Date: Sat, 20 Sep 2008 11:15:19 -0700 (PDT)
From: "Robert W. Schaefer" <robert.schaefer@post.harvard.edu>
Subject: Some truths regarding Georgia
A few thoughts regarding the exchange between LTC Hamilton, and Professors Hewitt and Hahn.
First, in the interest of full disclosure, I must say that I do not know, nor have I ever met any of the above participants. My purpose for writing is to dispel some inaccuracies and perhaps shed some light.
Why should you listen to me? Because I'm the horse, and you're going to hear the truth straight from my mouth.
I personally conceived, planned, and developed the blocks of instruction on counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations and planning for the Georgian Armed Forces and the Georgian government for the Georgian Train and Equip Program (GTEP) in 2002. Moreover, in the larger scheme, I was one of two "Program of Instruction Meisters" for the mission; my responsibility was compiling and finalizing all the combat training that each battalion received. As such, I was included in most of the high-level planning and most meetings with representatives from all areas of the USG regarding that operation. Moreover, as the only Green Beret of the original 18 on the ground that spoke Russian, I was also included in most high-level meetings with the Georgian government -- if only to ensure that the translators were doing their jobs properly.
Having established my bona-fides, let me state a few facts.
#1. Let me say unequivocally that the counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism training that I developed (with assistance from the JFK Special Warfare Center) was not designed for, nor could it be used in the manner suggested by some. The biggest problem with counterinsurgency (COIN) and counter-terrorism (CT) operations is that most people don't understand them -- sadly, this extends to government officials and many military personnel as well. Being intelligent, educated and well-read does not qualify one to be conversant in COIN, and unless one specifically studies COIN, I would suggest that one is not even qualified to weigh in on the discussion. COIN is different from other types of warfare and it requires a completely different skill set and way of thinking. I don't even consider myself to be an expert and I've spent more than 20 years immersed in it one way or the other.
Here's an interesting fact -- the original plan for the GTEP did not call for a block of instruction on COIN and CT because there were concerns that it might be considered provocative. However, I personally lobbied my commander to include a basic block of instruction on COIN and CT operations as part of the training because I felt it necessary to explain to the government of Georgia how important government action is in COIN and CT operations. What was my reward for suggesting this brilliant idea? I got to write it.
Although it is a relatively well-accepted fact today, in 2002, the idea that the military could not be the lead agency in COIN operations was not widely accepted except by those of us in the Special Forces community who do that kind of thing for a living. So the COIN and CT training that was provided was designed specifically to explain, at a basic level, how the interplay of the elements of National Power were used to design a broad government (not military) policy to address the legitimate concerns of the population and thus reduce instability.
In other words -- and I can not say this more plainly -- the COIN and CT blocks of instruction that I wrote and that were presented to the Georgians were specifically designed to demonstrate to them that military action was not the answer and that the only way to achieve lasting security was to integrate economic, diplomatic and informational efforts within a secure environment (which would be provided by the military). This training was designed exclusively to deal with the situation in the Pankisi Gorge. However, if the Georgians were to have taken the COIN training that I wrote and applied it to the current situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, then they would have done things differently.
Therefore I must respectfully tell Dr. Hahn that he is wrong when he states there was an element of recklessness to the GTEP. Although I know that Dr. Hahn could not have been privy to the exact training that was provided, a quick review of basic counterinsurgency tactics would show that most are relatively mundane and are security-related, while the more aggressive elements like "clear, hold, build" were not part of the program and could not then, have been used against the South Ossetians.
As for training snipers -- every military force in the world must have some well-trained snipers as part of a basic defense force. Snipers are a basic building block of any military force, there is nothing exotic about them and their presence in no way indicates any kind of special, COIN or CT operation. Paradoxically, if one truly understands COIN operations, then one understands that when combating an insurgency, a battalion of engineers is more useful than a battalion of snipers (although I'm sure all the snipers in the audience will take umbrage at that).
#2. Any insinuation that the training provided to the Georgians was somehow covertly designed to be used against the Abkhaz and the South Ossetians is patently false. It is entirely reasonable to think that the basic combat training that we provided to the battalions could be used in other operations. Unfortunately, there is no way to prevent that -- but not because we didn't try. Our guiding principle and the thing that was drilled into our heads every day was how important it was that we did not give the Russians any reason to not welcome our involvement -- so anything that could have possibly been construed in that light was cut from the program.
