April 5, 1998  
This Date's Issues: 2134•  2135• 

Johnson's Russia List
#2135
5 April 1998
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. RIA Novosti: RUSSIA SHIFTS TO ECONOMIC PROGRESS. GOVERNMENT NEEDS 
NEW BLOOD, DEEMS EXPERT. (Georgi Satarov).
2. Reuters: Russia PM feels heat from magnates but won't crack.
3. Reuters: Yeltsin cajoles, threatens Duma over PM vote.
4. New York Times editorial: The State of Boris Yeltsin's Health.
5. The Athens News (Greece); John Helmer, KOZYENOK ACCUSES YELTSIN OF 
DIAMOND KICKBACK.
6. Washington Post: Fred Hiatt, No Place for Appeasement. (Latvia).
7. Gunars Reinis: John Mage, Riga, Rumbuli.
8. Commersant Daily: Ilya Bulavinovov, KOKOSHIN BEGINS TO PUT A REIN 
ON POWER STRUCTURES.
9. Moscow Times: Lyudmila Telen, Shake-Up Plot Backfires.
10. Moscow Times: Natalya Shulyakovskaya, Checks Ignored At Nuclear 
Site.
11. RIA Novosti: THE PROGRAMME SERGEI KIRIYENKO WILL PRESENT NEXT WEEK
CONSISTS OF 'ELEMENTARY YET SOUND STEPS', ALEXANDER POCHINOK BELIEVES.]

*******

#1
RUSSIA SHIFTS TO ECONOMIC PROGRESS. GOVERNMENT NEEDS NEW BLOOD, DEEMS EXPERT

MOSCOW, APRIL 5, RIA NOVOSTI - Russia is shifting to an
economic rise, so its government needs new people. This was why
President Boris Yeltsin recently dismissed the federal Cabinet,
prominent political scientist Georgi Satarov, once presidential
assistant, said to the Moscow Echo radio company yesterday.
Economic progress demands new strategies and tactics,
another political system, and new blood to cope with these
formidable tasks. Besides, this is the last year for unhampered
routine work with no orientation on the political situation
preceding the next presidential election, due 2000.
The men who could have offered the strongest resistance to
new cabinet formation now lost their portfolios, pointed out the
expert.
He described acting Prime Minister Sergei Kirienko as
dynamic and free of corporate biases. "The man knows the new
economy and has had a personal taste of problems which obsessed
the previous cabinet," he added.

*******

#2
Russia PM feels heat from magnates but won't crack
By Alastair Macdonald 

MOSCOW, April 5 (Reuters) - Sergei Kiriyenko, the 35-year-old plucked from
obscurity by President Boris Yeltsin to be Russia's prime minister, has
already felt pressured by big business and media barons but said he will
remain his own man. 
In an informal and wide-ranging interview aired late on Saturday by Russian
Television, the former energy minister said media reports last week of
allegations he had links to a controversial religious cult were
``ridiculous.'' 
He said he was mentally prepared for pressure from the business elites which
opposition groups say have wielded considerable influence over past government
policy. 
Independence from such influence, if Kiriyenko can prove it, could help win
the support he needs from the opposition if he is to be confirmed as premier
by parliament. 
His nomination to replace the veteran Viktor Chernomyrdin, who was sacked by
Yeltsin on March 23, has run into a storm of protest from the Communist-led
State Duma lower house, where Kiriyenko is expected to face a confirmation
hearing on Friday. 
He was asked in the interview how he felt about the ``oligarchs'' -- code for
the powerful financial and media groups who rallied behind Yeltsin in 1996 to
help secure his re-election against a stiff Communist challenge. 
``I don't feel bothered,'' the acting premier replied. 
But he went on to describe how powerful businesses exercised influence
and how
he had already sensed their presence. 
``This past week, I've already come across some of it,'' he said. ``A careful
offer of 'help' comes from somewhere. I ignore it -- the next day some
newspaper changes its tone. 
``Only yesterday it was quite restrained and then suddenly it revives some
absolutely crazy tale about my alleged religious affiliation. Or some other
gibberish which I am trying not to remember as it is just ridiculous.'' 
``I think they're just testing my strength,'' he said. ``I'm well aware of
what comes next and am psychologically ready.'' 
Kiriyenko gave no further details. 
The clearest instances of such pressure came last year when liberal former
first deputy premiers Anatoly Chubais and Boris Nemtsov -- Kiriyenko's former
mentor in provincial Nizhny Novgorod -- were pilloried in certain media after
their proprietors lost out in privatisation sales by the government. 
``As soon as the government starts taking decisions which are not in the
interests of some particular big businessman there's total blackmail in the
media,'' Kiriyenko said. 
``If a government caves in the face of this blackmail then we will have the
problems of oligarchy influence and a weak state. If it stands firm than there
is nothing to talk about.'' 
Kiriyenko also held out an offer of a sympathetic ear to opposition
groups and
trade unions which plan nationwide strikes and demonstrations on Thursday in
protest at long wage arrears. 
A modest technocrat who has grown visibly in political stature over the past
two weeks, he has already pledged to address the problem and to give a frank
and honest assessment of his predecessor's performance at his confirmation
hearing. 
In the interview, he said he would not abandon key elements of his market
philosophy at round table talks on Tuesday with Yeltsin and opposition leaders
but was ready to listen. 
``There are some acquired convictions which are not a matter for
compromise,''
he said. ``If they are altered or not included in the programme then I see no
sense in doing the job.'' 
But he added: ``One can probably survive without the full support...of all
other political parties. But to implement (the programme) without popular
support is all but impossible.'' 

