Subject: Obama and Russia
Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2008
From: "Vlad Sobell" <Vlad.Sobell@dir.co.uk>
Barack Obama will correct the US policy towards Russia
¡ President-elect Barack Obama is the right person to tackle the economic, foreign policy and moral crisis affecting the United States.
¡ His bi-partisan approach in domestic politics suggests he is determined to overcome the limitations of the rigidly partisan system.
¡ The correction of the dangerously misconceived policy towards Russia, bequeathed to him by President Bush, will feature high on his foreign policy agenda, as its perpetuation risks destabilising entire Europe a key US ally.
¡ Examination of Obama’s political testimony shows that there are no reasons why he should not see eye-to-eye with Russian leaders, especially since both countries’ interests strongly overlap.
¡ We argue that, if presented with undistorted facts, President Obama will override the counsel of his hard-line advisers.
¡ With both countries facing severe economic crisis, the US and Russian leaders will adopt a strictly pragmatic stance.
¡ The cold war against Russia will likely be brought to an end during Obama’s first term.
The terminal crisis of the US-led global system
The election of Barack Obama as the next president of the United States marks a paradigm shift, raising hopes in the US democracy’s capacity to respond to challenges by promoting individuals best suited to tackle them.
President George W. Bush’s departure coincides with a severe economic downturn, triggered by a seizure of the entire financial and banking system and throwing the global economy out of kilter. This is not a run-of-the-mill cyclical event, an unavoidable feature of an otherwise healthy market economy. The US is facing a deep systemic and moral crisis caused by ideology-driven policies and a culture where the nexus between performance and responsibility has been weakened and where financial alchemy has come to be confused with reputable practice.
In external affairs, Washington’s neocon-shaped policies have entangled the US in costly and debilitating quagmires in Iraq and Afghanistan. Its aggressive unilateralism and contempt for international organizations, symbolised by the United Nations, has alienated its allies and divided the US-led Atlantic alliance. Although this has been done under the banner of the “war on terror”, the misconceived policies have failed to deliver decisive results in the containment of terrorism and rogue states. Perhaps nothing symbolises this better than the persistent spawning of terrorism in the failing state of Pakistan, a nominal US ally, and the failure to capture Osama bin Laden believed to be hiding in NATO-occupied Afghanistan.
The United States is facing a deep recession and a crushing emerging markets-style government debt and fiscal deficit that will take a decade to bring under control. When the dust has settled the US will no longer be the pre-eminent global power, a position it has occupied since the middle of the last century. This is not merely because its economy and military will be weaker relative to Europe, Japan and the emerging economies (most important China); nor is it because the US dollar will no longer be the dominant reserve currency. Above all, America will have lost its claims to uncontested leadership, as trust in its capacity to set universal standards will have been irrevocably lost.
The Obama revolution
Against this dismal picture, the arrival of Barack Obama should be seen as a revolutionary event. In virtually all respects, the incoming president is very different from his predecessor. His ethnic background (African father and American mother), the childhood experience of life in Indonesia, a visit to Kenya as a young man and continued links with his relatives there have given him a solid understanding of the complex world beyond America’s shores. A product of very different cultures, Obama is a bona fide cosmopolitan. Yet his community activity and politics in Chicago have kept his feet firmly on American ground.
The modest circumstances of his upbringing and the personal experience of racial prejudice have exposed him to some of the worst ills of American society, while challenging him to respond to them in an intelligent manner, setting standards for everyone to follow. Indeed, his rise to the most powerful and coveted office in the United States has demonstrated this society’s ability to draw on talent, regardless of the ethnic or social class origins of the persons in question. Obama’s election may turn out to be an event that will put the United States back on the map as a society whose standards should be emulated. Under his presidency, America has a chance to some extent recover its claim to moral leadership.
By contrast, President Bush travelled little before assuming the office, with his visit in Europe in June 2001 being a somewhat belated turning point. While benefiting from first-rate education Mr Bush’s privileged background tended to insulate him from the pressures regularly encountered by the likes of Barack Obama. His main challenge seemed to have boiled down to avoiding some of the perilous pitfalls of such charmed existence.
