Russia Profile
April 27, 2009
Lessons From Sochi
A Respectable Showing for Boris Nemtsov at the Expense of the Communists
By Roland Oliphant
The elections in Sochi are over, and the acrimony is just beginning. But amidst accusations about early-voting, suspiciously-placed polling stations and United Russia’s abuse of administrative resources, a very small glimmer of hope for Russia’s democrats cannot be denied. Boris Nemtsov was not only allowed to stand, but took second place in the vote. Given a level playing field, he might have done even better.
After a month of high profile campaigning by celebrity and not-so-celebrity candidates, the Sochi Mayoral Elections are over. But what had been dubbed the most interesting elections in Russia’s recent history produced a disappointingly orthodox result. United Russia’s candidate, acting mayor Anatoly Pakhomov, took some 77 percent of the vote, with opposition candidate Boris Nemtsov and the communist Yury Dzagania trailing far behind, with just 13 and seven percent respectively. The remaining candidates failed to take more than a percentage point each.
That result is reflective of national and regional elections in the past several years, and is not much of a surprise. But polls by Nemtsov’s team had suggested he would take as much as 35 percent, forcing a second round. Even if he had not won, it would have prolonged the drama. As it is, Pakhomov’s apparent land slide has killed the fun dead. There will be no revolution in Sochi.
Nonetheless, for maybe the first time a good day for United Russia has also been a good day for Russia’s democratic opposition. Nemtsov forced the Communist candidate into second place, a near unheard of feat for a liberal opposition figure. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) have for the past several years positioned themselves as the “only real opposition,” because they are the only party with a significant voter base (however small) other than United Russia. A combination of a loyal base of core voters and domination of the left of the political spectrum has allowed the communists to become accustomed to taking second place with between 10 to 15 percent of the vote. Indeed, Dzagania won just such a result when he stood in the previous election.
Partly the communists were squeezed by local peculiarities, and partly they are suffering from United Russia’s own very careful response to the threat from the left. United Russia has repositioned itself to the left, partly as a direct result of the economic crisis, and partly in response to the KPRF’s own ferocious campaigning on the issue. “The party of power – that is United Russia – has been very keen not to alienate pensioners and traditional communist voters,” said Nikolai Petrov, an expert on regional affairs at the Moscow Carnegie center. The result is that it is more or less “social democratic,” in tone, using all the tools of traditional leftist parties and making it very difficult for the Communist party to compete in its traditional constituency. Meanwhile, Nemtsov was able to appeal to the local protest vote – not only those affected by the economic crisis, but the considerable minority in Sochi who are disgruntled by the preparations for the Sochi Olympics (Nemtsov campaigned against the construction of new facilities, which have led to the displacement of many living on sites ear marked for such projects).
At this point it would be a speculation too far to say that this signals a general displacement of the communists as the most significant opposition group in the country. The democratic opposition has few if any other faces as well known as Nemtsov’s, and the anti-Olympic protest vote he tapped into is confined to Sochi. But none the less, it seems that they have learnt some lessons. “Social protest is obviously quite high in Sochi, because of the economic crisis but also the controversy surrounding the Olympics, and Nemtsov did well tapping into this kind of discontent. But I think that kind of pattern of voting is going to be much more widespread this fall when the economic crisis increase social protest in general,” said Petrov.
United Russia has also played a surprisingly sophisticated game, in that it did simply prevent Nemtsov from standing at once, and even allowed him onto the ballot on election day. That may not have happened if the party of power had felt that the elections were getting beyond their control – the removal of Alexander Lebedev and the Just Russia candidate, Viktor Kurptiko, on legal technicalities was a clear signal that Nemtsov could be pushed out of the running at any time.
Allowing a man as well-known as Nemtsov to stand against a United Russia candidate as anonymous as Pakhomov, who was parachuted into the role of acting mayor last year, but is neither local nor famous, may have been risky. Whatever strategist thought it up has been vindicated. Nemtsov (modestly) triumphed at the expense of the communist candidate, but made no dent at all in the United Russia vote. “And because Pakhomov is relatively unknown, it is clear that these people were actually voting for Putin and United Russia; and that means they can repeat the same stunt all over the country,” noted Petrov.
Despite the obvious irregularities, the result is more of a victory for the Putin brand of populism than anything else. The party of power tested itself against a well known candidate from an opposition movement that it has hitherto shown an almost paranoid aversion to facing at the ballot box, and came out well in the lead. No one should be surprised about that, but it does suggest that by facing a serious candidate like Nemtsov the party is preparing itself for the more serious political fights it may face as the economic situation deteriorates.
However flawed the election itself, the very decision to allow such a competition is to be welcomed. But that is not to say the election was fair. Apart from the disqualification of several candidates on technicalities, there are accusations that early voting was exploited to force public sector workers such as teachers to vote for United Russia, and complaints about a polling station set up suspiciously close to the Abkhaz border.
There is also a good amount of evidence to suggest that the authorities worked hard to keep turnout low. There was little more than a month of campaigning between candidacies being announced and polling day. And despite coverage in the national media, correspondents in the city reported few visible signs that an election was going on. Opposition candidates complained that Radio and TV stations and papers refused to take their campaign adds. Even Pakhomov kept surprisingly out of sight (the Kommersant daily’s correspondent in Sochi was one of several to describe a Kafkaesque chase to get an interview with the candidate, being referred by City hall to an apparently non-existent campaign headquarters, and by the local branch of United Russia to City hall).
As a result, turnout was just 39 percent (RIA Novosti reported 38.62 percent. Other sources quoted 39.5 percent). And though there is no minimum turnout necessary to legitimize the poll, a higher showing might have hurt United Russia’s chances. “There is a segment in society who be relied on to vote and do so a sign of loyalty to the authorities. There is definitely an interest in keeping the campaign low key. If young people and others were to be politicized enough to vote, they might well vote for other candidates,” said Petrov. That can only be tested at the ballot box, but opinion polls seem to suggest that United Russia voters are also the least politically aware. At Sochi, at least, opposition parties were allowed to stand. The next step will be allowing them a real debate. Then they really might win something.