*******

#3
FOCUS-Yeltsin cajoles, threatens Duma over PM vote
By Alastair Macdonald 

MOSCOW, April 5 (Reuters) - Boris Yeltsin's aides gave a foretaste on Sunday
of the mix of flattery and threats that he hopes will persuade the Communist-
led parliament to endorse his choice of prime minister this week. 
Yeltsin's nominee, the hitherto obscure Sergei Kiriyenko, meanwhile launched
his own charm offensive to calm fierce Communist opposition while assuring
liberals he will stand by basic market principles. 
In a form of leak favoured by the Kremlin of late, Interfax news agency
quoted
an unnamed member of Yeltsin's staff saying on Sunday the president felt he
would win over the State Duma lower house, which is expected to vote on
Kiriyenko's appointment on Friday. 
The source said talks with Communist Duma speaker Gennady Seleznyov and the
speaker of the upper house on Thursday had persuaded Yeltsin that he could
count on a victory in the Duma. 
``Yeltsin is counting on Sergei Kiriyenko being confirmed as premier at the
first vote in the Duma,'' Interfax said. 
A Kremlin spokesman declined to comment on the report. 
Seleznyov hinted at a compromise on Friday when he welcomed a suggestion by
Kiriyenko that industrial policy should gain more prominence and said such
measures should be given a chance. 
Emphasising compromise, Yeltsin consented to hold ``round table'' talks
in the
Kremlin on Tuesday, to hear all parties' views on a new government. The
Kremlin aide said he hoped to maintain a ``spirit of non-confrontational
cooperation.'' 
Yet behind the bonhomie, Yeltsin has not been afraid to brandish the big
stick
of Russia's 1993 constitution, which gives him vast personal powers to appoint
whoever he wishes. 
If the Duma votes three times to reject Yeltsin's nominee, he is empowered to
dissolve it -- and has forcibly reminded deputies of that fact. 
Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov has said he is prepared to go as far as
triggering dissolution and early Duma elections in order to block the 35-year-
old Kiriyenko who, he says, is inexperienced and too liberal. 
According to the Kremlin aide quoted by Interfax, Yeltsin is still ready to
call Zyuganov's bluff. ``The president is firm in his intention to put forward
Sergei Kiriyenko for parliamentary approval as many times as necessary,'' he
said. 
In fact, with attention shifting towards the next presidential poll in 2000,
neither side seems keen on fighting early Duma elections. Analysts say some
form of compromise is likely. 
But while Yeltsin will listen at Tuesday's round table talks and seems keen,
as he enters the final two years of his term, to show that he heeds the
people's concerns, the Kremlin said on Friday that any new government will
have to stick with market reform. 
Kiriyenko, a quiet technocrat who has grown markedly in political stature
after a fortnight in the limelight, stressed that he would not abandon key
principles at the round table. 
``There are some acquired convictions which are not a matter for
compromise,''
he said in a wide-ranging and personal interview on Russian Television on
Saturday night. 
But he also made clear he was prepared to take the round table seriously as a
guide to what public opinion would stand. 
Trade unions plan strikes and marches across Russia on Thursday in protest at
the mounting wage arrears for which Yeltsin said he finally decided to sack
the last prime minister, long-serving Viktor Chernomyrdin. 
``One can probably survive without the full support...of all other political
parties. But to implement (the programme) without popular support is all but
impossible,'' Kiriyenko said. 
Kiriyenko, defending his onetime membership of the Soviet Communist Party as
something he ``believed in at the time,'' also emphasised his independence of
the big business and media barons whom opposition politicians accused of
exerting undue influence on previous governments. 
``This past week, I've already come across some of it,'' he said. ``A careful
offer of 'help' comes from somewhere. I ignore it -- the next day some
newspaper changes its tone.'' 
Some media alleged last week that Kiriyenko had dabbled in a controversial
religious sect. He called that ``ridiculous.'' 
``I think they're just testing my strength,'' he said. ``I'm well aware of
what comes next and am psychologically ready.''