You have to remember that, at the time, the Russians were making incursions into Georgian territory to get at the insurgents and terrorists using the Pankisi Gorge as a sanctuary. In an effort to stabilize the situation in the Caucasus and to help the Russians, we provided training and basic necessities so that the Georgians could take care of their own problem with insurgents and terrorists using their territory as a sanctuary. If Pakistan were to do today what the Georgians did then, then we would be very appreciative of the effort. The Russians, unfortunately, were not. I have my own views as to why that is, but I am only dealing with facts in this posting so I will leave my analysis and conjecture out of the picture. However, on a personal level, as someone who has worked very closely with some of the best Russian units around and as the first American officer to have been officially awarded the Russian Officer Master Class decoration for my work with the desantniki, I was very disappointed that our efforts to help the Russians did not result in closer cooperation between our governments because that was our intent: any insinuation or claim to the contrary is false.
One could claim that the GTEP was somehow part of a larger geopolitical game to destabilize the region, or -- as was actually the case -- one could remember the geopolitical situation at the time when Presidents Bush and Putin were on very friendly terms and the GTEP was launched as the first major offensive as part of Operation Enduring Freedom in the Global War on Terrorism. We were all chummy with the Russians at the time, remember? The cold war was over, it was a new era of cooperation, remember? All you analysts were afraid you'd be marginalized and out of a job because Russia was no longer important, remember? The GTEP was launched to stabilize, not the other way around -- you have it from the horse's mouth. One could say that I young and stupid and idealistic and blind to the larger forces manipulating me for their own larger game -- and you might be right. However, I'm still the guy that sat down and wrote the counterinsurgency training and there wasn't some strange guy in an overcoat and sunglasses looking over my shoulder and telling me what to write. And as the single and ultimate source on this matter, I'm telling you that what was presented to the Georgians was aimed at stabilization and helping the Russians.
#3. Some general information for the readership, and why, although I have never met him, I would be inclined to listen to LTC Hamilton. I'm sure that someone will accuse me of sticking up for my fellow officer, but that is really not the case. I truly believe that most people, being unfamiliar with U.S. Embassy operations, have no idea what kind of information LTC Hamilton would have access to. The specifics, of course, would be classified, but in general, the readership should know that LTC Hamilton, by virtue of his position as the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) Chief in Georgia, was an extremely powerful and influential man and if anyone would know the facts about US involvement over the past few years, it would be him. Although no one dares to say it out loud, depending on the country, the ODC Chief is arguably as influential as the Ambassador because the ODC Chief is the "candy man," the person who controls millions (sometimes billions) of US dollars going to a country. I'll let you think about the implications of that yourself.
Moreover, I must respectfully tell Dr. Hahn that he is dead wrong if he says that information that LTC Hamilton uses from the U.S. Embassy about the events of August 8th would only be coming from the Georgians and should therefore be discounted. No Embassy in the world, U.S. or otherwise, relies solely on the host country for information and to even suggest that the U.S. Country Team in Georgia was not constantly in contact with Washington, and that Washington was not pinging our own intelligence assets for independent information suggests either a momentary oversight or a fundamental lack of knowledge about how the system works.
In short, I'm sure LTC Hamilton has his own opinions about events that he did not personally observe on August 7/8 and as we like to say in the Army, "opinions are like ********, everyone has one and they all stink." Feel free to hurl invectives at LTC Hamilton for his opinions.
However, when it comes to discussing US policy (and intent), training, and funds provided to the Georgians over the past few years, given LTC Hamilton's unmatched placement and access (at least as far as this discussion is concerned), I for one would be inclined to take notes when he speaks. Undoubtedly, that is because I have the luxury of understanding the system in which he worked and most of you probably do not. So in the interests of using the best possible sources for our information and for the benefit of the larger discussion, I'm letting you know, in his particular realm, LTC Hamilton is the horse.
While I'm busy throwing metaphors around, I'll end by saying I have no dog in this fight. I hope I dispelled some misunderstandings.
Very Respectfully,
Major (P) Robert W. Schaefer
United States Army Special Forces
Eurasian Foreign Area Officer.