Russia Profile
www.russiaprofile.org
July 22, 2008
Similar, But Different
Radical Islam is the universal challenge in Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan
Comment by Sergey Markedonov
Sergey Markedonov, PhD, is the head of the Interethnic Relations Department at Moscow’s Institute of Political and Military Analysis.
The Northern Caucasus today has diverse problems that are impossible to solve “using the same measure.” However, as this region “awakens” and bears witness to an increase of protesting attitudes, the Caucasus, more than ever before, needs a comprehensive Russian strategy of development.
Despite multiple reports about the stabilization of the situation in the Russian Caucasus, the number of problems in this region does not decrease on a daily basis. On July 10, during the enlarged session of the Board of Dagestan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), a decision was made to extend the regime of counter-terrorism operations in the republic’s Untsukul district until November 1. This operation was started on December 15, 2007, which means that by this November it will have lasted for almost a year, and it might even be extended once again.
On the same day, a press-conference entitled “The increase in violence and lawlessness in Ingushetia – whose fault is it?” was held in Moscow. The head of the organizing committee of the Nationwide Ingush Meeting (this is not a one-time public act, but a protesting body of the republic’s opposition) Magomed Khazbiyev did not stop at simply answering this eternal Russian question. He suggested his own vision on the issue of “What to do?” According to Khazbiyev, an appeal will soon be sent on behalf of all Ingushetia residents addressed to President Dmitry Medvedev, with a request to remove the current head of the republic Murat Zyazikov. The appeal will suggest an alternative to the current president of Ingushetia, in the person of Ruslan Aushev. It is worth reminding ourselves that, in May of this year, representatives of the Ingush opposition came out with an initiative to collect signatures in support of bringing Ingushetia’s first president Ruslan Aushev back to power. In early July the signature collection campaign was concluded. A total of 105,000 signatures was collected. Out of this figure, 80,000 signatures were delivered to Moscow, while the remaining 25,000, according to Khazbiyev, were confiscated by MVD officers from one of the activists of the opposition movement. However, even 80,000 signatures for a republic with an area of 4.3 thousand square kilometers and a population of 468,900 people is a very impressive number.
In Chechnya, things are also far from being as calm and peaceful as we would like them to be (and there is no irony in this statement). On July 13, a car with two police officers was attacked in the Grozny district of the republic; one high-ranking officer of the Russian MVD was wounded. Two days before that, on July 11, a powerful landmine was exploded on the route of the convoy of internal forces of Russia’s MVD. On July 3, servicemen from Russia’s Ministry of Defense were attacked by militants in the Vedeno district. On June 29, the building of the territorial police department came under fire in the village of Elistanzhi. Some people were wounded, some were killed.
On July 10, the President of Dagestan Mukhu Aliyev spoke at the session of the National Assembly of Dagestan. In his speech, he gave special mention to the unsatisfactory work of the MVD: “Illegal business cannot go unpunished for so many years, without some type of patronage from the law-enforcement authorities, and primarily from the police. Such a situation cannot continue in the towns and districts unless the heads of municipal authorities are in on the act with the ‘shady businessmen’. We must put an end to the operating of such corruption schemes…” No argument here: this is an honest and objective analysis! But this is what makes politicians different from political analysts – the former have the resources to power and the legitimacy necessary to overcome negative tendencies.
In this regard, there is a great temptation to look at all these phenomena and events from a single perspective. For example, some say that “the Northern Caucasus” has awakened again! But was it ever really asleep? Was there no ambush in March by the militants in the Chechen village of Alkhazurovo? Was there no counter-terrorism operation in the Dagestan village of Gimry in Untsukul district that has dragged on for months now? Is there no wave of violence in Ingushetia, which has now cemented itself in the region? A stable Caucasus has simply become an image that was often exploited by the authorities and the Russian mass media.
In conditions where the public has no sense of political involvement, with no opportunities for public discussions, there has been no effort to analyze the causes of the new instability or to examine its new driving forces (along with its slogans, ideology and practices). Essentially, a struggle is taking place between two different discourses. One of them can be defined by the scenario that “everything is calm in the Caucasus,” and the other can be described as unrestrained alarmism. The formula “the Caucasus will secede soon” can fit in as well (of course, nobody is talking about any reasonable time-terms for this). Meanwhile, it is very important today to recognize the ways in which the situations in the three Northern Caucasus republics (and in the region as a whole) are similar, but what differences exist between them? After all, the events of explosions or violence by themselves are not reasons in themselves for a “generalized” (stereotyped) understanding of the region under one standard.
It is possible to mention some common challenges, as well as some serious differences. The universal challenge everywhere (in Chechnya, in Ingushetia and in Dagestan) is radical Islam (which is not one and whole – it is built on a network principle, not on a vertical one). Separatist ideas were never in popular demand in Ingushetia or Dagestan, and in Chechnya the “Ichkerian idea” ended up rejected by yesterday’s separatists themselves.