*******

#4
New York Times
5 April 1998
Editorial
The State of Boris Yeltsin's Health

Russian rulers have never been a buttoned-down lot, but Boris Yeltsin has
been doing some pioneering work in eccentric leadership. The gyrations of
recent weeks have left a nation with thousands of nuclear weapons in the
untenable position of having no sure line of succession to a President of
uncertain health. That raises the awkward but unavoidable question of whether
Mr. Yeltsin is capable of providing the steady leadership his country so
urgently needs. 
In deed and in word, Mr. Yeltsin has seemed wobbly of late. By replacing a
seasoned prime minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin, with a political novice, Sergei
Kiriyenko, Mr. Yeltsin increases the chances of future instability. Mr.
Kiriyenko seems no match for the political heavyweights who would contend for
the presidency if Mr. Yeltsin became incapacitated or died before his term
expires in 2000. Without a strong prime minister to fill the post and hold
together the country until new elections could be called, a constitutional
succession could be overwhelmed by a scramble for power. 
Mr. Yeltsin seemed indifferent to this danger as he decapitated his
Government. He compounded the problem by seeming unclear himself about which
ministers he planned to reappoint and Parliament's role in the formation of a
new government. All this follows several episodes in which Mr. Yeltsin
surprised his aides with improvised policy pronouncements, including the
assertion earlier this year that an American attack on Iraq might lead to a
new world war. 
Russian satirists make sport of this unpredictable behavior, but it is not
amusing. Mr. Yeltsin, through force of personality and revision of the
Constitution, has given the presidency lopsided power. That puts a premium on
constant leadership. It also places a burden on Mr. Yeltsin, his aides and his
doctors to level with Russians about his health. 
Since bypass surgery in November 1996, Mr. Yeltsin has dropped out of sight
several times to treat what his doctors described as severe respiratory
illnesses. They have denied any recurrence of the heart problems that
incapacitated Mr. Yeltsin before the surgery, and have said he suffered no
mental impairment during or after the operation. 
The Kremlin, unfortunately, has a long history of camouflaging enfeebled
leaders. Given Mr. Yeltsin's impulsive instincts, it is hard to know whether
his recent conduct is just another burst of capricious behavior or a sign of
physical or mental deterioration. It is not a question that Russia can afford
to sidestep. 

******

#5
Date: Sun, 5 Apr 1998 17:14:42 +0400 (WSU DST)
From: helmer@glas.apc.org (John Helmer)
Subj: KOZLYENOK ACCUSES YELTSIN OF DIAMOND KICKBACK

The Athens News (Greece), April 6, 1998
KOZYENOK ACCUSES YELTSIN OF DIAMOND KICKBACK
>From John Helmer in Moscow

Andrei Kozlyenok, the prominent Russian diamond industry figure now in prison
in Athens, has publicly accused President Boris Yeltsin of taking a kickback
from the sale of state diamonds.
The accusation came in Kozlyenok's most detailed and dramatic commentary yet
on the Russian application for his extradition from Greece. In an interview
published in Kommersant-Daily, a Moscow business paper, Kozlyenok was asked
if he knew that part of the money he earned from the sale of Russian
diamonds was intended to be channelled back to the Kremlin through payments
for a book of Yeltsin's memoirs.
"I remember," Kozlyenok replied, "that the representatives of the Russian 
government asked Golden ADA [Kozlyenok's San Francisco-based company] to 
deposit money into the fund of presidential programs of Russia. Probably, 
the money was used for publication of the book you talk about."
This is the first time Kozlyenok has commented on rumours that have
been widespread in Moscow, ever since the government accused Kolzyenok
and Golden ADA of fraud, that his diamond transactions had a political 
purpose.
It is also the first time Yeltsin has been accused of receiving money
illegally through a book royalty scheme. Last year, several ministers
of the Russian government were fired or punished by Yeltsin for
accepting $90,000 payments for their contributions to a book on
privatization. This was after it was revealed that the book publisher
was an obscure Swiss company manipulated by Moscow's powerful Uneximbank.
First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais and several senior privatization
ministers were on the receiving end of Uneximbank's favour, as Uneximbank
won several privatization auctions. These have since been declared illegal
by the Russian parliament.
First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov was not punished in the so-called
"writers' union" affair, although it has been disclosed that he too received
an equally large and unearned royalty for a book of memoirs. That was paid
by a media organization dependent on government contracts.
Yeltsin's book-writing was ghosted by his current chief of staff, Valentin
Yumashev, and until now, the sizeable royalties Yeltsin received
have not been challenged in the Russian press. Last week, in his annual
statement of income, Yeltsin said he received $117,000 in 1997, up
dramatically from $46,000 in 1996. The increase was attributed to
book fees and bank interest, but there was no further detail in the
Kremlin release.
Kozlyenok's claims about his management of the Golden ADA's cashflow
and assets have been challenged in a San Francisco federal court, where
both the US Internal Revenue Service and the Russian government have
filed claims. Associates of Kozlyenok have told The Athens News they have
direct knowledge of bribes he paid to senior Russian government officials.
They also claim Kozlyenok spent cash on luxury homes, boats, aircraft,
and cars for himself, and has since lied about that.
Kozlyenok's charge that his activities were intended to skim cash from
transactions with state property creates a fresh problem for the Greek
Supreme Court and Ministry of Justice in deciding whether he should
be extradited to Moscow.
The terms of extradition in international law usually provide exemptions in 
cases involving crimes that are political in nature, and for individuals
facing torture and death if returned. Whether or not Kozlyenok's diamond
trading operations were intended to fund presidential political
purposes, or Yeltsin personally, will be difficult for Greek officials
to investigate. But the suspicion that part of what Kozlyenok is
saying is true is widely held in Moscow today.
He also told his Russian interviewer that the mysterious death of a
business associate in a court holding cell in Moscow recently substantiates
the risk to his life, if Greece agrees to extradition. "This incident scares 
me and clearly shows how they can shut the mouths of people who can tell the 
truth in Russia. It's obvious that if I come back, I won't live longer than 
two or three days."
Greek officials in Moscow with Defence Minister Aki Tsohatzhopoulos last
week say there was no comment by the Russians on the extradition matter.
In January and February, Greek sources say, Russian officials were
insistent and emphatic on extradition at their meetings with Greek officials.

