| JRL HOME | SUPPORT | SUBSCRIBE | RESEARCH & ANALYTICAL SUPPLEMENT | |
Old Saint Basil's Cathedral in MoscowJohnson's Russia List title and scenes of Saint Petersburg
Excerpts from the JRL E-Mail Community :: Founded and Edited by David Johnson
#31 - JRL 2009-69 - JRL Home
RIA Novosti
April 14, 2009
Stalemate in Georgia as Saakashvili cannot resign - analyst

Lincoln Mitchell, a leading U.S. expert on Georgia at Columbia University, discusses the current unrest in Georgia with Dmitry Gornostaev, the New York Bureau Chief of RIA Novosti

Q: Mr. Mitchell, you were in Tbilisi during the "Rose Revolution". Georgia is now again divided, with the opposition demanding the president's resignation, as in 2004. How will President Mikheil Saakashvili respond - will he forcefully suppress the riots, as he did in 2007, or will he resign?

A: I think Saakashvili understands that he cannot repeat what he did in November 2007. Domestically this would be very bad for Georgia, and I think that internationally people would not tolerate what he did so easily - countries like United States.

Q: Is it possible that he will resign?

A: Saakashvili is not going to resign today. I mean, it would be shock if Saakashvili resigns today. If I were sitting next to Saakashvili, I would say: "Don't resign, that would be dumb". And I'm sure that the people seating next to him are saying that.

Q: So what happens next?

A: I think the opposition have backed themselves into a corner here - which was tactically not wise. The Georgian government and the Georgian opposition have to find a way to move forward together in a time that I think is of paramount importance for their country.

Q: What solution could be found?

A: Well, it gets harder every day - that's the problem. I think that one of the major challenges is that the government internally doesn't have credibility as a reformer on political issues. On economic issues, on corruption, they have great credibility. On the political issues - they don't.

The question of how they can win this credibility back is a difficult one. How do they proactively find ways to bring the opposition's voices into the policymaking process, to proactively allow for recognizing that the government is unpopular.

When the government is unpopular, there's going to be a loud opposition. That's a fact of life. But it doesn't make a president resign.

Bush was extremely unpopular for most of 2007-2008, but didn't resign. He had trouble governing, doing what he wanted to do, but he didn't resign.

This is not a radically dissimilar situation. The regime is at stake here. If this crumbles, if either the president resigns and you have widespread instability, or it tags into a more authoritarian regime, then we have a real threat. So I think that is what they need to avoid from both sides.

I think the opposition's leadership should think of presenting options where Saakashvili can say "Yes". "Resign, period" is not an option to which the president can, or frankly should, say "Yes".

Q: What is an option? What is a demand to which the president can say yes?

A: What I don't see is a basic negotiating approach, and I that's unfortunate. I'm not saying there aren't reasons why many Georgians want him to resign. I think there are reasons why he has failed the Georgian people. But we have to have another solution. This isn't the answer.

Q: So the opposition doesn't have any legal options and the president doesn't have real political options to calm the situation?

A: I think the question here is - what is a political option?

And I think that the political mistake by the government was to keep forcing the question, continuing to apply force on the opposition, demonizing the opposition. It's this almost axiomatic notion that if you are against President Saakashvili then you are somehow unpatriotic, somehow pro-Russian. And there are a lot of people in Georgia, ordinary people and leaders, who think of themselves as patriotic Georgians who don't support President Saakashvili. And one of the most dangerous things you can do in a democracy - whether it's a strong one and old as one in the United States, or a weaker, newer, less democratic one like Georgia - is to create an option where if you don't support the president somehow you're unpatriotic.

Q: Who could be an alternative leader? Nino Burdzhanadze?

A: Right now Burdzhanadze does not enjoy enough support among the Georgian people.

Q: Why?

A: I think she is seen too close to the government. I think that like [Irakli] Alasania, people still don't quite know all that much about Burdzhanadze. Alasania has potential, but he isn't there yet.

