From: GORDON HAHN <gordon-hahn@sbcglobal.net>
Subject: Response to Georgi Stutua in JRL #174
Date: Thu, 25 Sep 2008
On why I called the war "Georgian" in the title:
Nothing to worry about here. The war occurred in Georgia, so I call it the Georgian war. Elsewhere I have called it the Ossetian, South Ossetian, Russo-Georgian war, and the Georgian-Russian war.
On why I omitted the information from the September 26 New York Times article: I finished the first draft of the timeline before September 16th. I have other things to do. If someone would like to get me a new job covering the Caucasus to exclusion of teaching, running a terrorism database, and much else, then I will be pleased. Unfortunately, such positions in the U.S. go only to people with an anti-Russian bent to one degree or another.
On why the Kremlin allegedly took no diplomatic action: The Russians proposed a UN Security Council resolution on the cessation of the use force on August 7 which was rejected by the Western members. Moscow repreatedly warned in public statements that the Georgians were violating the ceasefire by among other things concentrating forces inside the conflict zone and near it and firing on Tskhinvali and surrounding villages for weeks before the conflict. Russia also arranged a meeting of the parties in Tskhinvali, which was aborted for as yet unclear reasons. The Russian side claims the car of the delegate to the Joint Control Commission had a flat tire on the way to the meeting. Moscow repreatedly called for a resumption of the JCC talks in the weeks leading up to the war and even offered to host one in Moscow, but the Georgians insisted on bilateral talks with the Ossetians, until the last days. Most or all of this is in the longer chronology, which is both military-political and diplomatic and which I offered to readers of JRL if they contact me. A version of the longer version will appear at some point on the CCI site/blog www.russiaotherpointsofview.com.
My own view is that there is blame to go around - to the Georgians, Russians, the U.S. and its allies (Ukraine comes to mind first - see yesterday's data from Patrick Armstrong on the arms "sales" from Kiev to Tbilisi likely facilitated by Washington), and the breakaway regions. Unfortunately, the Western media and think tank circles insist on focusing and digging up evidence to prove only Russia's part in the this tragedy.
I do not quite understand his equating Der Spiegel and Pravda.
On the concentration of Georgian forces that surely should have seen the Georgians' concentration of forces: Yes, they did and they pointed to it several times, as did the Ossetians in the runup to the war. I am also sure Western intelligence and military sources had it as well. Where was their urgency, in particlular, at the UN on August 7? Yet on August 5, NATO denied they had any info on such a concentration of Georgian forces.
As I have suggested elsewhere, I believe this was a mutual game of chicken and provocation played by at least the Georgian, Ossetian, and the Russian sides. The U.S. perhaps also played in this game, though it's still not clear to me yet. Certainly the U.S. carries some of the responsibility for the war because of its policy of NATO expansion, its courtship of Georgia and providing a 'krisha' for Tbilisi while it rejected a no use of force agreement and amassed weapons. Georgia's democracy appears to have gone to war on the basis of a decision taken by Saakashvili without any legislative oversight; a major cause of wars, according to 'democratic peace' theory, which posits that authoritarian and democratizing semi-authoritarian states are more likely to go to war than consolidated democracies because of the lack of legislative and public checks on the executive's war powers. This theory is popular within the Washington consensus and among those like Sec of State Rice, but somehow the details got lost in trumpeting the need to expand democracy as fast as you can everywehere and at all times and the attendant policy of isolating those who are perceived as resisting and simultaneously incapable of damaging American/Western interests.
That said, It would be nice to see Moscow accomplish some (and then some) of what Saakashvili achieved in the area of MVD/police reform and fighting corruption.
In sum, the desire to stare the other side down first likely explains each side's failure to get serious about diplomacy. Where many find a Russian or Georgian or U.S. conspiracy, I see an accident waiting to happen with the road greased by multilateral incompetence, negligence, carelessness, excessive ambition, and brinksmanship.