*******

#6
Washington Post
5 April 1998
[for personal use only]
No Place for Appeasement
By Fred Hiatt

While the unpredictable Boris Yeltsin recently grabbed attention by 
giving his prime minister the boot, another drama was unfolding in 
Moscow, little noticed here but with significant implications for this 
country.
This one began modestly enough on March 3, when a few thousand 
Russian-speaking residents of Latvia held a demonstration in that tiny 
Baltic nation's capital of Riga, demanding that the government continue 
to recognize their Soviet-era passports. The protesters, many of them 
elderly, tied up traffic for several hours and were finally dispersed 
forcibly by police.
No one was injured, but the videotape got top billing on Moscow news 
shows. Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, never one to miss an 
opportunity, decried Latvia's "flagrant violation of basic human 
rights." The Duma picked up the cue, attacking President Yeltsin for 
being too soft on Russia's Baltic neighbors. Yeltsin canceled a planned 
summit with Latvia's president. Russian officials began holding up 
Latvian produce at the border for days or more at a time.
Then Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, a leading candidate to replace Yeltsin 
as president in the year 2000, really stirred things up. Latvia was 
"pursuing a consistent policy of genocide," Moscow's Hizzoner 
maintained. He likened Latvia's democratically elected government to Pol 
Pot's regime in Cambodia and said Russian speakers there "have 
practically been turned into slaves." And the mayor, who runs Russia's 
largest city as if it were his personal estate, called for "all possible 
measures . . . except force" against Latvia.
Now, there's no question that Latvia has been too slow to integrate the 
44 percent of its population for whom Russian, not Latvian, is the 
primary language. But Luzhkov's comments distorted reality so 
outrageously that they could only be part of a presidential campaign 
that will be based on nationalism, bullying and great-power nostalgia -- 
dangerous in a country where many people still haven't come to terms 
with the loss of empire.
In this context, it's important to remember that Yeltsin, erratic as he 
is, has been mostly a force for good -- for helping his compatriots 
understand that the 14 other former Soviet republics are not Russian 
suzerainties. Russia could destabilize all these nations -- by 
withholding gas and oil, by military threat, by encouraging ethnic 
Russians to make trouble. Yeltsin has played those cards, but far less 
than he might have. At home, he has stocked his government with Jews, 
ethnic Germans, Balts and others perceived in Moscow as "non-Russian."
But as would-be successors jockey for Yeltsin's job, the atmosphere 
could change. Yeltsin's prime minister-designate, Sergei Kiriyenko, 
hasn't announced an economic program, but he felt compelled first thing 
to disclose that his father was Jewish, hoping thereby to defuse what 
might have become a whispering campaign against him. Already, Mayor 
Luzhkov has laid claim to parts of Ukraine and inflamed Muscovite 
prejudices against darker-skinned residents from the south. Yeltsin is 
not above bowing to such winds if they gain strength.
Some in the West seek to defuse such nationalist sentiment by deferring 
to it. They would derail or delay NATO expansion. They would pay court 
in Russia -- as German Chancellor Helmut Kohl shamefully did last month 
-- by suggesting that they sympathize totally with Russia in its Latvia 
dispute. They would give Russia a veto over Latvia's joining the 
European Union by suggesting, as Kohl and others have, that border 
disputes with Russia should be disqualifying.
This kind of appeasement does Russia's democrats no favor. Every 
country, no matter how small, has the right to plot its own course. If 
Primakov and Luzhkov can make gains in the West by threatening Russia's 
weaker neighbors, they will only do it more. Russians who favor 
civilized, equitable relations will be weakened.
It's just as wrongheaded, though, to cut off contacts and aid, or 
threaten to do so, whenever Russia displeases U.S. policymakers or 
congressmen, whether in its policy toward Iraq, Iran or Latvia. The West 
also must keep engaging with Russia -- opening markets to its new 
businesses, for example -- to show that a non-bullying foreign policy 
can have rewards.
This is where Ukraine comes to mind. Russia's most important neighbor, 
Ukraine -- with roughly the population and economic potential of France 
-- has failed to push reforms quickly enough, and so finds itself mired 
in corruption and declining prosperity.
Some in Congress now want to punish Ukraine -- most immediately for 
alleged mistreatment of some U.S. investors -- by forcing the Secretary 
of State to "decertify" it and cut off half or more of U.S. aid. Never 
mind the progress it has made in democratization. Never mind that it 
gave up all its nuclear weapons, as U.S. officials blithely promised 
that it would lose no leverage as a result.
Pushing for reform is justified. Corruption in Ukraine is unacceptable 
-- and hurts Ukrainians far more than U.S. investors. But it's worth 
keeping in mind, as Natan Sharansky, former Soviet dissident and current 
Israeli trade minister, cautioned during a recent visit here, that many 
Russians still view the former Soviet Union as theirs. They look 
hopefully at Ukraine, he said, "because they see it has problems, and 
they see the West is not in a hurry to help."
"The moment they will succeed with Ukraine," he added, "that moment they 
will be able to succeed with the whole [former] Soviet Union."
Long years in the gulag give Sharansky his own reasons to avoid 
sentimentality in these matters. But you don't need his history to see 
that disengagement from Ukraine -- as from Russia -- is the wrong 
approach. It would hurt Ukraine, weaken Russia's democrats and embolden 
Moscow's mayor.
The writer is a member of the editorial page staff. 