The numerous failures, which have peaked at the time of President Bush’s departure, certainly cannot all be laid only at his door he has merely exacerbated, rather than cured the numerous dysfunctions he inherited. However, his relatively insular upbringing and lack of wider exposure arguably contributed to the ideology- and faith-driven approach to complex domestic and international issues, which has characterised his presidency. Thus, in contrast to his successor, the selection and election of George W. Bush symbolised a system failure one so cataclysmic that it has impacted on the global system as a whole.
Bi-partisanship and multilateralism
Although it tends to be misunderstood, the paradigm shift is already well in evidence. The bi-partisan approach, so strongly signalled by the appointment of Obama’s team, has been greeted by some commentators, mainly at the liberal end of the spectrum, with dismay (although it has been very well received by the public). Such commentators also see it as proof that the new president cannot escape the constraints of a dysfunctional deeply entrenched “system”.
However, under present circumstances, where partisanship and divisions have developed to absurd proportions, inhibiting effective governance and ushering in a systemic crisis, Obama’s bi-partisanship is exactly what the doctor ordered. Far from being a sign that the innovator will be constrained by the system, it is proof that he is managing to escape the shackles, as sterile partisanship is what the system has degenerated into.
Whereas Bush was a divisive figure, Obama’s demonstrable ability to overcome apparently unbridgeable chasms (such as those of race relations) will make him a conciliator and synthesiser. This will lead to a focus on the main issues at hand and the pragmatic solution of problems, instead of the fruitless point scoring engendered by partisanship.
A similar transformation will occur in US conduct in external affairs. We can expect Obama to end the divisive policies of the Bush era, which have aggravated existing sources of instability rather than delivering greater security and peace as promised. As he himself has made clear, he will aim to achieve this mainly by reverting to multilateralism and respect for international law (as is shown below).
President Obama and Russia: removing senseless anomalies
Among the legion of its wrong-headed policies, the Bush-Cheney administration’s stance on Russia was surely one of the most ill-conceived and damaging. Absurdly depicting post-totalitarian Russia as an “autocracy” aiming to re-create a modern version of the Soviet Union, Washington has demonised Vladimir Putin, both in his capacity as president and now as prime minister, preventing much needed all-round co-operation with this key post-Soviet country and former superpower.
Despite the famed good personal relations between Bush and Putin, Washington has relentlessly pressed ahead with policies that Moscow cannot but consider a direct threat to the security of the Russian Federation. Most objectionable of these (from Russia’s point of view) include the enlargement of NATO into the former Soviet Baltic republics, with plans to include Ukraine and Georgia, and the installation of anti-missile facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic.
In August 2008 the anti-Russian campaign culminated in an attack by Georgia a close US ally in the Caucasus on the separatist enclave of South Ossetia, resulting in a massacre of the ethnic Russian population and the killing of a dozen of Russian peacekeepers. Russia’s belated military response was then intentionally misrepresented either as unprovoked Russian aggression (the Western press claimed the war was started by Russia) or a disproportionate response to Georgia’s actions. As if wanting to add insult to injury, instead of censoring and investigating it for suspected war crimes, the West has rewarded the Tbilisi regime with $1bn of “reconstruction” aid, which Russia not without justification, regards as aid for re-armament.
As a result, US-Russian relations have sunk to levels observed only during the worst episodes of the Cold War, if not lower. (Despite the bitterness of the Cold War, both adversaries managed to avoid direct military confrontation, including a confrontation between the Soviet Union and a close US ally.) The fact that US-Russian relations have not been completely severed is entirely due to Moscow’s restraint (which some see as appeasement) as well as relative economic and military weakness, and a pragmatic desire to co-operate with the West.
However, the issue does not concern merely Russia and the consequent US inability to fully co-operate with it on pressing problems of mutual concern. The escalating tensions with Russia threaten to undermine the stability and security of the US’s most important ally Western Europe. The Bush-Cheney policies have created new geo-political and ideological divisions, above all between Russia and (most of) the rest of Europe. Some analysts have gone as far as to raise the spectre of an accidental nuclear standoff, comparable to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.
