ideological preparation is apparently needed too. It is unlikely
that fewer people will support a "strong hand" here than in Belarus. And
from the right-wing point of view too, as 1993 showed, this question can
easily be resolved.
We have all we need for a dictatorship except...a dictator. B.
Yeltsin is not of an age to change his habits. Having mobilized all his
mental and physical reserves and mobilized the minds of his best aides, he
could carry out an administrative reform, but he is unlikely to be able to
enjoy its fruits.
Even the democratic media are not ashamed to call him a crank (and
that is one of the mildest epithets). You will agree that that is a very
strange description of a dictator. If B. Yeltsin tries, in present
conditions, to use direct coercion, that will multiply tenfold the hatred
of the most diverse sections of society for him.
Of course, miracles have happened in history. And there is one chance
in a hundred that, after setting the government of the country in order and
doing away with favoritism, B. Yeltsin will rectify the country's economic
position to such an extent that he will be rapturously reelected for a
third presidential term.
But reality is more terrible. In that bulwark of democracy Nizhniy
Novgorod, Mr. Klimentyev has been elected governor. In Vladivostok they
did not hesitate to hurl abuse at Mayor Cherepkov in the presence of the
police. The majority of governors are loyal to B. Yeltsin only on the
surface. Not only the working people, but the elite itself needs a new
leader now. Even if B. Yeltsin succeeds in "clearing the ground" for open
authoritarianism in Russia, he will not be the main player on that ground.
But it is unequivocally clear that the days of favoritism are
numbered. New rules of the game are being devised.

********