******

#7
Date: Sat, 04 Apr 1998 19:19:30 -0800
From: Gunars Reinis <inarar19@idt.net>
Subject: John Mage, Riga, Rumbuli

Mr. Mages incoherent outburst against Latvia and Latvians requires some
factual rebuttal.
1. Independent Latvia was proclaimed on Nov. 18, 1918. All people
living in Latvia, all minorities included, became citizens. All of them
and their descendants are citizens today. 
2. During the independence period there were no persecutions. 
Minorities enjoyed economical and political power along with the
majority, sometimes greater than their numbers.
3. When Russia (then called USSR) illegally occupied Latvia in 1940,
massive persecutions including murder, torture and deportations started
immediately and continued up to the day the Russians were driven out by
the invading Germans. The Russians were assisted by some locals of
various ethnic backgrounds. Most of the victims were Latvians, but
minorities also suffered.
4. During the German occupation the persecutions targeted mostly Jews,
but others, including also minorities, suffered. The Germans were
assisted by some locals of various ethnic backgrounds. 
5. The Latvian Legion was formed in 1943, about 2 years after the
annihilation of the local Jewish population. Most members of the Legion
were drafted, I know many of them personally, some were my schoolmates. 
To equate all of them to killers of Jews is the same as saying the US
Army consists of Lt. Calleys only. 
Members of the Latvian Legion would have much preferred to fight the
Russians communists with American arms, wearing American uniforms, but
such were not available then. 
6. When Russia reoccupied Latvia in 1944/45 persecution resumed on an
even more massive scale and continued until 1991 when Latvia regained
independence. 
7. The martyrs of Kolima, Rumbuli, Vorkuta and Dachau are all equally
dead and deserve to be remembered equally. Or are some more dead than
others? 
8. Since 1991 there have been no persecutions in (now again)
independent Latvia. The laws governing naturalization of immigrants and
their descendants are generally more liberal than in Sweden, Germany,
Israel, USA, etc. Minorities enjoy considerable economic and political
power. 
9. It appears beyond dispute that all the inhabitants of Latvia are
immeasurably better off during periods of Latvian independence than
during the occupations. The only exceptions are the members of the KGB,
Gestapo and the ex Red Army officers, who have lost their enormous
power and privilege, but not their mouthpieces. They are the ones
demonstrating today in the streets of Riga. 
10. One final fact: there have been and are boat people from Russia,
China, Vietnam, Cuba and other communist paradises, but there have not
been nor are there now from independent Latvia. 

********

#8
>From RIA Novosti
Commersant Daily
April 2, 1998
KOKOSHIN BEGINS TO PUT A REIN ON POWER STRUCTURES
By Ilya BULAVINOVOV

The two-day trip to Tajikistan by the Secretary of the
Security Council, Andrei Kokoshin, which ended on Tuesday
night, has become his first public appearance after the
appointment to this post. The visit has become the beginning of
the implementation of Kokoshin's new jurisdiction over all the
power structures of Russia. This report from Dushanbe has been
sent by Ilya Bulavinov.