On October 7, 2007, Doku Umarov, one of the Chechen separatist leaders, who was considered as “the President of Chechen Republic of Ichkeria” until that time, made a public statement, in which he announced a new formation – the Caucasus Emirate. Umarov proclaimed himself as the “Emir of the Caucasus mujahedeen” and called for a worldwide jihad against everyone “who attacked Muslims.” The Ichkerian idea was eventually replaced by the idea of a supra-ethnic Islamist protest. “Freedom of Chechnya” gave way to slogans of “Islamic solidarity.” This can be explained by both internal and external reasons. The hopes that the West will prefer to continue the “breakdown of the Empire of Evil” were not justified, which is why yesterday’s nationalists now turned to the East. In this regard, it should be noted above all that while no anti-Western motives were present in the slogans of the “Ichkerians,” Doku Umarov declares the Western world as the enemy of “true Muslims.”
All three examples (Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia) are united by a common approach to governing the Northern Caucasus. This approach can be defined as “remote.” What matters most is the outside loyalty of the elites and guarantees that nobody is going to secede. The cost of the matter is the increasing regional particularism, along with the absence of Russian law and state in the region.
However, this is where the differences begin. The republican government in Chechnya is much more organized and consolidated than the ones in Ingushetia or Dagestan. Kadyrov Jr. has his own resource of popularity and support (even despite the periodical attacks from people who are disloyal to the current regime in Grozny). There is no opposition to Kadyrov – except for the forces that exist in the mountains. Many “Ichkerians” are settled quite comfortably in different administration jobs and in police positions (or anywhere in the “law-enforcement bloc” in general, which is not limited to just the police in the Chechen republic). Grozny periodically receives messages of ideological support even from abroad. The “vertical” created by Ramzan does not allow the existence of any kind of systemic opposition. Therefore, the choice is simply this: either to the mountains (and, with it, the ideology of a pan-Caucasian Islamic dissent) or to a budget and personal dependence on the republic’s leading man.
The situation in Ingushetia is different. The authorities do not have a popularity resource that can be compared to what Kadyrov has in Chechnya. The regime there is not seen by the people as their “own.” “All the recent events, starting with the protest meetings at the end of last year and beginning of this year, point to the fact that the local population is strongly anticipating some changes in personnel within the republic’s government. This is so because it is quite obvious that the current authorities do not satisfy the people,” as Ivan Sukhov, columnist for Vremya Novostey newspaper, justly claims. But the opposition is different in Ingushetia too. It is not limited to only radical Islamists. There is also a “loyalist” opposition here – that is, the part of the protest movement that appeals to the Russian authorities and Russian legislation. This opposition group does not support separatist approaches and values of “pure Islam” but prefers peaceful fighting methods to diversionary acts and terrorism. It is worth noting that such a type of opposition is not present in Chechnya at all, while in Dagestan it is not powerful enough to be reckoned with. The secular democratic opposition (the Communist Party, Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces (SPS)) have lost its past influence and has been demoralized (take, for example, last year’s tragic death of Farid Babayev, the leader of the local Yabloko).
In Dagestan any “vertical” is rather problematic. A fragmented society (divided on the principles of ethnicity and different perceptions of Islam) needs a mediator, not a dictator. And although the old 1990s model of a “collective president” (a State Council, made up of representatives of the main fourteen ethnic communities of the republic) was replaced by the model of a presidential republic, this does not change the heart of the matter. Mukhu Aliyev has a certain resource of popularity and significant political influence, but the conglomerate character of the Dagestan society, in the conditions when there’s no clear federal strategy for the republic’s development, defines its own, special rules. In today’s Dagestan, there are three main conflict groups. The first one is the confrontation between “traditional” Islam (Sufi and Tariqat) and Salafism (or Wahhabism, as it is called by the mass media and the republic’s authorities). The second line of schism is ethnic, although today this problem is less manifest than in the early 1990s. And the third group of conflict consists of the Dagestani who live outside of the republic but have certain financial resources and political ambitions, along with the local elite. Objectively speaking, “Dagestan’s domestic emigrants focus their efforts on “opening” the republic. Meanwhile, their ambitions conflict, in some ways subjectively, and in some – objectively, with all levels of the power elite in Dagestan. This elite was formed back in the times of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (and unlike the neighboring republics, it has changed much less). It is used to receiving blank checks from Moscow for “stabilizing the situation” and to not compete with anyone. And while the official government of Dagestan at Makhachkala knows how to combat the ethnic nationalists or religious radicals, it is not very clear what to do with the “new wave” of “domestic emigrants”. Some of them can be integrated into the regime – some, on the contrary, can be distanced. But not many people give serious thought to what the strategy of renewal should be like. At the same time, all of these above-mentioned interests can overlap each other in some way and touch in some areas.
Thus, the Northern Caucasus today has diverse problems that are impossible to solve “using the same measure.” However, the “awakening” of this region, which signifies the increase of protesting attitudes (even if they do have different “hues”), means that the Caucasus, more than ever before, needs a comprehensive strategy of development – a strategy in which the Russian state will be not a dispassionate witness and “expert analyst,” but an organizer of the actual development process.