Q: But he was close to the government as well working as an ambassador to the United Nations...

A: Yes, but he was doing something that everybody thought was important. He was here, representing Georgia in key moments at the United Nations, doing a very good job.

I think that Burdzhanadze was in a good situation but she stayed a little too long. Irakli is relatively unknown. The work that he has to do is to go out there and build support, build name recognition.

Q: The Russian President Medvedev said that he would not talk to Georgia while Saakashvili is in power. What options do you see? Could the US help?

A: I think it would be very good and very useful, but I don't think it will be very easy. And the truth is - I don't know how high a priority this is for Obama or his administration. Our relationship with Russia is important, and I think that the meeting between our two presidents was a good one. One of the things that came out of it is that they agreed to disagree on a number of topics, and one of these was Georgia.

And if you look at what President Obama said, I don't think it radically differs from what President Bush would have said or President McCain would have said. Again, Obama has the same support for Georgia and for Georgia's sovereignty as his predecessor had. Just as President Saakashvili and his successor will have similar positions towards Russia and towards the United States. But in all cases, tone and style matter.

It was very interesting when those arrests occurred a couple of weeks ago in Georgia, of which we haven't heard anything more, and then the US sent someone to meet with Nino Burdzhanadze and Irakli Alasania to say that we still believe that these people can contribute to the democratization of Georgia. That's not the message that the Georgian government wanted from the West.

And that tells you that this new administration in Washington is sending out a warning that we are still going to support our friends in the Caucasus, in the Middle East, and elsewhere. We are going to take on a style oriented towards problem solving and bringing people together, rather than rhetoric and polarization. And I think that in this vein we can help to do that, but for brokering a deal between Putin and Saakashvili to be the high priority for Obama - I doubt this.

Q: The Russian foreign minister has accused Georgia of preparing new acts of provocation along the borders with South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Do you think Saakashvili could try to drive public attention away from internal problems by waging a new war there?

A: If you asked me that question three months ago I'd said I had a real concern of this. Every day I have less concern. Not to say that it's impossible.

It would be terrible for Georgia and terrible for the United States.

But I think that right now what we're seeing in Tbilisi this week and the last few months is that no one is going to fall for that kind of ‘Wag the Dog' scenario. No one is going to fall for it. They're unlikely to do that, and that speaks for the sophistication of the Georgian people. And I would suspect that the president of Georgia and the leadership of Georgia understand that.

On the other hand, further Russian aggression can't go unanswered. So I think - is it possible that Russia could provoke Georgia again, seeing its weakness? I think that in the long run that would be a really bad mistake for Russia. I think Russia overplayed their hand in this war in August, and lost a lot of support.

I think that we have a chance that at least for now the chance of re-escalating that conflict is less then it was three months ago.

Russia has its own domestic problems, which tend to be more economic than political in nature, but the two are always interrelated.

Things depend on how deep the economic downturn becomes. It's had a very strong affect on Russia, so who knows what Medvedev's government might need to do to stay in power. But I don't think we're there yet.

Q: What do you mean by ‘further Russian aggression'? In practical terms, Russia fulfilled its military goals in repelling the attack on South Ossetia. Do you believe that it wants to advance its troops beyond Abkhazia and South Ossetia?

A: I hope not! But the situation in relations between Georgia and Russia right now is that they're both counseling doing things to upset each other.

So if any provocations occur, you could see the Russian propaganda machine saying this is now a crisis - we have to respond now, and go another few kilometers into Georgia. I think that would be terrible, a big mistake through which Russia would demonstrate to the West that it is simply an aggressive imperialist power again.

And what would be achieved is that all those comments Saakashvili has been making about Russian aggression would become accepted in the West as unquestionable. And this would jeopardize any kind of rapprochement between our two countries.

So, I don't think they will do that. But it's not impossible.

Lincoln Mitchell is Assistant Professor in the Practice of International Politics at Columbia University, and headed the Tbilisi office of the National Democratic Institute during the "Rose Revolution".