Kokoshin was invited to Tajikistan by the Director of the
Federal Frontier Service, Nikolai Bordyuzha, to take part in
the session of the FFS. The trip to Tajikistan has come as a
proof that Kokoshin is becoming the chief supervisor of the
Russian power structures, which unconditionally recognized his
role.
With all his behaviour General Bordyuzha has demonstrated
the superior role of the Secretary of the Security Council and
stayed in the shadow of Kokoshin, so to speak, while the first
deputy director of the Federal Security Service, Valentin
Sobolev, and the deputy director of the Foreign Intelligence
Service, Viktor Yerin, who travelled together with Kokoshin,
unanimously urged journalists in an informal interview to a
Commersant correspondent to "support Andrei".
That Kokoshin has made Tajikistan a testing ground for
building his relations with the power ministers and directors
is not really surprising. In extreme situations there are
several Russian power structures working there at the same
time: the Defence Ministry, the Federal Frontier Service, the
Federal Security Service and the Foreign Intelligence Service.
There were many serious contradictions between them before
which led to tragic consequences: for example when the command
of the 201st division deployed in Tajikistan denied support to
the fighting frontier troops, while during the presidential
elections in 1994 different Russian services supported
different candidates: Emomali Rakhmonov and Abdumalik
Abdullodzhanov. Apart from the consolidation of the power
structures Kokoshin studied the Tajik combat experience of the
Russian military: under his supervision work has begun in the
Security Council to draw up new combat regulations for actions
in the so-called low-intensity conflicts.
Despite the continuing armed clashes, the situation on the
Tajik-Afghan border and in Tajikistan has somewhat stabilized
today: the Tajik opposition sits in the centre of Dushanbe
(incidentally Kokoshin has had talks both with President
Rakhmonov and with the opposition leader, Said Abdullo Nuri.
The opposition is also represented in the government of the
republic. There are different problems on the agenda now: the
war in Afghanistan which threatens Tajikistan's security and
the drug traffic which goes from Afghanistan to Tajikistan and
then to Kirghizia, Kazakhstan and Russia (last year more than
three thousand tons of narcotic drugs were produced in
Afghanistan). Russia can no longer afford to maintain its huge
military and border contingent which numbers more than 24,000
men. All the more so since Dushanbe meets only 8 to 10 per cent
of its border financing commitments, while Russian soldiers and
officers continue to die in armed clashes. But then Rakhmonov
refuses to hear anything about the reduction of Russian
military presence ("This is not the time for reducing anything
on the southern borders!) he says and complains about the lack
of attention from the international community ("Why do
everybody attend to the problems of Yugoslavia and Iraq, but
nobody seems to care about Afghanistan?").
In other words, having embarked on the road of settlement
of the Russian-Tajik problems, Kokoshin has put himself in a
difficult position, for neither the Kremlin nor the power
structures will forgive his possible failure. It appears,
however, that this is an all-out effort on his part: in the
event of success the new Secretary of the Security Council will
live up to the position of supervisor of all power structures
and thereby augment his political weight.

*******

#9
For more articles from The Moscow Times, check out their website at
www.moscowtimes.ru

Moscow Times
April 4, 1998 
Shake-Up Plot Backfires 
By Lyudmila Telen
Special to The Moscow Times
Lyudmila Telen is deputy editor of Moskovskiye Novosti. She contributed 
this comment to The Moscow Times. 

