Russia Profile
September 16, 2008
Reassessing the Damage
Russia Was Too Swift to Recognize the Independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia
Comment by Vladimir Frolov
It is natural for any nation to rally around the flag at a time of war, and to support the troops and the commander in chief. During the conflict with Georgia, Russians did exactly that. Democracies, however, have a healthy practice of going back and reviewing the way their leaders behaved in the face of animosity.
A month after the war erupted on August 8, the time has come for a rational analysis of what happened, and whether there might have been a better strategy for Russia in dealing with this crisis. Was Russia prepared for a war with Georgia?
The basic answer to this question is “yes.” The Russian political and military leadership clearly anticipated the crisis. It was hard not to. The writing had been on the wall since Mikheil Saakashvili’s election as Georgia’s president in January of 2004. The first attempt to seize South Ossetia came, and failed, in the summer of 2004. Since Saakashvili’s second election in January 2008, when his support rating dropped by 40 percent, it became clear that he would jump sooner rather than later.
It was not, however, clear where he would attack first in Abkhazia or in South Ossetia. For a while it looked like Abkhazia was a more likely target, with Georgian forces moving into the Khodori Gorge and flying reconnaissance drones over Abkhazia to spot targets.
Russia quickly deployed additional peacekeeping forces to Abkhazia (but stayed within the allowed 3,000 limit), as well as railway construction troops to upgrade the railroad linking Abkhazia with Russia.
Washington claims that this was a direct provocation (just like shooting down a Georgian drone) intended to facilitate the movement of Russian forces into Abkhazia later in August. It may, of course, look this way. But it also seems like a prudent and necessary precaution on the part of Russia when the Georgian invasion appeared imminent. Should a war erupt, a railway is essential for quickly delivering reinforcements and supplies.
The same could be said of Russia’s decision to send fighter-bombers, and publicly announce it, into Georgia’s airspace in early July, when skirmishes between Georgia and South Ossetia began to get out of hand.
Much has been made by the West of the fact that Russia had forces pre-deployed in staging areas on the border with South Ossetia and Abkhazia. That, again, was a measure of prudent preparation if a war is believed to be likely or even imminent, you need to move forces to the theatre quickly. Russia did not conceal this fact, and announced a major military exercise in the region - “Kavkaz-2008” - as a measure of deterrence. “Don’t even think about it,” the Kremlin signaled to Saakashvili.
In short, Russia took preparatory military steps and was ready for the war. The Kremlin acted responsibly and deserves praise for this.
Was Russia justified in its military response to the Georgian attack?
No question about it. It was the only right thing to do. Blood was spilled. Georgia attacked first. Russian peacekeepers and civilians were killed. Not to roll back Saakashvili’s army would have taken a heavier political toll on Russia and the Russian leadership than staying neutral. Going wobbly on South Ossetia would have fatally undermined the Kremlin’s credibility in North Ossetia, Chechnya, and throughout the rest of the Caucasus.
Was Russia right to use overwhelming force?
Definitely so. When you go to war, you go to win, and have to make sure that your forces enjoy clear superiority on the battlefield. It’s the “Powell Doctrine.” The United States always does that when it goes to war. We do not analyze the military aspects of the Russian operation (this is meant for a purely professional discussion), just the political decisions. And the decision to use a large contingent of forces, including the air force and the navy, was the right one it helped achieve the objectives quickly and minimize casualties.
Was it right to go deep into Georgia and to destroy the Georgian military infrastructure?
Again, yes. You do everything necessary to win and destroy the enemy’s forces and his capability to wage war again. There were Georgian bases with heavy equipment, including long-range artillery and tanks, at Gori and Senaki, and there were combat ships, including guided missile boats at Poti. They were either seized or destroyed. The civilian port of Poti, including the oil terminals, was left intact. An extended security zone outside the borders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia had to be established and controlled by Russian forces to put civilian targets out of the Georgian artillery’s range. Until international (most likely the EU) monitors can be sent to this extended security zone, Russian forces have to be there.
There were some disquieting signs that Russian military commanders were prepared to go further and even march on Tbilisi. The Kremlin quickly brought them to their senses and stopped the operation exactly where it should have been halted.
Was a “regime change” in Tbilisi Moscow’s objective during the war?
The answer is no. The Kremlin never thought of bombing and storming Tbilisi and deposing Saakashvili. That would have meant too many casualties, and would have been counterproductive to Russia’s long-term strategy to win over the Georgian people.
If a regime change has been on the cards, Saakashvili would have been a target, his bunker would have been bombed, and Georgia’s television would have been taken off the air in the first hours of the war. This is exactly what the United States did in Iraq and in Yugoslavia. In fact, the United States and NATO bombed Yugoslavia for 78 days, specifically targeting civilian infrastructure bridges, power plants, TV stations to incur pain and suffering on the population, so that it would rise up against the government of Slobodan Milosevic. Nothing of the sort was attempted by Russia.
A regime change in Tbilisi might well be Russia’s strategic political objective; hence Moscow’s refusal to deal with the “political corpse” of Saakashvili, but it was not the objective of this war.
Was Russia justified to claim genocide of Ossetians by Saakashvili’s regime?
The claim was exaggerated in the smoke of war. Undoubtedly, Georgian forces indiscriminately fired at civilian targets in South Ossetia using heavy artillery to bomb the cities of Tskhinvali and Jaba. Notoriously inaccurate Grad multiple rocket launch systems were widely used on soft targets, killing many civilians.
However, Russia rushed to pronounce the civilian casualty count of 2,000 in the first days of the war. That claim was never backed up by evidence. The Russian military investigators documented 133 civilian deaths, and Human Rights Watch fewer than 100.
This is still a very heavy death toll, and clear proof of the fact that the Georgian military committed war crimes in their assault on South Ossetia. This makes Saakashvili, as the commander in chief who gave the order, a war criminal as well. But it does not amount to a genocide, which is defined as a long term, systematic killing of a certain group of people based on ethnicity.
Was Russia right to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states right after the war?
My answer to this one is “no.” There was no rush to do it. The political cost for Russia has so far been too high to justify the action.
It is true that just like Kosovo Albanians, Abkhazians and South Ossetians would never again live in a single state with Georgians. Blood is thicker than water. It is unimaginable that the international community would ever be able to make them change their minds.
But here is a case where the process matters just as much as the end result. Kosovo was under UN administration for nine years, and there were multiple rounds of UN and the EU-sponsored final status talks between Belgrade and Pristina to no avail. There was a UNSC sponsored Ahtisaari plan that was to be voted on at the UN, had Russia not indicated that it would veto it. The process exhausted itself. The way for unilateral recognition was opened.
It was possible and desirable to go through at least some of these motions, and the Dmitry Medvedev-Nicolas Sarkozy cease-fire agreement, which did not even mention Georgia’s territorial integrity and referred to the need for an international process to determine South Ossetia’s future, clearly envisaged such a possibility.
Perhaps, there might have been compelling reasons to hasten the recognition that we cannot talk about, like securing a legal basis for stationing substantial Russian forces in the two republics that could not be covered by a peacekeeping mandate. I do not know. It does not look this way.
But it certainly looks like we might have avoided much international criticism had we moved slower on the independence issue. Perhaps, the planned talks in Geneva in mid-October will make up for a political process leading to wider recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. We shall see.
All in all, the Russian leadership acted competently in the run up and during the crisis (if you discount the lost information war). The strategy to roll back Saakashvili’s aggression was right and was feasible. It was on the recognition issue that a better strategy was clearly available. We need to ask the Russian leaders why they did not choose it.