Simultaneously, Washington’s encouragement of the stridently anti-Russian East European neophytes (especially Poland and the Baltic republics) is dividing the bedrock of European security the Atlantic Alliance. The countries of “Old Europe” (led by Germany, France and Italy) oppose the neophyte-Washington axis; and the more aggressive the axis gets, the more disunited and hence weaker the NATO alliance will grow.
Given these alarming trends, we believe that despite his formal adherence to a tough line against Russia (see next section) the incoming president will work to swiftly wind down this senseless confrontation. This in turn will lead to a sea change in the Russo-Western relationship and an improvement in Europe’s security. Georgia and Ukraine may well enter NATO in the long run, but the new regime in Washington would likely seek an accommodation with Moscow before going ahead. (Most likely this would be preceded by the accession of less stridently anti-Russian regimes in Kiev and Tbilisi.)
The missile defences will likely be scrapped (or postponed for an indefinite period, or pursued jointly with Russia), as Obama is known to have little faith in the ability of this costly project to actually deliver tangible security benefits. (He made his views to this effect sufficiently clear during the election campaign.)
By the same token, we can anticipate that Obama will take seriously Moscow’s proposals for new security architecture in Europe, thus far dismissed by Western establishments as a long-standing ploy to separate Europe from the US. The notion that Russia wants to pursue such a former Soviet goal is, of course, another corrosive misinterpretation of the facts.
The sceptics’ arguments examined
These predictions will certainly be met with derision by the sceptics. They will point to Obama’s hostile rhetoric during the election campaign, the appointment of Hilary Clinton (no friend of Putin) as his Secretary of State and the expectations that his advisers will include the most strident critics of Russia, such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, along with a like-minded younger guard. The latter seem to have failed to realise that the USSR no longer exists.
Indeed, Obama’s election campaign remarks on Russia differed little from those of his Republican opponent, John McCain, a strident Cold War warrior who is blind to the differences between modern Russia and the Soviet Union. Obama has said he believes that Russia is displaying neo-imperialist tendencies and that its power needs to be checked.
In his political testament he notes that the United States must continue to provide a nuclear umbrella for Europe and play the role of the “world’s reluctant sheriff”, as long as rogue nations attack others and as long as militarily strong Russia and China “have not fully rid themselves of the instincts to throw their weight around”. His most recent signal to the Russian leaders, delivered after his election on 8th December, went as follows: “We also have to send a clear message that [the Russian leaders] have to act in ways that are not bullying their neighbours”.
Indeed, if America’s new president were to adhere to this assessment and act on it, serious tensions with Russia would persist, if not deepen.
However, the notion that Obama would rigidly stick to this line does not stand up to scrutiny. Being a pragmatist and being faced with the host of urgent problems including those of Russia-US relations, Obama will tackle these relations head on. Pursuing a senseless confrontation with Russia at a time when the US economy is collapsing and its military overstretched would be a severe case of misplaced priorities. Doing so on the counsel of discredited political figures in Georgia, Ukraine or Poland would be foolhardy. After the US’s dismal experience in Iraq he is very unlikely to repeat a situation in which the “tail is wagging the dog”, with America having to foot the bill with massive human and material losses.
Furthermore, as noted above, Obama has expressed a strong commitment to the multilateral approach in foreign affairs, the building of alliances and support for the United Nations. An alliance with Russia rather than a new cold war would yield significant dividends for the US in Afghanistan, Iran, weapons proliferation and control of terrorism.
Ideological convergence: external affairs…
A closer examination of Obama’s political philosophy reveals a surprising convergence with the basic tenets of the Putin regime’s ideology and strategic thinking.
Let’s first turn to the Moscow’s preoccupation with what it sees as America’s desire to set itself up not only as the global arbiter but also as the enforcer of unilaterally interpreted rules that everyone is obliged to accept. This usually goes under the heading of Russia’s rejection of the uni-polar and its advocacy of a multi-polar global system. Russia also bristles at what it sees as “double standards” one set of rules that applies to US and Western conduct in general and another to Russia.