President Boris Yeltsin unexpectedly accepted the opposition's proposal 
on Thursday and agreed to hold a round table on the government crisis. 
Moreover, he proposed that the leaders of the various factions draw up a 
list of their candidates for ministerial portfolios, and quickly forgot 
about his recent threats to the State Duma, the lower house. This and 
other events that followed the scandalous dismissal of the government 
leave no doubt that the president had no strategic plans, at least as 
far as speeding up reforms was concerned. The events, which broke the 
relatively stable situation in Russia, were dictated not by state 
concerns, but by survival instincts. This was a matter of survival not 
just of the president, but of the like-minded people close to him. 
The main goal that the initiators of Prime Minister Viktor 
Chernomyrdin's dismissal set is obvious. The Kremlin team tried to 
provoke the weak president into engaging in a bout of political venture, 
taking his closest competitors out of the game and replacing them with 
figures who, with or without Yeltsin, would insure them against shocks 
in 2000. 
Until recently, Yeltsin's understudy for the next presidential elections 
was almost officially considered to be Chernomyrdin. But during the past 
months, apparently, those who are usually referred to as Yeltsin's 
"inner circle" -- his chief of staff, Valentin Yumashev, his spokesman 
Sergei Yastrzhembsky, his daughter Tatyana Dyachenko and, joining them, 
tycoon Boris Berezovsky -- had doubts over the loyalty of the former 
prime minister or over his ability to win in the next elections. 
The task that the president's team tried to solve was not simple. It had 
to take into consideration two options for the future. The first was 
that Yeltsin would be among the candidates for the presidency in 2000. 
The second was an election without him. Certain moves to change the 
balance of forces could be of use to the Kremlin circle in either case. 
The Kremlin, for example, needed to break the pace in the topsy-turvy 
presidential race that was under way, given that the participants 
aspiring to the title of "candidate from the party ofpower" as well as 
the oligarchs who were called upon to finance this candidate were 
practically out of control. 
The prime minister started to be too active on all fronts -- in the 
Duma, in his contacts with oligarchs (including not only Berezovsky but 
Vladimir Potanin of Uneximbank) and on the international scene, in 
particular in the United States. Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov went on the 
political attack at the same time. It is no accident that the 
presidential administration took a series of steps to weaken the mayor, 
in particular, leaking information about his "dangerous" plans. Acting 
First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov allowed himself to speak of 
the creation of a widespread anti-oligarchical movement. The situation 
clearly required intervention. 
The initiators of the government shake-up intended to change sharply the 
balance of forces in the presidential race. According to one version, 
Ivan Rybkin, minister for the affairs of Commonwealth of Independent 
States, was the first choice to replace Chernomyrdin. Yabloko leader 
Grigory Yavlinsky was second. Intensive negotiations were led between 
him and the head of the presidential administration, perhaps through a 
third person. 
In the "Rybkin version," the president and his team would get a kind of 
weakened version of the Chernomyrdin Cabinet that would be loyal, have a 
prime minister acceptable to the Duma and manageable and that would give 
Yeltsin a free hand in the future presidential campaign. In the 
"Yavlinsky version," the Kremlin, on the contrary, would receive an 
obstinate government, but one capable of providing an economic break and 
thus fair conditions for a third term for Yeltsin. 
According to Kremlin sources, Yeltsin was especially convinced of the 
expediency of the Rybkin option. But by mid-March, it was clear that he 
would definitely not be approved. The Yavlinsky option was also 
doubtful. On March 21, it was obvious to the president's close circle 
that the prime minister would be sacked. The other part of the plan, 
however, had fallen through. The choice of Sergei Kiriyenko was not 
foreseen and could hardly suit the initiators of the crisis. But this 
choice suited the president himself, who, as could be expected, does not 
plan to step down from power. 
The stake on the inexperienced, politically undefined Kiriyenko turned 
the government over to the control of the president, lowering it to the 
level of a department in the administration. Not having presidential 
ambitions, the acting prime minister could take unpopular measures and 
help Yeltsin by promoting economic growth. Furthermore, he could be 
kicked out from the White House in case of social unrest, which would 
shift the blame from the Kremlin. Finally, by naming Kiriyenko, Yeltsin 
can keep a reserve of personnel intact -- including Nemtsov, Yavlinsky 
and Rybkin, who could be called on closer to the elections. 
Yeltsin's instinct for survival did not fail him this time, so he has 
something to be personally happy about. And what about everyone else? As 
a result of the moves he took, the country remains with a 
not-very-healthy president who is trying to concentrate even more power 
in his hands, which in reality will flow over to his administration. At 
the same time, the threat arises of getting a little-known Nizhny 
Novgorod banker as a temporary president if the master of the Kremlin 
for one reason or another is not able to carry out his duties. For all 
the well-known and unknown virtues of the new acting prime minister, 
this would guarantee a political crisis with unpredictable consequences 
-- unpredictable even for those who initiated Chernomyrdin's dismissal. 

*******

#10
Moscow Times
April 4, 1998 
Checks Ignored At Nuclear Site 
By Natalya Shulyakovskaya
Staff Writer

Environmental inspectors have threatened to halt construction of a $250 
million U.S.-Russian storage unit in the Urals for plutonium and uranium 
removed from nuclear warheads due to breaches of safety standards. 
The State Committee on the Environment has warned the Mayak nuclear 
complex in the Chelyabinsk region, where the facility has been under 
construction since 1995, that it may order work stopped this month. 
Inspectors say Mayak, a division of the Nuclear Power Ministry, has been 
constructing the facility without first submitting to environmental 
checks, which are compulsory under Russian law. Mayak has been given 
until April 15 to present proof that the checks have been made. 
The ministry has already received $55 million from the U.S. government 
to construct the facility as part of a major disarmament program. 
Andrei Pechkurov, a senior inspector with the State Committee on the 
Environment who conducted snap inspections at Mayak, said the committee 
could freeze Mayak's finances if it did not comply. 
No official survey of the new facility has been carried out, but 
Pechkurov said the ecological risk at the existing Mayak complex has 
been radioactive elements released into ground water. 
"We have to do something or it will turn into an international scandal," 
said Alexander Suslov, chief engineer at Mayak. 
A U.S. official said that any interruption to the project would be 
regrettable, although he had not heard of the dispute. "It is a 
significant job, it is a multimillion-dollar job. It's been very 
difficult" to make sure the finances kept on coming, said Tom Kuenning, 
the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. "But we are trying to 
keep it going." 
A U.S. General Accounting Office report noted last month that there have 
be en problems assuring U.S. access to Mayak to monitor radioactive 
materials stored there. 
The new storage facility at Mayak is being built to accommodate a 
growing stockpile of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, the main 
explosives of nuclear bombs. 
Since the end of the Cold War, Russia and the United States have been 
retiring warheads at the rate of 1,500 to 2,000 nuclear weapons per year 
each because of arms limitation agreements and natural attrition. The 
U.S. government has offered Russia money to help with the process as an 
incentive for speeding up disarmament. 
The overall nuclear stockpiles to be destroyed are estimated at tens of 
th ousands of weapons. The storage facility at Mayak, whose first stage 
is expected to be completed by the end of 2000, will eventually hold 
50,000 containers with dangerous material from 12,500 weapons. 
The ultimate fate of the materials stored at Mayak remains unclear. The 
uranium can be blended to lower grade isotopes and used as fuel in 
nuclear power stations. Russia has already exported some highly enriched 
uranium from warheads to the United States under a major disarmament 
deal.But the plutonium cannot be easily converted to fuel. Russia is 
attempting to turn its plutonium stocks into mixed plutonium-uranium 
fuel, known as MOX, for use in nuclear power stations. But the program 
is highly controversial and has been criticized by environmentalists. 
U.S. Secretary of Energy Federico Pena has just completed a round of 
discussions with the Russian Atomic Energy on the issue of plutonium 
disposal. 
In the meantime, while the technology and reactors for MOX fuel are 
being developed, plutonium extracted from warheads has to be stored 
safely. 
"If the storage facility isn't built, the process will be stalled. We 
will use up all the storage space," said Yevgeny Kudryavtsev, a senior 
specialist with the nuclear chemical production department of the atomic 
ministry. 
Mayak blames the current environmental dispute on the Nuclear Power 
Ministry. Suslov of Mayaksaid former Nuclear Power Minister Viktor 
Mikhailov, had ordered Mayak to obtain its environmental permits from a 
separate state nuclear facility at Arzamas-16 on the Volga River. But 
Mayak had refused to pay the price Arzamas-16 had demanded for the 
study. 
Later, Mayak found out that an ecological study conducted by the Atomic 
Ministry's own researchers would not have been legally valid. Russian 
law requires an impact survey from an independent body. "We just lost 
time," Suslov said. 
A spokesman for the Nuclear Power Ministry blamed the failure to obtain 
permits on a lack of Russian government financing for the project. 
Yury Golovin, a former ministry official who has been supervising the 
project and is currently working as a consultant to Mayak, said that, so 
far, the U.S. Departments of Defense and Energy have given $55 million 
for construction. But financing from the Russian side has been spotty. 
"If Russia were giving money for the project, we would've had an 
ecological study done long ago," said Golovin. A study could cost up to 
100,000 rubles ($16,400). It usually takes 3 months, but could be 
performed in about a month. 
Environmental activists agree the facility is necessary, but criticize 
the Nuclear Power Ministry's disregard of environmental law. 
"The Atomic Energy Ministry has always despised Russian law, it has 
always been a state within the state," said Natalia Mironova, an 
environmental activists working in Chelyabinsk. "It has always ignored 
the environmental laws especially in its international dealings." 

*******

#11
THE PROGRAMME SERGEI KIRIYENKO WILL PRESENT NEXT WEEK
CONSISTS OF 'ELEMENTARY YET SOUND STEPS', ALEXANDER POCHINOK
BELIEVES
MOSCOW, 4 APRIL, RIA NOVOSTI'S ALEXANDER DETKOV. The
government's programme of action which acting premier Sergei
Kiriyenko will present for the consideration of the State Duma
next week consists of "seemingly elementary yet sound steps,"
Alexander Pochinok said in an exclusive interview to RIA
Novosti. The chief of the State Taxation Service stressed that
Kiriyenko "has no illusions about the state of Russia's economy.
He appreciates the depth of the crisis - both in the financial
market and the market of raw materials."
Pochinok points out that the acting premier intends to
articulate the dilemma of "whether we will continue to live in
debt and shift the burden of making decisions onto the future
generations, or we start learning to earn money and spend it
sparingly." In Pochinok's opinion, the suggested measures "are
not populist, but rather well-thought out." They are a result of
a "detailed analysis of all possible optional decisions."
In particular, Kiriyenko's programme contains suggestions
of how to expedite the money circulation to enable the state to
overcome the crisis of payments. Pochinok supports this
suggestion and believes that the "money can and must circulate
faster" and that the country has realistic capacities to have
the money make at least two circulations in a month. 
The internal revenue service chief believes that one key
element of Kiriyenko's programme is the suggestion to
differentiate the treatment of the largest, medium-size and
small taxpayers. The suggested measures to streamline the
taxation of the oil companies is worthy of serious attention, he
believes. The programme also charts steps to offset the deficits
of the regional budgets and to tackle the social affairs.
On the prospect of the programme passing the vote in the
Duma, Pochinok expressed the hope that the lower house will
endorse it. "I have always believed in common sense and trust
that the Duma members will vote proceeding from their common
sense, rather than for fear of the Duma's disbandment," he said.

********