Obama’s views on America’s role in the world show that he eschews isolationism and believes that the US is bound, as it were by default, to act as the pre-eminent power for a long time to come. However, he also argues forcefully that the American primus inter pares must strictly observe the rules, which it wants other countries to follow. Thus he writes:
Why conduct ourselves in this way? Because nobody benefits more than we do from the observance of international “rules of the road”. We can’t win converts to those rules if we act as if they apply to everyone but us. When the world’s sole superpower willingly restrains its power and abides by internationally agreed-upon standards of conduct, it sends a message that these are rules worth following, and robs terrorists and dictators of the argument that these rules are simply tools of American imperialism.
Obama also argues that the only area where the US can legitimately act unilaterally is the improvement of its own democracy and institutions, leading, as it were, by example rather than lecturing.
This amounts to an explicit rejection of the uni-polarist thinking. If such principles were to be enshrined in President Obama’s foreign policy, there would be no insurmountable barrier to cooperation between Russia and the United States.
It is significant that Obama explicitly rejects the central tenet of the neocon ideology, namely the idea that the US should promote democracy at the barrel of the gun. He argues that there are few examples in history where freedom was delivered through outside intervention and that most cases of successful liberation were the result of a local awakening. The implication here is that, instead of invading Iraq, the US should have confined its efforts to the encouragement of and practical aid to the opposition.
…and democracy
Putin and his associates have been regularly accused of anti-democratic practices. However, rather than being contemptuous of democracy, the regime is simply opposed to sterile debates and destructive personality-based duels, which fail to address the pressing problems at hand. This is a luxury that post-totalitarian Russia, still decimated by communism, simply cannot afford.
The example of Ukraine, which has been driven to the precipice by such politics (but which until recently was celebrated in the West as a model new democracy), tends to be cited in Russia as a case in point. Putin’s political style has bred consensus, rather than discord; and his regime has been effective, having averted a disintegration of the Federation following the economic collapse in the 1990s. (Moreover, it is coping reasonably well with the unfolding global crisis.)
Barack Obama’s complaints about the dire state of American democracy are in harmony with the Putin regime’s thinking. He despairs of the prevailing environment in the US, in which the search for consensus is cast as the surrender of political, if not moral, integrity and where decisions cannot be made because of petty often personality-based conflicts. And he rails against the rigidly partisan tactics, which, instead of solving problems, elevate blind allegiance to one’s political clan as the supreme goal.
Not least important, Obama appears to share the Russian regime’s view (which its critics would see as highly controversial) that meaningful democracy can materialise only if it is preceded by economic development. To this effect he writes:
For half of the world’s population, roughly three billion people around the world living on less than two dollars a day, an election is at best a means, not the end; a starting point, not deliverance. These people are looking less for an “electocracy” than for the basic elements that for most of us define a decent life food, shelter, electricity, basic health care, education for their children, and the ability to make their way through life without having to endure corruption, violence or arbitrary power.
Obama cannot afford to tolerate the prevailing analytical fog
This analysis does not claim to be the definitive examination of Barack Obama’s views on foreign policy and on how the US should deal with Russia. Nevertheless, since it focuses on several tenets of the incoming president’s political philosophy, it can claim to serve as a rough and ready benchmark.
We strongly believe that he will act swiftly to end the malaise that has driven the US and Russia towards ever more bitter confrontation. We also expect this to be accomplished by the end of his first term.
Most of the “evidence” supporting the mis-interpretation of Russia which Obama himself has embraced comes from unreliable sources. These include the institutionally biased Washington think tanks (most of which were set up during the Cold War and whose existence depends on outdated thinking), defence and foreign policy establishments, organisations such as NATO (which equally have strong vested interest in persisting tensions) and assorted neophyte politicians, such as the now discredited Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili.
The United States has been badly burned by placing too much store on evidence about Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction and by acting on the advice of self-serving opponents of his regime. It is difficult to believe that the new president would be foolish enough to let the US fall once again into such a trap, thus needlessly pushing it into a conflict with Russia and throwing Europe into turmoil. He is more likely to listen to wiser counsels, including those coming from Old Europe, and ignore the advice of the hard-liners. Just as he is cutting loose from bi-partisan domestic politics, so he will likely unshackle Washington’s policy on Russia from the limitations bequeathed to him by his predecessor.